Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

..., see, e.g., Gidden v. State, 613 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1993), we conclude that this type of plea agreement requires proof by the State that the defendant has breached the contract. [6] When a pretrial' detainee is released on his or her own recognizance, section 903.047(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), requires that the release is conditioned upon the defendant refraining from criminal activity. Section 903.0471 provides that a court may, on its own motion, revoke pretrial release and order pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release....

...4th DCA 2000). Among other things, the new laws authorize trial courts to order pretrial detention for persons on pretrial release who commit a new crime under certain circumstances where there is "probable cause to believe the defendant committed a new crime." § 903.0471, Fla....

...Notably, although the State attempted to seek revocation of bond on the basis of this subsequent charge that it contended caused Paul to be a danger to the community, the State did not pursue the firearm charges that also served as part of the basis for the trial court's finding that Paul was a danger to the community. [3] Section 903.047, Florida Statutes (1997), sets forth the statutory conditions of pretrial release, one of which is that "[t]he defendant refrain from criminal activity of any kind." [4] Specifically, the trial court found that Paul was presently char...

...n of the court, supports a finding that no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons or assure the presence of the accused at trial. Ch. 2000-229, § 2, Laws of Fla. The Legislature also created section 903.0471, which provides: 903.0471 Violation of condition of pretrial release....

...termination was made that en banc consideration was unnecessary in light of the 2000 legislative amendments. See id. at 530-31. Most recently, in Parker v. State, 780 So.2d 210 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), the Fourth District upheld the constitutionality of section 903.0471 and concluded that the Legislature had not intended that section 907.041 be followed after a defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release. Although newly-enacted section 903.0471 is a free-standing provision authorizing pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release, as stated in footnote 1, the constitutionality of that provision is not before us in this case....

...and pretrial release, even to the extent that the amendments repeal Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.131 and 3.132 "to the extent that the rules are inconsistent with this act." Ch.2000-178, § 5 at 1470, Laws of Fla. Additionally, by enacting section 903.0471 and section 907.045(4)(b)7, the Legislature used the term "pretrial detention" in a way that signifies that the term applies to a revocation of an existing bond....

...The State gives the Court the authority to do that. That's what I'm doing. On this case the calendar call is November 9th. The trial date is November 13th. Parker was remanded into custody without bond. He later filed a motion to reconsider the bond revocation, contending that section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2000), is unconstitutional....

...statute constitutional, and denied the motion. [1] Parker *874 filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court; the court denied the petition. Parker sought review before this Court. The issue posed in the present case is whether section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2000), is constitutional. At the hearing on October 17, 2000, the trial court heard argument of counsel concerning the constitutionality of section 903.0471 and declared the statute constitutional....

...ditions may be, the court shall consider: . . . . (j) Whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release. § 903.046, Fla. Stat. (2000) (emphasis added). And finally, the Legislature enacted section 903.0471, which provides as follows: 903.0471 Violation of condition of pretrial release.—Notwithstanding s. 907.041, a court may, on its own motion, revoke pretrial release and order pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release. § 903.0471, Fla....

...2001), holding that the above enactments did not apply retroactively and were inapplicable to Paul. [7] Unlike the situation in *877 Paul, however, the crimes in the present case took place after the effective dates of the above enactments and are governed by the enactments. IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 903.0471 Parker claims that section 903.0471 is unconstitutional for three reasons: it violates the plain language of article I, section 14, Florida Constitution; it violates substantive due process; and it violates procedural due process. A. The Plain Language of Section 14 Parker's main claim is that section 903.0471 violates the plain language of article I, section 14, because it fails to require specific findings. We disagree. The district court below addressed this claim as follows: Parker argues that section 903.0471 is unconstitutional as violating Article I, section 14 of the Florida Constitution which allows pretrial detention if "no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons, assure the pr...

...state constitution, but to be coextensive with it. Barns [v. State], 768 So.2d [529] at 532-33 [(Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ]. Barns, as we said earlier, involved a violation of a condition which was not a new crime, and thus was analyzed under 907.041, not section 903.0471. Our conclusion, however, that the trial judge's decision to deny pretrial release was still circumscribed by the Florida Constitution, would be equally applicable where the defendant committed a new crime and was being detained under section 903.0471....

...ned. Art. I, § 14, Fla. Const. (emphasis added). Contrary to Parker's claim, this section contains no requirement that a court articulate findings prior to denying pretrial release. Subsequent to the above amendment, the Legislature in 1984 enacted section 903.047, which provided in relevant part: 903.047 Conditions of pretrial release.— (1) As a condition of pretrial release, whether such release is by surety bail bond or recognizance bond or in some other form, the court shall require that: (a) The defendant refrain from criminal activity of any kind .... § 903.047, Fla....

...ons of release can "assure the integrity of the judicial process"), for the commission of a crime by a pretrial releasee unquestionably impugns the integrity of the judicial process—the defendant in effect is "thumbing his nose" at the court. After section 903.047 was enacted, the Legislature later gave "teeth" to that section's proscription by enacting section 903.0471. As noted earlier, section 903.0471 provides: 903.0471 Violation of condition of pretrial release.— Notwithstanding s. 907.041, a court may, on its own motion, revoke pretrial release and order pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release. § 903.0471, Fla....

...ee committed a new crime. Contrary to violating the plain language of article I, section 14, this statutory section works hand-in-hand with section 14 to "assure the integrity of the judicial process." B. Substantive Due Process Parker contends that section 903.0471 violates substantive due process because the "probable cause" burden of proof is too low a burden on which to base pretrial detention. We disagree. The district court below addressed this claim thusly: Parker also argues that section 903.0471 violates substantive due process because it authorizes a court to deny a second pretrial release upon finding probable cause that a defendant committed a new crime, which is less than the burden on the state when pretrial detention is sought under section 907.041....

...[12] The type of proceeding that is at issue in the present case, i.e., a revocation of pretrial release, is similar in nature to a revocation of probation, for both proceedings involve the revocation of a significant form of legal restraint. Similarly, the "probable cause" standard that is called for in section 903.0471 is no more onerous for a defendant than the "in the conscience of the court" standard that traditionally has been used in revocation of probation proceedings....

...he "substantial probability" standard, [14] it is logical for a court to apply a less forgiving standard (i.e., "probable cause") when a detainee seeks release following a subsequent violation. C. Procedural Due Process Finally, Parker contends that section 903.0471 violates procedural due process because it does not require an adversarial hearing prior to revocation of pretrial release....

...In light of the fact that a Florida defendant is accorded a full adversarial hearing under section 907.041 upon his or her initial application for pretrial release, the requirements of article I, section 14, Florida Constitution, are satisfied by the dictates of section 903.0471 upon subsequent violation. V. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we approve Parker v. State, 780 So.2d 210 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), and hold that section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2000), comports with article I, section 14, Florida Constitution, and with the Due Process Clauses of the state and federal constitutions as explained herein....

...Although I agree that the revocation of Parker's pretrial release did not violate his constitutional rights, I believe that the majority has gone further than necessary to reach this conclusion. In this case, the trial court denied pretrial release under section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, finding probable cause to believe that Parker had committed a crime while on pretrial release, and also finding, in a subsequent hearing, "consistent with Article I, Section 14, that detention was necessary to protect the community from the risk of physical harm." Parker v. State, 780 So.2d 210, 212 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Based on the trial court's findings as to both probable cause and the existence of one of the criteria of article I, section 14, the Fourth District rejected Parker's constitutional challenges to section 903.0471. Regarding the claim that the statute violates article I, section 14, the Fourth District stated that the trial judge's decision to deny pretrial release under section 903.0471 is "circumscribed by the Florida Constitution." Id....

...Regarding Parker's procedural due process claim that he *881 did not receive adequate procedural safeguards, the Fourth District found that "[h]aving received those safeguards [in article I, section 14], his due process rights were not violated." Id. Thus, the Fourth District expressly declared section 903.0471 valid, and we exercised our discretion to review this decision under article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. The majority now approves the decision of the Fourth District, but, departing from the Fourth District's rationale, suggests that in order to deny pretrial release under section 903.0471, the trial court need not make findings consistent with the requirements of article I, section 14....

...detention is necessary to assure the integrity of the judicial system, satisfying article I, section 14. The conclusion that an article I, section 14 finding is not required is, in my view, not necessary to our assessment of the constitutionality of section 903.0471 in a case in which the trial court did in fact articulate an article I, section 14 finding....

...ease can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons, assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process, the accused may be detained." The initial constitutional question posed by section 903.0471, as construed by the majority, is whether a finding of probable cause that the defendant has committed a new crime while on pretrial release, without any additional findings, satisfies the language in article I, section 14 authorizing pretrial detention of an accused if no conditions of release can assure the integrity of the judicial process. This question should be answered in the negative, because section 903.0471 creates an irrebuttable presumption....

...assure the integrity of the judicial process." Contrary to the conclusion of the majority, commission of a new crime does not necessarily impugn the integrity of the judicial process and thereby obviate the need for an explicit finding to that effect in order to comport with article I, section 14. Under section 903.0471, the crime for which the defendant might be arrested could range from driving with a suspended license to possession of drug paraphernalia, misdemeanors that do not inherently undermine the integrity of the judicial process when allegedly committed by a person on pretrial release....

...mmission of a new crime. For example, a defendant who *882 leaves the county, state, or country, contrary to the conditions of release, or one who makes contact with an alleged victim in violation of the mandatory condition of pretrial release under section 903.047(2), is—in the majority's phrase—"thumbing his nose" at the court to a greater degree than one arrested for a drug or traffic misdemeanor unrelated to the original charges. These violations may also put the community or persons at risk of physical harm or place the defendant's appearance at trial in doubt. However, section 903.0471, as construed by the majority, does not require a finding of any of the three constitutional criteria for pretrial detention....

...Although the defendant in Paul was arrested for drug and firearm offenses, the State subsequently filed an information only on a misdemeanor cannabis charge and a "no information" on the remaining charges. Id. at 1043 n. 2. Therefore, I believe that section 903.0471 as construed by the majority is on precarious constitutional footing under article I, section 14....

...lease can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons, assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process. [15] Without a requirement of this latter finding, I cannot conclude that section 903.0471 comports with article I, section 14 under all conceivable circumstances....

...SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS In the absence of a required finding of one of the article I, section 14 criteria, I am further concerned with the standard for determining whether a new crime has been committed. The majority observes that the "probable cause" standard in section 903.0471 is no higher than the traditional "in the conscience of the court" standard to establish a violation of probation, [16] *883 and that it is an appropriately less forgiving standard than "substantial probability," used for an initial order of pretrial detention under section 907.041(4)(c), Florida Statutes....

...at 498 (quoting In re Whitney, 421 F.2d 337, 338 (1st Cir.1970)). Next, in stating that it is logical to apply a less forgiving standard than the "substantial probability" standard contained in section 907.041(4)(c), the majority does not identify several important distinctions between that statute and section 903.0471....

...ts for appearance at trial, threat of harm to the community or obstruction of the judicial process. [17] *884 In comparison to the "comprehensive and specific framework" of section 907.041, see Paul, 783 So.2d at 1052, the probable cause standard of section 903.0471 is tied only to the commission of an offense while on pretrial release. Section 903.0471 thus makes a novel use of the venerable concept of probable cause....

...at 120, 95 S.Ct. 854. Article I, section 14 brings additional considerations to bear on the complete denial of bail, triggering the need for an adversarial hearing. The absence of an adversarial hearing makes the probable cause determination under section 903.0471 an irrebuttable presumption that the article I, section 14 criteria for pretrial detention are satisfied, resulting in an indefinite deprivation of liberty and offending due process. Cf. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979) (conclusive presumption would conflict with overriding presumption of innocence). CONCLUSION Although I have deep reservations as to whether section 903.0471 as construed by the majority comports with article I, section 14 of the Florida Constitution or affords procedural or substantive due process, I conclude that the provision was not unconstitutionally applied to Parker. In this case, the lower courts applied section 903.0471 as if the article I, section 14 findings were required....

...[1] We thank the Committee for its hard work under the capable leadership of its chair, Thomas Bateman, III, noting that most of the proposals were unanimously approved by the Committee. Amendments The first proposal addresses amendments to rule 3.131(a) (Right to Pretrial Release) to reflect that, pursuant to section 903.047(2), Florida Statutes (2009), a condition of pretrial release is that the defendant shall have no contact with the victim except for authorized pretrial discovery....

...At his Arthur [1] hearing, the trial judge concluded that defendant was entitled to bond. [2] Defendant was released on $15,000 bond and house arrest. The pretrial release conditions included the statutory condition that defendant not engage in any criminal activity, see § 903.047(1)(a), Fla....

...community. See Fla. Const. art. I, § 14. Defendant has petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. It is a statutory condition of all pretrial release, whether on bond or otherwise, that "[t]he defendant refrain from criminal activity of any kind ...." § 903.047(1)(a), Fla....

...It wisely leaves the ultimate decision relating to conditions of release to the sound judgment and experience of the trial judge. [3] *1175 Aside from the issue of reasonable bail conditions, the trial court's decision to require urinalysis has support in a separate law. Section 903.047 mandates that: "As a condition of pretrial release ... the court shall require that ... the defendant refrain from criminal activity of any kind ..." § 903.047(1)(a), Fla....

...The fact that section 903.046(2)(k) authorizes the trial court to consider "[a]ny other facts that the court considers relevant," does not expand the clear and specific purposes delineated in section 90.046(1). Furthermore, I fail to see how the language quoted from section 903.047 supports the majority, where the court may require the defendant to refrain from criminal activity of any kind....

...None of the cases cited by the majority support this urinalysis condition. The imposition of house arrest in Alvarez v. Felton, 639 So.2d 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) was arguably for the protection of the public. See also Williams v. Spears, 814 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (holding section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, constitutional and stating that the trial court may revoke pretrial release where the defendant commits a new crime)....

...Our holding is limited to an interpretation of section 907.041 as now in effect. It is within the scope of legislative authority to address this issue again in the future. This order does not preclude the trial court from setting reasonable conditions for the petitioner's pretrial release pursuant to section 903.047, Florida Statutes and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.131....

...F06-001943-XX, we granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus as to that case. In Parker, the trial court revoked the bond of a defendant who, while out on bond for pending charges, was arrested on new charges. The Florida Supreme Court held that section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, *849 which allows a trial court to sua sponte revoke pretrial release when there is probable cause to believe a defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release, is neither a violation of due process considerations nor of article I, section 14 of the Florida Constitution. Section 903.047(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), specifically requires that a defendant who is on any form of pretrial release "refrain from criminal activity of any kind." Section 903.047 is immediately followed by section 903.0471, which is the subject of Parker and states that "[n]otwithstanding s....

...These new charges were clearly a violation of Alexander's conditions of pretrial release in case number CF06-000735-XX. Accordingly, when the trial court relied on Parker to sua sponte revoke the pretrial release in case number CF06-000735-XX, it was properly proceeding under section 903.0471....

...mber CF06-000735-XX, but also used Parker to impose a "no bond hold" as to Alexander's new charges in case number CF06-001943-XX. Because Alexander had never been on any form of pretrial release as to those charges, the trial court could not rely on section 903.0471 to revoke pretrial release that had not yet been imposed. Neither Parker nor section 903.0471 addresses the court's authority to hold a defendant with no bond on new charges that form the basis of a revocation of pretrial release as to old charges....

...Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.132 establishes the procedures for handling the state's motion for pretrial detention. A separate statutory and rule framework apply to the situation where a defendant violates a condition of an existing bond by committing criminal acts. Sections 903.046-903.047, Florida Statutes (1999), have been ignored by this court. Unlike the more narrow focus of section 907.041, sections 903.046-903.047 broadly define the powers of the court in all bail/pretrial release situations....

...As set forth in the statute, [t]he purpose of a bail determination in criminal proceedings is to ensure the appearance of the criminal defendant at subsequent proceedings and to protect the community against unreasonable danger from the criminal defendant. § 903.046(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). Section 903.047(1)(a) makes it a condition of all forms of pretrial release that the "defendant refrain from criminal activity of any kind." As Judge Cope has written, revocation of bond has always been within the inherent power of a court where a de...

...arrest and commitment of the defendant who is at large on bail" when "there has been a breach of the undertaking." Of course, the failure of a defendant to comply with the statutory condition of refraining "from criminal activity" is such a breach. § 903.047(1)(a), Fla....

...Although the trial court did not cite to the statute, the defendant's conduct was a violation of the statutory condition of the bond that the "defendant refrain from any contact of any type with the victim, except through pretrial discovery pursuant to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure." § 903.047(1)(b), Fla....

...694 So.2d at 842-43. Metzger thus relied only on Merdian to bring Rule 3.132 and section 907.041 procedures into cases where a defendant's bond was revoked for violating a condition of the bond, that the "defendant refrain from criminal activity of any kind." § 903.047(1)(a), Fla....

...xceeding 24 hours before the state attorney files a motion seeking pretrial detention. Section 907.041(4)(e) provides for a pretrial detention hearing "within 5 days of the filing by the state attorney of a complaint to seek pretrial detention." [2] Section 903.047, Florida Statutes (1999), was enacted in 1984....

SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. Santiago seeks habeas corpus relief from an order revoking his pretrial release and detaining him without bond entered pursuant to section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2000): Notwithstanding s....

...unwel-comed contact with her. The next day, he was brought to a first appearance hearing on the aggravated stalking and accompanying charges at which the court set bond and entered a stay away order that also prohibited contact with the victim. See § 903.047, Fla....

...Burris, 875 So.2d 408, 414 (Fla.2004); Maddox v. State, 923 So.2d 442, 448 (Fla.2006). In essence, the issue is one of statutory interpretation which, of course, is based entirely upon a correct reading of legislative intent. The very purpose of enacting section 903.0471 was to reinstate the common and well justified practice of, in effect, granting a defendant only one shot at pretrial release and, as it were, automatically revoking it when he has violated its most basic term by committing another offense thereafter....

...ord, "Unable" written. [1] The statute that defines the crime of violation of a condition of pretrial release is section 741.29, Florida Statutes (2002), which provides: (6) A person who willfully violates a condition of pretrial release provided in s. 903.047, when the original arrest was for an act of domestic violence as defined in s. 741.28, commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083, and shall be held in custody until his or her first appearance. One of the conditions authorized by section 903.047 is no contact with the victim....

...gment of Acquittal at the close of the State's case. Section 741.29(6), Florida Statutes, defines the crime of violation of a condition of pretrial release. It provides: (6) A person who willfully violates a condition of pretrial release provided in s. 903.047, when the original arrest was for an act of domestic violence as defined in s. 741.28, commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083, and shall be held in custody until his or her first appearance. *531 (Emphasis added). The conditions of pretrial release set out in section 903.047, referred to above, include the prohibition of contact by the defendant with the victim. § 903.047(1)(b), Fla....

...741.29(6). Section 741.29(6) confines the offense to instances where the defendant was originally arrested for an act of domestic violence. § 741.29(6), Fla. Stat. (2006) ("A person who willfully violates a condition of pretrial release provided in s. 903.047, when the original arrest was for an act of domestic violence as defined in s....

Crim.P. 8 Id. 9 Section 903.046(2), F.S. 10 Section 903.047, F.S. 11 Id.

the conditions of pretrial release. See id.; § 903.047(1). See also Fla. Const. Art. I, § 14, 2d sentence

...We deny the petitions because the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the petitioners’ motions for bond. This Court reviews conditions of a pretrial release under an abuse of discretion standard. See Hernandez v. Roth, 890 So. 2d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). Sections 903.047(1)(a), 903.0471, and 907.041(4)(c)7, Florida Statutes (2014), provide for revocation of the defendants’ pretrial release under the circumstances presented in these cases. Under section 903.047(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2014), as a condition of pretrial release, a defendant shall “[r]efrain from criminal activity of any kind.” Section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2014), provides that “a court may, on its own motion, revoke pretrial release and order pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretria...

...2003), the Florida Supreme Court determined that a trial court’s revocation of a defendant’s pretrial release after the defendant committed another crime while on bond for pending charges was not a due process violation. The Florida Supreme Court found that an adversarial hearing was not required and that section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2000) is consistent with article 1, section 14 of the Florida Constitution. Id. The Florida Supreme Court has, in fact, construed section 903.0471 broadly to authorize trial courts to revoke a defendant’s pretrial release when a second crime is committed from jail even when a defendant has not been physically released from custody....

...case is whether a defendant who is “released from custody” upon a court’s determination of no probable cause, see Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.133(a)(4), is on “pretrial release” and therefore subject to the conditions provided in section 903.047(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2013) We agree that the answer to that question is “no”....

...Thus, the rule draws a distinction between these two types of “release,” and we agree that in this case, the finding of no probable cause with no formal charges filed meant the defendant was required to be “released from custody,” without the condition set forth in section 903.047(l)(a). 2 This type of release should not be equated with “pretrial release” as that term of art is used in sections 903.047 and 903.0471....

...defendant in the same position (from a custodial, liberty and supervisory standpoint) he was in prior to his arrest. Because the defendant’s release cannot be considered a “pretrial release” it could not be conditioned upon his compliance with section 903.047(iXa). Therefore his release could not be revoked pursuant to section 903.0471 as a result of his subsequent arrest for a new crime....

...A defendant who has been retained in custody or returned to custody by such a determination shall be allowed an adversary preliminary hearing in all instances in which a felony offense is charged. Under these facts, we grant the petition and vacate the bond conditions imposed in case number F13-4783A. . Section 903.047(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2013) provides: (1) As a condition of pretrial release, whether such release is by surety bail bond or recognizance bond or in some other form, the defendant shall: (a) Refrain from criminal activity of any kind....

...condition of pretrial release within the meaning of section 741.29(6), Florida Statutes. Section 741.29(6) defines the crime of violation of a condition of pretrial release and provides that: A person who willfully violates a condition of pretrial release provided in s. 903.047, when the original arrest was for an act of domestic violence . . . , commits a misdemeanor of the first degree . . . . § 741.29(6), Fla. Stat. (2019). Section 903.047, which is explicitly referenced in section 741.29(6), sets forth the conditions of pretrial release and provides in relevant part: 2  (1) As a condition of pretrial release, whether such r...

...or until it is modified by the court. The defendant shall be informed in writing of the order of no contact, specifying the applicable prohibited acts, before the defendant is released from custody on pretrial release. . . . § 903.047(1)(a)–(b), Fla....

...release” within the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in section 741.29(6). Specifically, he maintains that “[t]he plain and obvious meaning of the phrase ‘violates a condition of pretrial release,’ in the context of Sections 741.29(6) and 903.047, requires a defendant to post a bond and thereby effectuate his pretrial release before he can violate a condition of that release and commit the crime defined in Section 741.29(6).” Thus, because Defendant did not post bond to effectuate his release, his conduct could not constitute a violation of a condition of pretrial release. We disagree as Defendant’s interpretation of section 741.29(6) ignores and renders meaningless the language in section 903.047(1)(b) providing that “[a]n order of no contact is effective immediately.” “When construing the meaning of a statute, we must first look at its plain language.” McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., LLC v....

...Moreover, “courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.” Unruh v. State, 669 So. 2d 242, 245 (Fla. 1996) (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 456 (Fla. 1992)). 3  Here, because section 903.047 is referenced in section 741.29(6), both statutes must be construed together to harmonize the statutes and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Section 741.29(6) provides that “[a] person who willfully violates a condition of pretrial release provided in s. 903.047 . . . commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.” § 741.29(6), Fla. Stat. (2019). Section 903.047, in turn, sets out the conditions of pretrial release and includes as an available condition that the defendant “refrain from any contact of any type with the victim.” § 903.047(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2019); see also Sheppard v. State, 974 So. 2d 529, 531 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (recognizing that “[t]he conditions of pretrial release set out in section 903.047 ....

...include the prohibition of contact by the defendant with the victim”). There is no language in either section dictating that a defendant must be released from jail in order to violate the condition of pretrial release prohibiting contact with the victim. To the contrary, the language in section 903.047(1)(b) expressly states that, “[a]n order of no contact is effective immediately.” § 903.047(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2019) (emphasis added). Simply put, the plain language of sections 741.29(6) and 903.047(1)(b) support the conclusion that a defendant can violate a condition of pretrial release prohibiting contact with the victim before being released from jail. Any other interpretation of the statutes would render meaningless the “effective immediately” language in section 903.047(1)(b). Our holding is supported by Florida Standard Criminal Jury Instruction 8.25 and the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of that instruction....

...1. (Defendant) was arrested for an act of domestic violence. 2. Before [his] [her] trial, (defendant’s) release on the domestic violence charge was set with a condition of (insert condition of pretrial release in Fla. Stat. 903.047). 3....

...ent number 4 two to instruction 8.25—i.e., ‘Before [his] [her] trial, (defendant’s) release on the domestic violence charge was set with a condition of (insert condition of pretrial release in Fla. Stat. 903.047)’—reflects the interpretation that one can violate a condition of pretrial release before being released from jail.” In re Standard Jury Instructions in Crim....

...3d DCA 2013), further supports our holding. In that case, the defendant was arrested and charged with aggravated stalking. Id. at 849. At first appearance, the trial court set bond and ordered the defendant have no contact with the victim as a condition of pretrial release pursuant to section 903.047(1)(b). Id....

...The defendant ultimately posted bond in both cases and was released from jail. Id. at 849–50. When the defendant appeared before the trial court for his arraignment on the first case, the court sua sponte revoked his bond on that first case pursuant to section 903.0471, Florida Statutes. Id. at 850. That statute permits the sua sponte revocation of a defendant’s pretrial release based upon a finding of “probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release.” Id. at 849 (quoting § 903.0471, Fla. Stat.). On habeas corpus review of the order revoking the defendant’s pretrial release, the Third District framed the legal issue presented as whether section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, “applies when the defendant commits new felonies from jail during the period between the setting of bond for previous offenses and his release.” Id....

...This petition followed. Analysis “As a condition of pretrial release, whether such release is by surety bail bond or recognizance bond or in some other form, the defendant must: (a) Refrain from criminal activity of any kind.” § 903.047(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018). The trial court can order pretrial detention when it finds probable cause that the defendant violated this condition by committing a new offense. Section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, “Violation of condition of pretrial release,” provides: “Notwithstanding s....

...ation of bail by the judge presiding over the defendant’s first appearance hearing.” Thus, the rules allow the trial judge to cede its authority to the first appearance judge. That did not occur here. 4 903.0471, Florida Statutes. See, e.g., Santiago v. Ryan, 109 So. 3d 848, 850 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (denying habeas corpus petition where the trial court revoked bond under section 903.0471 even though defendant had been released on bond at first appearance for a new offense). Defendant relies on Gadson v....

...ease conditions for those offenses. The first appearance judge had no authority to make a final determination over the pretrial release conditions in the pending 2018 cases. The trial court properly exercised its authority to revoke bond pursuant to section 903.0471, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. Petition denied. GERBER, C.J., CIKLIN and LEVINE, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposit...

...(Defendant) was arrested for an act of domestic violence. 2. Before [his] [her] trial, (defendant’s) release on the domestic violence charge was set with a condition of (insert condition of pretrial release in Fla. Stat. 903.047). 3....

...State, 512 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1stst DCA 1987). “Willfully” means knowingly, intentionally and purposely. - 25 -  Give as applicable and if the defendant is charged with violating a no contact order. § 903.047(1)(b), Fla....

...number SC13-1254 and directed the Committee to file its proposal in case number SC13-2453. When originally published by the Committee, one comment was received, from the Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association. While the proposed violates a condition of pretrial release provided in s. 903.047, when the original arrest was for an act of domestic violence as defined in s....

...ions as proposed by the Committee. Element number two to instruction 8.25—i.e., “Before [his] [her] trial, (defendant’s) release on the domestic violence charge was set with a condition of (insert condition of pretrial release in Fla. Stat. 903.047)”— reflects the interpretation that one can violate a condition of pretrial release before being released from jail. New instruction 8.25, as set forth in the appendix to this opinion, is hereby authorized for publication and use....

...(Defendant) was arrested for an act of domestic violence. 2. Before [his] [her] trial, (defendant’s) release on the domestic violence charge was set with a condition of (insert condition of pretrial release in Fla. Stat. 903.047). 3....

046(2), F.S., and Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.131(b)(3). 10 Section 903.047(1), F.S. 11 See, ss. 903.046(2), 903.047, 903

046(2)(a)–(m), Fla. Stat. (listing factors); § 903.047(1)(a)–(c), Fla. Stat. (listing conditions of pretrial

...v. R.H., 819 So. 2d 858, 862 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (“Florida courts also require that in order to find an individual in contempt, the trial court must find that the contemnor had the ability to comply with the previous court order.”); see also § 903.047(1)(b), Fla....

...of a punishment. Generally, conditions of pretrial release, when the accused is still presumed innocent, are imposed to insure that the defendant will refrain from criminal activity and from contact with the victim except through pretrial discovery. § 903.047, Fla....

...miss, finding that the conditions imposed were reasonably designed to protect the community from risk of physical harm and to assure the integrity of the judicial process. The court found that the condition that Parent use no drugs was authorized by section 903.047(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), and that the requirement that Parent attend AA or NA meetings *600 was not punishment, but merely “a means to help the defendant comply with the prior conditions that he consume no alcohol or drugs.�...

COPE, J. The question presented is whether section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2001) is constitutional....

...Bond was set for $7,500 in the second case. 1 In the first case, the defendant’s pretrial release was revoked because the defendant had committed a new crime and thus breached a condition of the pretrial release. The defendant filed a motion to reinstate bond. He argued that section 903.0471, Florida Statutes (2001), violated the pre *1169 trial release provision of the Florida Constitution and the due process clauses of the Florida and Federal Constitutions. The trial court ruled that section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, is constitutional and declined to reinstate bail for the defendant....

...The defendant has petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. We concur with Judge Lopez that the statute is constitutional, and deny the defendant’s petition. II. It is a statutory condition of pretrial release that “[t]he defendant refrain from criminal activity of any kind....” Id. 903.047(l)(a). In 2000, the Florida legislature enacted section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, which provides: 903.0471 Violation of condition of pretrial release....

...The defense declined the invitation, opting instead to argue solely the issue of unconstitutionality. Thus, for present purposes it is accepted that there was probable cause to arrest the defendant on the second crime. That being so, the defendant fell within the terms of section 903.0471. The trial court acted within its statutory authority in refusing to allow any further pretrial release. III. The defendant’s primary argument is that section 903.0471 violates article I, section 14, of the Florida Constitution....

...of the judicial process .... ” Id. A release on bond (or other pretrial release) is a release on good behavior. The defendant’s release carried with it the explicit condition that “[t]he defendant refrain from criminal activity of any kind_” § 903.047(l)(a), Fla....

...n that. The integrity of the judicial process is undercut if the courts do not have effective tools to use where a defendant free on bail commits a further crime. IV. At the hearing below, the defense argued that if the trial court wanted to rely on section 903.0471 in denying any further bail, it was necessary not only to make the statutory finding that there was “probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release,” id., but the court must also make...

...” The trial court in an abundance of caution made a finding that the defendant “is a danger and/or a risk of physical harm to the community or persons within the community. ...” This additional finding by the trial court was unnecessary. Where section 903.0471 is involved, the only finding which need be made is the statutory finding that there is “probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release.” § 903.0471, Fla....

...The reason for revoking the defendant’s pretrial release in this case — and refusing further release — is because the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release. No showing that the defendant poses a risk of physical harm is required. 2 V. Section 903.0471 is consistent with the approach followed in other jurisdictions....

...trial courts a similar authority, in the proper circumstances, to revoke a defendant’s bail for serious noncompliance with the conditions of his release. State v. Ayala, 610 A.2d at 1171-74 (some citations omitted). VI. The defendant contends that section 903.0471 violates the due process clauses of the Florida and Federal Constitutions. We reject that argument on authority of Parker v. State, 780 So.2d 210, 212-13 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), review granted, 800 So.2d 615 (Fla.2001). VII. For the reasons stated, we hold that section 903.0471, Florida Statutes, is constitutional....