The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
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We note that by statute, wearing a mask has been made a misdemeanor of the second degree under certain circumstances. See generally §§ 876.12—.20, Fla. Stat. (2001). For example, section 876.12 criminalizes wearing a mask or hood on a public way; section 876.13 criminalizes the wearing of a hood or mask on public property; and section 876.14 makes it illegal to wear a hood or mask on the property of another. These statutes, which were first passed in the 1950's, were apparently aimed at the Ku Klux Klan. The Florida Supreme Court found one of these statutes (all of which are virtually identical) unconstitutional in Robinson v. State, 393 So.2D 1076 (Fla. 1980) (holding that statute criminalizing wearing hood of mask on public property was overbroad, and exceptions provided by section 876.16 were not sufficient to cure this fatal overbreadth, nor were the statutory words susceptible of any limiting construction). The legislature apparently attempted to cure these problems in 1981, by the passage of section 876.155m Florida Statutes, which limits the application of these statutes.
Reason # 1 is invalid on three separate points. First, the use of a dangerous weapon is an essential element of the offense of armed robbery, Thorne v. State, 496 So.2d 891 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), and is thus a factor already taken into account in calculating the guideline sentence. Hendrix v. State, 475 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 1985). Second, since appellant was not convicted of wearing a mask, pursuant to sections 876.13 and 876.155(4), Florida Statutes, the use of this reason violates Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(11). Third, the use of the victim's removal from the scene as a reason for departure is also invalid under the Hendrix case since it is an inherent element of the kidnapping in this case.
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Robinson v. State, [ 393 So.2d 1076] Case Number 58,232, decided December 18, 1980, held that s. 876.13, Florida Statutes, was unconstitutional because it was susceptible of application to entirely innocent activities, and
Appellant was charged with violating section 876.13, Florida Statutes (1977). That section provides:
. . . For example, section 876.12 criminalizes wearing a mask or hood on a public way; section 876.13 criminalizes . . .
. . . . §§ 876.12, 876.13 (1987); La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14:313 (West 1986); Mich.Comp.Laws § 750.-396 (1979); . . .
. . . Second, since appellant was not convicted of wearing a mask, pursuant to sections 876.13 and 876.155( . . .
. . . State, [393 So.2d 1076] Case Number 58,232, decided December 18, 1980, held that s. 876.13, Florida Statutes . . .
. . . Appellant was charged with violating section 876.13, Florida Statutes (1977). . . .