The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
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“In order to challenge the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge, a party must file written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings and recommendation to which objection is made and the specific basis for objection.” Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed.Appx. 781, 783 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 822 (11th Cir. 1989)) (alterations omitted). The objections must also present “supporting legal authority.” S.D. Fla. L. Mag. J.R. 4(b). The portions of the report and recommendation to which an objection is made are reviewed de novo only if those objections “pinpoint the specific findings that the party disagrees with.” United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). If a party fails to object to any portion of the magistrate judge's report, those portions are reviewed for clear error. Macort, 208 Fed.Appx. at 784 (quoting Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999)); see also Liberty Am. Ins. Grp., Inc. v. WestPoint Underwriters, L.L.C., 199 F.Supp.2d 1271, 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2001). “It is improper for an objecting party to ... submit [ … “In order to challenge the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge, a party must file written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings and recommendation to which objection is made and the specific basis for objection.” Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed.Appx. 781, 783 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 822 (11th Cir. 1989)) (alterations omitted). The objections must also present “supporting legal authority.” S.D. Fla. L. Mag. J.R. 4(b). The portions of the R&R to which an objection is made are reviewed de novo only if those objections “pinpoint the specific findings that the party disagrees with.” United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). If a party fails to object to any portion of the magistrate judge's report, those portions are reviewed for clear error. Macort, 208 Fed.Appx. at 784 (quoting Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999)); see also Liberty Am. Ins. Grp., Inc. v. WestPoint Underwriters, L.L.C., 199 F.Supp.2d 1271, 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2001). “It is improper for an objecting party to ... submit [ ] papers to a district… Some interlocutory district-court rulings, however, are unreviewable after final judgment because they are over come by later developments in the litigation. As Ortiz explains, one such ruling is the denial of summary judgment on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds. 562 U.S., at 184. Factual challenges depend on, well, the facts, which the parties develop and clarify as the case progresses from summary judgment to a jury verdict. Thus, "[o]nce the case proceeds to trial, the full record developed in court supersedes the record existing at the time of the summary-judgment motion." Ibid. So after trial, a district court's assessment of the facts based on the summary-judgment record becomes "ancient history and [is] not subject to appeal." Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 831 F.3d 815, 823-824 (CA7 2016). Fact-dependent appeals must be appraised in light of the complete trial record.To challenge the findings and recommendations of a magistrate judge, a party must file specific written objections identifying the portions of the proposed findings and recommendation to which objection is made. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 822 (11th Cir. 1989); Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed.Appx. 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006). A district court reviews de novo those portions of the report to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). To the extent a party fails to object to parts of the magistrate judge's report, the Court may accept the recommendation so long as there is no clear error on the face of the record. Macort, 208 Fed.Appx. at 784. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, even in the absence of an objection. See LeCroy v. McNeil, 397 Fed.Appx. 554, 556 (11th Cir. 2010); Cooper-Houston v. S. Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 604 (11th Cir. 1994).As an initial matter, the Court observes that Mr. Johnson has not properly objected to the Report because no objection is “specific” as required by Rule 72(b)(2). See Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed.Appx. 781, 783 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that a challenge to a report and recommendation must identify “the specific basis for objection” (quoting Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 822 (11th Cir. 1989))). Instead, he makes general, conclusory objections to the Magistrate Judge's findings. See, e.g., Objections at 1-2 (“At page 34 of the R&R, Plaintiff objects to the finding that the ‘allegations [contained in the complaint] fail to show that Mr. Johnson has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury' associated with Confederate tributes on public land.”); id. at 2 (“At page 34 of the R&R, Plaintiff objects to the finding that ‘Mr. Johnson fails to allege facts sufficient to establish ordinary or taxpayer standing, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, and dismissal is warranted.'”). While Mr. Johnson expresses his disagreement with Judge Barksdale's recommended findings, he fails to explain the basis for his disagreement, and he identifies no legal… To challenge the findings and recommendations of a magistrate judge, a party must file specific written objections identifying the portions of the proposed findings and recommendation to which objection is made. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 822 (11th Cir. 1989); Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed.Appx. 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006). A district court reviews de novo those portions of the report to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). To the extent a party fails to object to parts of the magistrate judge's report, the Court may accept the recommendation so long as there is no clear error on the face of the record. Macort, 208 Fed.Appx. at 784. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, even in the absence of an objection. See LeCroy v. McNeil, 397 Fed.Appx. 554, 556 (11th Cir. 2010); Cooper-Houston v. S. Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 604 (11th Cir. 1994).Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a), the Court may enter a preliminary injunction “to preserve the status quo until the merits of the controversy can be fully and fairly adjudicated.” Ne. Fla. Chapter of Ass'n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1284 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Am. Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, Inc., 483 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1973)). Before a court grants a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must establish four conditions: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a showing that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if an injunction does not issue; (3) proof that the threatened injury to plaintiff outweighs any harm that might result to the defendant; and (4) a showing that the public interest will not be disserved by the granting of a preliminary injunction. See id. at 1284-85 (citing Cunningham v. Adams, 808 F.2d 815, 819 (11th Cir. 1987)). The “[f]ailure to show any of the four factors is fatal” to a motion for a preliminary injunction. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1198 (11th Cir. 2009). Where the government is the opposing party… To challenge the findings and recommendations of a magistrate judge, a party must file specific written objections identifying the portions of the proposed findings and recommendation to which objection is made. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 822 (11th Cir. 1989); Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed.Appx. 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006). A district court reviews de novo those portions of the report to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). To the extent a party fails to object to parts of the magistrate judge's report, the Court may accept the recommendation so long as there is no clear error on the face of the record. Macort, 208 Fed.Appx. at 784. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, even in the absence of an objection. See LeCroy v. McNeil, 397 Fed.Appx. 554, 556 (11th Cir. 2010); Cooper-Houston v. S. Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 604 (11th Cir. 1994).“A district court [however,] may deny a motion to amend on ‘numerous grounds, such as undue delay, undue prejudice to the defendants, and futility of the amendment.'” Kendall v. Thaxton Road LLC, 443 Fed.Appx. 388, 393 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (quoting Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of the Div. of Univs. of the Fla. Dep't of Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003)). “However, leave to amend should only be denied on the ground of futility when the proposed amendment is clearly insufficient or frivolous on its face.” Taylor v. Fla. State Fair Auth., 875 F.Supp. 812, 815 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (finding that denial on the basis of futility is improper where determination of a complex factual inquiry is required); see also Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. ATA Fishville FL, LLC, No. 2:19-cv-297-FtM-38NPM, 2020 WL336246, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2020) (finding arguments opposing amendment were better suited for dispositive motions to permit both sides to fully develop and respond to arguments).“In order to challenge the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge, a party must file written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings and recommendation to which objection is made and the specific basis for objection.” Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed.Appx. 781, 783 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 822 (11th Cir. 1989)) (alterations omitted). The objections must also present “supporting legal authority.” S.D. Fla. L. Mag. J.R. 4(b). The portions of the report and recommendation to which an objection is made are reviewed de novo only if those objections “pinpoint the specific findings that the party disagrees with.” United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). If a party fails to object to any portion of the magistrate judge's report, those portions are reviewed for clear error. Macort, 208 Fed.Appx. at 784 (quoting Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999)); see also Liberty Am. Ins. Grp., Inc. v. WestPoint Underwriters, L.L.C., 199 F.Supp.2d 1271, 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2001). “It is improper for an objecting party to ... submit [ … . . . Id., at 815. . . . Id., at 815. . . .
. . . S. 815, 113th Cong., 1st Sess. . . .
. . . No. 19-815. Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . Monsanto Co. , 467 U.S. 986, 1016-1017, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984) (citing United States v . . . Byrd , 521 U.S. 811, 815, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997) (treating legal obligations of the Government . . .
. . . Coronado Oil & Gas Co. , 285 U.S. 393, 406, 52 S.Ct. 443, 76 L.Ed. 815 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting . . . 199, 168 P.3d 1208 (2007), rev. denied, 345 Ore. 415, 197 P.3d 1104 (2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 815 . . . Oregon , 558 U.S. 815, 130 S.Ct. 52, 175 L.Ed.2d 21 (2009) ; Lee v. . . .
. . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 194, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). . . .
. . . United States , 511 U.S. 809, 815, 114 S.Ct. 1960, 128 L.Ed.2d 797 (1994), Congress must provide a sufficiently . . .
. . . Joyner , 815 F.3d 163, 168 (C.A.4 2016) ("We too have held that 'a change in decisional law subsequent . . .
. . . . § 815(a). . . . Id. at 815-16 (citation and footnote omitted). . . .
. . . Muhammad , 735 F.3d at 815. This court affirmed the denial of the § 2255 motion. . . .
. . . Christensen , 828 F.3d 763, 815 (9th Cir. 2015). . . . Chung , 659 F.3d 815, 833 (9th Cir. 2011) ("Instructions to an individual to do something are ... not . . .
. . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007) ). . . .
. . . Greenpeace, Inc. , 815 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2016). . . .
. . . Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 815, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969), the Court considered a declaratory judgment . . .
. . . Hall , 26 Okla. 815, 110 P. 911, 911 (1910). . . .
. . . PetSmart, Inc., asserting claims under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 . . . practices include any "misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact." 815 . . . See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10b(1). . . .
. . . Avila , 557 F.3d at 815 (quoting United States v. Stigler , 413 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2005) ). . . .
. . . Ct. at 815-16. . . . Ct. at 815-816. The majority's analysis conflates these inquiries. . . . Cisneros , 815 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2016) ); Kinney v. . . . Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) ("Qualified immunity is lost if a case is erroneously permitted . . . Fitzgerald prevents plaintiffs from relying on subjective evidence of bad faith. 457 U.S. 800, 815-16 . . .
. . . Hill , 815 F.3d at 657. . . . Hill , 815 F.3d at 668 ; see also Sheets v. . . . Hill , 815 F.3d at 668 (quotations and alterations omitted). c. . . . Hill , 815 F.3d at 668 ; see also Prager v. Campbell Cty. Mem. . . . Hill , 815 F.3d at 670. . . .
. . . Yost, 479 F.3d 815, 819 (11th Cir. 2007). . . .
. . . Lara , 815 F.3d 605, 613 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Davis , 564 U.S. at 232, 131 S.Ct. 2419 ). . . . See Lara , 815 F.3d at 613 ; see also Wanjiku , 919 F.3d at 485-86 (finding that agents had reasonable . . . Lara , 815 F.3d at 613-14. * * * In sum, the manual searches and the Cellebrite search of Cano's cell . . .
. . . Postal Serv. , 875 F.2d 814, 815 (10th Cir. 1989) ; Percy v. S.F. Gen. . . .
. . . Enomoto , 815 F.2d 1323, 1327 (9th Cir. 1987) (appointment of a special master cannot be appealed under . . .
. . . Shabaz , 579 F.3d 815, 819-820 (7th. Cir 2009). . . .
. . . Glover , 755 F.3d at 815 ; see also Hancock , 844 F.3d at 707-08. A. . . .
. . . Lynch , 815 F.3d 469, 482-83 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Owens, J., concurring) ("A better mousetrap is . . .
. . . Id. at 815 ; see also Jefferson Cty. v. . . . See Papp , 842 F.3d at 815 ("A defendant need not win his case before he can have it removed." . . .
. . . Id. at 815. . . .
. . . Tulsiram , 815 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2016) ("[W]e have no difficulty in reaching our holding today: . . .
. . . Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). United States v. Salean, 583 F.3d 1059, 1060 n.2 (8th Cir. 2009). . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007) requires us to analyze whether there . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 191, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007), when confronted with a similar . . .
. . . Supp. 2d at 815. . . .
. . . See 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. §§ 505/1, 510/1. . . .
. . . Bowen , 815 F.2d 1152, 1155 (7th Cir. 1987) ; Fenix v. . . .
. . . Ct. 808, 815, 190 L. Ed.2d 679 (2015). . . .
. . . Johnson , 624 F.3d 815, 821-22 (7th Cir. 2010). . . .
. . . Alatorre, 863 F.3d 810, 815 (8th Cir. 2017) (protective sweep of four rooms on one floor of residence . . .
. . . Avid Tech., Inc. , 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016). . . .
. . . No. 91-1) (the "'815 Registration")) According to Defendants, "[s]ometime after Defendants' application . . . No. 91-1); '815 Registration (Dkt. . . . No. 91-1); '815 Registration (Dkt. . . . No. 91-1)) The '815 Registration grants Defendants the right to use the WOODSTOCK mark on "cigarette . . . roiling papers" and "lighters for smokers." ('815 Registration (Dkt. . . .
. . . Balmoral Racing Club, Inc. , 831 F.3d 815, 834 (7th Cir. 2016) (approving of a similar instruction); . . .
. . . Illinois's Rate Relief Law as "to deregulat[ing] the electricity market to allow for competition." 815 . . . to switch electricity suppliers through false promises of a teaser rate, which she never received. 815 . . . Court the question whether the Illinois Commerce Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over her claim, 815 . . . Richards stands unrebutted that a public utility is not a relevant comparator in these circumstances. 815 . . .
. . . Blackfin Yacht Corp. , 357 N.J.Super. 418, 815 A.2d 537, 541 (2003) ; see also N.J. Stat. . . .
. . . Fibreboard Corp. , 527 U.S. 815, 846, 119 S.Ct. 2295, 144 L.Ed.2d 715 (1999) (citation omitted); Zenith . . .
. . . Schriro , 882 F.3d 778, 815-16 (9th Cir. 2018) ; Apelt v. . . .
. . . Vill. of Monroe , 815 F. . . .
. . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). . . .
. . . Lynch , 818 F.3d 808, 815 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that Chevron deference applies where "there is 'binding . . .
. . . State , 303 Ga. 853, 815 S.E.2d 903 (2018). . . . whose medical prognosis was not definitive and whose future competency was legally unsettled"); Carr , 815 . . .
. . . Id. at 192, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . Id. at 188, 127 S.Ct. 815. The Court disagreed with that argument. Id. at 190, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . Id. at 192, 127 S.Ct. 815 (emphasis added). . . . Id. at 194-95, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . Almanza-Arenas , 815 F.3d at 489 (Watford, J., concurring). . . .
. . . Taylor , 620 F.3d at 815 (quoting Miera , 539 F.3d at 1236 ). . . .
. . . J.A. 112, 451-52, 485, 707-08, 762, 815. . . .
. . . Plaintiffs' Commencement of Employment with CRST ...815 E. . . .
. . . Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 815) (observing that "[r]evenue rulings are written and reviewed at the same . . .
. . . Jewell , 815 F.3d 544, 554 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting River Runners for Wilderness v. . . . Alaska Oil , 815 F.3d at 554 (internal quotation marks omitted). . . . Alaska Oil , 815 F.3d at 554. * * * In sum, DOJ's use of the two scoring factors is well within its statutory . . .
. . . Groupon, Inc. , 815 F.3d 1331, 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016). . . . Blue Calypso , 815 F.3d at 1339, 1348. . . .
. . . Lee , 232 F.2d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 1956) ; 7 Wright et al. , § 1716. . . .
. . . Joyner , 815 F.3d 163, 168 (4th Cir. 2016). . . .
. . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007) ). . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . 184, 191, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013) (quoting Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815 . . . such a manner, he fails to meet the threshold set forth in Duenas-Alvarez . 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815 . . .
. . . Adams , 815 F.3d 1291, 1292-93 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that, after Johnson , a Florida conviction for . . .
. . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007) ). . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . 184, 191, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013) (quoting Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815 . . . such a manner, he fails to meet the threshold set forth in Duenas-Alvarez . 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815 . . .
. . . Murguia-Rodriguez , 815 F.3d 566, 574 (9th Cir. 2016) ("Without a forfeited error, plain error does not . . .
. . . Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). . . . Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting . . .
. . . M/V Roberta Tabor , 815 F.2d 1037, 1043 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[A]n insurer cannot by way of subrogation recover . . . Roberta Tabor , 815 F.2d at 1045 (emphasis in original). . . . Peavey , 971 F.2d at 1177 ; Roberta Tabor , 815 F.2d at 1044-45 ; Marathon Oil , 786 F.2d at 1302. . . .
. . . Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[P]ublic interest concerns are implicated when a constitutional . . . Id. at 815. . . .
. . . Betz , 815 So. 2d 627, 633 (Fla. 2002) ("As the odor of previously burnt marijuana certainly warranted . . .
. . . expressly abrogated the distinction among principals and aiders and abettors." 549 U.S. 183, 189, 127 S.Ct. 815 . . . Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . principal, within the scope of [the theft offense's] generic definition." 549 U.S. at 189, 127 S.Ct. 815 . . . at 85, 134 S.Ct. 1240 (Alito, J., dissenting) (2014); see Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815 . . .
. . . Blackfin Yacht Corp. , 357 N.J.Super. 418, 815 A.2d 537, 541 (2003) ; see also N.J. Stat. . . .
. . . Id. at 82 (quoting Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815 ). . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007) ). . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . .
. . . Burleson , 815 F.3d 170, 176 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding petitioner actually innocent where he pleaded guilty . . .
. . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). . . .
. . . Shkolnik, 443 Mass. 300, 820 N.E.2d 815, 824 n.17 (2005) (quoting Doe v. New Bedford Hous. . . .
. . . Robinson , 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). . . .
. . . McLane Co., 857 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Ashcroft , 253 F.3d 811, 815 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[R]emoval proceedings commence when the INS files the . . . Ashcroft , 253 F.3d at 815 ; see also Arbaugh v. . . .
. . . Ledyard Nat'l Bank (In re Campbell), 398 B.R. 799, 815 (Bankr. D. . . . Ledyard Nat'l Bank (In re Campbell), 398 B.R. 799, 815 (Bankr. D. . . .
. . . Brown , 250 F.3d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 2001). . . .
. . . Ranjel , 872 F.3d 815, 821 (7th Cir. 2017) (applying similar waiver principles to a challenge to the . . .
. . . Amended Complaint asserts violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 . . .
. . . . ; Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 Ill. Comp. . . .
. . . Id. at 757 ; accord Slatkin , 525 F.3d at 815 ("Although the Johnsons argue that there is a question . . .
. . . Crandall Assoc., Inc. , 815 F.2d 426, 428 (6th Cir. 1987) ("[A] successive motion [must] state new facts . . .
. . . Random House, Inc. , 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002) ). . . .
. . . In Munoz the California Court of Appeal noted that under Government Code § 815, "a public entity is not . . . public entity liable for this type of negligence, no direct liability could be established under section 815 . . . Plaintiffs acknowledge that under California Government Code § 815, "direct tort liability of public . . .
. . . Cricks , 815 A.2d 1063, 1070 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) ; see Coll. Watercolor Grp., Inc. v. William H. . . .
. . . Walsh, 791 F.2d 811, 815 (10th Cir. 1986) (noting that the Supreme Court in Jacobsen held that removing . . .
. . . Monsanto Co. , 467 U.S. 986, 1016, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984) we rejected a takings claim . . . Coronado Oil & Gas Co. , 285 U.S. 393, 406, 52 S.Ct. 443, 76 L.Ed. 815 (1932) (dissenting)). . . . Monsanto Co. , 467 U.S. 986, 1018, n. 21, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984) ). . . . Coronado Oil & Gas Co. , 285 U.S. 393, 406, 52 S.Ct. 443, 76 L.Ed. 815 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting . . .
. . . Ellis, 815 F.3d 419, 422 n.2 (8th Cir. 2016) (reinforcing Bain ); accord United States v. . . .
. . . Sonson, 815 So. 2d 685, 686 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (holding the "trial court properly ratified the general . . .
. . . Supreme Court routinely articulated and insisted on [an] unconstitutional causal nexus test." 813 F.3d at 815 . . .
. . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007) ); see also United States v . . . Id. at 190-94, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . Id. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . outside the generic definition of a crime.' " (quoting Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815 . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). . . . apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition." 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815 . . .
. . . Rep. 815 (K. B. 1726) 1 Leach 134, 168 Eng. Rep. 169 (K. B. 1775). See, e.g. , A. . . . Coronado Oil & Gas Co. , 285 U.S. 393, 406-408, 52 S.Ct. 443, 76 L.Ed. 815 (1932) (dissenting opinion . . . Rep. 815 (K. B. 1726). . . . Rep., at 815. . . .
. . . Orleans , 425 U.S. 807, 815-16, 96 S.Ct. 1971, 48 L.Ed.2d 390 (1976), but such conditions and restrictions . . .
. . . Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 815, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (internal quotation marks and alteration . . .
. . . Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984). . . .
. . . Denny's Rests., Inc. , 117 Wash.2d 426, 435, 815 P.2d 1362 (Wash. 1991) ). . . .
. . . Starks, 815 F.3d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. . . . See, e.g., Starks, 815 F.3d at 441 ; United States v. Mendoza, 341 F.3d 687, 693 (8th Cir. 2003). . . .
. . . Vill. of Wesley Hills , 815 F. Supp. 2d 679, 696-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ; T.S. Haulers, Inc. v. . . . See Mosdos Chofetz Chaim , 815 F. Supp. 2d at 693-97 (collecting cases). . . .
. . . ."); In re Schnabel , 153 B.R. 809, 815 (Bankr. N.D. . . .
. . . Ranjel , 872 F.3d 815, 821-22 (7th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . common law unfair competition; and violation of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 815 . . .
. . . State, 815 So. 2d 657, 660 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), rev'd on other grounds by State v. . . .