The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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I respectfully disagree with the majority's contention that the ability of Black voters to "elect the candidate of their choice" is a question of law not controlled by the stipulation of the parties. The law may supply the meaning of the term, but whether a new district diminishes the ability of Black voters to elect a candidate of their choice is based on facts. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 41 (1986) ("Based on statistical evidence presented by expert witnesses, supplemented to some degree by the testimony of lay witnesses, the [federal district] court found that all of the challenged districts exhibit severe and persistent racially polarized voting."); McMillan v. Escambia Cnty., Fla., 748 F.2d 1037, 1043 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Defendants contend that voting in Escambia County is not polarized. This contention is not supported by the evidence."); Martinez v. Bush, 234 F.Supp.2d 1275, 1279-80 (S.D. Fla. 2002) ("We present detailed findings of fact comparing voting behavior by race in performing black districts existing before and after the redistricting process at issue in this litigation."). The stipulation of the parties established the facts here and is binding on us… Finally, to the extent Plaintiff may claim these practices were systematic, Plaintiff does not have standing in his pro se capacity to bring suit on behalf of a class. 28 U.S.C. § 1654; see also Timson v. Samson, 518 F.3d 870, 873-74 (11th Cir. 2008) (highlighting that the right of a litigant to proceed pro se in federal court under § 1654 is “a personal right that does not extend to the representation of the interest of others”); Real v. Mission, No. 214-CV-729-FTM-38MRM, 2015 WL 4935627, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 08, 2015) (“Most significantly, a pro se litigant cannot prosecute a class action in this Court.”).The Newmans make a brief reference to the denial of their motion to file a reply brief in support of their Rule 60(b) motion. But they do not make any significant argument in their opening brief regarding either the district court's decision on their motion to file a reply brief or its denial of their Rule 60(b) motion. Those issues are therefore abandoned. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014); Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).We hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard and liberally construe them. Campbell v. Air Jam., Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). Nevertheless, courts should not serve as a pro se party's counsel or rewrite a deficient pleading to sustain an action. Id. at 1168-69. Pro se litigants must comply with the applicable procedural rules. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007). Additionally, a pro se party abandons an issue by failing to challenge it on appeal. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). A party abandons a claim when he presents his argument in "passing references" or "in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority." Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). "[S]imply stating that an issue exists," without providing reasoning and citation to authority that the appellant relies on, "constitutes abandonment of that issue." Singh v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009).A district court “may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought” if the transfer would make the litigation more convenient or would otherwise serve the interests of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d 570, 572 (11th Cir. 1989).We will generally not consider non-jurisdictional arguments that are forfeited on appeal, however. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 872-73 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,__ U.S.__, 143 S.Ct. 95 (2022). Specifically, any "issue that an appellant wants the Court to address should be specifically and clearly identified in the brief.... Otherwise, the issue . . . will be considered abandoned." Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). An appellant fails to adequately brief a claim when he does not "plainly and prominently raise it." Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted) (discussing abandonment). Also, we will not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (deeming "issues . . . raised for the first time in a . . . litigant's reply brief" abandoned).The district court liberally construed Walker's complaint as raising three other claims: (1) "a claim for employment discrimination based on religion," (2) a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim arising under Georgia law, and (3) an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim arising under Georgia law. Doc. 8 at 8. With respect to these three claims, the district court concluded that Walker's complaint failed to state a claim for relief and thus denied his motion for default judgment as to these claims as well. Because Walker's appellate brief, even liberally construed, does not raise any argument related to these non-constitutional claims, we discuss them no further. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) ("While we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned[.]" (citation omitted)).The Plaintiffs are incorrect that the Defendants owed them a heightened duty of care. As noted, Eleventh Circuit precedent “is clear that the owner of a vessel in navigable waters owes passengers a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances.” Kressly v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., 718 Fed.Appx. 870, 872 (11th Cir. 2017); see also Amy v. Carnival Corp., 961 F.3d 1303, 1308 n.4 (11th Cir. 2020) (same). Indeed, in Kressly, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the appellant's argument that the court should “adopt a heightened standard of care for vessels when they transport passengers during tumultuous weather,” explaining that the appellant “d[id] not provide any circuit precedent to support her contention that, under the specific circumstances of th[e] case, [the appellee] owed her a heightened standard of care.” 718 Fed.Appx. at 872. Like the appellant in Kressly, the Plaintiffs here do not provide any authority that supports the imposition of a heightened standard of care on the Defendants under the circumstances of this case. The authority that the Plaintiffs do cite is either misquoted or distinguishable.Enforcement of a money judgment by writ of execution “must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is located.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 69(a). In Florida, a person who has recovered a judgment in any court against any entity has a right to a writ of garnishment. Fla. Stat. § 77.01. Chapter 77 of the Florida Statutes sets forth the procedure for obtaining a writ of garnishment under Florida law. “[U]nder Florida law[,] ‘[g]arnishment proceedings are statutory in nature and require strict adherence to the provisions of the statute.'” Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v. Carrerou, 730 Fed.Appx. 869, 870 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Zivitz v. Zivitz, 16 So.3d 841, 847 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)).We need not address the district court's order denying Johnson's motions to vacate because Johnson has abandoned any challenge to that order on appeal. To avoid abandonment, a party must plainly identify the issues or claims that they seek to raise on appeal. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680-81 (11th Cir. 2014). A party abandons a claim on appeal when he fails to "plainly and prominently raise it, for instance by devoting a discrete section of his argument to those claims." Id. at 681. We construe a pro se litigant's briefs liberally, but an issue not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant is deemed abandoned. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).. . . Parilla , 8 N.Y.3d 654, 659, 838 N.Y.S.2d 824, 870 N.E.2d 142, 145 (2007) ; R. Davis & T. . . .
. . . referring to the June 2017 DAPA rescission memo, which stated that DACA would "remain in effect," App. 870 . . .
. . . Fong , 870 F.3d 928 (2017), but conflicted with the Eleventh Circuit's en banc decision in Harris v. . . .
. . . See Casey , 505 U.S. at 861, 112 S.Ct. 2791 ; id., at 870, 873, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (plurality opinion). . . .
. . . No. 19-870 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . Bridgeforth , 441 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2006). . . .
. . . Id. at 861, 870. None of that is true here. . . .
. . . In re Tarrant , 349 B.R. 870, 873 (Bankr. N.D. . . .
. . . Malcom , 755 F.3d 870, 877 (10th Cir. 2014). . . .
. . . Houser , 130 F.3d at 870. . . .
. . . Martinez , 870 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2017). . . . Martinez , 870 F.3d at 1166 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. . . . Martinez , 870 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Berryhill , 870 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Pederson , 887 F.3d 870, 876 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). . . .
. . . Sessions , 862 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . In re Hoffner , 870 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Felker v. . . . requirements, which this Court has characterized as a "light burden." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C) ; Hoffner , 870 . . . Hoffner , 870 F.3d at 307. . . .
. . . Forest River, Inc. , 635 F.3d 870, 877 (7th Cir. 2011). . . .
. . . Id. at 870. . . .
. . . Vasquez-Garcia, 449 F.3d 870, 873 (8th Cir. 2006) ; see United States v. . . .
. . . Resch, 785 F.3d at 870, 871 n.2, 875. . . .
. . . Ryan , 571 F.3d 860, 870 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations and punctuation omitted). . . . aggravating evidence weighed against a conclusion that defendant was prejudiced); Bible , 571 F.3d at 870 . . .
. . . Johnson , 870 F.2d 1469, 1473-75 (9th Cir. 1989), for example, the Chilkat Indian Village (the "Village . . . Chilkat , 870 F.2d at 1474 (quoting Nat'l Farmers , 471 U.S. at 851, 105 S.Ct. 2447 ). . . . Compare Chilkat , 870 F.2d at 1473-75, with Boe v. . . . See Chilkat , 870 F.2d at 1474 n.9. . . . Chilkat , 870 F.2d at 1475. . . .
. . . the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party," Gregg , 870 . . . Safety , 870 F.3d 883, 886-87 (9th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Berryhill , 870 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2017) But, in the Seventh Circuit, the ALJ also has an obligation . . .
. . . Berryhill , 870 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . McCrary , 220 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2000) ("The exercise of jurisdiction over [the defendant] is solely . . .
. . . See J.A. 902 at 7:20-8:4; J.A. 870 at 23:8-11; J.A. 923 at 90:14-15. . . .
. . . Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc. , 2016 IL 119518, ¶ 24, 402 Ill.Dec. 870, 53 N.E.3d 1. . . . Richter , 2016 IL 119518 at ¶ 22, 402 Ill.Dec. 870, 53 N.E.3d 1 (citing Hernandez v. . . .
. . . Sunoco, Inc. , 870 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2017) ("[T]he presumption of arbitrability applies only where . . . Sunoco, Inc. , 870 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Notably, the plaintiff in Noske presented an expert affidavit, id. at 870, making Noske entirely dissimilar . . .
. . . Chisholm , 870 F.3d 603, 620 (7th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Tolliver , 140 Ohio St.3d 420, 19 N.E.3d 870, 874 (2014), takes the position that conviction requires . . .
. . . Town , 870 F.3d 380, 383 (5th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Whirlwind Soldier , 499 F.3d 862, 870 (8th Cir. 2007). . . .
. . . Univ. , 870 F.3d 562, 571 (7th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Supp. 2d 868, 870 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (discussing Amick v. State Farm Fire and Cas. . . .
. . . MJ Optical, Inc. , 870 F.3d 820, 827 (8th Cir. 2017). Mahler's claim fails at the second step. . . .
. . . Morris-Walker, LTD , 922 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2019), quoting Already, LLC , 568 U.S. at 91, 133 S.Ct . . .
. . . Henry , 819 F.3d 856, 870 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). . . .
. . . Bank of Savannah, N.A. , 859 F.2d 865, 870-71 (11th Cir. 1988). . . . Blackwell , 908 F.2d 864, 870 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that the "test developed in McDonnell Douglas . . .
. . . Giddins , 858 F.3d 870, 885 (4th Cir. 2017) ; see also United States v. . . .
. . . Adejumo, 848 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. . . .
. . . Colvin, 788 F.3d 870, 872 (8th Cir. 2015) ). . . .
. . . Nutraceutical Corp. , 870 F.3d 1170, 1182 (9th Cir. 2017), rev'd on other grounds , --- U.S. ----, 139 . . . used, and the damages may be computed even if the result reached is an approximation.' " Lambert , 870 . . .
. . . Berryhill , 870 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2017) ; Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir.1997). . . . Berryhill , 870 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Van Hare, 870 So. 2d 125, 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (reversing criminal contempt order for failure to comply . . . Inc., 271 So. 3d 870, 880 (Fla. 2018) ("Fundamental errors are those which go 'to the foundation of the . . .
. . . Wirum (In re Straightline Invs., Inc.) , 525 F.3d 870, 883 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Although the statute . . .
. . . United States, 870 F.3d 282, 290 (3d Cir. 2017) ; Khan v. . . .
. . . Id . at 870. . . .
. . . Auth. , 926 F.3d 870, 874 (D.C. . . .
. . . Ct. 866, 870, 55 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1978). . . .
. . . In re Sinclair , 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989). . . .
. . . Co. , 870 F.3d. 1262 (11th Cir. 2017), for the proposition that "the existence of the PPA does not extinguish . . . See Quality Auto Painting Ctr. of Roselle , 870 F.3d at 1277 ("[a]ssuming the truth of the allegations . . .
. . . Duncan, 870 F.Supp.2d 133, 147 (D.D.C. 2012) (rejecting argument that Department of Education measures . . .
. . . Office Manager , 870 F.3d 144, 152-53 (3d Cir. 2017). . . . See Parker , 870 F.3d at 153. . . .
. . . Safety & Corr. , 870 F.3d 365, 368-69 (5th Cir. 2017) (upholding as reasonable visual body-cavity searches . . . Rubenstein , 825 F.3d 206, 215 (4th Cir. 2016) ; Lewis , 870 F.3d at 368-69 ; Stoudemire v. Mich. . . .
. . . In re SuperValu, Inc. , 870 F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Inc. , 870 F.3d 774, 792 (8th Cir. 2017) ("A party 'is not entitled to a particularly worded instruction . . . ("[F]ederal courts lack jurisdiction if no named plaintiff has standing."); In re SuperValu, Inc. , 870 . . .
. . . Morris-Walker, LTD , 922 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2019), we agree with Haroun that the court erred in . . .
. . . Fong , 870 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2017), for the proposition that we look only to the timing of the SAC when . . . Fong , 870 F.3d at 932. Shortly after filing his suit, Mr. Jackson moved to amend his complaint. . . .
. . . Chicago Cubs Baseball Club, LLC , 870 F.3d 682, 690 (7th Cir. 2017) (applying similar reasoning to parallel . . .
. . . Microsoft Corp. , 627 F.3d 859, 870 (Fed. Cir. 2010). . . .
. . . O'Dell, 766 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) ("When the issuing judge relied solely upon the . . .
. . . Co. (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 870, 881, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509, 710 P.2d 309.) ... . . .
. . . United States , 395 U.S. 6, 36, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969) ); see also Black , 512 F.2d at 870 . . .
. . . Lockridge , 498 Mich. 358, 870 N.W.2d 502, 513-14 (2015) (applying Alleyne v. . . . Lockridge , 498 Mich. 358, 870 N.W.2d 502 (2015). . . . See 870 N.W.2d at 513-14. . . . guidelines-advisory, but "a highly relevant consideration in a trial court's exercise of sentencing discretion." 870 . . . See Lockridge , 870 N.W.2d at 520 n.28. . . .
. . . O'Brien, 870 F.3d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 2017). A. . . . O'Brien, 870 F.3d at 21. . . .
. . . extent of the Federal Election Commission's ability to disclose its investigative files. 920 F.3d 866, 870 . . .
. . . Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 2013) ; Smith v. . . . Schuette , 726 F.3d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 2013) ; Smith v. . . .
. . . SBC Commc'n, Inc. , 418 F.3d 870, 872-73 (8th Cir. 2005). . . .
. . . Unocal Corp. , 270 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). A. . . .
. . . Gerber Truck Serv., Inc. , 870 F.2d 1148, 1151 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) ("Multi-employer plans are defined-contribution . . . Ralph's Grocery , 118 F.3d at 1022 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gerber Truck Serv. , 870 . . .
. . . Adejumo , 848 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2017) (explaining that restitution is authorized "only to the extent . . . See Adejumo , 848 F.3d at 870-71 (recognizing that testimonial evidence can be used to calculate the . . .
. . . United States , 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989) is misplaced. . . . Church reserved the determination of whether there was "agency action" within the meaning of the APA, 870 . . . United States , 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989), we allowed constitutional claims to proceed without even . . .
. . . Pickens , 844 F.3d 870, 877 (10th Cir. 2016) ). . . . Pickens , 844 F.3d 870, 879 (10th Cir. 2016) (use of taser to subdue person needing medical care), or . . .
. . . Eltec Corp. , 870 F.2d 1112, 1116 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that company's decision to transfer and subcontract . . . disputes are mandatory bargaining subjects is entitled to 'considerable deference,' " Plymouth Stamping , 870 . . .
. . . Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1989) ). . . .
. . . Safety , 870 F.3d 883, 887 (2017). . . .
. . . Cia Siderurgica do Para Cosipar , 870 F.3d 370 (5th Cir. 2017), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh'g . . .
. . . United States , 752 F.3d 865, 870 (10th Cir. 2014). . . .
. . . Id. at 870. iii. . . .
. . . Giddins , 858 F.3d 870, 885 (4th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Hagenbeck , 870 F.3d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 2017) (footnotes omitted). . . .
. . . Munro , 394 F.3d 865, 870 (CA10 2005) ; United States v. . . .
. . . See In re Ricoh Corp. , 870 F.2d 570, 573 (11th Cir. 1989) ("[I]n the usual motion for transfer under . . . In re Ricoh Corp. , 870 F.2d at 573 (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. . . .
. . . Pino-Perez , 870 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1989). . . . Pino-Perez , 870 F.2d at 1234. . . . See Pino-Perez , 870 F.2d at 1233. . . . Pino-Perez , 870 F.2d at 1234. None describe the facts here. . . . Pino-Perez , 870 F.2d at 1234. . . .
. . . Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 119, p. 870 (5th ed. 1984) (Prosser & Keeton) ("[O]ne who . . .
. . . Ryan , 870 F.3d 1033, 1060 (9th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1959). . . . No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., at 12; accord H. R. Rep. . . .
. . . United States , 870 F.3d 750, 753 (8th Cir. 2017) ; United States v. . . . See Jones , 870 F.3d at 753-54 ; Jennings , 860 F.3d at 460 ; Yates , 842 F.3d at 1053. . . .
. . . Landeros , 913 F.3d 862, 870 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added); cf. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. . . .
. . . Id. at 870. Similarly, in McCravy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. . . .
. . . Id . at 870. . . .
. . . Baron-Mantilla , 743 F.2d 868, 870 (11th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. . . .
. . . . § 1677e(b) (1994) ; see also SAA at 870, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4199 ("[N]ew section 776(b) permits Commerce . . . See SAA at 870, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4199 ("Where a party has not cooperated, Commerce ... may employ . . .
. . . Servs., Inc. , 271 So.3d 870, 880, 2018 WL 5660595, *6 (Fla. Nov. 1, 2018). . . .
. . . Stanley Works , 59 F.3d 384, 392-93 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1995) ; Aromatique, Inc. , 28 F.3d at 870. . . .
. . . Geozos , 870 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2017) (concluding that the movant may proceed with his claim under . . .
. . . App. 5th 870, 878, 222 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 (2017). . . .
. . . Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1989) ). . . .
. . . Dep't of Justice, 870 F. Supp. 2d 61, 66 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing King v. . . .