The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLVI
CRIMES

Chapter 825
ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND EXPLOITATION OF ELDERLY PERSONS AND DISABLED ADULTS

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F.S. 825.101

825.101 Definitions.—As used in this chapter:

(1) “Business relationship” means a relationship between two or more individuals or entities where there exists an oral or written contract or agreement for goods or services.

(2) “Caregiver” means a person who has been entrusted with or has assumed responsibility for the care or the property of an elderly person or disabled adult. “Caregiver” includes, but is not limited to, relatives, court-appointed or voluntary guardians, adult household members, neighbors, health care providers, and employees and volunteers of facilities as defined in subsection (7).

(3) “Disabled adult” means a person 18 years of age or older who suffers from a condition of physical or mental incapacitation due to a developmental disability, organic brain damage, or mental illness, or who has one or more physical or mental limitations that restrict the person’s ability to perform the normal activities of daily living.

(4) “Elderly person” means a person 60 years of age or older who is suffering from the infirmities of aging as manifested by advanced age or organic brain damage, or other physical, mental, or emotional dysfunctioning, to the extent that the ability of the person to provide adequately for the person’s own care or protection is impaired.

(5) “Endeavor” means to attempt or try.

(6) “Exploitation” has the same meaning as the term “exploitation of an elderly person or disabled adult” as defined in s. 825.103(1).

(7) “Facility” means any location providing day or residential care or treatment for elderly persons or disabled adults. The term “facility” may include, but is not limited to, any hospital, training center, state institution, nursing home, assisted living facility, adult family-care home, adult day care center, group home, mental health treatment center, or continuing care community.

(8) “Improper benefit” means any remuneration or payment, by or on behalf of any service provider or merchant of goods, to any person as an incentive or inducement to refer customers or patrons for past or future services or goods.

(9) “Kickback” has the same meaning as in s. 456.054(1).

(10) “Lacks capacity to consent” means an impairment by reason of mental illness, developmental disability, organic brain disorder, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, short-term memory loss, or other cause, that causes an elderly person or disabled adult to lack sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate reasonable decisions concerning the elderly person’s or disabled adult’s person or property.

(11) “Obtains or uses” means any manner of:

(a) Taking or exercising control over property; or

(b) Making any use, disposition, or transfer of property.

(12) “Position of trust and confidence” with respect to an elderly person or a disabled adult means the position of a person who:

(a) Is a parent, spouse, adult child, or other relative by blood or marriage of the elderly person or disabled adult;

(b) Is a joint tenant or tenant in common with the elderly person or disabled adult;

(c) Has a legal or fiduciary relationship with the elderly person or disabled adult, including, but not limited to, a court-appointed or voluntary guardian, trustee, attorney, or conservator;

(d) Is a caregiver of the elderly person or disabled adult; or

(e) Is any other person who has been entrusted with or has assumed responsibility for the use or management of the elderly person’s or disabled adult’s funds, assets, or property.

(13) “Property” means anything of value and includes:

(a) Real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found in land.

(b) Tangible or intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests, and claims.

(14) “Services” means anything of value resulting from a person’s physical or mental labor or skill, or from the use, possession, or presence of property, and includes:

(a) Repairs or improvements to property.

(b) Professional services.

(d) Lodging accommodations.

(e) Admissions to places of exhibition or entertainment.

(15) “Value” means value determined according to any of the following:

(a)1. The market value of the property at the time and place of the offense or, if the market value cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacing the property within a reasonable time after the offense.

2. In the case of a written instrument such as a check, draft, or promissory note, which does not have a readily ascertainable market value, the value is the amount due or collectible. The value of any other instrument that creates, releases, discharges, or otherwise affects any valuable legal right, privilege, or obligation is the greatest amount of economic loss that the owner of the instrument might reasonably suffer by the loss of the instrument.

3. The value of a trade secret that does not have a readily ascertainable market value is any reasonable value representing the damage to the owner suffered by reason of losing advantage over those who do not know of or use the trade secret.

(b) If the value of the property cannot be ascertained, the trier of fact may find the value to be not less than a certain amount; if no such minimum value can be ascertained, the value is an amount less than $100.

(c) Amounts of value of separate properties involved in exploitation committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, whether the exploitation involves the same person or several persons, may be aggregated in determining the degree of the offense.

(16) “Vulnerable adult” has the same meaning as in s. 415.102(28).

History.—s. 2, ch. 95-158; s. 1, ch. 96-322; s. 1, ch. 2002-195; s. 3, ch. 2014-200; s. 1, ch. 2018-100; s. 104, ch. 2019-3; s. 5, ch. 2021-221.

F.S. 825.101 on Google Scholar

F.S. 825.101 on Casetext

Amendments to 825.101

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 825.101

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 825.101.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 259 So. 3d 743 (Fla. 2018)

. . . involves the defendant exploiting a vulnerable adult, define "exploitation" and "vulnerable adult" from §§ 825.101 . . .

IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 257 So. 3d 370 (Fla. 2018)

. . . . § 825.101(3), Fla. Stat. . . . . § 825.101(4), Fla. Stat. . . . . § 825.101(7), Fla. Stat. . . . Stat., protects a "disabled person" (age unspecific) while § 825.101, Fla. . . .

IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 253 So. 3d 995 (Fla. 2018)

. . . . § 825.101(3), Fla. Stat. . . .

IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 236 So. 3d 282 (Fla. 2018)

. . . . § 825.101(4), Fla. Stat. . . . . § 825.101(3), Fla. Stat. . . . As applied to an Elderly Person or a Disabled Adult. § 825.101(2), Fla. Stat. . . . household members, neighbors, health care providers, and employees and volunteers of facilities. § 825.101 . . .

COULIBALY, v. TILLERSON, U. S., 273 F. Supp. 3d 16 (D.D.C. 2017)

. . . . § 825.101(a). . . .

IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 213 So. 3d 680 (Fla. 2017)

. . . . $825.101(4). Fla. Stat. . . . . §825.101(3). Fla. Stat. . . . As applied to an Elderly Person or a Disabled Adult. § 825.101(2). Fla. . . . adult household members, neighbors. health care providers, and employees and volunteers of facilities. §825.101 . . .

GRAVEL, v. COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP., 230 F. Supp. 3d 430 (E.D. Pa. 2017)

. . . . § 825.101(a). . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 202 So. 3d 830 (Fla. 2016)

. . . . § 825.101(3), Fla. Stat. . . .

GELIN, v. U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,, 837 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 825.101(4); Watson, 95 So.3d at 979-82 (reversing and remanding a § 825.102(1) conviction where the . . . Stat. § 825.101(3); see Jennings v. State, 920 So.2d 32, 34-35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. . . . Stat. § 825.101(4) (1997)); see also Gonzales v. . . . Stat. § 825.101(4). Lack of knowledge of the victim’s age is not a defense. Id. § 825.104. . . . IA § 825.101(3). . . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 194 So. 3d 1007 (Fla. 2016)

. . . . § 825.101(^3), Fla. Stat. . . . . § 825.101(5)), Fla. Stat. . . . Give as applicable. § 825.101(43), Fla. Stat. . . . . § 825.101(54), Fla. Stat. . . . Give in all cases. § 825.101(2), Fla. Stat. . . .

FRANKE, v. STATE, 188 So. 3d 886 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 825.101(6), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . .” § 825.101(10), This element is lacking under either theory here. . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 176 So. 3d 938 (Fla. 2015)

. . . -StaF-§ 825.101(1), Fla. Stat. . . . Stat. § 825.101(43), Fla. Stat. . . . Stat. § 825.101(2), Fla. Stat. . . . Stai § 825.101(16), Fla. Stat. . . . Stat § 825.101(1112), Fla. Stat. . . .

T. GRASSO, v. GRASSO, 131 F. Supp. 3d 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2015)

. . . According to Michelle and Teresa, the Second District Court of Appeal’s construction of Section 825.101 . . . ’, though, the relevant statute on the “vulnerable adult” issue is Section 425.101(27), not Section 825.101 . . . Section 825.101(4), which is part of Florida’s Abuse, Neglect, and Exploitation of Elderly Persons and . . . As is evident, Sections 825.101(4) and 415.102(27) define two different terms and are parts of two different . . . Second, to the extent the Second District Court of Appeal’s construction of Section 825.101(4) is a suitable . . .

AMSTUTZ, v. LIBERTY CENTER BOARD OF EDUCATION,, 127 F. Supp. 3d 846 (N.D. Ohio 2015)

. . . . § 825.101. . . .

GIDDENS, v. UPS SUPPLY CHAIN SOLUTIONS,, 70 F. Supp. 3d 705 (D. Del. 2014)

. . . . § 825.101). . . . . § 825.101(b), (c). . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 131 So. 3d 755 (Fla. 2013)

. . . . § 825.101(1). . . . Stat. § 825.101(F). . . . Stat. § 825.101(5). . . . Stat. § 825.101(9). . . . S 825.101(U)(b). . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 131 So. 3d 692 (Fla. 2013)

. . . . § 825.101(4), Fla. Stat. . . . . § 825.101(5), Fla. Stat. . . . Give as applicable. § 825.101 M, Fla. Stat. . . . . § 825.101(5), Fla. Stat. . . . Give in all cases. § 825.101(2), Fla. Stat. . . .

ARNAUTA, v. STATE, 125 So. 3d 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . in this section and in so doing either: (a) Victimizes 10 or more elderly persons, as defined in s. 825.101 . . .

MAXWELL, v. STATE, 110 So. 3d 958 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . .” § 825.101(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .

WATSON, v. STATE, 95 So. 3d 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Section 825.101(5) defines the term “elderly person” as follows: “Elderly person” means a person 60 years . . . Murphy qualified as an “elderly person” within the meaning of section 825.101(5). . . . ability of the person to provide adequately for the person’s own care or protection is impaired.” § 825.101 . . . subsection, the jury had to find that the victim met the definition of an “elderly person” in section 825.101 . . . We disagree with the State’s reading of section 825.101(5). . . .

LICHTENSTEIN, v. UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH MEDICAL CENTER, UPMC UPMC UPMC, 691 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 825.101(b) (“When a family emergency arises, ... workers need reassurance that they will not be asked . . .

STATE v. TRAYLOR, 77 So. 3d 224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . of an aggravated white-collar crime against (a) ten or more elderly persons, as defined in section 825.101 . . .

ESTATE OF BRENNAN, v. CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY FLAG SERVICE ORGANIZATION, INC., 832 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (M.D. Fla. 2011)

. . . inapplicable for several reasons, including that Kyle was not a “disabled adult” as defined in Section 825.101 . . . (4) and that no defendant is a “caregiver” as defined in Section 825.101(2). . . .

RESIDENTIAL SAVINGS MORTAGE, INC. a v. KEESLING a, 73 So. 3d 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . , which sets out the claim of exploitation of the elderly by deception pursuant to sections 772.11, 825.101 . . .

GUARSCIO, v. STATE, 64 So. 3d 146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . . § 825.101(3). . . . .” § 825.101(8). . . .

FINNERTY, v. WIRELESS RETAIL, INC. SC, 624 F. Supp. 2d 642 (E.D. Mich. 2009)

. . . . § 825.101 (“The FMLA was predicated on two fundamental concerns — the needs of the American workforce . . .

THURSTON, v. CHERRY HILL TRIPLEX,, 941 F. Supp. 2d 520 (D.N.J. 2008)

. . . . § 825.101). Employees who take FMLA leave are entitled to certain protections. . . .

ELLISON, v. STATE, 983 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Section 825.101(3), Florida Statutes (2005) defines deception as: (a) Misrepresenting or concealing a . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 965 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2007)

. . . . § 825.101(4), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . Accordingly, to bring instruction 11.11 into accord with section 825.101(4), we have substituted “developmental . . .

ENGELHARDT, v. S. P. RICHARDS COMPANY, INC., 472 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006)

. . . . § 825.101, by “balancing] the demands of the workplace with the needs of families ... in a manner that . . .

STATE v. HOSTY, v., 944 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 2006)

. . . trustworthiness, an out-of-court statement made by an elderly person or disabled adult, as defined in s. 825.101 . . . the statement must establish that a mental disability exists and meets the requirements of section 825.101 . . . Section 825.101(5), Florida Statutes (2001), defines an "elderly person” as "a person 60 years of age . . . of the person to provide adequately for the person’s own care or protection is impaired.” .Section 825.101 . . . In contrast, the term “disabled adult,” incorporated from section 825.101(4), Florida Statutes (2005) . . . .” § 825.101(4), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis added). . . .

HARRELL, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,, 445 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2006)

. . . . § 825.101(b) (“The enactment of the FMLA was predicated on two fundamental concerns — the needs of . . .

REED, v. BUCKEYE FIRE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, 422 F. Supp. 2d 570 (W.D.N.C. 2006)

. . . . § 825.101. . . .

T. TURNER, R. v. THE SULLIVAN UNIVERSITY SYSTEMS, INC., 420 F. Supp. 2d 773 (W.D. Ky. 2006)

. . . . § 825.101. . . .

L. JENNINGS, v. STATE, 920 So. 2d 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . For purposes of this and other crimes described in chapter 825, section 825.101(4) defines a disabled . . . activities of daily living sufficient to meet the statutory definition of a disabled adult under section 825.101 . . . is at issue, the trial court should instruct the jurors on the statutory definition of that term. § 825.101 . . .

HARRELL, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,, 415 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2005)

. . . . § 825.101(b) (“The enactment of the FMLA was predicated on two fundamental concerns — the needs of . . .

BERNAU, v. STATE, 891 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . Section 825.101(8), Florida Statutes (1999), defines “intimidation” as “the communication by word or . . . Section 825.101(3) defines “deception” as follows: (a) Misrepresenting or concealing a material fact . . .

MILLER, v. PERSONAL- TOUCH OF VIRGINIA, INC., 342 F. Supp. 2d 499 (E.D. Va. 2004)

. . . . § 825.101. . . .

J. CAVIN, v. HONDA OF AMERICA MANUFACTURING, INC., 346 F.3d 713 (6th Cir. 2003)

. . . . § 825.101). . . .

STATE v. HOSTY,, 835 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . trustworthiness, an out-of-court statement made by an elderly person or disabled adult, as defined in s. 825.101 . . . Section 825.101(4), Florida Statutes (2001) defines “[disabled adult” as: [A] person 18 years of age . . . Section 825.101(4) includes in the definition of “disabled adult” any person over 18 “who has one or . . .

C. PARKER, v. HAHNEMANN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL,, 234 F. Supp. 2d 478 (D.N.J. 2002)

. . . . § 825.101). . . .

EDWARDS, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY,, 179 F. Supp. 2d 714 (W.D. Ky. 2001)

. . . balance their work and family life by taking reasonable unpaid leave for medical reasons ....” 29 CFR § 825.101 . . . Id. at § 825.101(b). . . .

MARRERO, v. CAMDEN COUNTY BOARD OF SOCIAL SERVICES,, 164 F. Supp. 2d 455 (D.N.J. 2001)

. . . . § 825.101. . . . are in excess of those that an employer would be willing or able to provide on its own. 29 C.F.R. § 825.101 . . .

NAVARRO, a k a v. PFIZER CORPORATION,, 261 F.3d 90 (1st Cir. 2001)

. . . . § 825.101. We do not believe that Congress intended to create so illusory a benefit. . . .

BAYER, v. STATE, 788 So. 2d 310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . The court also included the definitions of caregiver and elderly person contained in section 825.101( . . .

PETERSON, v. STATE, 765 So. 2d 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . The central point on appeal concerns ■ whether under section 825.101(2), Florida Statutes, the defendant . . . The term “caregiver” is defined in section 825.101(2), Florida Statutes, as follows: “Caregiver” means . . . statutory language is much broader than the definition of “caregiver” adopted by the legislature in section 825.101 . . . This is a far more expansive definition of the term than that found in section 825.101(2), Florida Statutes . . . . § 825.101(2), Fla. Stat. . . .

STEKLOFF, v. ST. JOHN S MERCY HEALTH SYSTEMS,, 218 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2000)

. . . . § 825.101(c). . . .

SIENIARECKI, v. STATE, 756 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2000)

. . . .” § 825.101(2), Fla. Stat. (1997) (emphasis supplied). . . . .” § 825.101(4), Fla. Stat.(1997) (emphasis supplied). . . .

GARRETT, v. UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA AT BIRMINGHAM BOARD OF TRUSTEES, v., 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999)

. . . . § 825.101(a). . . . for validating the FMLA’s substantive provisions. . 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601(a), (b)(4) & (5); 29 C.F.R. § 825.101 . . .

R. CONNER, v. STATE, 748 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1999)

. . . Ford met the definition of “elderly person” found in section 825.101(6), Florida Statutes (1995), and . . . The Legislature defines “elderly person” and “disabled adult” in section 825.101, Florida Statutes (1995 . . . ability of the person to provide adequately for the person’s own care or protection is impaired. § 825.101 . . . These definitions are now found in sections 825.101(4) and (5), Florida Statutes (1997). . . . ruling, the trial court must find that the declarant qualifies as an "elderly person” under section 825.101 . . .

E. HITE v. BIOMET, INC., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (N.D. Ind. 1999)

. . . . § 825.101(a). . . .

R. CONNER, v. STATE, 709 So. 2d 170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . Section 825.101(6), Florida Statutes (1995), defines an “elderly person" as “a person sixty years of . . . Section 825.101(6) refers to impairment of an elderly person’s ability to’ protect himself or to care . . . trustworthiness, an out-of-court statement made by an elderly person or disabled adult, as defined in s. 825.101 . . .

SATTERFIELD, v. WAL- MART STORES, INC., 135 F.3d 973 (5th Cir. 1998)

. . . . § 825.101(b) (“The enactment of the FMLA was predicated on two fundamental concerns — the needs of . . .

VANDERHOOF v. LIFE EXTENSION INSTITUTE, d b a a P. C. P. C., 988 F. Supp. 507 (D.N.J. 1997)

. . . . § 825.101. . . .

M. VICTORELLI, v. SHADYSIDE HOSPITAL, 128 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 1997)

. . . . § 825.101. . . .

M. KAYLOR, v. FANNIN REGIONAL HOSPITAL, INC., 946 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ga. 1996)

. . . . § 825.101(b) (“The enactment of the FMLA was predicated on two fundamental concerns — the needs of . . .