The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
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As an initial matter, while Butler challenged the voluntariness of his consent in the district court, he abandoned any challenge to the district court's ruling on that issue by failing to brief it on appeal. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 871 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). Additionally, Butler does not challenge the district court's credibility determinations on appeal. Thus, we need address only the district court's findings that (1) the government's logical and physical extractions were within the scope of Butler's consent, and (2) Butler had a "minimal" possessory interest in the Samsung smartphone.Lotero-Diaz asserts her 2008 removal order was obtained unlawfully under 8 U.S.C. § 1361. We lack jurisdiction to review (or estop the government from enforcing) Lotero-Diaz's 2008 removal order, as she did not timely file a petition for review of that order. See Bing Quan Lin v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 881 F.3d 860, 870 (11th Cir. 2018) (stating we lack jurisdiction to "review earlier trips through immigration proceedings"). "[T]o seek judicial review of [the BIA's 2008] order, [Lotero-Diaz] must have filed a petition with [this] Court within 30 days of the issuance of that order," but she did not do so. See Gaksakuman v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 767 F.3d 1164, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)).While James expressed that she would personally take the stand if accused of a crime, she never stated that she would require testimony from Fleming. When pressed by defense counsel on this point, she stated that a juror is supposed to consider "all of the evidence" before them. And the trial court rehabilitated James by explaining the applicable law and asking if she could follow it. See Conde v. State, 860 So.2d 930, 941 (Fla. 2003) ("[W]here a prospective juror's answers suggest incompetency to be a juror, rehabilitation by the prosecutor or judge is the proper next step."). James' later answers show that she could follow the law and that she would not consider Fleming's decision not to testify during deliberations. Her responses simply do not express the prejudice required to grant a cause challenge."A denial of a motion to suppress involves mixed questions of fact and law," so we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and review questions of law and the district court's application of the law to facts de novo. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 870 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). We review a decision to admit expert opinion testimony for abuse of discretion and will not reverse "in the absence of manifest error." United States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234, 1264 (11th Cir. 2015).It is true that we have recognized a narrow exception to this rule that permits a petitioner to file a numerically second § 2254 petition when it raises a claim that could not have been brought in the original habeas petition. See Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856, 860 (11th Cir. 2011). But Jackson's current petition does not fall into this narrow exception because he does not raise any claim that could not have been brought earlier. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal.As an initial matter, to the extent Barotov seeks to challenge the BIA's 2021 decision and final order of removal directly, we lack jurisdiction. See Bing Quan Lin v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 881 F.3d 860, 870 (11th Cir. 2018) (stating we lack jurisdiction to "review earlier trips through immigration proceedings"). "[T]o seek judicial review of [that] order," Barotov was required to "have filed a petition with [this] Court within 30 days of the issuance of that order," but he did not do so. Gaksakuman, 767 F.3d at 1168. Thus, we dismiss his petition in this respect.the nonmovant's burden under Rule 56(d). Smedley v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, 676 Fed. App'x 860, 862 (11th Cir. 2017) (citation and quotation omitted). Similarly, the nonmovant cannot rely on “vague
Construing liberally Albert's appellate brief, we see no substantive arguments challenging the district court's rulings denying Albert's motion to reopen and denying Albert leave to file a second amended complaint. Albert has thus forfeited the argument that the district court erred in denying those motions. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 863 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (explaining that an appellant forfeits an argument by failing to raise it in his appellate brief); Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) ("While we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned." (citation omitted)).Although Ulta has cited to several cases in which written warnings were not considered materially adverse employment actions, those cases do not stand for the proposition that written warnings cannot constitute adverse employment actions as a categorical matter. See Debe, 860 Fed.Appx. at 641 (finding “unjustified coaching, increased scrutiny, [and] unfounded discipline” insufficient to demonstrate an adverse effect where the plaintiff did not demonstrate they resulted in objective harm”); see also Comerinsky v. Augusta Coating & Mfg., LLC, 418 F.Supp.3d 1252, 1263 (S.D. Ga. 2019) (“Although reprimands are not, per se, materially adverse changes under Title VII, they may qualify as adverse employment actions under the particular circumstances of a case.”); Brathwaite v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., Fla., 763 Fed.Appx. 856, 860 (11th Cir. 2019) (“The Eleventh Circuit has not yet held, in a published opinion, whether reprimands alone can or should constitute materially adverse changes under Burlington.”).The bottom line is this: Horowitz agreed that his only recourse-for any problems that might arise with his yacht-would be against Allied Marine. He thus cannot now revoke acceptance of the yacht from FGA or sue it for breach of warranty. We, therefore, properly dismissed Counts II, III, and V of the Amended Complaint. And, given the “historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals,” we exercise our discretion and decline Horowitz's invitation to certify judgment in FGA's favor on those claims. See Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 483 F.3d 773, 778 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The district court must act as a dispatcher and exercise its discretion in certifying partial judgments in consideration of judicial administrative interests-including the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals-and the equities involved.” (cleaned up)). Horowitz doesn't even suggest that he would suffer any prejudice by having to wait until after his trial against Allied Marine to appeal the whole case. See generally Motion for Reconsideration. And it's not our place to make arguments for him. See Cosgun v. Seabourn Cruise Line Ltd. Inc., 2023 WL 2660243, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 28… . . . Whitney , 14 Wall. 620, 649, 20 L.Ed. 860 (1872) (vacating an accounting that exceeded the profits from . . . Brown , 658 F.3d 858, 860-861 (CA8 2011) (per curiam ) (ordering joint-and-several disgorgement of funds . . . Whitney , 14 Wall. 620, 649, 20 L.Ed. 860 (1872) ; see also ante , at 1955 - 1946, 1949 - 1950. . . .
. . . No. 19-860 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . Matal , 860 F.3d 1352 (2017). . . .
. . . Strickland , 860 F.3d 1224, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 2017) ). . . . Strickland , 860 F.3d 1224, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 2017) ). . . . Calvillo-Palacios , 860 F.3d 1285, 1291 (9th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Sumner , 860 F.2d 328, 337 (9th Cir. 1988). . . . Michenfelder , 860 F.2d at 337 ; see also 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure . . . Michenfelder , 860 F.2d at 337. . . . Michenfelder , 860 F.2d at 337. . . .
. . . City of Westminster , 177 F.3d 839, 860 (9th Cir. 1999), as amended on denial of reh'g (July 15, 1999 . . .
. . . Cotton , 535 U.S. 625, 632, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002), and Johnson v. . . .
. . . Springfield , 829 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1987) was "clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning and the results . . .
. . . Supp. 3d 860, 872 (E.D. . . .
. . . State of Alabama , 860 F. Supp. 808, 816 (M.D. Ala. 1994). . . .
. . . Santana, 150 F.3d 860, 864 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). . . .
. . . Zamora-Salazar , 860 F.3d 826, 836 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S. . . .
. . . Foster Wheeler LLC , 860 F.3d 249, 258 (4th Cir. 2017) ). . . .
. . . Co. , 98 F.3d 860, 868 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Broussard v. Southern Pac. Transp. . . .
. . . Sessions , 860 F.3d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 2017). See Leyva-Licea v. . . .
. . . Stitt , 860 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. granted , --- U.S. ----, 138 S. . . . protection to a homeless person living in a car that it does to a person living in a manor, see Stitt , 860 . . .
. . . departures, as consistent with both the governing statutes and constitutional requirements. 862 F.3d at 860 . . . policies and practices' that 'avoid[ ] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants,' " id. at 860 . . .
. . . App. 3d 563, 307 Ill.Dec. 806, 860 N.E.2d 460 (2006), which holds that "[i]t is the duty to defend that . . . Id. at 570, 307 Ill.Dec. 806, 860 N.E.2d 460 (quoting Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Home Ins. . . .
. . . Sessions , 860 F.3d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 2017). Id . Id . 136 S. Ct. at 2256. United States v. . . . Harbin , 860 F.3d at 65. . . .
. . . Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc. , 860 F. Supp. 370, 375 (S.D. . . .
. . . Ryan , 571 F.3d 860, 870 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations and punctuation omitted). . . .
. . . Astrue , 860 F. Supp. 2d 615, 633 (N.D. Ill. 2012). . . .
. . . Watson Indus., Inc., 23 A.D.3d 1152, 803 N.Y.S.2d 860, 863 (2005) (restating the "well settled" proposition . . .
. . . Supp. 3d 860 (E.D.N.C. 2016). . . .
. . . Att'y Gen. , 881 F.3d 860, 874 (11th Cir. 2018). . . .
. . . Sec. of the Treasury of the U.S. , 475 U.S. 851, 860, 106 S.Ct. 1600, 89 L.Ed.2d 855 (1986) ("The normal . . .
. . . Montgomery , 860 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1988) ; Murphy v. . . .
. . . Janklow, 300 F.3d 842, 860 (8th Cir. 2002), and SB 2289 sufficiently evinces such a public purpose, I . . . Inst., 300 F.3d at 860 ; Deere & Co. v. State, 168 N.H. 460, 130 A.3d 1197, 1211 (2015). . . . Inst., 300 F.3d at 860, irrespective of whether the benefits to them are incidental. . . . Id. at 860-62. . . . purpose of a similar law was "to level the playing field between manufacturers and dealers," 300 F.3d at 860 . . .
. . . Selig , 860 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 2017) ("[W]e are bound by decisions of prior panels[ ] unless [ . . .
. . . . §§ 846, 860; and • conspiring to possess firearms during drug-trafficking crimes, see 18 U.S.C. § 924 . . .
. . . Greater Orlando Aviation , 860 So. 2d 1031, 1038 (Fla. Dist. Ct. . . .
. . . Union Gen. de Trabajadores de P.R., 903 F.2d 857, 860 (1st Cir. 1990) ); see also Advest, Inc. v. . . .
. . . Hiland Roberts Dairy, Co. , 860 F.3d 1121, 1125-26 (8th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Mustafa, 695 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). . . .
. . . Robins Co., Inc. , 860 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988) (concluding district court could require counsel to appear . . .
. . . Cotton , 535 U.S. 625, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002). . . .
. . . Volpe , 833 F.2d 850, 860 n.6 (9th Cir. 1987) (describing the district court's inability "to [otherwise . . .
. . . Burden , 860 F.3d 45, 56-57 (2d Cir. 2017) (distinguishing United States v. . . .
. . . account of "the limitations on the federal courts in the field of mental health," Shawar , 865 F.2d at 860 . . .
. . . Rogers Cartage Co. , 794 F.3d 854, 860-61 (7th Cir. 2015) ; Smith v. . . .
. . . Uhl , 210 F. 860, 862 (2d Cir. 1914). 569 U.S. at 191, 133 S.Ct. 1678. . . . Uhl , 210 F. 860, 862 (C.A.2 1914). 569 U.S. at 191, 133 S.Ct. 1678. . . . immigrant has committed such a crime, the record must show that he was convicted of the crime." 210 F. 860 . . .
. . . Betts-Gaston , 860 F.3d 525, 539 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 138 S. . . .
. . . Mosby-Year Book, Inc. , 969 S.W.2d 860, 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (internal quotation omitted). . . .
. . . See supra p.860 and note 3. R.38 at 32. Id. at 33. Appellant's Br. 9. . . .
. . . Brown County , 860 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2017) ; see generally Mathews v. . . .
. . . Fort Howard Paper Co. , 772 F.2d 860, 863 (Fed. . . .
. . . Ct. 853, 860, 190 L.Ed.2d 747 (2015). . . .
. . . Trump, 860 F.3d 686, 690 (D.C. . . .
. . . Stitt , 860 F.3d 854, 860-61 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (" Stitt I "). . . . Stitt I , 860 F. 3d at 856, 860-61. . . . Stitt I , 860 F.3d at 857. . . . Stitt I , 860 F.3d at 860-61. We also overruled our previous decision in United States v. . . .
. . . United States , 860 F.3d 547, 551 (7th Cir. 2017), and we see none here. . . .
. . . Chinese Univ. of Hong Kong , 860 F.3d 1367, 1377-79 (Fed. Cir. 2017). . . . Stanford , 860 F.3d at 1372-73 (noting that the Board relied on "Dr. . . . Stanford , 860 F.3d at 1378, 1379. . . . Stanford , 860 F.3d at 1374-75. . . . Stanford , 860 F.3d at 1370. . . .
. . . State, 238 So. 3d 857, 860 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017). . . .
. . . Cotton , 535 U.S. 625, 631, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) ). . . .
. . . Sebelius , 607 F.3d 860 (D.C. Cir. 2010). . . .
. . . Santana, 150 F.3d 860, 864 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .
. . . Lester Coggins Trucking, Inc. , 771 F.2d 860, 865-66 (5th Cir. 1985) ("An underlying principle is that . . .
. . . A.R. 404, 451, 467, 494, 519, 581, 645, 650, 789, 835, 848, 860, 866, 871, 1141, 1147, 1161). . . .
. . . Gomez , 763 F.3d at 860. . . . Gomez , 763 F.3d at 860. In this case, we are troubled by what was omitted from the instructions. . . .
. . . Great Lakes Brewing Co. , 860 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). . . .
. . . Univ. of Hous. , 860 F.3d 767, 777-78 (5th Cir. 2017) (resolving the case by reference to the Yusuf framework . . .
. . . Brown , 188 F.3d 860, 865-66 (7th Cir. 1999) (describing the Terry inquiry as "objective, not subjective . . .
. . . Dist ., 860 F.3d 494, 499-500 (7th Cir. 2017), and we follow the district court and the parties in using . . .
. . . State , 258 Ark. 880, 529 S.W.2d 860, 863 (1975). . . .
. . . Alliance Bank , 860 N.W.2d 638, 645 (Minn. 2015). Minn. Stat. § 513.45 ; Kelley v. . . . Minn. 2016) (citing Finn , 860 N.W.2d at 645 ). . . . Finn , 860 N.W.2d at 648-49. See generally Kelley v. Kanios , 2019 WL 2193163, at *5, *13 n.16. . . .
. . . Louisiana , 860 F.3d 785, 793 (5th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases). . . .
. . . Framingham Union Hosp. , 401 Mass. 860, 862, 520 N.E.2d 139 (1988) (emphasis added). . . .
. . . Windsor Industries, Inc. , 730 F.2d 860, 863 (2d Cir. 1984), which may include the employer's "knowledge . . .
. . . Id. , at 860. . . .
. . . If any person commits a violation of this subparagraph or of section 849, 859, 860, or 861 of this title . . .
. . . Thomas, 524 F.3d 855, 860-63 (8th Cir. 2008) (Colloton, J., concurring) (arguing that the first prong . . .
. . . Aleman, 860 So.2d 425 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). . . .
. . . Griffin , 542 So. 2d 860, 865 (Miss. 1989) )). . . .
. . . Smith , 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S.Ct. 2578, 153 L.Ed.2d 762 (2002) (per curiam). . . .
. . . Alvarez , 20 Misc.3d 606, 860 N.Y.S.2d 745 (Crim. Ct. 2008). . . . Alvarez , 20 Misc.3d 606, 860 N.Y.S.2d 745 (Crim. Ct. 2008). See Guzman v. Holder , 340 F. . . .
. . . Vernon, 567 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 2009) ; Rogers v. . . .
. . . United States, 36 C.I.T. 860, 893-94, 865 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1248-49 (2012). . . .
. . . Apfel , 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000) ). . . .
. . . (quoting In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig. , 860 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc . . .
. . . Jennings , 860 F.3d 450, 457 (7th Cir. 2017) ; Yates v. . . . See Jones , 870 F.3d at 753-54 ; Jennings , 860 F.3d at 460 ; Yates , 842 F.3d at 1053. . . .
. . . Weaver , 860 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). . . . Weaver , 860 F.3d at 94 (citation omitted, emphasis added). . . .
. . . Cotton , 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) ) ("When a requirement goes to subject-matter . . .
. . . United States , 465 U.S. 848, 859-61, 104 S.Ct. 1519, 79 L.Ed.2d 860 (1984) (holding that plaintiff's . . .
. . . Ahern , 207 Va. 860, 153 S.E.2d 216, 219 (1967) ). This argument also fails. . . .
. . . See id. at 860. This factor favors granting petitioner a bond hearing. . . . Supp. 3d 235, at 860 ; Sajous , 2018 WL 2357266, at *11 ("If immigration officials have caused delay, . . . Supp. 3d 853, at 860. . . .
. . . Smith , 860 F.3d 508, 516 (7th Cir. 2017) ("Before we can conclude that a court did not abuse its discretion . . .
. . . Asher , 910 F.3d 854, 860-61 (6th Cir. 2018). . . .
. . . Uhl , 210 F. 860, 863 (2d Cir. 1914) (noting that in determining whether a conviction is one involving . . .
. . . Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. , 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that review of the Secretary's . . .
. . . Foster Wheeler LLC , 860 F.3d 249, 254 (4th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). . . . carried out "for or relating to" the alleged official authority. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) ; Sawyer , 860 . . . Sawyer , 860 F.3d at 258 (finding a sufficient connection between the charged conduct and the asserted . . . were carried out "for or relating to" the alleged federal authority. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) ; Sawyer , 860 . . .
. . . Cotton , 535 U.S. 625, 629-31, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002), that such a flaw does not implicate . . .
. . . State , 262 So. 3d 859, 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) ("Because Appellant pled no contest without expressly . . .
. . . State , 860 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (emphasis added). . . .
. . . Taylor Milk Co., Inc. , 64 F.3d 860, 868 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying prejudgment interest at the IRS overpayment . . .
. . . Sessions , 860 F.3d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 2017) (state controlled substance statute that "incorporates state . . . include additional facts that need not be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt"); Harbin , 860 . . .
. . . Bryant , 860 F.3d 345, 352 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. . . . Barber , 860 F.3d at 352. . . .
. . . Brown , 188 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that not every investigatory stop will automatically . . .
. . . Murphy , 406 F.3d 857, 860-61 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding constructive amendment where court instructed . . .
. . . Georgia Gulf Corp. , 245 F.Supp.2d 853, 860-61 (M.D. La. Nov. 4, 2002) (applying Cleveland ). . . .
. . . Butland , 951 So. 2d 860, 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) ). . . .