The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
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We review de novo the dismissal of Taig's amended complaint against the city. Turner v. Williams, 65 F.4th 564, 577 (11th Cir. 2023). The alleged facts "must make a claim for relief not merely possible, but plausible." Id. "We review de novo whether . . . [law enforcement] officers are entitled to immunity." Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2016). We resolve any issues of material fact in Taig's favor and then address the legal question whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. See Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 848-49 (11th Cir. 2010).Mr. Carrin also had a serious medical need. Black v. Alabama Dep't of Corr., 578 Fed.Appx. 794, 795 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Hepatitis C is a serious medical need”); see, e.g., Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 862 (7th Cir. 2011); Hoffer, 973 F.3d at 1270; Gordon v. Schilling, 937 F.3d 348, 356 (4th Cir. 2019); Woodcock v. Correct Care Sols., 861 Fed.Appx. 654, 659 (6th Cir. 2021). Defendants do not dispute the seriousness of Mr. Carrin's medical need or his right to medical treatment. Rather, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because they did not violate Mr. Carrin's constitutional rights. ECF No. 74 at 6; ECF No. 75 at 6-7; ECF No. 80 at 6-7. Defendants argue that their actions or inactions did not rise “to the level of deliberate indifference.” ECF No. 74 at 9; ECF No. 75 at 910; ECF No. 80 at 9-10. Thus, the issue is whether the complaint sufficiently alleged that Defendants committed a constitutional violation.For instance, a trademarked good may be materially altered if a defendant defaces a good. See Davidoff, 263 F.3d at 1302-1303 (noting that defendant etched glasses of bottle of fragrances to remove batch code markings). A trademarked good may also be materially altered if a reseller removes the good from its original packaging and repackages that good in packaging that is not approved by the trademark owner's quality controls, and removes the warranty information from a good, invalidating the warranty. TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Pak China Grp. Co., 843 F.Supp.2d 1284, 1298 (S.D. Fla. 2012). Other examples of materially altering a good include adding markings on batteries (e.g., a “Not for Retail Trade” designation) while removing “safety information, safe handling instructions, and other warnings,” in addition to replacing the packaging of those batteries, Energizer Brands, LLC v. My Battery Supplier, LLC, 529 F.Supp.3d 57, 62 (E.D.N.Y. 2021); altering the “boxes, wrappers and trays” of various chocolate assortments, Nestle, 982 F.2d at 643; and an importer and distributor importing dolls into the United States with “adoption” papers in Spanish, not English, Original… As an initial matter, the Court observes that Mr. Johnson has not properly objected to the Report because no objection is “specific” as required by Rule 72(b)(2). See Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed.Appx. 781, 783 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that a challenge to a report and recommendation must identify “the specific basis for objection” (quoting Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 822 (11th Cir. 1989))). Instead, he makes general, conclusory objections to the Magistrate Judge's findings. See, e.g., Objections at 1-2 (“At page 34 of the R&R, Plaintiff objects to the finding that the ‘allegations [contained in the complaint] fail to show that Mr. Johnson has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury' associated with Confederate tributes on public land.”); id. at 2 (“At page 34 of the R&R, Plaintiff objects to the finding that ‘Mr. Johnson fails to allege facts sufficient to establish ordinary or taxpayer standing, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, and dismissal is warranted.'”). While Mr. Johnson expresses his disagreement with Judge Barksdale's recommended findings, he fails to explain the basis for his disagreement, and he identifies no legal or… After the district court has accepted a guilty plea and before sentencing, the defendant may withdraw a guilty plea if the defendant shows "a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). This standard should be liberally construed, but there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing. Buckles, 843 F.2d at 471. To determine whether a defendant has met this standard, a district court "may consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea," including "(1) whether close assistance of counsel was available; (2) whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; (3) whether judicial resources would be conserved; and (4) whether the government would be prejudiced if the defendant were allowed to withdraw his plea." Id. at 471-72 (citations omitted). We have not given considerable weight to the third and fourth factors when a defendant is found to have had the close assistance of counsel and pled guilty knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1987). A district court need not find prejudice to the government before it can deny a defendant's motion to withdraw… Dependency proceedings are unique because of the interrelated substantial interests involved. See N.S.H. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 843 So.2d 898, 902 (Fla. 2003) (noting that dependency proceedings are civil proceedings that affect "the substantial interests of the parents and children involved"). Of course, the most important consideration in any chapter 39 proceeding is the health, safety, and welfare of the child involved. See § 39.001(1)(b)1., Fla. Stat. ("The health and safety of the children served shall be of paramount concern."). From this primary consideration springs the State's significant interest in protecting the child from harm; however, that interest is juxtaposed with a parent's "natural God-given legal right to enjoy the custody, fellowship[,] and companionship of his offspring." State ex rel. Sparks v. Reeves, 97 So.2d 18, 20 (Fla. 1957); see Padgett v. Dep't of Health and Rehab. Servs., 577 So.2d 565, 568 (Fla. 1991) ("While we are loath to sanction government interference in the sacrosanct parent-child relationship, we are more reluctant still to forsake the welfare of our youth."). These often complimentary-but sometimes competing-interests lead… this offense: Title & Section Nature of Offense Date Offense Concluded Count Number(s) U.S.C. §§ 843(b) and 843(d)(1) Unlawful Use of Communications Facility in Furtherance of a Controlled Substance Offense
Furthermore, the Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff's argument that the lack of inspections leading up to her fall is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact can infer that the condition existed long enough that the exercise of reasonable care would have resulted in discovery by Defendant. As the Eleventh Circuit has recognized, “the fact there was no inspection for a given length of time in itself provides no proof that the defect was actually there for a sufficient period to place a landowner on reasonable notice of its existence.'” Espinoza v. Target Corp., 843 Fed.Appx. 168, 172 (11th Cir. 2021). There is no record evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer constructive notice based on the length of time the water was on the floor prior to Plaintiff's fall. As such, the Court turns to whether there is evidence of constructive notice based on regularity and foreseeability.Any dispute about whether Calusa Bay properly seeks actual cash value or replacement cost value, however, is “not [a] bas[i]s for denying appraisal.” CMR Constr. & Roofing, LLC v. Empire Indem. Ins. Co., No. 2:18-cv-779-FtM-99UAM, 2019 WL 2281678, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 29, 2019), aff'd, 843 Fed.Appx. 189 (11th Cir. 2021). A “review of the [c]omplaint's allegations shows that the parties at least disagree as to the amount of loss. Whether either party is justified in its disagreement is not an issue the Court addresses when determining whether appraisal is appropriate.” Id. Put differently, Empire's contentions about what losses are covered by the policy relate to a separate legal dispute that should be raised in a motion for summary judgment or at trial-not in opposing appraisal. Empire appears to acknowledge as much. (See Doc. 39 at 18 (arguing that “even if appraised, such amounts would not be enforceable”)). Indeed, Empire's ability to contest coverage of the reported losses is wholly unaffected by the appraisal process. See, e.g., Sunshine State Ins. Co. v. Rawlins, 34 So.3d 753, 754 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (citation omitted) (“[T]he order in which the issues of damages… The Court also finds that Plaintiff has shown a substantial threat of irreparable injury absent a preliminary injunction. “An injury is ‘irreparable' only if it cannot be undone through monetary remedies.” Arthur J. Gallagher Serv. Co. v. Egan, 514 Fed.Appx. 839, 843 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Under Florida law, the violation of a restrictive covenant creates a rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury. Fla. Stat. § 542.335(1)(j). Given that Plaintiff has demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, there exists a rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury. See TransUnion Risk & Alt. Data Sols., Inc. v. MacLachlan, 625 Fed.Appx. 403, 406-07 (11th Cir. 2015). Defendants have not rebutted this presumption. Plaintiff has therefore satisfied the second prerequisite to obtaining a preliminary injunction.. . . Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 842-843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984 . . .
. . . Amara , 563 U.S. 421, 439, 131 S.Ct. 1866, 179 L.Ed.2d 843 (2011) ; Montanile v. . . .
. . . similar); Act of June 6, 1900, § 2, 31 Stat. 322 (Alaska, similar); Act of Sept. 11, 1968, § 1, 82 Stat. 843 . . .
. . . Lidster , 540 U.S. 419, 424, 124 S.Ct. 885, 157 L.Ed.2d 843 (2004) ; see also Cohens v. . . .
. . . EPA , 843 F.2d 782, 791 (C.A.4 1988) ("[T]he control of non[-]point source pollution was so dependent . . .
. . . Co. , 867 F.3d 843, 848 (C.A.7 2017) ; EEOC v. . . . Id. , at 843, n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778 ; see also INS v. . . .
. . . No. 19-843. Supreme Court of the United States. March 9, 2020. . . .
. . . Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 843, n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984 . . .
. . . Brand X , deferred to the agency's new interpretation, and rejected petitioners' claim. 921 F.3d 836, 843 . . . is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." 467 U.S. at 843 . . . Id. , at 843-844, 104 S.Ct. 2778. . . . Michigan , supra , at ----, 135 S.Ct. at, 2713 (THOMAS, J., concurring) (quoting Chevron , supra , at 843 . . .
. . . Brock , 843 F.2d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir. 1987). . . . City & Cty. of San Francisco , 897 F.3d at 1244 (quoting Bresgal , 843 F.2d at 1170-71 ) (internal quotation . . . Bresgal , 843 F.2d at 1165. . . . City & Cty. of San Francisco , 897 F.3d at 1244 (quoting Bresgal , 843 F.2d at 1170-71 ) (internal quotation . . .
. . . Elyea , 631 F.3d 843, 859 (7th Cir. 2011) ("[I]nmate medical care decisions must be fact-based with respect . . .
. . . Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). . . .
. . . Dynegy, Inc. , 375 F.3d 831, 843 n.12 (9th Cir. 2004). . . .
. . . Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) ). . . .
. . . . § 843(b) (Count Nine) 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count Fourteen) 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), . . .
. . . Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 843, n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984 . . .
. . . See Earle, 850 F.2d at 843. . . .
. . . Koerner , 843 F.3d 833, 849 (10th Cir. 2016) (denying summary judgment for prison warden where supervisory . . .
. . . Benally , 843 F.3d 350, 353 (9th Cir. 2016). . . . Benally , 843 F.3d at 352. . . . Benally , 843 F.3d at 354 n.1 ; see also Smith v. . . . Benally , 843 F.3d at 353-54 (applying Leocal and Fernandez-Ruiz v. . . . Benally , 843 F.3d 350, 354 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that United States v. . . .
. . . traditional tools of statutory construction to discern the meaning of a statute, Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843 . . .
. . . Brock , 843 F.2d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir. 1987) ). . . . (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Bresgal , 843 F.2d at 1170-71 )). . . . Trump , 897 F.3d at 1244 (quoting Bresgal , 843 F.2d at 1170 ). . . . Id. at 582 (quoting Bresgal , 843 F.2d at 1170-71 ). . . . Bresgal , 843 F.2d at 1170-71 (emphasis added). . . .
. . . Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) )). . . . (first quoting Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843 n.9, 104 S.Ct. 2778 ; then quoting Pauley v. . . .
. . . Smith , 739 F.3d 843, 846 (5th Cir. 2014). . . . Smith , 739 F.3d 843, 847 (5th Cir. 2014). . . .
. . . Id. at 843 n.9, 104 S. Ct. at 2782 n.9. . . . Id. at 843, 104 S. Ct. at 2782. . . . See Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S. Ct. at 2782 ; Perez-Guzman , 835 F.3d at 1076 n.5. . . . Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843-44, 104 S. Ct. at 2781-82. . . . INS , 272 F.3d 1176, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (quoting Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843 n.9, 104 S.Ct. . . .
. . . Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) ). . . .
. . . City of Alexander , 843 F.3d 763, 766-67 (8th Cir. 2016). . . .
. . . Berger , 843 F.3d 285 (affirming dismissal for failure to state a claim on former athletes' claims against . . . Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n , 843 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2016). See Dawson v. . . .
. . . enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need." 711 F.3d 840, 843 . . . See Budd , 711 F.3d at 843. Wathen points to Tesch v. . . .
. . . . § 843(b). . . . Section 843(b) makes it a felony to "knowingly or intentionally [ ] use any communication facility in . . . In support, the Government points to 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), a federal statute with some similarities to . . . Citing Johnstone and § 843(b), the Pennsylvania Superior Court held in Commonwealth v. . . . Johnstone were categorical-approach cases, and so did not take up the question of whether either § 843 . . .
. . . Id. at 843-44. . . .
. . . Aey , 319 F.3d 843, 848-49 (6th Cir. 2003). . . .
. . . DuPont de Nemours & Co. , 17 F.3d 836, 843 (6th Cir. 1994). . . .
. . . Hercules Real Estate Servs., Inc. , 339 Ga.App. 843, 795 S.E.2d 81, 89 (2016). . . .
. . . Stevens , 706 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2013), she described the request as "premature." . . .
. . . Long Term Disability Plan , 477 F.3d 833, 843 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Minadeo v. . . .
. . . Fairchild Semiconductor Int'l, Inc. , 843 F.3d 1315, 1342-45 (Fed. Cir. 2016). . . . Fairchild , 854 F.3d at 1365 ; see also Power Integrations , 843 F.3d at 1345 (remanding only with respect . . .
. . . California , 547 U.S. 843, 848, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006) (quoting United States v. . . .
. . . App. 3d 868, 874, 148 Cal.Rptr. 843 (1978) (quotations omitted). . . .
. . . Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). . . .
. . . Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). . . .
. . . Farrand Optical Co. , 862 F.2d 841, 843-44 (11th Cir. 1989). . . . Reflectone , 862 F.2d at 843 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). . . . Reflectone , 862 F.2d at 843 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). . . .
. . . Collings , 256 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2001) ; Kim v. . . .
. . . La Republica de Venezuela , 200 F.3d 843, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ; Hercaire Int'l, Inc. v. . . .
. . . . § 843(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 ; using a facility in interstate commerce to promote unlawful activity, . . .
. . . J.A. 843. . . . J.A. 843, 1190. . . .
. . . , a Texas appellate court confronted a similar situation and found the discovery rule inapplicable. 843 . . .
. . . United States , 843 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 2016) (guilty plea) (noting that the petitioner admitted . . .
. . . Co. , 469 Mich. 679, 677 N.W.2d 843, 845-46 (2004). . . .
. . . City of Alexander , 843 F.3d 763, 767 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Walton v. . . . Wallace , 843 F.3d at 767 (quoting Walton , 752 F.3d at 1116 ). . . .
. . . Prado, 204 F.3d 843, 845 (8th Cir. 2000). . . .
. . . Davis , 301 F.3d 843, 850 (7th Cir. 2002). . . .
. . . controversy is the threshold question in every federal case); see also In re Herrera , 472 B.R. 839, 843 . . .
. . . Altera Corp. , 926 F.3d at 1075 (first quoting Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778 ; then quoting . . .
. . . Cty. of Washoe , 843 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). . . . Ojeda , 276 F.3d 486, 488 (9th Cir. 2002) ; see Kirkpatrick , 843 F.3d at 791 ; United States v. . . .
. . . Burns , 843 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2016). . . .
. . . Varga , 843 F.3d 258, 262 (7th Cir. 2016). . . .
. . . Co., 157 F.3d 843, 844 (11th Cir. 1998). . . .
. . . Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. . . . Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. . . . Local 23 , 484 U.S. 112, 123, 108 S.Ct. 413, 98 L.Ed.2d 429 (1987) ); see also Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843 . . . See Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843 & n.11, 104 S.Ct. 2778. . . .
. . . Tavares , 843 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2016), and United States v. . . . See Kennedy , 881 F.3d at 19 ; Tavares , 843 F.3d at 13. . . .
. . . Shell Oil Co. , 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (The "inquiry must cease if . . . Id. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 843. . . . Robinson , 519 U.S. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 843. . . . Robinson , 519 U.S. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 843. . . .
. . . Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778 ; see also Kisor v. Wilkie , --- U.S. ----, 139 S. . . . Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. . . .
. . . Co., 157 F.3d 843, 844 (11th Cir. 1998) ; see also Sewell v. . . .
. . . arguments squarely and distinctly,' or else forever hold its peace" (quoting Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 . . .
. . . Cir. 2001) ; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9, 104 S.Ct. 2778. . . . Cir. 2003) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778 ). . . . Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. . . .
. . . Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC , 571 U.S. 191, 198-200, 134 S.Ct. 843, 187 L.Ed.2d 703 (2014) ; see also . . .
. . . Shell Oil Co. , 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). . . . Apartments, LLC , 843 F.3d 1225, 1235 (10th Cir. 2016) ("undermines"); United States v. . . .
. . . Hofstra Univ. , 173 F.3d 843 (2d Cir. 1999) (summary order); Yusuf v. . . .
. . . Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). . . . Id. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 843. . . . of Title VII was ambiguous as to whether it included former employees. 519 U.S. at 341-45, 117 S.Ct. 843 . . . Cf. id. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 843 ("At first blush, the term 'employees' in § 704(a) would seem to refer . . . Id. at 345, 117 S.Ct. 843. Similarly, in Yates v. . . . Shell Oil Co. , 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) ). . . .
. . . Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988) ). . . .
. . . HIF Bio, Inc. , 556 U.S. 635, 639, 129 S.Ct. 1862, 173 L.Ed.2d 843 (2009). . . .
. . . SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmBH , 843 F.3d 48, 65 (2d Cir. 2016). . . .
. . . JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. , 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014). . . .
. . . Murray , 843 F.3d 698, 715 n.9 (7th Cir. 2016). . . . Village of University Park , 887 F.3d 842, 843-44 (7th Cir. 2018) (finding that plaintiff failed to state . . .
. . . See Cooper , 842 F.3d at 843 (concluding that the term "regularly scheduled" was unconstitutionally vague . . .
. . . California , 547 U.S. 843, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006), that even after conditional release . . .
. . . Shell Oil Co. , 519 U.S. 337, 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) ). . . .
. . . Williamson ("Brett Williamson "), 859 F.3d 843, 862 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 . . .
. . . Ryerson & Son, Inc. , 302 F.3d 839, 843 (8th Cir. 2002). . . .
. . . Credit Union , 653 A.2d 842, 843 (D.C. 1995) ). . . .
. . . Co., 843 F.3d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 2016). . . .
. . . Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843 n.9, 104 S.Ct. 2778. . . . Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). . . .
. . . Shell Oil Co ., 519 U.S. 337, 341-42, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (use of different and clearer . . .
. . . Goodwin , 843 F.2d 1150, 1153 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding finding of qualified immunity where state official . . . See Goodwin , 843 F.2d at 1153 (noting that the Constitution protects "privacy" in the context of "the . . .
. . . . § 2L1.2, id. at 843-44, which uses the same terminology as § 4B1.2. . . .
. . . . § 2L1.2, id. at 843-44, which uses the same terminology as § 4B1.2. . . .
. . . Goodrich Corp. , 448 F.3d 843, 847 (6th Cir. 2006). . . .
. . . . & Repair, Inc. , 398 So. 2d 842, 843 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (quoting Perry v. . . .
. . . Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d 885, 889 (Fla. 2003). . . .
. . . State, 429 So. 2d 842, 843 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) ; Walton v. . . . where the State's case was based on the statutory inference set forth in section 812.022. 429 So. 2d at 843 . . .
. . . App'x 840, 843 (10th Cir. 2014) ; United States v. Silva , 566 Fed. . . .
. . . Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 843 (1st Cir. 1983) (quoting Wong Sun v. . . . Id. at 843 (citations omitted). . . .
. . . International, Ltd. , 787 So. 2d 838, 843 (Fla. 2001). . . .
. . . Parker , 843 F.3d 617, 623 (5th Cir. 2016). Nothing in the current case suggests a different order. . . .
. . . Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. For their part, Defendants eschew the Chevron framework. . . .
. . . Corp. , 843 F.2d 613, 617-18 (1st Cir. 1988) (categorizing as scandalous "matter which impugned the character . . .
. . . Kappes , 782 F.3d at 843. . . .
. . . Burns , 843 F.3d 679, 697 (7th Cir. 2016) (plain-error review requires a "specific showing of prejudice . . .
. . . Amara , 563 U.S. 421, 131 S.Ct. 1866, 179 L.Ed.2d 843 (2011). . . . JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. , 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014). . . .
. . . Ctr. , 258 F.3d 843, 846 (8th Cir. 2001) ("We do not think that the rules specifying the contents of . . .
. . . Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. . . .