The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
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Nor may the Defendants claim vicarious or non-negligent liability through Jones Act negligence. According to the Jones Act, a maritime employer has a duty to provide their employees with a reasonably safe place to work. Davis v. Hill Engineering, Inc., 549 F.2d 314, 329 (5th Cir. 1977). A seaman has a cause of action in negligence under the Jones Act against his employer for personal injuries which the employer or its agents cause, and which occur during the course of employment. 46 U.S.C. § 30104; Skye v. Maersk Line, Ltd. Corp., 751 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2014). A finding of contributorily negligence does not bar the seaman from bringing a claim, but it will proportionately reduce damages between the employer and the injured seamen. Dempsey v. Mac Towing, Inc., 876 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1989). The Jones Act eradicated the English fellow servant defense which shielded employers from liability upon a finding that it was a fellow servant of the employee, not the employer, who caused the injury; with the Jones Act's passage employers became liable for the negligence of their agents as well. Mahnich, 321 U.S. at 101, 102. And, finally, a seaman's duty is to carry…
We affirm this Anders appeal, except regarding two matters, as to four cases in which Appellant pled open to the court. First, investigative costs of $50 payable to the Daytona Beach Shores Police Department were assessed against Appellant in three of the four cases, despite the fact that there was apparently no request for same. See Richards v. State, 288 So.3d 574, 576 (Fla. 2020). We reverse and remand for entry of amended orders that do not include investigative costs. Second, as to Case No. 2022-304672-MM, the court failed to identify what conditions Appellant had violated that led to revocation of probation. See Hollis v. State, 277 So.3d 1099 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (citing Patt v. State, 876 So.2d 1278, 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)). We reverse and remand for entry of an amended order identifying the condition(s) the court found Appellant violated in that case.
Tucker complains the trial court erroneously accepted two untimely affidavits in support of LNV's attorney's fee award. The first, LNV's "Amended Affidavit as to Time, Effort, and Costs," was filed only eleven days before the summary judgment hearing. But any error as to this affidavit is waived because Tucker failed to raise this argument below. See Lloyd v. State, 876 So.2d 1227, 1228 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ("It is well settled that arguments raised for the first time on appeal are not preserved and are therefore waived.").
The state court reasonably rejected Mitchell's ineffective-assistance claim. “[A]lthough the issue of ineffective assistance . . . is one of constitutional dimension,” a court “must defer to the state's construction of its own law when the validity of the [ineffective-assistance] claim . . . turns on state law.” Pinkney v. Sec'y, DOC, 876 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th Cir. 2017). Here, the state court found that trial counsel was not ineffective because, under Florida law, the prosecution did not impermissibly stack inferences in presenting its case. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. 10, p. 6.) “The state court therefore has answered the question of what would have happened had counsel objected to [the allegedly improper stacking of inferences]-the objection would have been overruled.” Block v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., No. 8:15-cv-2442-CEH-JSS, 2019 WL 700113, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2019); see also Herring v. Sec'y. Dep't of Corr., 397 F.3d 1338, 1354-55 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The Florida Supreme Court already has told us how the issues would have been resolved under state law had [counsel] done what [the appellant] argues he should have done.... It is a fundamental principle that state courts are…
Our post-Farmer decisions are a jumble, with different panels adopting one of two different mens rea standards at different times. On the one hand, some have interpreted Estelle and Farmer to require a deliberate-indifference plaintiff to show only that the defendant acted with "more than mere negligence." See, e.g., Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir. 1995); McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999); Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004); Mann v. Taser Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1176 (11th Cir. 2011); Jackson v. West, 787 F.3d 1345, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015); Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1223 (11th Cir. 2016); Mitchell v. Nobles, 873 F.3d 869, 876 (11th Cir. 2017); Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020); Keohane, 952 F.3d at 1266. On the other hand, just as many (if not more) of our opinions have said that a deliberate-indifference plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with "more than gross negligence." See, e.g., Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996); Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2005); Burnette v. Taylor, 533…
Conversely, conspiracy liability could be premised on a "more attenuated relation with the principal violation" because the defendant and the principal wrongdoer had agreed to a wrongful enterprise. Halberstam, 705 F.2d, at 485; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts §876, Comment a, p. 316 (1979) ("The theory of the early common law was that there was a mutual agency of each to act for the others").
To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that he suffered an injuryin-fact that is “(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; that the injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant”; and that it is “‘likely,' as opposed to merely ‘speculative,' that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.'” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (internal citations omitted). When a plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, “the injury-in-fact requirement insists that a plaintiff ‘allege facts from which it appears there is a substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future.'” Strickland v. Alexander, 772 F.3d 876, 883 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit Grp., 193 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 1999)). “Additionally, the continuing controversy may not be conjectural, hypothetical, or contingent; it must be real and immediate, and create a definite, rather than speculative threat of future injury.” Malowney, 193 F.3d at 1347.
"Heck bars a § 1983 claim only when it is a 'logical necessity' that judgment for the plaintiff in that suit would contradict the existing punishment." Dixon, 887 F.3d at 1239 (quoting Dyer v. Lee, 488 F.3d 876, 879 (11th Cir. 2007)). Factual allegations bar claims under Heck in only narrow circumstances: "where the allegation in the § 1983 claim is a specific one that both necessarily implies the earlier decision is invalid and is necessary to the success of the § 1983 suit itself." Id. "When a plaintiff alleges a fact that, if true, would conflict with the earlier punishment, but that fact is not necessary to the success of his § 1983 suit, the Heck bar does not apply." Id.
Cases of admiralty jurisdiction also can include in rem actions over vessels themselves, but "[a]n in rem admiralty proceeding requires as its basis a maritime lien." Crimson Yachts, 603 F.3d at 868; see also The Rock Island Bridge, 73 U.S. (6 Wall) 213, 215 (1867) ("The lien and the proceeding in rem are, therefore, correlative -- where one exists, the other can be taken, and not otherwise."). "A maritime lien is a special property right in a ship given to a creditor by law as security for a debt or claim, and it attaches the moment the debt arises." Crimson Yachts, 603 F.3d at 1228 (quotation marks omitted). Under the CIMLA, "a person providing necessaries to a vessel on the order of the owner or a person authorized by the owner . . . has a maritime lien on the vessel . . . [and] may bring a civil action in rem to enforce the lien." 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a)(1)-(2). So, "to obtain a maritime lien, a person must: (1) provide necessaries; (2) to a vessel; (3) on the order of the owner or agent." Galehead, Inc. v. M/V Anglia, 183 F.3d 1242, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999); accord Barcliff, LLC v. M/V DEEP BLUE, IMO No. 9215359 , 876 F.3d 1063, 1068 (11th Cir. 2017). The necessaries must…
The state court reasonably rejected Smith's ineffective-assistance claim. As explained above, a court “must defer to the state's construction of its own law when the validity of [an ineffective-assistance] claim . . . turns on state law.” Pinkney, 876 F.3d at 1295. Here, Smith's ineffective-assistance claim turns on a question of Florida law-namely, whether a Richardson violation occurred when the prosecution presented Officer Kirchgraber as an expert witness. The state court answered that question in the negative, concluding that “the State's limited questioning of [Officer] Kirchgraber did not amount to a Richardson violation.” (Doc. 8-5, Ex. 44, p. 9.) That determination binds this Court. See Herring, 397 F.3d at 1354-55 (“The Florida Supreme Court already has told us how the issues would have been resolved under state law had [counsel] done what [the appellant] argues he should have done.... It is a fundamental principle that state courts are the final arbiters of state law, and federal courts should not second-guess them on such matters.”); Torres v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., No. 8:18-cv-2201-VMC-JSS, 2021 WL 3079700, at *10 (M.D. Fla. July 21, 2021) (“To the extent…
. . . Smith , 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), for example, the Court explained that " . . .
. . . Smith , 494 U.S. 872, 879-882, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). . . .
. . . Smith , 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), the Court explained that "the right of . . .
. . . Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc. , 380 U.S. 255, 256, 85 S.Ct. 876, 13 L.Ed.2d 789 (1965) (per curiam . . .
. . . Id., at 875-876, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). . . .
. . . Rodriguez, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 875-876 (5th ed. 2009) (explaining that restrictionist . . .
. . . -, 138 S.Ct. 830, 841, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018) (plurality opinion); id. , at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 875-876 . . .
. . . Edwards & Sons, Inc. , 876 F.2d 69, 70 (CA8 1989) (per curiam ); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. . . . Edwards & Sons, Inc. , 876 F.2d 69, 70 (CA8 1989) (per curiam ), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1089, 110 S.Ct . . .
. . . Sadowy , 147 App.Div.2d 874, 876, 538 N.Y.S.2d 96, 98 (1989) ("[T]he subject easement ... reasonably . . .
. . . Gallagher , 712 F.3d 865, 876 (C.A.4 2013) ; Drake v. . . .
. . . Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC , 876 F.3d 996, 1000-1001 (CA9 2017) (declining to give weight to the 2006 . . . Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC , 876 F.3d 996, 1001-1002 (CA9 2017), with Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. . . .
. . . No. 19-876. Supreme Court of the United States. May 18, 2020 Petition for rehearing denied. . . .
. . . Smith , 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). . . .
. . . . ----, ----, 139 S.Ct. 1652, 1660, 203 L.Ed.2d 876 (2019). . . .
. . . Federal Election Comm'n , 558 U.S. 310, 378, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) (concurring opinion . . . Federal Election Comm'n , 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) ; Montejo v. . . . against the importance of having them decided right. " Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 378, 130 S.Ct. 876 . . . Federal Election Comm'n , 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010), where we overruled precedent . . . in by federal and state lawmakers in adopting the provisions at issue, id ., at 411-412, 130 S.Ct. 876 . . .
. . . Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S. 873, 876, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (holding that it violated the . . .
. . . No. 19-876. Supreme Court of the United States. . . .
. . . Appx. 876 (2018). . . .
. . . Pena-Irala , 630 F.2d 876 (C.A.2 1980) ). "Domestic officials were not at issue." Rodriguez v. . . .
. . . Federal Election Comm'n , 558 U.S. 310, 359-360, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) ). . . .
. . . App'x 873, 876-77 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (emphasis added). . . .
. . . Servs., LLC , 629 F.3d 876, 893 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Leadsinger, Inc. v. . . .
. . . Carnival Corp., 720 F.3d 876, 880 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. . . .
. . . Honea , 876 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2017) ; Hatim v. Obama , 760 F.3d 54, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2014). . . .
. . . Id. at 876. . . .
. . . Ct. 1652, 1660, 203 L.Ed.2d 876 (2019) (quoting Chafin v. . . .
. . . Kyle , 825 F.3d 876, 885 (8th Cir. 2016) (applying Whittenburg framework). . . .
. . . . § 876(c) ). Ben Stiller (Director), Zoolander [Film], United States: Paramount Pictures (2001). . . .
. . . Pederson , 887 F.3d 870, 876 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). . . .
. . . Inc. , 876 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Intercontinental Great Brands LLC v. . . .
. . . Sec'y of Finance , 876 F.3d 481, 488 n.9 (3d Cir. 2017) 5 U.S.C. § 704. Bennett v. . . .
. . . Kennedy , 32 F.3d 876 (4th Cir. 1994), which supports the district court's conclusion that the offense . . . Kennedy , 32 F.3d 876, 888 (4th Cir. 1994) ; United States v. . . .
. . . Prosecutor's Office , 378 N.J.Super. 539, 876 A.2d 806, 811 (App. Div. 2005). . . . See 876 A.2d at 807-08. . . .
. . . Univ. of Chicago Hosp. , 207 F.3d 876, 882-84 (7th Cir. 2000). . . .
. . . FEC , 558 U.S. 310, 339, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). . . . Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 340, 130 S.Ct. 876 (quoting WRTL , 551 U.S. at 464, 127 S.Ct. 2652 ). . . . Id . at 368, 130 S.Ct. 876. Nonetheless, the Court upheld the disclaimer requirements. . . . (quoting Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 369, 130 S.Ct. 876 ). . . . Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 371, 130 S.Ct. 876. . . .
. . . Maersk Line Ltd, 876 F.3d 502, 512 (3d Cir. 2017) (en banc) ("[W]hen our Court is in disagreement with . . .
. . . Motors LLC , 876 F.3d 182, 185 (6th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Schmidt Baking Co., 876 F.3d 596, 601 (4th Cir. 2017) ("The text of the TCA plainly provides that employees . . . the plaintiff], who spent 49% of her days on vehicles less than 10,000 pounds."); see also Schilling, 876 . . .
. . . Dep't of the Interior , 876 F.3d 1144, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. . . .
. . . ESPN, Inc. , 876 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2017) ("Violations of the right to privacy have long been actionable . . . knowingly disclosing "personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider." 876 . . . Eichenberger , 876 F.3d at 983 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. b); see also Van Patten . . .
. . . Supp. 3d 876, 884 (N.D. Ill. 2019). . . .
. . . Slay, 875 F.3d 876, 882 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted), and it may rely on reconstructed . . .
. . . Friedberg, 713 N.W.2d at 876-77, to support this proposition. . . . Noske, 713 N.W.2d at 876. . . .
. . . Id. at 876 (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .
. . . Johnson, 848 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. . . .
. . . Co. , 876 S.W.2 d 132, 133 (Tex. 1994) (explaining that general contract interpretation rules apply to . . .
. . . Pena-Irala , 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), plaintiffs brought an action against a former Paraguayan police . . .
. . . Equifax Information Services, LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 889-90 (9th Cir.2010). . . .
. . . Adducci , 912 F.3d 869, 876 (6th Cir. 2018) ("Congress does not suspend the writ [of habeas corpus] when . . .
. . . App'x 875, 876 (5th Cir. 2016) (credible threat of violence when defendant pointed gun at customer, threatened . . .
. . . held that the ex-spouse had violated the stay by "continuing" the contempt proceeding. 445 B.R. at 876 . . .
. . . Election Comm'n , 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010), nevertheless held that the Farm . . .
. . . App'x 876 (4th Cir. 2018) (Ritchie II ). . . .
. . . Falwell , 485 U.S. 46, 56-57, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988). It is protected speech. Id. . . . Hustler , 485 U.S. at 50, 108 S.Ct. 876. . . . Id. at 54, 108 S.Ct. 876. . . . Hustler , 485 U.S. at 54, 108 S.Ct. 876. . . . See Hustler , 485 U.S. at 57, 108 S.Ct. 876 ("The Court of Appeals interpreted the jury's finding to . . .
. . . McCalla, Raymer, Cobb, Nichols & Clark, L.L.C. , 214 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2000) ). . . . the letter will increase over time." 817 F.3d at 77 (emphasis added); see also Miller , 214 F.3d at 876 . . .
. . . Estrada , 876 F.3d 885, 887 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting § 1326(d) ). . . . Estrada , 876 F.3d at 887 (citing cases). . . . Estrada , 876 F.3d at 887. . . . See Estrada , 876 F.3d at 887-88 ; cf. United States v. . . . Estrada , 876 F.3d at 888 (citing cases) (holding there is no constitutional right to be informed of . . .
. . . State , 876 So.2d 618, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). . . .
. . . Gutierrez, 876 F.3d 1254, 1255-57 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 138 S. . . .
. . . Supp. 3d 867, 876-77 (N.D. Cal. 2016) ; Racies v. . . .
. . . United States , 312 U.S. 342, 347, 61 S.Ct. 603, 85 L.Ed. 876 (1941) ). . . .
. . . FEC , 558 U.S. 310, 352, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) (quoting Austin v. . . .
. . . See United States v. 13,255.53 Acres of Land, 158 F.2d 874, 876 (3d Cir. 1946) ("This question of substantive . . .
. . . Expedia, Inc. , 876 F.3d 296, 302 (7th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Hosp. , 64 F.3d 869, 876 (3d Cir. 1995). . . .
. . . Phillips Petroleum Co. , 339 U.S. 667, 671, 70 S.Ct. 876, 94 L.Ed. 1194 (1950) (finding that the Declaratory . . .
. . . Belew (In re Belew ), 588 B.R. 875, 876 (8th Cir. . . .
. . . Gutiérrez, 876 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2017) ; United States v. . . .
. . . Lynch , 798 F.3d 876, 881 (9th Cir. 2015) ("[T]he § 1252(a)(2)(C) bar does not apply to the denial of . . .
. . . I fully agree with the panel that "[w]ords should mean something," ante at 876, and I find the following . . . Ante at 876. . . . Carter 's standard that forcible restraint exists when there is no alternative but compliance, ante at 876 . . .
. . . Littlewind , 595 F.3d 876, 881 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). . . .
. . . Ctr., Inc., 876 F. Supp. 2d 122, 127 (D. Mass. 2012) ; Legrice v. Harrington, No. . . .
. . . Lothian, 532 F.3d 876, 880 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2008). . . .
. . . Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). C. . . .
. . . Sch. , 876 F.3d 926, 936 (7th Cir. 2017) ; see also Energy Reserves Grp. , 459 U.S. at 412-13, 103 S.Ct . . . Elliott , 876 F.3d at 937 (citing Spannaus , 438 U.S. at 245, 98 S.Ct. 2716 ; U.S. . . .
. . . Durham , 166 F.2d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 1948) (holding that where an insurance policy expressly excluded . . .
. . . Election Comm'n , 558 U.S. 310, 340, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) (rejecting argument that, . . .
. . . Foxworth , 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994). . . . Glenn , 673 F.3d at 876 (citing Scott v. Henrich , 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994) ). . . .
. . . Election Comm'n , 558 U.S. 310, 339, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) ("The right of citizens to . . . Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 340, 130 S.Ct. 876. . . . Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 339, 130 S.Ct. 876. . . .
. . . Gordon , 876 F.2d 1121, 1125 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing 21 U.S.C § 841(a)(1) ). . . . Gordon , 876 F.2d at 1125. . . .
. . . Thompson, 876 F.2d 1381, 1384 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that a defendant's refusal to sign a written consent . . .
. . . Henderson, 908 N.W.2d 868, 876 (Iowa 2018) ; State v. . . .
. . . Dunn , 268 U.S. 121, 131, 45 S.Ct. 451, 69 L.Ed. 876 (1925) ). . . .
. . . JBM Envelope Co. , 876 F.3d 1112, 1120 (8th Cir. 2017). . . .
. . . Department of the Interior , 876 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2017) and Presbyterian Church v. . . . claims espousing the same theory under two different causes of action (under the APA and "equitably"). 876 . . . Department of the Interior , 876 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2017), we explained that "a court is foreclosed . . .
. . . Winston , 845 F.3d 876, 877 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .
. . . United States , 733 F.2d 873, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1984). . . . to persuade the court that the contested tariff provision is incorrect, Jarvis Clark , 733 F.2d at 876 . . .
. . . Schroeter , 876 F.3d 424, 450 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson v. . . .
. . . Johnson, 401 F.3d 874, 876 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curium) (PLRA's exhaustion requirements do not apply . . .
. . . Martin, 876 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir. 2017) (alterations in original) (quoting Teague v. . . . Libertarian Party of Ark., 876 F.3d at 951 (explaining that, in the context of a claim mooted by legislative . . . See Libertarian Party of Ark., 876 F.3d at 952 (declining to address a challenge to a statute amended . . .
. . . Similarly, in In re Brown, 319 B.R. 876 (Bankr. N.D. . . .
. . . Dist. , 792 F.3d 876, 880 (8th Cir. 2015) ). Warth v. . . .
. . . See Rucho , 318 F.Supp.3d at 875-876, 894 ; App. 276. . . .
. . . Winston, 845 F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 2017), Pryor claims that because the Missouri statute can be satisfied . . .
. . . McLeod Health, Inc. , 914 F.3d 876, 881-82 (4th Cir. 2019), where the Fourth Circuit reversed summary . . . McLeod Health, Inc. , 914 F.3d 876 (4th Cir. 2019) (reversing summary judgment for employer where there . . .
. . . Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc. , 876 F.3d 1372, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ). . . .
. . . M/V Alaia , 876 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1989), strongly counsels towards recognizing subject matter jurisdiction . . .
. . . Pleitez , 876 F.3d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Montejo v. . . .
. . . Texas Comm'n of Arts , 992 F.Supp. 876, 878-79 (N.D. . . .
. . . Supp. 2d 868, 876 (D. Minn. 2001) (citing Pershern v. Fiatallis N. . . . Supp. 2d at 876 (citing Pershern , 834 F.2d at 138 ). . . .
. . . Falwell , 485 U.S. 46, 56, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) ("[S]peech that is vulgar, offensive, . . .