The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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To challenge the findings and recommendations of a magistrate judge, a party must file specific written objections identifying the portions of the proposed findings and recommendation to which objection is made. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 822 (11th Cir. 1989); Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed.Appx. 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006). A district court reviews de novo those portions of the report to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). To the extent a party fails to object to parts of the magistrate judge's report, the Court may accept the recommendation so long as there is no clear error on the face of the record. Macort, 208 Fed.Appx. at 784. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, even in the absence of an objection. See LeCroy v. McNeil, 397 Fed.Appx. 554, 556 (11th Cir. 2010); Cooper-Houston v. S. Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 604 (11th Cir. 1994).Further, this interpretation is consistent with the definition of "incur" State Farm advanced in its arguments, which is born from Ceballo v. Citizens Property Insurance Corp., 967 So.2d 811, 815 (Fla. 2007). In Ceballo, the Florida Supreme Court agreed that "'to incur' means to become liable for the expense, but not necessarily to have actually expended it." Id. (emphasis added). At oral argument, State Farm conceded that the definition from Ceballo is essentially indistinguishable from the definition of "incur" in Black's.To challenge the findings and recommendations of a magistrate judge, a party must file specific written objections identifying the portions of the proposed findings and recommendation to which objection is made. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 822 (11th Cir. 1989); Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed.Appx. 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006). A district court reviews de novo those portions of the report to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). To the extent a party fails to object to parts of the magistrate judge's report, the Court may accept the recommendation so long as there is no clear error on the face of the record. Macort, 208 Fed.Appx. at 784. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, even in the absence of an objection. See LeCroy v. McNeil, 397 Fed.Appx. 554, 556 (11th Cir. 2010); Cooper-Houston v. S. Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 604 (11th Cir. 1994).Noshirvan argues the Court should dismiss Garramone's tortious interference claim as well. The elements of tortious interference are “(1) the existence of a business relationship . . . (2) knowledge of the relationship on the part of the defendant; (3) an intentional and unjustified interference with the relationship by the defendant; and (4) damage to the plaintiff as a result of the breach of the relationship.” Ethan Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647 So.2d 812, 814 (Fla. 1994) (citation omitted). A plaintiff may allege “tortious interference with present or prospective customers but no cause of action exists for tortious interference with a business's relationship to the community at large.” Id. at 815.Upon review, Plaintiff does not allege that any named Defendant is a state actor subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is suing the owner of Facebook and Facebook, a publicly traded company. These Defendants are not state actors. A private party rarely can be considered a state actor for purposes of section 1983 and here Plaintiff does not allege any of the three causal connections outlined above to attempt to establish the Defendants acted under color of state law. See Stevens v. Plumbers and Pipefitters Local 219, 812 Fed.Appx. 815, 820 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding the plaintiff failed to allege a causal connection between the state and private corporation or publicly traded bank although the plaintiff's complaint alleged a civil rights violation). Rayburn, 241 F.3d at 1347.To determine whether a defendant took a substantial step under § 2422(b), we consider the totality of the defendant's actions. Id. at 914, 916. We have held that a defendant's sexually solicitous communication can constitute a substantial step under § 2422(b) because the principal, if not exclusive, means of committing the offense requires oral or written communications. United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 626-27 (11th Cir. 2010). The defendant takes a substantial step when his communication crosses the line from sexual banter to criminal enticement. Id. at 627. Additionally, in Murrell, we determined that the defendant took a substantial step where the defendant did the following: sent text messages to an undercover officer posing as the minor's parent, in which he expressed his desire to have sex with the minor in exchange for money; arranged a meeting for the purpose of having sex with the minor; arrived at the designated time and place; and brought with him a teddy bear, $300 in cash, and a box of condoms. Murrell, 368 F.3d at 1284-85, 1287-88. However, evidence that the defendant traveled to meet the minor is not necessary to sustain an attempt conviction under … To challenge the findings and recommendations of a magistrate judge, a party must file specific written objections identifying the portions of the proposed findings and recommendation to which objection is made. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 822 (11th Cir. 1989); Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed.Appx. 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006). A district court reviews de novo those portions of the report to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). To the extent a party fails to object to parts of the magistrate judge's report, the Court may accept the recommendation so long as there is no clear error on the face of the record. Macort, 208 Fed.Appx. at 784. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, even in the absence of an objection. See LeCroy v. McNeil, 397 Fed.Appx. 554, 556 (11th Cir. 2010); Cooper-Houston v. S. Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 604 (11th Cir. 1994).To challenge the findings and recommendations of a magistrate judge, a party must file specific written objections identifying the portions of the proposed findings and recommendation to which objection is made. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 822 (11th Cir. 1989); Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed.Appx. 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006). A district court reviews de novo those portions of the report to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). To the extent a party fails to object to parts of the magistrate judge's report, the Court may accept the recommendation so long as there is no clear error on the face of the record. Macort, 208 Fed.Appx. at 784. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, even in the absence of an objection. See LeCroy v. McNeil, 397 Fed.Appx. 554, 556 (11th Cir. 2010); Cooper-Houston v. S. Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 604 (11th Cir. 1994).In Herr v. Butler, the Court for the first time held liable an owner of an automobile for injuries caused by the negligent driving of a gratuitous bailee-that is, someone who borrowed the car for free. 132 So. 815 (Fla. 1931). The owner had allowed his adult son to borrow his car while visiting from out of state when the son negligently caused an accident. Concluding that "this case comes well within the rule" in Southern Cotton Oil Co., we explained that an owner is liable even if he entrusts his automobile to another to be operated solely for the latter's benefit. Id. at 816.Court, Doyle is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment, it has no power to render a judgment on the merits, and must dismiss such claims without prejudice. Nichols v. Alabama State Bar, 815 F.3d 726, 733 (11th Cir. 2016). Thus, Gaffney's claims against Doyle will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Court will not consider their merits.. . . Id., at 815. . . . Id., at 815. . . .
. . . S. 815, 113th Cong., 1st Sess. . . .
. . . No. 19-815. Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . Monsanto Co. , 467 U.S. 986, 1016-1017, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984) (citing United States v . . . Byrd , 521 U.S. 811, 815, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997) (treating legal obligations of the Government . . .
. . . Coronado Oil & Gas Co. , 285 U.S. 393, 406, 52 S.Ct. 443, 76 L.Ed. 815 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting . . . 199, 168 P.3d 1208 (2007), rev. denied, 345 Ore. 415, 197 P.3d 1104 (2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 815 . . . Oregon , 558 U.S. 815, 130 S.Ct. 52, 175 L.Ed.2d 21 (2009) ; Lee v. . . .
. . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 194, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). . . .
. . . United States , 511 U.S. 809, 815, 114 S.Ct. 1960, 128 L.Ed.2d 797 (1994), Congress must provide a sufficiently . . .
. . . Joyner , 815 F.3d 163, 168 (C.A.4 2016) ("We too have held that 'a change in decisional law subsequent . . .
. . . . § 815(a). . . . Id. at 815-16 (citation and footnote omitted). . . .
. . . Muhammad , 735 F.3d at 815. This court affirmed the denial of the § 2255 motion. . . .
. . . Christensen , 828 F.3d 763, 815 (9th Cir. 2015). . . . Chung , 659 F.3d 815, 833 (9th Cir. 2011) ("Instructions to an individual to do something are ... not . . .
. . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007) ). . . .
. . . Greenpeace, Inc. , 815 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2016). . . .
. . . Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 815, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969), the Court considered a declaratory judgment . . .
. . . Hall , 26 Okla. 815, 110 P. 911, 911 (1910). . . .
. . . PetSmart, Inc., asserting claims under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 . . . practices include any "misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact." 815 . . . See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/10b(1). . . .
. . . Avila , 557 F.3d at 815 (quoting United States v. Stigler , 413 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2005) ). . . .
. . . Ct. at 815-16. . . . Ct. at 815-816. The majority's analysis conflates these inquiries. . . . Cisneros , 815 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2016) ); Kinney v. . . . Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) ("Qualified immunity is lost if a case is erroneously permitted . . . Fitzgerald prevents plaintiffs from relying on subjective evidence of bad faith. 457 U.S. 800, 815-16 . . .
. . . Hill , 815 F.3d at 657. . . . Hill , 815 F.3d at 668 ; see also Sheets v. . . . Hill , 815 F.3d at 668 (quotations and alterations omitted). c. . . . Hill , 815 F.3d at 668 ; see also Prager v. Campbell Cty. Mem. . . . Hill , 815 F.3d at 670. . . .
. . . Yost, 479 F.3d 815, 819 (11th Cir. 2007). . . .
. . . Lara , 815 F.3d 605, 613 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Davis , 564 U.S. at 232, 131 S.Ct. 2419 ). . . . See Lara , 815 F.3d at 613 ; see also Wanjiku , 919 F.3d at 485-86 (finding that agents had reasonable . . . Lara , 815 F.3d at 613-14. * * * In sum, the manual searches and the Cellebrite search of Cano's cell . . .
. . . Postal Serv. , 875 F.2d 814, 815 (10th Cir. 1989) ; Percy v. S.F. Gen. . . .
. . . Enomoto , 815 F.2d 1323, 1327 (9th Cir. 1987) (appointment of a special master cannot be appealed under . . .
. . . Shabaz , 579 F.3d 815, 819-820 (7th. Cir 2009). . . .
. . . Glover , 755 F.3d at 815 ; see also Hancock , 844 F.3d at 707-08. A. . . .
. . . Lynch , 815 F.3d 469, 482-83 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Owens, J., concurring) ("A better mousetrap is . . .
. . . Id. at 815 ; see also Jefferson Cty. v. . . . See Papp , 842 F.3d at 815 ("A defendant need not win his case before he can have it removed." . . .
. . . Id. at 815. . . .
. . . Tulsiram , 815 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2016) ("[W]e have no difficulty in reaching our holding today: . . .
. . . Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). United States v. Salean, 583 F.3d 1059, 1060 n.2 (8th Cir. 2009). . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007) requires us to analyze whether there . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 191, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007), when confronted with a similar . . .
. . . Supp. 2d at 815. . . .
. . . See 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. §§ 505/1, 510/1. . . .
. . . Bowen , 815 F.2d 1152, 1155 (7th Cir. 1987) ; Fenix v. . . .
. . . Ct. 808, 815, 190 L. Ed.2d 679 (2015). . . .
. . . Johnson , 624 F.3d 815, 821-22 (7th Cir. 2010). . . .
. . . Alatorre, 863 F.3d 810, 815 (8th Cir. 2017) (protective sweep of four rooms on one floor of residence . . .
. . . Avid Tech., Inc. , 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016). . . .
. . . No. 91-1) (the "'815 Registration")) According to Defendants, "[s]ometime after Defendants' application . . . No. 91-1); '815 Registration (Dkt. . . . No. 91-1); '815 Registration (Dkt. . . . No. 91-1)) The '815 Registration grants Defendants the right to use the WOODSTOCK mark on "cigarette . . . roiling papers" and "lighters for smokers." ('815 Registration (Dkt. . . .
. . . Balmoral Racing Club, Inc. , 831 F.3d 815, 834 (7th Cir. 2016) (approving of a similar instruction); . . .
. . . Illinois's Rate Relief Law as "to deregulat[ing] the electricity market to allow for competition." 815 . . . to switch electricity suppliers through false promises of a teaser rate, which she never received. 815 . . . Court the question whether the Illinois Commerce Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over her claim, 815 . . . Richards stands unrebutted that a public utility is not a relevant comparator in these circumstances. 815 . . .
. . . Blackfin Yacht Corp. , 357 N.J.Super. 418, 815 A.2d 537, 541 (2003) ; see also N.J. Stat. . . .
. . . Fibreboard Corp. , 527 U.S. 815, 846, 119 S.Ct. 2295, 144 L.Ed.2d 715 (1999) (citation omitted); Zenith . . .
. . . Schriro , 882 F.3d 778, 815-16 (9th Cir. 2018) ; Apelt v. . . .
. . . Vill. of Monroe , 815 F. . . .
. . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). . . .
. . . Lynch , 818 F.3d 808, 815 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that Chevron deference applies where "there is 'binding . . .
. . . State , 303 Ga. 853, 815 S.E.2d 903 (2018). . . . whose medical prognosis was not definitive and whose future competency was legally unsettled"); Carr , 815 . . .
. . . Id. at 192, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . Id. at 188, 127 S.Ct. 815. The Court disagreed with that argument. Id. at 190, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . Id. at 192, 127 S.Ct. 815 (emphasis added). . . . Id. at 194-95, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . Almanza-Arenas , 815 F.3d at 489 (Watford, J., concurring). . . .
. . . Taylor , 620 F.3d at 815 (quoting Miera , 539 F.3d at 1236 ). . . .
. . . J.A. 112, 451-52, 485, 707-08, 762, 815. . . .
. . . Plaintiffs' Commencement of Employment with CRST ...815 E. . . .
. . . Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 815) (observing that "[r]evenue rulings are written and reviewed at the same . . .
. . . Jewell , 815 F.3d 544, 554 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting River Runners for Wilderness v. . . . Alaska Oil , 815 F.3d at 554 (internal quotation marks omitted). . . . Alaska Oil , 815 F.3d at 554. * * * In sum, DOJ's use of the two scoring factors is well within its statutory . . .
. . . Groupon, Inc. , 815 F.3d 1331, 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016). . . . Blue Calypso , 815 F.3d at 1339, 1348. . . .
. . . Lee , 232 F.2d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 1956) ; 7 Wright et al. , § 1716. . . .
. . . Joyner , 815 F.3d 163, 168 (4th Cir. 2016). . . .
. . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007) ). . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . 184, 191, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013) (quoting Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815 . . . such a manner, he fails to meet the threshold set forth in Duenas-Alvarez . 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815 . . .
. . . Adams , 815 F.3d 1291, 1292-93 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that, after Johnson , a Florida conviction for . . .
. . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007) ). . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . 184, 191, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013) (quoting Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815 . . . such a manner, he fails to meet the threshold set forth in Duenas-Alvarez . 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815 . . .
. . . Murguia-Rodriguez , 815 F.3d 566, 574 (9th Cir. 2016) ("Without a forfeited error, plain error does not . . .
. . . Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). . . . Ct. 808, 815, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting . . .
. . . M/V Roberta Tabor , 815 F.2d 1037, 1043 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[A]n insurer cannot by way of subrogation recover . . . Roberta Tabor , 815 F.2d at 1045 (emphasis in original). . . . Peavey , 971 F.2d at 1177 ; Roberta Tabor , 815 F.2d at 1044-45 ; Marathon Oil , 786 F.2d at 1302. . . .
. . . Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[P]ublic interest concerns are implicated when a constitutional . . . Id. at 815. . . .
. . . Betz , 815 So. 2d 627, 633 (Fla. 2002) ("As the odor of previously burnt marijuana certainly warranted . . .
. . . expressly abrogated the distinction among principals and aiders and abettors." 549 U.S. 183, 189, 127 S.Ct. 815 . . . Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . principal, within the scope of [the theft offense's] generic definition." 549 U.S. at 189, 127 S.Ct. 815 . . . at 85, 134 S.Ct. 1240 (Alito, J., dissenting) (2014); see Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815 . . .
. . . Blackfin Yacht Corp. , 357 N.J.Super. 418, 815 A.2d 537, 541 (2003) ; see also N.J. Stat. . . .
. . . Id. at 82 (quoting Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815 ). . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007) ). . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . .
. . . Burleson , 815 F.3d 170, 176 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding petitioner actually innocent where he pleaded guilty . . .
. . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). . . .
. . . Shkolnik, 443 Mass. 300, 820 N.E.2d 815, 824 n.17 (2005) (quoting Doe v. New Bedford Hous. . . .
. . . Robinson , 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). . . .
. . . McLane Co., 857 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Ashcroft , 253 F.3d 811, 815 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[R]emoval proceedings commence when the INS files the . . . Ashcroft , 253 F.3d at 815 ; see also Arbaugh v. . . .
. . . Ledyard Nat'l Bank (In re Campbell), 398 B.R. 799, 815 (Bankr. D. . . . Ledyard Nat'l Bank (In re Campbell), 398 B.R. 799, 815 (Bankr. D. . . .
. . . Brown , 250 F.3d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 2001). . . .
. . . Ranjel , 872 F.3d 815, 821 (7th Cir. 2017) (applying similar waiver principles to a challenge to the . . .
. . . Amended Complaint asserts violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 . . .
. . . . ; Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 Ill. Comp. . . .
. . . Id. at 757 ; accord Slatkin , 525 F.3d at 815 ("Although the Johnsons argue that there is a question . . .
. . . Crandall Assoc., Inc. , 815 F.2d 426, 428 (6th Cir. 1987) ("[A] successive motion [must] state new facts . . .
. . . Random House, Inc. , 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002) ). . . .
. . . In Munoz the California Court of Appeal noted that under Government Code § 815, "a public entity is not . . . public entity liable for this type of negligence, no direct liability could be established under section 815 . . . Plaintiffs acknowledge that under California Government Code § 815, "direct tort liability of public . . .
. . . Cricks , 815 A.2d 1063, 1070 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) ; see Coll. Watercolor Grp., Inc. v. William H. . . .
. . . Walsh, 791 F.2d 811, 815 (10th Cir. 1986) (noting that the Supreme Court in Jacobsen held that removing . . .
. . . Monsanto Co. , 467 U.S. 986, 1016, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984) we rejected a takings claim . . . Coronado Oil & Gas Co. , 285 U.S. 393, 406, 52 S.Ct. 443, 76 L.Ed. 815 (1932) (dissenting)). . . . Monsanto Co. , 467 U.S. 986, 1018, n. 21, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984) ). . . . Coronado Oil & Gas Co. , 285 U.S. 393, 406, 52 S.Ct. 443, 76 L.Ed. 815 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting . . .
. . . Ellis, 815 F.3d 419, 422 n.2 (8th Cir. 2016) (reinforcing Bain ); accord United States v. . . .
. . . Sonson, 815 So. 2d 685, 686 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (holding the "trial court properly ratified the general . . .
. . . Supreme Court routinely articulated and insisted on [an] unconstitutional causal nexus test." 813 F.3d at 815 . . .
. . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007) ); see also United States v . . . Id. at 190-94, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . Id. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . outside the generic definition of a crime.' " (quoting Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815 . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815. . . . Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). . . . Duenas-Alvarez , 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). . . . apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition." 549 U.S. at 193, 127 S.Ct. 815 . . .
. . . Rep. 815 (K. B. 1726) 1 Leach 134, 168 Eng. Rep. 169 (K. B. 1775). See, e.g. , A. . . . Coronado Oil & Gas Co. , 285 U.S. 393, 406-408, 52 S.Ct. 443, 76 L.Ed. 815 (1932) (dissenting opinion . . . Rep. 815 (K. B. 1726). . . . Rep., at 815. . . .
. . . Orleans , 425 U.S. 807, 815-16, 96 S.Ct. 1971, 48 L.Ed.2d 390 (1976), but such conditions and restrictions . . .
. . . Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 815, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (internal quotation marks and alteration . . .
. . . Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984). . . .
. . . Denny's Rests., Inc. , 117 Wash.2d 426, 435, 815 P.2d 1362 (Wash. 1991) ). . . .
. . . Starks, 815 F.3d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. . . . See, e.g., Starks, 815 F.3d at 441 ; United States v. Mendoza, 341 F.3d 687, 693 (8th Cir. 2003). . . .
. . . Vill. of Wesley Hills , 815 F. Supp. 2d 679, 696-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ; T.S. Haulers, Inc. v. . . . See Mosdos Chofetz Chaim , 815 F. Supp. 2d at 693-97 (collecting cases). . . .
. . . ."); In re Schnabel , 153 B.R. 809, 815 (Bankr. N.D. . . .
. . . Ranjel , 872 F.3d 815, 821-22 (7th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . common law unfair competition; and violation of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 815 . . .
. . . State, 815 So. 2d 657, 660 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), rev'd on other grounds by State v. . . .