Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 903.046 (2025)

Purpose of and criteria for bail determination.

✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session

Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section FL-LEGleg.state.fl.us JustiaFla. Statutes CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

903.046 Purpose of and criteria for bail determination.—

(1) The purpose of a bail determination in criminal proceedings is to ensure the appearance of the criminal defendant at subsequent proceedings and to protect the community against unreasonable danger from the criminal defendant.

(2) When determining whether to release a defendant on bail or other conditions, and what that bail or those conditions may be, the court shall consider:

(a) The nature and circumstances of the offense charged.

(b) The weight of the evidence against the defendant.

(c) The defendant’s family ties, length of residence in the community, immigration status, employment history, financial resources, and mental condition.

(d) The defendant’s past and present conduct, including any record of convictions, previous flight to avoid prosecution, or failure to appear at court proceedings. However, any defendant who had failed to appear on the day of any required court proceeding in the case at issue, but who had later voluntarily appeared or surrendered, shall not be eligible for a recognizance bond; and any defendant who failed to appear on the day of any required court proceeding in the case at issue and who was later arrested shall not be eligible for a recognizance bond or for any form of bond which does not require a monetary undertaking or commitment equal to or greater than $2,000 or twice the value of the monetary commitment or undertaking of the original bond, whichever is greater. Notwithstanding anything in this section, the court has discretion in determining conditions of release if the defendant proves circumstances beyond his or her control for the failure to appear. This section may not be construed as imposing additional duties or obligations on a governmental entity related to monetary bonds.

(e) The nature and probability of danger which the defendant’s release poses to the community.

(f) The source of funds used to post bail or procure an appearance bond, particularly whether the proffered funds, real property, property, or any proposed collateral or bond premium may be linked to or derived from the crime alleged to have been committed or from any other criminal or illicit activities. The burden of establishing the noninvolvement in or nonderivation from criminal or other illicit activity of such proffered funds, real property, property, or any proposed collateral or bond premium falls upon the defendant or other person proffering them to obtain the defendant’s release.

(g) Whether the defendant is already on release pending resolution of another criminal proceeding or on probation, parole, or other release pending completion of a sentence.

(h) The street value of any drug or controlled substance connected to or involved in the criminal charge. It is the finding and intent of the Legislature that crimes involving drugs and other controlled substances are of serious social concern, that the flight of defendants to avoid prosecution is of similar serious social concern, and that frequently such defendants are able to post monetary bail using the proceeds of their unlawful enterprises to defeat the social utility of pretrial bail. Therefore, the courts should carefully consider the utility and necessity of substantial bail in relation to the street value of the drugs or controlled substances involved.

(i) The nature and probability of intimidation and danger to victims.

(j) Whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release.

(k) Any other facts that the court considers relevant.

(l) Whether the crime charged is a violation of chapter 874 or alleged to be subject to enhanced punishment under chapter 874 or reclassification under s. 843.22. If any such violation is charged against a defendant or if the defendant is charged with a crime that is alleged to be subject to such enhancement or reclassification, he or she is not eligible for release on bail or surety bond until the first appearance on the case in order to ensure the full participation of the prosecutor and the protection of the public.

(m) Whether the defendant, other than a defendant whose only criminal charge is a misdemeanor offense under chapter 316, is required to register as a sexual offender under s. 943.0435 or a sexual predator under s. 775.21; and, if so, he or she is not eligible for release on bail or surety bond until the first appearance on the case in order to ensure the full participation of the prosecutor and the protection of the public.

History.—s. 41, ch. 82-175; s. 42, ch. 84-103; s. 4, ch. 86-151; s. 1476, ch. 97-102; s. 1, ch. 2000-178; s. 18, ch. 2008-238; s. 1, ch. 2013-214; s. 2, ch. 2014-201; s. 48, ch. 2016-24; s. 19, ch. 2021-156; s. 13, ch. 2025-1; ss. 37, 66, ch. 2025-156.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 75 cases (11 in the last 5 years), 1983–2026 · leading case: Parker v. State, 843 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 2003).

Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment

Parker v. State, 843 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 2003). · cites it 6× “§ 903.046, Fla. Stat. (2000) (emphasis added).”

Dennis Mehaffie v. John Rutherford as Sheriff of Duval etc., 143 So. 3d 432 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). · cites it 11× “” § 903.046(1), Fla. Stat. (2013); Patterson v.”

State v. Dixon & Matienzo, 217 So. 3d 1115 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017). · cites it 6× “Then, with no notice to the State, motion by defense counsel, or consideration of any of the factors that the court is required to consider when determining whether to release a defendant on bail or other conditions, see § 903.046, Fla. Stat. (2016), the trial judge sua sponte…”

Greenwood v. State, 51 So. 3d 1278 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). · cites it 5× “When challenged by trial counsel at the first appearance hearing in regard to the court’s obligation to consider the factors set forth in section 903.046(2), 3 which counsel contended was required by the Fourth District’s decision in Hollander , the court responded, “I do…”

Hernandez v. Roth, 890 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). · cites it 4× “Section 903.046, Florida Statutes (2004) entitled "[p]urpose of and criteria for bail determination," lists those two as the only purposes for bail determination in criminal proceedings: (1) "to ensure the appearance of the criminal defendant at subsequent proceedings and [2] to…”

State v. Paul, 783 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 2001). · cites it 2× “[6] Section 903.046(2), Florida Statutes (1997), sets forth the following criteria for the trial court to consider when determining whether to release a defendant on bail or other conditions: (a) The nature and circumstances of the offense charged.”

Preston v. Gee, 133 So. 3d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). · cites it 5× “4 *1223 When assessing whether there is a substantial probability of one of the seven circumstances, the court may consider the defendant’s behavior patterns, the criteria in section 903.046, Florida Statutes, and any other relevant facts.”

State v. Raymond, 906 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 2005). · cites it 2× “See § 903.046, Fla. Stat. (2000). [2] The court did not consider electronic monitoring, another form of nonmonetary pretrial release.”

Sikes v. McMillian, 564 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). · cites it 5× “Likewise, the trial court did not fairly weigh the factors set forth in section 903.046 to justify raising the bail.”

Campbell v. Johnson, 586 F.3d 835 (11th Cir. 2009). “See Fla. Stat. § 903.046 (1). Given our precedent, it is questionable whether a county’s pecuniary interests can rise to the level of a compelling interest.”

Dyson v. Campbell, 921 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). · cites it 2× “131; § 903.046, Fla. Stat. (2005). In this case, few if any of those factors weigh in petitioner's favor, and insofar as it relates to monetary conditions, we decline to adopt petitioner's view that "reasonable conditions" of pretrial release necessarily means conditions that…”

Hollander v. Crowder, 952 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). · cites it 4× “131(b)(3); § 903.046, Fla. Stat. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.”

Show all 75 citing cases →

— 903.046(1) — 10 cases

Dennis Mehaffie v. John Rutherford as Sheriff of Duval etc., 143 So. 3d 432 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). “” § 903.046(1), Fla. Stat. (2013); Patterson v.”

Henley v. Jenne, 796 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

State v. Dixon & Matienzo, 217 So. 3d 1115 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017). “Then, with no notice to the State, motion by defense counsel, or consideration of any of the factors that the court is required to consider when determining whether to release a defendant on bail or other conditions, see § 903.046, Fla. Stat. (2016), the trial judge sua sponte…”

Thomas v. Jenne, 766 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

Nicholas v. Cochran, 673 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).

— 903.046(2) — 17 cases

State v. Paul, 783 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 2001). “[6] Section 903.046(2), Florida Statutes (1997), sets forth the following criteria for the trial court to consider when determining whether to release a defendant on bail or other conditions: (a) The nature and circumstances of the offense charged.”

Dennis Mehaffie v. John Rutherford as Sheriff of Duval etc., 143 So. 3d 432 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). “” § 903.046(1), Fla. Stat. (2013); Patterson v.”

Greenwood v. State, 51 So. 3d 1278 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). “When challenged by trial counsel at the first appearance hearing in regard to the court’s obligation to consider the factors set forth in section 903.046(2), 3 which counsel contended was required by the Fourth District’s decision in Hollander , the court responded, “I do…”

Gomez v. Hinckley, 473 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).

Parrino v. Bradshaw, 972 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

— 903.046(2)(a) — 2 cases

Hodges v. Hoffman (Sarasota) (M.D. Fla. 2022).

Dominguez v. Cloutier (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).

— 903.046(2)(b) — 3 cases

Preston v. Gee, 133 So. 3d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). “4 *1223 When assessing whether there is a substantial probability of one of the seven circumstances, the court may consider the defendant’s behavior patterns, the criteria in section 903.046, Florida Statutes, and any other relevant facts.”

Roussonicolos v. State, 59 So. 3d 238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

Byrd v. Mascara, 197 So. 3d 1211 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

— 903.046(2)(c) — 3 cases

Williams v. State, 855 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

Byrd v. Mascara, 197 So. 3d 1211 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

Michael Arslanian v. Daniel Junior, Etc. (Fla. 3d DCA 2022).

— 903.046(2)(d) — 2 cases

Bratton v. Ryan, 133 So. 3d 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).

Sardinas v. Junior, 252 So. 3d 295 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).

— 903.046(2)(f) — 7 cases

Marcos Casiano v. Michael Scott, Sheriff, 241 So. 3d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).

Lonzo L. Sparrow, Jr. v. State, 240 So. 3d 841 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018).

Snell v. Junior, 251 So. 3d 273 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).

Sylvester v. State, 175 So. 3d 813 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).

Sniceson Fleury v. State of Florida, 254 So. 3d 975 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).

— 903.046(2)(g) — 1 case

Griglen v. Ryan, 138 So. 3d 1172 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).

— 903.046(2)(h) — 4 cases

Sikes v. McMillian, 564 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). “Likewise, the trial court did not fairly weigh the factors set forth in section 903.046 to justify raising the bail.”

Alvarez v. Crowder, 645 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

Sniceson Fleury v. State of Florida, 254 So. 3d 975 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).

— 903.046(2)(k) — 1 case

Hernandez v. Roth, 890 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). “Section 903.046, Florida Statutes (2004) entitled "[p]urpose of and criteria for bail determination," lists those two as the only purposes for bail determination in criminal proceedings: (1) "to ensure the appearance of the criminal defendant at subsequent proceedings and [2] to…”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.