The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
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NCH argues that personal jurisdiction exists because the insurance policies contained no geographic limitation on coverage, and it was foreseeable that the insureds might travel to Florida and require emergency treatment. However, the Supreme Court has consistently maintained that foreseeability alone is not a sufficient benchmark for exercising personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980); see also Meyer v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 492 So.2d 1314, 1315-16 (Fla. 1986) (holding that insurer that did not maintain an office or solicit business in Florida was not subject to personal jurisdiction based on foreseeable risk of loss in Florida); Hassneh Ins. Co. of Israel v. Plastigone Techs., Inc., 623 So.2d 1223, 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) ("The mere risk of loss in a forum, even if foreseeable, is not sufficient to subject a foreign defendant to personal jurisdiction." (citations omitted)); Am. Cmty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Naples Rsch. &Counseling Ctr., Inc., 534 So.2d 836, 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) ("Even though a [foreign] insurance company might foresee that its insured would… EAJA fees are determined by using the “lodestar” method-the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 773 (11th Cir. 1988), aff'd 496 U.S. 154 (1990). The EAJA requires that the amount of attorney's fees be “reasonable,” which is determined by the “prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). However, “attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.” Id. The party requesting fees has the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the fee and the number of hours expended. Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988); Watford v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1562, 1568 (11th Cir. 1985). The requesting party may also include the number of hours it took to prepare the EAJA request in its request for fees. Jean, 863 F.2d at 779-80.We concluded that the plaintiff had failed to show that, as a line cook, he wasn't a "direct threat" to his own and others' safety. Id. at 835. He "point[ed] to no probative evidence suggesting that [his employer] could have made his work site safe." Id. at 836. As a result, he was not a "qualified individual" because he was unable to perform his job with or without accommodations. See id. at 83536. Unlike the plaintiff in LaChance, it's undisputed that Beasley was a "qualified individual" who could perform the essential functions his job with reasonable accommodations. Nothing about the holding in LaChance entitles O'Reilly to summary judgment on Beasley's failure to accommodate claim.In this case, the Commissioner does not oppose Plaintiff's request for fees under the EAJA. (Dkt. 25 at 3-4.) Nevertheless, as the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals instructs, “[i]f fee applicants do not exercise billing judgment, courts are obligated to do it for them.” ACLU of Ga., 168 F.3d at 428. See Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[W]here the time or fees claimed seem expanded or there is a lack of documentation or testimonial support the court may make the award on its own experience.” (citation omitted)); see also Porco v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:21-cv-32-JLB-NPM, 2022 WL 394394, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2022) (finding that “the Magistrate Judge did not err in sua sponte recommending that the requested attorney time be reduced”). Upon review of Plaintiff's counsel's affidavit, the court finds that a reduction in fees is warranted.But was he more than grossly negligent? We hold, especially in light of his attempt to communicate with the prison's medical staff through notations in Henegar's MAR, that he was not. In Cottrell, we described the "more than gross negligence" standard as "'the equivalent of recklessly disregarding' a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate." Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1490-91 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836). Sergeant Keith's partial disregard of (what we will assume to be) his training doesn't satisfy that high standard. Accordingly, the district court correctly granted him summary judgment.Moreover, although some witnesses live in or near Leon County, the record fails to reflect that the Pinellas County venue would significantly inconvenience any of them. See Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Burns, 672 So.2d 834, 836 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (explaining that while the parties' residences are important, there must also be "a showing that the parties or witnesses will suffer substantial inconvenience or undue expense due to the chosen forum"). Indeed, there are now widely available means by which witnesses can testify remotely, as expressly contemplated in Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.530, entitled "Communication Technology." Unsurprisingly, then, the circuit court made no finding that any party or witness would suffer substantial inconvenience or undue hardship if the case remained in Pinellas County.While a different factfinder may well have credited Lopez's opinions, that is not the test. The dispositive question here is whether there is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate” to support the ALJ's conclusion. Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154. “The substantial evidence threshold is not high and defers to the presiding ALJ, who heard testimony and reviewed the medical evidence.” Rodriguez v. Berryhill, 836 Fed.Appx. 797, 803 (11th Cir. 2020). Given this low bar, the Court will affirm.The party requesting fees must exercise “billing judgment” and must exclude from its fees motion hours that would be unreasonable to bill a client, and therefore to one's adversary, “irrespective of the skill, reputation, or experience of counsel.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301.In determining the lodestar figure, a “reasonable hourly rate” consists of “the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. In this context, “market rate” means the hourly rate charged in the local legal market by an attorney with expertise in the area of law who is willing and able to take the case, if indeed such an attorney exists. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 437 (11th Cir. 1999). The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing the requested rates are in line with the prevailing market rates by producing direct evidence of rates charged in similar circumstances or opinion evidence of reasonable rates. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299.The Court uses the lodestar method to determine a reasonable fee award, which it calculates by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).The party moving for fees has the burden of establishing that the hourly rates and hours expended are reasonable. See Norman v. Housing Auth. of the City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988). “[A] reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Duckworth v. Whisenant, 97 F.3d 1393, 1396 (11th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). As for the hours reasonably expended, counsel must exercise proper “billing judgment” and exclude hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.. . . Stevens , 529 U.S. 765, 774, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) ); see also Muskrat v. . . . on different meanings and emphases as we move from one context to another.' " Black's Law Dictionary 836 . . . See Black's Law Dictionary, at 836 (defining "good faith" to mean, among other things, "absence of intent . . .
. . . . ----, ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 830, 836-837, 842, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018). . . .
. . . Stevens , 529 U.S. 765, 771-774, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (qui tam statute makes a relator . . . Stevens , 529 U.S. 765, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000), is to the contrary. . . .
. . . Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc. , 486 U.S. 825, 837, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988) . . .
. . . Patent No. 5,818,836 ('836 patent). . . . -then the exclusive licensee of the '836 patent -against Keen, Inc. See Inforocket.Com , Inc. v. . . .
. . . Stevens , 529 U.S. 765, 780, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000), the Fourth Circuit concluded that . . . Oneida Tribe of Wis. , 836 F.3d 818 (2016). . . . distinguished its earlier decision in Bormes , which recognized a waiver of federal sovereign immunity. 836 . . .
. . . Gilkey , 314 F.3d 832, 836 (CA7 2002) ; Winarske v. . . .
. . . No. 19-836 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . followed Brand X , deferred to the agency's new interpretation, and rejected petitioners' claim. 921 F.3d 836 . . .
. . . factual disputes are resolved, and all reasonable inferences are drawn, in plaintiff's favor.' " Id. at 836 . . . Morris , 736 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2013). . . .
. . . Inc. , 836 F.3d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). . . . See Kimzey , 836 F.3d at 1268-71. Ultimate Software satisfies all three prongs of the test. B. . . . Kimzey , 836 F.3d at 1268. . . . Kimzey , 836 F.3d at 1268 ; see also Roommates.com , 521 F.3d at 1162 n.6 ("[t]oday, the most common . . . Roommates.com , 521 F.3d at 1175 ; see also Kimzey , 836 F.3d at 1269 n.4 (the material contribution . . .
. . . Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006) (Federal Tort Claims Act's judgment bar); Cunningham v. . . .
. . . Rollins , 836 F.3d 737, 742-43 (7th Cir. 2016), we overruled Raupp 's reliance on the residual clause . . .
. . . CNH Am., LLC, 673 F.3d 829, 836 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting McCoy v. . . .
. . . Cohen , 146 Misc. 836, 262 N.Y.S. 320, 323-24 (N.Y. Sup. . . .
. . . Benoit, 850 F.2d 836, 844 (1st Cir. 1988) ). . . .
. . . Colvin , 758 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2014). . . .
. . . Needham, 852 F.3d 830, 836 (8th Cir. 2017) ("The party authenticating the exhibit need only prove a rational . . .
. . . Martinez-Cruz, 836 F.3d 1305, 1313-14 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding § 846 conspiracy is not a categorical . . .
. . . Martinez-Cruz , 836 F.3d 1305, 1314 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding same). . . . Martinez-Cruz , 836 F.3d at 1314. . . .
. . . Zamora-Salazar , 860 F.3d 826, 836 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S. . . .
. . . Landrigan , 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (citing Williams , 529 U.S. at . . .
. . . Kjaer , 836 F.3d 251, 260 (3d Cir. 2016). . . .
. . . Dart , 814 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2016). . . .
. . . FDA , 836 F.3d 987, 989-90 (9th Cir. 2016) ; Batton v. . . . IRS , 56 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1995). . . .
. . . FDA , 836 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). . . .
. . . Barland , 751 F.3d at 836-37. . . . Citizens United "applies only to the specifics of the disclosure requirement at issue there," id . at 836 . . .
. . . Stevens , 529 U.S. 765, 769 n.1, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000). . . .
. . . Landrigan , 550 U.S. 465, 474, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007). . . .
. . . Landrigan , 550 U.S. 465, 481, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) )). . . .
. . . Athletic Track & Court Const. , 172 F.3d 836, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1999). . . .
. . . CVS Caremark Corp., 836 F.3d 88, 91 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Alt. Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. . . . CVS Caremark Corporation favors Dumont. 836 F.3d at 90-91. . . . CVS Caremark Corp., 836 F.3d 88, 90 (1st Cir. 2016) (containing the image of an allegedly deceptive product . . .
. . . DuPont de Nemours & Co. , 17 F.3d 836, 843 (6th Cir. 1994). . . .
. . . Colvin , 758 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2014). . . .
. . . Colvin , 758 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2014). . . .
. . . Spock , 424 U.S. 828, 836, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976). . . .
. . . Dep't of Transp. , 836 F.3d 42, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up) (quoting NRDC v. . . .
. . . Michigan , 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991), where defendant's career offender "guideline . . .
. . . Supp. 3d 836, 844 (E.D. Tex. 2017). We affirmed the jury on appeal. VirnetX II , 748 F. . . . Supp. 3d 836 (E.D. Tex. 2017). We recently affirmed. See VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc. , 748 F. . . .
. . . . & UAW , 355 NLRB 836, 855-56 (2010) ; BP Amoco Chemicalfchocolate Bayou and Paper , 351 NLRB 614, 617 . . . indicating that it would bargain with the union in good faith, see, e.g. , Stabilus, Inc. & UAW , 355 NLRB 836 . . .
. . . Carter , 836 F.3d 722, 727-28 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc). . . . Petties , 836 F.3d at 727-28, citing Farmer v. . . . Petties , 836 F.3d at 728-29. . . . Proving actual subjective knowledge of the risk is often difficult, see Petties , 836 F.3d at 728, but . . . Barnes , 787 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases). . . .
. . . Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991). . . .
. . . Inc. , 836 F.3d 1263, 1269 n.4 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Jones , 755 F.3d at 413-14 ). . . .
. . . State , 163 Ga.App. 836, 296 S.E.2d 154, 154 (1982), upheld an indictment that charged a defendant with . . .
. . . of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk." 511 U.S. 825, 836 . . . Farmer , 511 U.S. at 836, 114 S.Ct. 1970. . . .
. . . Co. , 836 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2016) ). . . .
. . . Sood , 836 F.3d 800, 805 (7th Cir. 2016). . . .
. . . Colvin , 758 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2014). . . .
. . . Hill, 44 Mass.App.Ct. 184, 689 N.E.2d 833, 836 (1998) ). . . . See Kurker, 689 N.E.2d at 836. . . .
. . . Auth. of Montgomery , 836 F.2d 1292, 1302 (11th Cir. 1988). . . . See Norman , 836 F.2d at 1301. . . . Norman , 836 F.2d at 1301. . . . Norman , 836 F.2d at 1304. . . . See Norman , 836 F.2d at 1299-1300 ("We still believe that at least some of the Johnson factors have . . .
. . . Lucas , 836 F.3d 612, 625-26 (6th Cir. 2016) (a claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourteenth . . .
. . . Jones , 214 F.3d 836, 837-38 (7th Cir. 2000). . . . Ankeny , 502 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering such factors as whether the defendant had a history . . .
. . . Spock , 424 U.S. 828, 836, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976) ("The guarantees of the First Amendment . . . Cornelius , 473 U.S. at 801, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (citing Greer , 424 U.S. at 836, 96 S.Ct. 1211 ) (holding . . .
. . . United States , 450 U.S. 1, 6, 101 S.Ct. 836, 67 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (per curiam)). . . .
. . . Acres of Land , 821 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2016) ; United States v. 2,560.00 Acres of Land, More or Less , 836 . . .
. . . Whitaker, 908 F.3d 836, 840 (1st Cir. 2018). . . .
. . . Fogg , 836 F.3d 951, 956 (8th Cir. 2016) -even acknowledged, much less addressed, the possibility that . . .
. . . Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 764 F.3d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). . . .
. . . Ct. 830, 836-38, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018) (explaining the removal processes for various types of applicants . . .
. . . standing ... are threshold determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention."). 927 F.3d 830, 836 . . .
. . . . § 836(o). . . .
. . . Lanier Collection Agency , 486 U.S. 825, 830-31, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988) ). . . .
. . . Airline Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 88 F.3d 831, 836 (10th Cir. 1996) (explaining that "minor disputes [covered . . .
. . . been warned that he "would be required to follow all the 'ground rules' of trial procedure," id. at 836 . . .
. . . Linkline Commc'ns, Inc. , 555 U.S. 438, 450, 129 S.Ct. 1109, 172 L.Ed.2d 836 (2009) ; Verizon Commc'ns . . .
. . . Reckmeyer , 836 F.2d 200, 205-06 (4th Cir. 1987). . . . 853(n) 's requirement "that the interest exist in the property subject to forfeiture," Reckmeyer , 836 . . .
. . . Id. at 836. . . .
. . . Winfield , 664 A.2d 836, 838 (D.C. 1995). . . .
. . . Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc. , 486 U.S. 825, 829, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988) (citation . . .
. . . Flores , 73 F.3d 826, 836 (8th Cir. 1996) (affirming a three-level U.S.S.G. § 3B 1.1(b) enhancement for . . .
. . . Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). . . .
. . . Food & Drug Admin. , 836 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (per curiam). . . . Fund , 836 F.3d 987 ). . . . Fund , 836 F.3d 987. . . .
. . . Supp. 3d 818, 836 (E.D. . . .
. . . Fahey , 769 F.2d 829, 836 (1st Cir. 1985) ). . . .
. . . Schwartz , 836 F.3d 176, 194 (2d Cir. 2016) (standing); N.Y. SMSA Ltd. P'ship v. . . .
. . . Dole Food Company, Inc. , 836 F.3d 205, 224 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1631, not 28 U.S.C . . .
. . . Sec. of H.H.S., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that appellant was entitled to a de novo review . . .
. . . See id. at 836, 839. . . . Ct. at 836 ; see also id. at 851 (declining to address the underlying due process question). . . .
. . . Supp. 3d 828, 836 (S.D. Iowa 2015). . . .
. . . D'Addario , 268 Conn. 441, 455, 844 A.2d 836 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .
. . . App.), cert. denied , 549 U.S. 1098, 127 S.Ct. 836, 166 L.Ed.2d 670 (2006). Crutsinger , 576 F. . . .
. . . produce identification, and wait in the patrol car while the deputy examined his license. 457 F.3d 831, 836 . . .
. . . United States, 836 F.3d 894, 895-96 (8th Cir. 2016) (Melloy, J., dissenting). . . .
. . . McKune , 323 F.3d 825, 836 (10th Cir. 2003). . . . See Cook , 323 F.3d at 836. . . .
. . . Gill, 513 F.3d 836, 849 (8th Cir. 2008) ). . . .
. . . Co. , 585 F.3d 833, 836-37 (5th Cir. 2009). . . .
. . . App. 3d at 836, 145 Ill.Dec. 810, 557 N.E.2d 580. . . .
. . . Dist. of Phila. , 836 F.3d 235, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2016). . . .
. . . Isabella , 918 F.3d 816, 836 (10th Cir. 2019) ("We review evidentiary decisions applying the [Federal . . .
. . . Michigan , 501 U.S. 957, 962, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (citing Robinson v. . . .
. . . Petruk, 836 F.3d 974, 976 (8th Cir. 2016). . . .
. . . Rosario, 836 F.3d 1072, 1085 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . . Draper, 836 F.3d at 1085. . . .
. . . Robinson , 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). . . . See Pate , 383 U.S. at 378, 86 S.Ct. 836. See also Twining v. . . .
. . . Rosario , 836 F.3d 1072, 1085 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . . Draper , 836 F.3d at 1085. . . .
. . . Bank Nat'l Ass'n , 764 F.3d 833, 836-37 (8th Cir. 2014) ; Peterson v. . . . Shorthorn Ass'n , 402 F.3d 833, 836-37 (8th Cir. 2005). Grassmueck , 402 F.3d at 836-37. . . . Dkt. 75 at 13. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) ; Grassmueck , 402 F.3d at 836. See supra note 14. Pl.' . . .
. . . Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841-42 (1st Cir. 1993). . . .
. . . Barnes, Almanac of American Politics 2016, p. 836 (2015). . . . See Almanac of American Politics 2016, at 836, 880. . . .
. . . , 107 S.Ct. 2360 (parsing claims under different prongs of reopener statute); Heckler , 470 U.S. at 836 . . . See also, e.g. , Heckler , supra, at 836-837, 105 S.Ct. 1649. . . .
. . . Sood , 836 F.3d 800, 805 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Farmer v. . . .
. . . Stevens , 529 U.S. 765, 772, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) ); United States ex rel. . . .