The 2023 Florida Statutes
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Moreover, there is no support for Defendant's argument in the Third Motion that Defendant invoked his right to counsel during his interrogation, (Third Mot. at 1.) See United States v. Davis, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994); United States v. Isaac, 448 Fed.Appx. 954, 956 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that law enforcement officers have no duty to stop an interrogation where the suspect's invocation of either of those rights is equivocal.” (citing Davis, 512 U.S. at 459)); United States v. Smith, 322 Fed.Appx. 876, 979 n.3 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that a defendant's invocation of his right to counsel must be express and unequivocal). As the Davis Court made clear, theIntuit's motion to dismiss was timely filed and requests, among other things, dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 6). As such, Intuit properly responded to the complaint and is not required to file an answer until the court disposes of the motion to dismiss. See Lockwood v. Beasley, 211 Fed.Appx. 873, 876 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (finding that a district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the pro se plaintiff's motions for default due to the defendants' failure to file an answer where the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim).A court “abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper procedures in making a determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Torres v. First Transit, Inc., 979 F.3d 876, 881 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Brown v. Ala. Dep't of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1173 (11th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A ‘clear error in judgment' is also an abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2005)).We review denials of motions for sanctions, disqualification, and disgorgement for abuse of discretion. See In re Hood, 727 F.3d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 2013) (sanctions); Giles v. Garwood, 853 F.2d 876, 878 (11th Cir. 1988) (disqualification); S.E.C. v. Levin, 849 F.3d 995, 1001 (11th Cir. 2017) (disgorgement). "An abuse of discretion occurs if the judge fails to apply the proper legal standard or to follow proper procedures in making the determination or bases an award upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous." Electro-Wire Prods., Inc. v. Sirte & Permutt, P.C., 40 F.3d 356, 359 (11th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).To the extent that Defendant argues Menendez prevents retroactive application of any statutory provision involving an insurance policy, that argument is incorrect. As Plaintiffs correctly argue, although Menendez stated that “the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract,” Menendez, 35 So.3d at 876, the court made that statement as part of its initial evaluation of whether a retroactivity analysis was necessary at all. If the Florida Supreme Court had concluded the amendment here was procedural, it would have concluded the tolling provision applied retroactively in this case. See id. at 880 (“Based on our above analysis, we conclude that the statutory presuit notice provision is not ‘procedural' and should not be given retroactive application.”).It is well-established that to support an unjust enrichment claim, a plaintiff must have directly conferred a benefit on the defendant. The Florida Supreme Court made this clear in Kopel v. Kopel, 229 So.3d 812 (Fla. 2017), when it wrote that "to prevail on an unjust enrichment claim, the plaintiff must directly confer a benefit to the defendant." Id. at 818. This proposition is well-settled in Florida law. See Peoples Nat'l Bank of Com. v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Fla., N.A., 667 So.2d 876, 879 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (holding that plaintiff failed to state cause of action for unjust enrichment because it "could not and did not allege that it had directly conferred a benefit on the defendants"); Extraordinary Title Servs., LLC v. Fla. Power &Light Co., 1 So.3d 400, 404 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (following Peoples Nat'l Bank); CFLB P'ship, LLC v. Diamond Blue Int'l, Inc., 352 So.3d 357, 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (following Kopel, Peoples Nat'l Bank, and Extraordinary Title); Am. Safety Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Griggs, 959 So.2d 322, 331 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (following Peoples Nat'l Bank); see also Johnson v. Catamaran Health Sols., LLC, 687 Fed.Appx. 825, 830 (11th Cir. 2017) (recognizing… In the alternative, AIG renews its Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. “[A] district court has ‘inherent power to summarily enforce settlement agreements entered into by parties litigant in a pending case.'” Ford v. Citizens & S. Nat. Bank, Cartersville, 928 F.2d 1118, 1121 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Cia Anon Venezolana de Navegacion v. Harris, 374 F.2d 33, 36 (5th Cir.1967)). “The motion to enforce the settlement agreement essentially is an action to specifically enforce a contract.” Id. at 1122 (quoting Adams v. Johns-Manville Corp., 876 F.2d 702, 709 (9th Cir. 1989)).When we review a habeas petition under section 2254(d), "[t]he question is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable-a substantially higher threshold." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (marks and citation omitted). Our review here is thus "doubly deferential" to the state appeals court's decision denying Garcia's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Id. And here, there is yet a third layer of deference: because the effectiveness of Garcia's counsel depended on the validity of a state-law defense, we "must defer to the state's construction of its own law" in determining whether the state court's assessment of ineffective assistance was reasonable. Pinkney v. Sec'y, DOC, 876 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th Cir. 2017).As for the mediation cost, this cost is not enumerated under § 1920. But the Court will allow the award under the FMLA's broader grant of “other costs of the action.” 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3); see also Evans v. Books-A-Million, 762 F.3d 1288, 1299 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that a similar ERISA cost-shifting provision, rather than § 1920, allows an award for mediation costs). And the Court will not sift through each of Wertheim's costs to determine which costs are associated with each count. See Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Devine, No. 215-cv-328FTM29MRM, 2019 WL 3491962, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2019), aff'd, 826 Fed.Appx. 876 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding that prevailing-party status under Rule 54(d) “relates to the case, not just individual counts within the federal case.”).In diversity cases, state law governs prejudgment interest. Royster v. Union Carbide Corp., 737 F.2d 941, 948 (11th Cir. 1984). However, when a federal court holds jurisdiction over a case under federal question jurisdiction, it is not bound by state law regarding prejudgment interest. Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GumbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1446-47 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Corporacion AIC, SA v. Hidroelectrica Santa Rita S.A., 66 F.4th 876 (11th Cir. 2023). In the Eleventh Circuit, awards of prejudgment interest are equitable remedies to be decided in a district court's sound discretion. Indus. Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1446. Moreover, prejudgment interest is not a penalty but is compensation to the plaintiff for the use of funds that rightfully belonged to them. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. M/V Ocean Lynx, 901 F.2d 934, 942 (11th Cir. 1990).. . . Smith , 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), for example, the Court explained that " . . .
. . . Smith , 494 U.S. 872, 879-882, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). . . .
. . . Smith , 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), the Court explained that "the right of . . .
. . . Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc. , 380 U.S. 255, 256, 85 S.Ct. 876, 13 L.Ed.2d 789 (1965) (per curiam . . .
. . . Id., at 875-876, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). . . .
. . . Rodriguez, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 875-876 (5th ed. 2009) (explaining that restrictionist . . .
. . . -, 138 S.Ct. 830, 841, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018) (plurality opinion); id. , at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 875-876 . . .
. . . Edwards & Sons, Inc. , 876 F.2d 69, 70 (CA8 1989) (per curiam ); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. . . . Edwards & Sons, Inc. , 876 F.2d 69, 70 (CA8 1989) (per curiam ), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1089, 110 S.Ct . . .
. . . Sadowy , 147 App.Div.2d 874, 876, 538 N.Y.S.2d 96, 98 (1989) ("[T]he subject easement ... reasonably . . .
. . . Gallagher , 712 F.3d 865, 876 (C.A.4 2013) ; Drake v. . . .
. . . Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC , 876 F.3d 996, 1000-1001 (CA9 2017) (declining to give weight to the 2006 . . . Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC , 876 F.3d 996, 1001-1002 (CA9 2017), with Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. . . .
. . . No. 19-876. Supreme Court of the United States. May 18, 2020 Petition for rehearing denied. . . .
. . . Smith , 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). . . .
. . . . ----, ----, 139 S.Ct. 1652, 1660, 203 L.Ed.2d 876 (2019). . . .
. . . Federal Election Comm'n , 558 U.S. 310, 378, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) (concurring opinion . . . Federal Election Comm'n , 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) ; Montejo v. . . . against the importance of having them decided right. " Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 378, 130 S.Ct. 876 . . . Federal Election Comm'n , 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010), where we overruled precedent . . . in by federal and state lawmakers in adopting the provisions at issue, id ., at 411-412, 130 S.Ct. 876 . . .
. . . Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S. 873, 876, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (holding that it violated the . . .
. . . No. 19-876. Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . Appx. 876 (2018). . . .
. . . Pena-Irala , 630 F.2d 876 (C.A.2 1980) ). "Domestic officials were not at issue." Rodriguez v. . . .
. . . Federal Election Comm'n , 558 U.S. 310, 359-360, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) ). . . .
. . . App'x 873, 876-77 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (emphasis added). . . .
. . . Servs., LLC , 629 F.3d 876, 893 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Leadsinger, Inc. v. . . .
. . . Carnival Corp., 720 F.3d 876, 880 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. . . .
. . . Honea , 876 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2017) ; Hatim v. Obama , 760 F.3d 54, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2014). . . .
. . . Id. at 876. . . .
. . . Ct. 1652, 1660, 203 L.Ed.2d 876 (2019) (quoting Chafin v. . . .
. . . Kyle , 825 F.3d 876, 885 (8th Cir. 2016) (applying Whittenburg framework). . . .
. . . . § 876(c) ). Ben Stiller (Director), Zoolander [Film], United States: Paramount Pictures (2001). . . .
. . . Pederson , 887 F.3d 870, 876 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). . . .
. . . Inc. , 876 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Intercontinental Great Brands LLC v. . . .
. . . Sec'y of Finance , 876 F.3d 481, 488 n.9 (3d Cir. 2017) 5 U.S.C. § 704. Bennett v. . . .
. . . Kennedy , 32 F.3d 876 (4th Cir. 1994), which supports the district court's conclusion that the offense . . . Kennedy , 32 F.3d 876, 888 (4th Cir. 1994) ; United States v. . . .
. . . Prosecutor's Office , 378 N.J.Super. 539, 876 A.2d 806, 811 (App. Div. 2005). . . . See 876 A.2d at 807-08. . . .
. . . Univ. of Chicago Hosp. , 207 F.3d 876, 882-84 (7th Cir. 2000). . . .
. . . FEC , 558 U.S. 310, 339, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). . . . Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 340, 130 S.Ct. 876 (quoting WRTL , 551 U.S. at 464, 127 S.Ct. 2652 ). . . . Id . at 368, 130 S.Ct. 876. Nonetheless, the Court upheld the disclaimer requirements. . . . (quoting Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 369, 130 S.Ct. 876 ). . . . Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 371, 130 S.Ct. 876. . . .
. . . Maersk Line Ltd, 876 F.3d 502, 512 (3d Cir. 2017) (en banc) ("[W]hen our Court is in disagreement with . . .
. . . Motors LLC , 876 F.3d 182, 185 (6th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Schmidt Baking Co., 876 F.3d 596, 601 (4th Cir. 2017) ("The text of the TCA plainly provides that employees . . . the plaintiff], who spent 49% of her days on vehicles less than 10,000 pounds."); see also Schilling, 876 . . .
. . . Dep't of the Interior , 876 F.3d 1144, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. . . .
. . . ESPN, Inc. , 876 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2017) ("Violations of the right to privacy have long been actionable . . . knowingly disclosing "personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider." 876 . . . Eichenberger , 876 F.3d at 983 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. b); see also Van Patten . . .
. . . Supp. 3d 876, 884 (N.D. Ill. 2019). . . .
. . . Slay, 875 F.3d 876, 882 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted), and it may rely on reconstructed . . .
. . . Friedberg, 713 N.W.2d at 876-77, to support this proposition. . . . Noske, 713 N.W.2d at 876. . . .
. . . Id. at 876 (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .
. . . Johnson, 848 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. . . .
. . . Co. , 876 S.W.2 d 132, 133 (Tex. 1994) (explaining that general contract interpretation rules apply to . . .
. . . Pena-Irala , 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), plaintiffs brought an action against a former Paraguayan police . . .
. . . Equifax Information Services, LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 889-90 (9th Cir.2010). . . .
. . . Adducci , 912 F.3d 869, 876 (6th Cir. 2018) ("Congress does not suspend the writ [of habeas corpus] when . . .
. . . App'x 875, 876 (5th Cir. 2016) (credible threat of violence when defendant pointed gun at customer, threatened . . .
. . . held that the ex-spouse had violated the stay by "continuing" the contempt proceeding. 445 B.R. at 876 . . .
. . . Election Comm'n , 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010), nevertheless held that the Farm . . .
. . . App'x 876 (4th Cir. 2018) (Ritchie II ). . . .
. . . Falwell , 485 U.S. 46, 56-57, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988). It is protected speech. Id. . . . Hustler , 485 U.S. at 50, 108 S.Ct. 876. . . . Id. at 54, 108 S.Ct. 876. . . . Hustler , 485 U.S. at 54, 108 S.Ct. 876. . . . See Hustler , 485 U.S. at 57, 108 S.Ct. 876 ("The Court of Appeals interpreted the jury's finding to . . .
. . . McCalla, Raymer, Cobb, Nichols & Clark, L.L.C. , 214 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2000) ). . . . the letter will increase over time." 817 F.3d at 77 (emphasis added); see also Miller , 214 F.3d at 876 . . .
. . . Estrada , 876 F.3d 885, 887 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting § 1326(d) ). . . . Estrada , 876 F.3d at 887 (citing cases). . . . Estrada , 876 F.3d at 887. . . . See Estrada , 876 F.3d at 887-88 ; cf. United States v. . . . Estrada , 876 F.3d at 888 (citing cases) (holding there is no constitutional right to be informed of . . .
. . . State , 876 So.2d 618, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). . . .
. . . Gutierrez, 876 F.3d 1254, 1255-57 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 138 S. . . .
. . . Supp. 3d 867, 876-77 (N.D. Cal. 2016) ; Racies v. . . .
. . . United States , 312 U.S. 342, 347, 61 S.Ct. 603, 85 L.Ed. 876 (1941) ). . . .
. . . FEC , 558 U.S. 310, 352, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) (quoting Austin v. . . .
. . . See United States v. 13,255.53 Acres of Land, 158 F.2d 874, 876 (3d Cir. 1946) ("This question of substantive . . .
. . . Expedia, Inc. , 876 F.3d 296, 302 (7th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Hosp. , 64 F.3d 869, 876 (3d Cir. 1995). . . .
. . . Phillips Petroleum Co. , 339 U.S. 667, 671, 70 S.Ct. 876, 94 L.Ed. 1194 (1950) (finding that the Declaratory . . .
. . . Belew (In re Belew ), 588 B.R. 875, 876 (8th Cir. . . .
. . . Gutiérrez, 876 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2017) ; United States v. . . .
. . . Lynch , 798 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir. 2015) ("[T]he § 1252(a)(2)(C) bar does not apply to the denial of . . .
. . . I fully agree with the panel that "[w]ords should mean something," ante at 876, and I find the following . . . Ante at 876. . . . Carter 's standard that forcible restraint exists when there is no alternative but compliance, ante at 876 . . .
. . . Littlewind , 595 F.3d 876, 881 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). . . .
. . . Ctr., Inc., 876 F. Supp. 2d 122, 127 (D. Mass. 2012) ; Legrice v. Harrington, No. . . .
. . . Lothian, 532 F.3d 876, 880 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2008). . . .
. . . Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). C. . . .
. . . Sch. , 876 F.3d 926, 936 (7th Cir. 2017) ; see also Energy Reserves Grp. , 459 U.S. at 412-13, 103 S.Ct . . . Elliott , 876 F.3d at 937 (citing Spannaus , 438 U.S. at 245, 98 S.Ct. 2716 ; U.S. . . .
. . . Durham , 166 F.2d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 1948) (holding that where an insurance policy expressly excluded . . .
. . . Election Comm'n , 558 U.S. 310, 340, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) (rejecting argument that, . . .
. . . Foxworth , 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994). . . . Glenn , 673 F.3d at 876 (citing Scott v. Henrich , 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994) ). . . .
. . . Election Comm'n , 558 U.S. 310, 339, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) ("The right of citizens to . . . Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 340, 130 S.Ct. 876. . . . Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 339, 130 S.Ct. 876. . . .
. . . Gordon , 876 F.2d 1121, 1125 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing 21 U.S.C § 841(a)(1) ). . . . Gordon , 876 F.2d at 1125. . . .
. . . Thompson, 876 F.2d 1381, 1384 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that a defendant's refusal to sign a written consent . . .
. . . Henderson, 908 N.W.2d 868, 876 (Iowa 2018) ; State v. . . .
. . . Dunn , 268 U.S. 121, 131, 45 S.Ct. 451, 69 L.Ed. 876 (1925) ). . . .
. . . JBM Envelope Co. , 876 F.3d 1112, 1120 (8th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Department of the Interior , 876 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2017) and Presbyterian Church v. . . . claims espousing the same theory under two different causes of action (under the APA and "equitably"). 876 . . . Department of the Interior , 876 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2017), we explained that "a court is foreclosed . . .
. . . Winston , 845 F.3d 876, 877 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .
. . . United States , 733 F.2d 873, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1984). . . . to persuade the court that the contested tariff provision is incorrect, Jarvis Clark , 733 F.2d at 876 . . .
. . . Schroeter , 876 F.3d 424, 450 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson v. . . .
. . . Johnson, 401 F.3d 874, 876 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curium) (PLRA's exhaustion requirements do not apply . . .
. . . Martin, 876 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir. 2017) (alterations in original) (quoting Teague v. . . . Libertarian Party of Ark., 876 F.3d at 951 (explaining that, in the context of a claim mooted by legislative . . . See Libertarian Party of Ark., 876 F.3d at 952 (declining to address a challenge to a statute amended . . .
. . . Similarly, in In re Brown, 319 B.R. 876 (Bankr. N.D. . . .
. . . Dist. , 792 F.3d 876, 880 (8th Cir. 2015) ). Warth v. . . .
. . . See Rucho , 318 F.Supp.3d at 875-876, 894 ; App. 276. . . .
. . . Winston, 845 F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 2017), Pryor claims that because the Missouri statute can be satisfied . . .
. . . McLeod Health, Inc. , 914 F.3d 876, 881-82 (4th Cir. 2019), where the Fourth Circuit reversed summary . . . McLeod Health, Inc. , 914 F.3d 876 (4th Cir. 2019) (reversing summary judgment for employer where there . . .
. . . Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc. , 876 F.3d 1372, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ). . . .
. . . M/V Alaia , 876 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1989), strongly counsels towards recognizing subject matter jurisdiction . . .
. . . Pleitez , 876 F.3d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Montejo v. . . .
. . . Texas Comm'n of Arts , 992 F.Supp. 876, 878-79 (N.D. . . .
. . . Supp. 2d 868, 876 (D. Minn. 2001) (citing Pershern v. Fiatallis N. . . . Supp. 2d at 876 (citing Pershern , 834 F.2d at 138 ). . . .
. . . Falwell , 485 U.S. 46, 56, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) ("[S]peech that is vulgar, offensive, . . .