The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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Even if these claims had merit, none of them pertain to Husband, who is the petitioner before us. See Palma v. S. Fla. Pulmonary &Critical Care, LLC, 307 So.3d 860, 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (observing that it is a "principle of law deeply ingrained in our legal and economic system that an LLC is an autonomous legal entity, separate and distinct from its members"). And it is obvious that we cannot grant certiorari relief based on alleged harm to a party not before the court. See Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 720 So.2d 214, 215 (Fla. 1998) ("[I]t is settled law that, as a condition precedent to invoking a district court's certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioning party must establish that it has suffered an irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on direct appeal." (emphasis added)); Mims v. Broxton, 191 So.3d 552, 553 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (noting that for an appellate court to have certiorari jurisdiction, "the petitioner must show" that "the petitioner will suffer" irreparable harm (emphasis added)).Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on Count IV because Defendants fail to state a plausible claim under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”), and the undisputed evidence fails to support any such claim. As with Count III, Defendants do not offer a response. To prevail on their FDUTPA claim, Defendants must prove three elements: “(1) a deceptive act or unfair practice; (2) causation; and (3) actual damages.” Am. Mariculture, Inc. v. Syaqua Americas, Inc., 2021 WL 2315003, *4 (M.D. Fla. June 7, 2021) (quoting Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 951 So.2d 860, 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)). An act is deceptive within the meaning of the FDUTPA where a party makes a “representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment.” Peterbrooke Franchising of Am., LLC v. Miami Chocolates, LLC, 312 F.Supp.3d 1325, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2018)). Furthermore, “[p]roof of actual damages is necessary to sustain a FDUTPA claim.” Nazario v. Pro. Acct. Servs., Inc., 2017 WL 1179917, *5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2017).The defendants argue here-as they did in the district court-that any fair-housing claims that are not barred by res judicata are barred by the statute of limitations. It is true that the Newmans alleged that the defendants discriminated against them beginning as early as 2008, and that any housing discrimination claims arising more than two years before they filed their complaint are generally barred under federal and state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (authorizing a civil action filed within two years of a discriminatory housing practice); Fla. Stat. § 760.35 (same for Florida housing discrimination claims). We therefore affirm the dismissal of the Newmans' housing-discrimination claims to the extent that they were clearly barred by the statute of limitations based on the Newmans' own allegations. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 879 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) ("we have discretion to affirm on any ground supported by the law and the record that will not expand the relief granted below" (quotation omitted)).Standing under the Fourth Amendment is non-jurisdictional, and "the government waives any standing objection that it fails to raise." United States v. Ross, 963 F.3d 1056, 1065-66 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc). A legal claim or argument not briefed before our court is deemed forfeited, and we will consider its merits only in extraordinary circumstances. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S.Ct. 95 (2022).Similarly, on appellate review, we do not consider "whether the record contains evidence which could be interpreted to support the arguments rejected by the JCC." Frederick v. United Airlines, 688 So.2d 412, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); see Swanigan, 442 So.2d at 1027 ("We do not review whether there was competent, substantial evidence to support the claim disallowed by the [JCC]; we only review whether the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the [JCC's] order.); Mercy Hosp. v. Holmes, 679 So.2d 860, 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) ("Once again we remind counsel of the basic premise that the standard of review in worker's compensation cases is whether competent substantial evidence supports the decision below, not whether it is possible to recite contradictory record evidence which supported the arguments rejected below.").Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b), the Court is authorized to enter final default judgment against a party who has failed to respond to a complaint. Before entering default judgment, a “district court must ensure that the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint . . . actually state a cause of action and that there is a substantive, sufficient basis in the pleadings for the particular relief sought.” Tyco Fire & Sec., LLC v. Alcocer, 218 Fed.Appx. 860, 863 (11th Cir. 2007). Upon review of the Motion and the record, the Court finds a sufficient basis to support ADS's claims against IB Corp for Negligence (Count IV) and Conversion (Count V). In addition, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established entitlement to the sum of $9,075,000.00, representing the total amount of the Bonds.While we hold the allegations of pro se litigants to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," we may not "serve as de facto counsel for a party" or "rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action." Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014). An appellant forfeits any argument not briefed on appeal, made in passing, or raised briefly without supporting arguments or authority. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 68182 (11th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir.) (en banc).(“nexus/joint action test”). Rayburn, 241 F.3d at 1347 (quoting NBC, Inc. v. Comm. Workers of America, 860 F.2d 1022, 1026-27 (11th Cir.1988)). Upon review, Plaintiff does not allege that any named Defendant
We will generally not consider non-jurisdictional arguments that are forfeited on appeal, however. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 872-73 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,__ U.S.__, 143 S.Ct. 95 (2022). Specifically, any "issue that an appellant wants the Court to address should be specifically and clearly identified in the brief.... Otherwise, the issue . . . will be considered abandoned." Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). An appellant fails to adequately brief a claim when he does not "plainly and prominently raise it." Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted) (discussing abandonment). Also, we will not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (deeming "issues . . . raised for the first time in a . . . litigant's reply brief" abandoned).The Defendants have shown good cause to seal the documents. The Defendants' legitimate interest in maintaining privacy around commercial information including pricing and finances outweighs the public interest in accessing the agreements here, especially because the information does not appear to be central to the Plaintiff's claims. See VAS Aero Servs., LLC v. Arroyo, 860 F.Supp.2d 1349, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (Middlebrooks, J.) (“Documents containing strategic marketing plans and pricing information have been held to constitute trade secrets under Florida law.”) Further, the publication of the information could give the Defendants' competitors an unfair advantage by providing insight into the inner workings of the Defendant businesses and their heavily negotiated confidential business dealings. See Deltona Transformer Corp. v. Noco Co., No. 6:19-CV-308-CEM-LRH, 2021 WL 4443999, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 21, 2021) (granting leave to file under seal “information concerning [] internal business operations, financials, customer information, competitive strategy, business decisions of the parties, and internal decision making-process.”) The Court therefore grants the Defendants… . . . Whitney , 14 Wall. 620, 649, 20 L.Ed. 860 (1872) (vacating an accounting that exceeded the profits from . . . Brown , 658 F.3d 858, 860-861 (CA8 2011) (per curiam ) (ordering joint-and-several disgorgement of funds . . . Whitney , 14 Wall. 620, 649, 20 L.Ed. 860 (1872) ; see also ante , at 1955 - 1946, 1949 - 1950. . . .
. . . No. 19-860 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . Matal , 860 F.3d 1352 (2017). . . .
. . . Strickland , 860 F.3d 1224, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 2017) ). . . . Strickland , 860 F.3d 1224, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 2017) ). . . . Calvillo-Palacios , 860 F.3d 1285, 1291 (9th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Sumner , 860 F.2d 328, 337 (9th Cir. 1988). . . . Michenfelder , 860 F.2d at 337 ; see also 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure . . . Michenfelder , 860 F.2d at 337. . . . Michenfelder , 860 F.2d at 337. . . .
. . . City of Westminster , 177 F.3d 839, 860 (9th Cir. 1999), as amended on denial of reh'g (July 15, 1999 . . .
. . . Cotton , 535 U.S. 625, 632, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002), and Johnson v. . . .
. . . Springfield , 829 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1987) was "clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning and the results . . .
. . . Supp. 3d 860, 872 (E.D. . . .
. . . State of Alabama , 860 F. Supp. 808, 816 (M.D. Ala. 1994). . . .
. . . Santana, 150 F.3d 860, 864 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). . . .
. . . Zamora-Salazar , 860 F.3d 826, 836 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S. . . .
. . . Foster Wheeler LLC , 860 F.3d 249, 258 (4th Cir. 2017) ). . . .
. . . Co. , 98 F.3d 860, 868 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Broussard v. Southern Pac. Transp. . . .
. . . Sessions , 860 F.3d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 2017). See Leyva-Licea v. . . .
. . . Stitt , 860 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. granted , --- U.S. ----, 138 S. . . . protection to a homeless person living in a car that it does to a person living in a manor, see Stitt , 860 . . .
. . . departures, as consistent with both the governing statutes and constitutional requirements. 862 F.3d at 860 . . . policies and practices' that 'avoid[ ] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants,' " id. at 860 . . .
. . . App. 3d 563, 307 Ill.Dec. 806, 860 N.E.2d 460 (2006), which holds that "[i]t is the duty to defend that . . . Id. at 570, 307 Ill.Dec. 806, 860 N.E.2d 460 (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Home Ins. . . .
. . . Sessions , 860 F.3d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 2017). Id . Id . 136 S. Ct. at 2256. United States v. . . . Harbin , 860 F.3d at 65. . . .
. . . Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc. , 860 F. Supp. 370, 375 (S.D. . . .
. . . Ryan , 571 F.3d 860, 870 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations and punctuation omitted). . . .
. . . Astrue , 860 F. Supp. 2d 615, 633 (N.D. Ill. 2012). . . .
. . . Watson Indus., Inc., 23 A.D.3d 1152, 803 N.Y.S.2d 860, 863 (2005) (restating the "well settled" proposition . . .
. . . Supp. 3d 860 (E.D.N.C. 2016). . . .
. . . Att'y Gen. , 881 F.3d 860, 874 (11th Cir. 2018). . . .
. . . Sec. of the Treasury of the U.S. , 475 U.S. 851, 860, 106 S.Ct. 1600, 89 L.Ed.2d 855 (1986) ("The normal . . .
. . . Montgomery , 860 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1988) ; Murphy v. . . .
. . . Janklow, 300 F.3d 842, 860 (8th Cir. 2002), and SB 2289 sufficiently evinces such a public purpose, I . . . Inst., 300 F.3d at 860 ; Deere & Co. v. State, 168 N.H. 460, 130 A.3d 1197, 1211 (2015). . . . Inst., 300 F.3d at 860, irrespective of whether the benefits to them are incidental. . . . Id. at 860-62. . . . purpose of a similar law was "to level the playing field between manufacturers and dealers," 300 F.3d at 860 . . .
. . . Selig , 860 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 2017) ("[W]e are bound by decisions of prior panels[ ] unless [ . . .
. . . . §§ 846, 860; and • conspiring to possess firearms during drug-trafficking crimes, see 18 U.S.C. § 924 . . .
. . . Greater Orlando Aviation , 860 So. 2d 1031, 1038 (Fla. Dist. Ct. . . .
. . . Union Gen. de Trabajadores de P.R., 903 F.2d 857, 860 (1st Cir. 1990) ); see also Advest, Inc. v. . . .
. . . Hiland Roberts Dairy, Co. , 860 F.3d 1121, 1125-26 (8th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Mustafa, 695 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). . . .
. . . Robins Co., Inc. , 860 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988) (concluding district court could require counsel to appear . . .
. . . Cotton , 535 U.S. 625, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002). . . .
. . . Volpe , 833 F.2d 850, 860 n.6 (9th Cir. 1987) (describing the district court's inability "to [otherwise . . .
. . . Burden , 860 F.3d 45, 56-57 (2d Cir. 2017) (distinguishing United States v. . . .
. . . account of "the limitations on the federal courts in the field of mental health," Shawar , 865 F.2d at 860 . . .
. . . Rogers Cartage Co. , 794 F.3d 854, 860-61 (7th Cir. 2015) ; Smith v. . . .
. . . Uhl , 210 F. 860, 862 (2d Cir. 1914). 569 U.S. at 191, 133 S.Ct. 1678. . . . Uhl , 210 F. 860, 862 (C.A.2 1914). 569 U.S. at 191, 133 S.Ct. 1678. . . . immigrant has committed such a crime, the record must show that he was convicted of the crime." 210 F. 860 . . .
. . . Betts-Gaston , 860 F.3d 525, 539 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S. . . .
. . . Mosby-Year Book, Inc. , 969 S.W.2d 860, 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (internal quotation omitted). . . .
. . . See supra p.860 and note 3. R.38 at 32. Id. at 33. Appellant's Br. 9. . . .
. . . Brown County , 860 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2017) ; see generally Mathews v. . . .
. . . Fort Howard Paper Co. , 772 F.2d 860, 863 (Fed. . . .
. . . Ct. 853, 860, 190 L.Ed.2d 747 (2015). . . .
. . . Trump, 860 F.3d 686, 690 (D.C. . . .
. . . Stitt , 860 F.3d 854, 860-61 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (" Stitt I "). . . . Stitt I , 860 F. 3d at 856, 860-61. . . . Stitt I , 860 F.3d at 857. . . . Stitt I , 860 F.3d at 860-61. We also overruled our previous decision in United States v. . . .
. . . United States , 860 F.3d 547, 551 (7th Cir. 2017), and we see none here. . . .
. . . Chinese Univ. of Hong Kong , 860 F.3d 1367, 1377-79 (Fed. Cir. 2017). . . . Stanford , 860 F.3d at 1372-73 (noting that the Board relied on "Dr. . . . Stanford , 860 F.3d at 1378, 1379. . . . Stanford , 860 F.3d at 1374-75. . . . Stanford , 860 F.3d at 1370. . . .
. . . State, 238 So. 3d 857, 860 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017). . . .
. . . Cotton , 535 U.S. 625, 631, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) ). . . .
. . . Sebelius , 607 F.3d 860 (D.C. Cir. 2010). . . .
. . . Santana, 150 F.3d 860, 864 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .
. . . Lester Coggins Trucking, Inc. , 771 F.2d 860, 865-66 (5th Cir. 1985) ("An underlying principle is that . . .
. . . A.R. 404, 451, 467, 494, 519, 581, 645, 650, 789, 835, 848, 860, 866, 871, 1141, 1147, 1161). . . .
. . . Gomez , 763 F.3d at 860. . . . Gomez , 763 F.3d at 860. In this case, we are troubled by what was omitted from the instructions. . . .
. . . Great Lakes Brewing Co. , 860 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). . . .
. . . Univ. of Hous. , 860 F.3d 767, 777-78 (5th Cir. 2017) (resolving the case by reference to the Yusuf framework . . .
. . . Brown , 188 F.3d 860, 865-66 (7th Cir. 1999) (describing the Terry inquiry as "objective, not subjective . . .
. . . Dist ., 860 F.3d 494, 499-500 (7th Cir. 2017), and we follow the district court and the parties in using . . .
. . . State , 258 Ark. 880, 529 S.W.2d 860, 863 (1975). . . .
. . . Alliance Bank , 860 N.W.2d 638, 645 (Minn. 2015). Minn. Stat. § 513.45 ; Kelley v. . . . Minn. 2016) (citing Finn , 860 N.W.2d at 645 ). . . . Finn , 860 N.W.2d at 648-49. See generally Kelley v. Kanios , 2019 WL 2193163, at *5, *13 n.16. . . .
. . . Louisiana , 860 F.3d 785, 793 (5th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases). . . .
. . . Framingham Union Hosp. , 401 Mass. 860, 862, 520 N.E.2d 139 (1988) (emphasis added). . . .
. . . Windsor Industries, Inc. , 730 F.2d 860, 863 (2d Cir. 1984), which may include the employer's "knowledge . . .
. . . Id. , at 860. . . .
. . . If any person commits a violation of this subparagraph or of section 849, 859, 860, or 861 of this title . . .
. . . Thomas, 524 F.3d 855, 860-63 (8th Cir. 2008) (Colloton, J., concurring) (arguing that the first prong . . .
. . . Aleman, 860 So.2d 425 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). . . .
. . . Griffin , 542 So. 2d 860, 865 (Miss. 1989) )). . . .
. . . Smith , 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S.Ct. 2578, 153 L.Ed.2d 762 (2002) (per curiam). . . .
. . . Alvarez , 20 Misc.3d 606, 860 N.Y.S.2d 745 (Crim. Ct. 2008). . . . Alvarez , 20 Misc.3d 606, 860 N.Y.S.2d 745 (Crim. Ct. 2008). See Guzman v. Holder , 340 F. . . .
. . . Vernon, 567 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 2009) ; Rogers v. . . .
. . . United States, 36 C.I.T. 860, 893-94, 865 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1248-49 (2012). . . .
. . . Apfel , 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000) ). . . .
. . . (quoting In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig. , 860 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc . . .
. . . Jennings , 860 F.3d 450, 457 (7th Cir. 2017) ; Yates v. . . . See Jones , 870 F.3d at 753-54 ; Jennings , 860 F.3d at 460 ; Yates , 842 F.3d at 1053. . . .
. . . Weaver , 860 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). . . . Weaver , 860 F.3d at 94 (citation omitted, emphasis added). . . .
. . . Cotton , 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) ) ("When a requirement goes to subject-matter . . .
. . . United States , 465 U.S. 848, 859-61, 104 S.Ct. 1519, 79 L.Ed.2d 860 (1984) (holding that plaintiff's . . .
. . . Ahern , 207 Va. 860, 153 S.E.2d 216, 219 (1967) ). This argument also fails. . . .
. . . See id. at 860. This factor favors granting petitioner a bond hearing. . . . Supp. 3d 235, at 860 ; Sajous , 2018 WL 2357266, at *11 ("If immigration officials have caused delay, . . . Supp. 3d 853, at 860. . . .
. . . Smith , 860 F.3d 508, 516 (7th Cir. 2017) ("Before we can conclude that a court did not abuse its discretion . . .
. . . Asher , 910 F.3d 854, 860-61 (6th Cir. 2018). . . .
. . . Uhl , 210 F. 860, 863 (2d Cir. 1914) (noting that in determining whether a conviction is one involving . . .
. . . Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. , 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that review of the Secretary's . . .
. . . Foster Wheeler LLC , 860 F.3d 249, 254 (4th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). . . . carried out "for or relating to" the alleged official authority. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) ; Sawyer , 860 . . . Sawyer , 860 F.3d at 258 (finding a sufficient connection between the charged conduct and the asserted . . . were carried out "for or relating to" the alleged federal authority. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) ; Sawyer , 860 . . .
. . . Cotton , 535 U.S. 625, 629-31, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002), that such a flaw does not implicate . . .
. . . State , 262 So. 3d 859, 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) ("Because Appellant pled no contest without expressly . . .
. . . State , 860 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (emphasis added). . . .
. . . Taylor Milk Co., Inc. , 64 F.3d 860, 868 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying prejudgment interest at the IRS overpayment . . .
. . . Sessions , 860 F.3d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 2017) (state controlled substance statute that "incorporates state . . . include additional facts that need not be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt"); Harbin , 860 . . .
. . . Bryant , 860 F.3d 345, 352 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. . . . Barber , 860 F.3d at 352. . . .
. . . Brown , 188 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that not every investigatory stop will automatically . . .
. . . Murphy , 406 F.3d 857, 860-61 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding constructive amendment where court instructed . . .
. . . Georgia Gulf Corp. , 245 F.Supp.2d 853, 860-61 (M.D. La. Nov. 4, 2002) (applying Cleveland ). . . .
. . . Butland , 951 So. 2d 860, 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) ). . . .