The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLVII
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CORRECTIONS

Chapter 921
SENTENCE

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F.S. 921.137

921.137 Imposition of the death sentence upon an intellectually disabled defendant prohibited.—

(1) As used in this section, the term “intellectually disabled” or “intellectual disability” means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18. The term “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning,” for the purpose of this section, means performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities. The term “adaptive behavior,” for the purpose of this definition, means the effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community. The Agency for Persons with Disabilities shall adopt rules to specify the standardized intelligence tests as provided in this subsection.

(2) A sentence of death may not be imposed upon a defendant convicted of a capital felony if it is determined in accordance with this section that the defendant is intellectually disabled.

(3) A defendant charged with a capital felony who intends to raise intellectual disability as a bar to the death sentence must give notice of such intention in accordance with the rules of court governing notices of intent to offer expert testimony regarding mental health mitigation during the penalty phase of a capital trial.

(4) After a defendant who has given notice of his or her intention to raise intellectual disability as a bar to the death sentence is convicted of a capital felony and an advisory jury has returned a recommended sentence of death, the defendant may file a motion to determine whether the defendant is intellectually disabled. Upon receipt of the motion, the court shall appoint two experts in the field of intellectual disabilities who shall evaluate the defendant and report their findings to the court and all interested parties prior to the final sentencing hearing. Notwithstanding s. 921.141, s. 921.142, or s. 921.1425, the final sentencing hearing shall be held without a jury. At the final sentencing hearing, the court shall consider the findings of the court-appointed experts and consider the findings of any other expert which is offered by the state or the defense on the issue of whether the defendant has an intellectual disability. If the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant has an intellectual disability as defined in subsection (1), the court may not impose a sentence of death and shall enter a written order that sets forth with specificity the findings in support of the determination.

(5) If a defendant waives his or her right to a recommended sentence by an advisory jury following a plea of guilt or nolo contendere to a capital felony and adjudication of guilt by the court, or following a jury finding of guilt of a capital felony, upon acceptance of the waiver by the court, a defendant who has given notice as required in subsection (3) may file a motion for a determination of intellectual disability. Upon granting the motion, the court shall proceed as provided in subsection (4).

(6) If, following a recommendation by an advisory jury that the defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment, the state intends to request the court to order that the defendant be sentenced to death, the state must inform the defendant of such request if the defendant has notified the court of his or her intent to raise intellectual disability as a bar to the death sentence. After receipt of the notice from the state, the defendant may file a motion requesting a determination by the court of whether the defendant is intellectually disabled. Upon granting the motion, the court shall proceed as provided in subsection (4).

(7) Pursuant to s. 924.07, the state may appeal a determination of intellectual disability made under subsection (4).

(8) This section does not apply to a defendant who was sentenced to death before June 12, 2001.

(9) For purposes of the application of the criminal laws and procedural rules of this state to any matters relating to the imposition and execution of the death penalty, the terms “intellectual disability” or “intellectually disabled” are interchangeable with and have the same meaning as the terms “mental retardation” or “retardation” and “mentally retarded” as those terms were defined before July 1, 2013.

History.—s. 1, ch. 2001-202; s. 23, ch. 2006-195; s. 38, ch. 2013-162; s. 3, ch. 2023-25.

F.S. 921.137 on Google Scholar

F.S. 921.137 on Casetext

Amendments to 921.137

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 921.137

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 921.137.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

IN RE BOWLES,, 935 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 921.137, covered only those with "an IQ of 70 or below." Zack v. . . . Stat. § 921.137, as interpreted by Florida's courts, was unconstitutional. 572 U.S. at 721, 134 S. . . .

RAULERSON, Jr. v. WARDEN,, 928 F.3d 987 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . . § 921.137 (2013). . . .

FOSTER, v. STATE, 260 So. 3d 174 (Fla. 2018)

. . . by the statutory definition of "mental retardation" that was already in effect at that time, see § 921.137 . . .

J. WRIGHT, v. STATE, 256 So. 3d 766 (Fla. 2018)

. . . Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) ; see also § 921.137(2), Fla. . . . In Florida, section 921.137, Florida Statutes, defines ID with a three-prong test: (1) "significantly . . . To demonstrate ID, a defendant must make this showing by clear and convincing evidence. § 921.137(4). . . . Compare § 921.137(1), with DSM-5, at 37, and AAIDD-11, at 6, 43. . . . See § 921.137 ; Moore , 137 S.Ct. at 1046. . . .

QUINCE, v. STATE, 241 So. 3d 58 (Fla. 2018)

. . . disability as a bar to execution, which was filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203 and section 921.137 . . . Virginia , 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), and section 921.137, Florida Statutes . . . Finally, Quince argues that section 921.137(4), Florida Statutes, which requires that defendants prove . . . we need not address the constitutionality of the clear and convincing evidence standard of section 921.137 . . . Section 921.137 requires a defendant to establish his or her intellectual disability by demonstrating . . .

STATE v. MORRISON, Jr., 236 So. 3d 204 (Fla. 2017)

. . . In Hall, the United States Supreme Court held that Florida's interpretation of section 921.137(1), Florida . . . . § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2015) ; see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.203. . . .

JONES, v. STATE, 231 So. 3d 374 (Fla. 2017)

. . . .” § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . In Hall, the Supreme Court held that Florida’s interpretation of section 921.137(1) as establishing a . . .

T. GLOVER, v. STATE, 226 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 2017)

. . . P. 3.203; § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .

WILLIAMS, v. STATE, 226 So. 3d 758 (Fla. 2017)

. . . . -, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016); § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. . . . State, 59 So.3d 82, 92 (Fla. 2011); § 921.137(4), Fla. Stat. . . . The term “adaptive behavior,” as used in section 921.137(1), Fla. . . . reiterated that “[i]f the defendant fails to prove any one of the[] components [delineated in section 921.137 . . .

ZACK, III, v. STATE III, v. L., 228 So. 3d 41 (Fla. 2017)

. . . . § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (2016); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.203. . . .

OATS, Jr. v. L. JONES,, 220 So. 3d 1127 (Fla. 2017)

. . . In 2001, before Atkins, the Legislature enacted section 921.137, Florida Statutes, barring the execution . . . See § 921.137(2), Fla. Stat. (2001). . . . Thus, Oats has not demonstrated that Florida’s Atkins procedure, as set forth in section 921.137, is . . .

SNELGROVE, v. STATE v. L., 217 So. 3d 992 (Fla. 2017)

. . . .2d 503, 511 (Fla. 2008) (“[T]he majority of Phillips’s IQ scores exceed that required under section 921.137 . . . Section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes, defines “adaptive behavior” as “the effectiveness or degree with . . . in adaptive behavior; and (3) manifestation of the condition before age eighteen,” Id.; see also § 921.137 . . . See § 921.137(9), Fla. Stat. (2016). . Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1993). . . . .

HAMPTON, v. STATE v. L., 219 So. 3d 760 (Fla. 2017)

. . . . § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . . independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community.” § 921.137 . . .

J. WRIGHT, v. STATE, 213 So. 3d 881 (Fla. 2017)

. . . satisfy the requirements for statutory mitigation ... or qualify as mentally retarded under section 921.137 . . . Florida, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016); § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. . . . State, 59 So.3d 82, 92 (Fla. 2011); § 921.137(4), Fla. Stat. . . . In Dufour, we explained what this prong requires: As desmbed in section 921.137(1) and rule 3.203(b), . . . The definition in section 921.137 and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203 states that the subaverage . . .

FRANQUI, v. STATE v., 211 So. 3d 1026 (Fla. 2017)

. . . . § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . See § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat.; Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.203(b); Fla. Admin. Code 65G-4.011. . . .

SIMMONS, v. STATE, 207 So.3d 860 (Fla. 2016)

. . . Section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes (2014), provides generally that for a defendant to be intellectually . . .

McCLOUD, v. STATE, 208 So. 3d 668 (Fla. 2016)

. . . to be intellectually disabled, thereby rendering him ineligible for the death penalty under section 921.137 . . .

THOMPSON, v. STATE, 208 So. 3d 49 (Fla. 2016)

. . . See § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (2001); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.203. . . . See also, section 921.137(1), Fla. Stat.; Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.203(c) & (e). . . . Thompson again raised the claim that Atkins, section 921.137, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Criminal . . . “Because we find that Cherry does not meet this first prong of section 921.137(1) criteria, we do not . . .

A. WALLS, v. STATE, 213 So. 3d 340 (Fla. 2016)

. . . .” § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test.” § 921.137 . . . P. 3.203; see also § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . .

HALL, v. STATE, 201 So. 3d 628 (Fla. 2016)

. . . Circuit court’s denial of Hall’s postconviction motion, holding that our interpretation of section 921.137 . . . The United States Supreme Court reversed our decision, holding that our decision interpreted section 921.137 . . . Hall filed a motion to declare section 921.137, Florida Statutes, unconstitutional. . . . Stat. § 921.137(1) (2013). . . . Florida courts may continue to abide by section 921.137(1), but may not have a bright-line cutoff IQ . . .

J. W. LEDFORD, Jr. v. WARDEN, GEORGIA DIAGNOSTIC AND CLASSIFICATION PRISON,, 818 F.3d 600 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 921.137. . . .

K. SALAZAR, v. STATE K. v. L., 188 So. 3d 799 (Fla. 2016)

. . . .§ 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. . . . State, 59 So.3d 82, 92 (Fla.2011); § 921.137(4), Fla. Stat. . . . which requires that the person exhibit “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning.” § 921.137 . . . As defined in section 921.137(1), the term adaptive behavior “means the effectiveness or degree with . . .

OATS, Jr. v. STATE, 181 So. 3d 457 (Fla. 2015)

. . . See § 921.137, Fla. . . . . only that the intellectual disability “manifested during the period from conception to age 18.” § 921.137 . . . (enacting § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (2001)). . . . Contrary to the circuit court’s decision, section 921.137 requires a showing only that an intellectual . . . disability “manifested during the period from conception to age 18.” § 921.137, Fla. . . .

KILGORE, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,, 805 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 921.137(1) (2007); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.203(b). . . . Stat. § 921.137(1). . . .

In HILL, Jr., 777 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 921.137. . . . Stat. § 921.137(1), -with AAIDD, Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification and Systems of Supports . . . . § 921.137 to provide that a prisoner sentenced to death was required to show an IQ test score of 70 . . .

MARTIN, v. STATE, 151 So. 3d 1184 (Fla. 2014)

. . . See § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (2013). . In 1992, Martin scored a 71 on the WAIS-R. . . .

ARBELAEZ, v. D. CREWS,, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1271 (S.D. Fla. 2014)

. . . Arbelaez did not prove that he has concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior as required by section 921.137 . . . The definition in section 921.137 and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203 states that the subaverage . . . Stat. § 921.137 and Jones.” ([DE 1] at 66). . . . Section 921.137, Florida Statutes. . . . “[Hjowever, [921.137] applies only to persons sentenced to death after the effective date of the statute . . .

In HENRY,, 757 F.3d 1151 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . Under § 921.137 of the Florida Statutes as interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court, a prisoner sentenced . . . In relevant part, § 921.137 provides: [T]he term “intellectually disabled” or “intellectual disability . . . Stat. § 921.137(1). . . . .

HENRY, v. STATE, 141 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2014)

. . . See § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (2013); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.203. . . . Section 921.137(1) provides that intellectual disability means “significantly subaverage general intellectual . . .

HALL, v. FLORIDA., 134 S. Ct. 1986 (U.S. 2014)

. . . . § 921.137(1) Validity Called into Doubt Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.130(2); Va. . . . Stat. § 921.137(1) (2013). . . .

HALL, v. FLORIDA., 572 U.S. 701 (U.S. 2014)

. . . . § 921.137(1) (2013). . . .

HURST, v. STATE, 147 So. 3d 435 (Fla. 2014)

. . . State, 2 So.3d 137, 142 (Fla.2009); § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . . See Nixon, 2 So.3d at 145; § 921.137(4), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . . See ch.2013-162, Laws of Fla.; see, e.g., section 921.137, Florida Statutes (2013), titled "Imposition . . .

DIAZ, v. STATE v. D., 132 So. 3d 93 (Fla. 2013)

. . . Under section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes (2009), to prevail on this claim Diaz was required to establish . . . “In Cherry, we held that the language of section 921.137(1) is clear and unambiguous in mandating a strict . . .

HALL, v. STATE, 109 So. 3d 704 (Fla. 2012)

. . . Section 921.137, Florida Statutes (2012), prohibits the trial court from sentencing to death a mentally . . . See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318, 122 S.Ct. 2242; § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2012); Fla. R.Crim. . . . State, 959 So.2d 702 (2007), we determined the proper interpretation of section 921.137. . . . State, 944 So.2d 234, 249 (Fla.2006); § 921.137(4), Fla. Stat. (2012). . . . Section 921.137, Florida Statutes was enacted during a regular session of the Florida Legislature in . . . I do not disagree with my esteemed colleagues that section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes (2012), and our . . . Prior to Atkins, this State adopted section 921.137, which provides in relevant part: The term “significantly . . . standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities. § 921.137 . . . language of the statute and found that an IQ higher than 70 failed to meet the first prong of section 921.137 . . . offered by the state or the defense on the issue of whether the defendant has mental retardation. § 921.137 . . . Between 1991 and 2010, two developments in the law occurred: (1) the Legislature enacted section 921.137 . . . This requirement derives from the language of section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes, which this Court . . . However, until that time, this Court is not at liberty to deviate from the plain language of section 921.137 . . . Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-618(a)(2) (2012)); Delaware (Del.Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(3) (2012)); Florida (§ 921.137 . . .

SNELGROVE, v. STATE, 107 So. 3d 242 (Fla. 2012)

. . . See § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . . See § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2009); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.203; Nixon v. . . . This Court has “consistently interpreted section 921.137(1) as providing that a defendant may establish . . . State, 59 So.3d 82, 92 (Fla.2011); see § 921.137(4),- Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . Section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes, defines “adaptive behavior” as “the effectiveness or degree with . . .

STATE v. HERRING,, 76 So. 3d 891 (Fla. 2011)

. . . Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins, the Florida Legislature enacted section 921.137, Florida . . . In accordance with section 921.137 and in response to Atkins, this Court adopted Florida Rule of Criminal . . . See § 921.137(4), Fla. Stat. (2010); Franqui v. . . . State, 69 So.3d 235, 247 (Fla.2011) (stating that the plain meaning of section 921.137 and rule 3.203 . . . See Cherry, 959 So.2d at 713 (noting that the plain language of section 921.137(1) “does not use the . . .

LUKEHART, v. STATE v. G., 70 So. 3d 503 (Fla. 2011)

. . . prohibiting the imposition of a sentence of death to be imposed on a mentally retarded defendant, section 921.137 . . .

COLEMAN, v. STATE v. G., 64 So. 3d 1210 (Fla. 2011)

. . . constitutions, and (3) Coleman is mentally retarded and therefore his execution is forbidden by section 921.137 . . .

In T. TURNER,, 637 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 2011)

. . . See § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . . Stat. § 921.137(1). . . . Stat. § 921.137(8). . . . Rule 3.203’s definition of mental retardation is substantially identical to that of § 921.137 and the . . . Stat. § 921.137(1), with Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.203(b); see also Phillips, 984 So.2d at 509-10. . . .

JONES, v. A. McNEIL,, 776 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (S.D. Fla. 2011)

. . . Jones also argues that “the Florida Supreme Court’s construction of Section 921.137(2) violates fundamental . . . P. 3.203(b) and Fla Stat. § 921.137, section 921.137 “applies only to persons sentenced to death after . . . Stat. 921.137(8).” Carroll v. Secy. Dept. of Corr., 574 F.3d 1354, 1367 (11th Cir.2009). Mr. . . . Therefore, § 921.137 is inapplicable to Mr. . . . Stat. § 921.137, the Court will consider the factual determinations in the context of Atkins and under . . .

DUFOUR, v. STATE, 69 So. 3d 235 (Fla. 2011)

. . . Moreover, Dufour contended that section 921.137, Florida Statutes (2004), violates both the United States . . . See § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (2001). . . . Accord § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . P. 3.203(b); § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 921.137(1). . . . Developmental Disabilities’ (AAIDD) definition of mental retardation, as well as the language of section 921.137 . . . See § 921.137(1), Fla. . . . Section 921.137(1) defines adaptive behavior as “the effectiveness or degree with which an individual . . . independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community.” § 921.137 . . .

FRANQUI, v. STATE, 59 So. 3d 82 (Fla. 2011)

. . . See § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2009); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.203; Nixon v. . . . The circuit court’s task is to apply the law as set forth in section 921.137, Florida Statutes, which . . . See § 921.137(4), Fla. Stat. (2009); Nixon, 2 So.3d at 145. . . . State The proper interpretation of section 921.137(1) was raised in Cherry v. . . . State, 959 So.2d 702, 711 (Fla.2007), where the question before the Court was whether section 921.137 . . .

HODGES, v. STATE, 55 So. 3d 515 (Fla. 2010)

. . . Based on section 921.137(4), Florida Statutes (2008), defense counsel moved that the trial court appoint . . . “The Florida Legislature enacted section 921.137 in 2001. . . . See § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2007); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.203(b). . . . defendant has the burden to prove that he is mentally retarded by clear and convincing evidence. § 921.137 . . .

KILGORE, v. STATE v. A., 55 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2010)

. . . See § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (2001). . . . In response to Atkins and section 921.137, we promulgated Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203, which . . . Pursuant to both section 921.137 and rule 3.203, a defendant must prove mental retardation by demonstrating . . . See § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2007); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.203(b). . . . This State in section 921.137(1) defines subaverage general intellectual functioning as “performance . . .

JACKSON, v. NORRIS,, 615 F.3d 959 (8th Cir. 2010)

. . . . § 921.137(1); Ky.Rev.Stat. § 532.130(2); Neb. . . .

SCHOENWETTER, v. STATE v. A., 46 So. 3d 535 (Fla. 2010)

. . . State, 966 So.2d 319, 326 (Fla.2007) (quoting § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2005)); see also Hurst v. . . .

HURST, v. STATE, 18 So. 3d 975 (Fla. 2009)

. . . State, 966 So.2d 319, 326 (Fla.2007) (quoting § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2005)). . . . See § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2008); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.203(b) (effective Oct. 1, 2004). . . . .

J. WRIGHT, v. STATE, 19 So. 3d 277 (Fla. 2009)

. . . not satisfy the requirements for statutory mitigation or qualify as mentally retarded under section 921.137 . . . However, this expert did not consider the recognized standardized intelligence tests required by section 921.137 . . . Section 921.137(1) defines mental retardation for purposes of the statutory determination to be "significantly . . .

CARROLL, v. SECRETARY, DOC, FL, 574 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2009)

. . . . § 921.137. . . . Section 921.137, however, applies only to persons sentenced to death after the effective date of the . . . Stat. § 921.137(8). . . . Stat. § 921.137 (stating significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning must exist concurrently . . . Stat. § 921.137. . . .

THOMPSON, s v. STATE s, 3 So. 3d 1237 (Fla. 2009)

. . . See also section 921.137(1), Fla. State.; Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.203(c) & (e). In Cherry v. . . .

NIXON, v. STATE, 2 So. 3d 137 (Fla. 2009)

. . . Moreover, Nixon contended that section 921.137, Florida Statutes (2002), as interpreted in Cherry v. . . . See § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (2001). . . . See § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2007); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.203(b). . . . This State in section 921.137(1) defines subaver-age general intellectual functioning as “performance . . . See id. at 309 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. 2242; § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .

PHILLIPS, v. STATE, 984 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2008)

. . . The Florida Legislature enacted section 921.137 in 2001. . . . See § 921.137, Fla. Stat. . . . Section 921.137(1) defines subaverage general intellectual functioning as “performance that is two or . . . Here, the majority of Phillips’s IQ scores exceed that required under section 921.137. . . . (citing § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2007); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.203(b)). Dr. . . .

CONNOR, v. STATE, 979 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 2007)

. . . And to the extent Connor argues that the date in section 921.137 precludes some defendants from making . . .

JONES, v. STATE, 966 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 2007)

. . . . § 921.137(1), Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added); accord Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.203(b). . . . the death penalty applies to a defendant who “is mentally retarded” or “has mental retardation.” § 921.137 . . . concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18.” § 921.137 . . . on a standardized intelligence test” specified by the Department of Children and Family Services. § 921.137 . . .

CHERRY, v. STATE, 959 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2007)

. . . determination that he is not mentally retarded in accordance with the definition set forth in section 921.137 . . . Stat. § 921.137. . . . Both section 921.137 and rule 3.203 provide that significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning . . . Because we find that Cherry does not meet this first prong of the section 921.137(1) criteria, we do . . .

UNITED STATES v. SABLAN,, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (D. Colo. 2006)

. . . . § 921.137; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.95.030). . . . .

BURNS, v. STATE, 944 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 2006)

. . . supplemental brief concerning whether he met the statutory definition for mental retardation based on section 921.137 . . . Section 921.137(4) sets out the clear and convincing evidence standard as the appropriate standard to . . .

RODGERS, Jr. v. STATE, 948 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2006)

. . . As to mental retardation, the court concluded that Rodgers is not mentally retarded under section 921.137 . . . First, he argues that section 921.137, Florida Statutes (2003), which governs determinations of mental . . . citing Arbelaez and finding “no merit to [Rodriguez’s] claim regarding the constitutionality of [section 921.137 . . . concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18.” § 921.137 . . . independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community.” § 921.137 . . .

TROTTER, v. STATE v. R., 932 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 2006)

. . . Trotter also argues that the clear and convincing evidence standard of section 921.137(4), Florida Statutes . . . Section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes (2005), provides an identical definition, but the statute “does . . . Id. § 921.137(8). . . . . In his original brief, Trotter raises one issue — that section 921.137, Florida Statutes (2001), is unconstitutional . . .

MORRIS, v. STATE v. R., 931 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 2006)

. . . phase of the trial; (II) Morris is educable mentally retarded and his execution would violate section 921.137 . . .

FOSTER, v. STATE, 929 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2006)

. . . Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), the Florida Legislature created section 921.137 . . . See § 921.137(8). Hence, Foster was not eligible for relief under this statutory scheme. . . . after the evidentiary hearing occurred because Atkins had not yet been decided, and because section 921.137 . . . Foster allege or attempt to prove mental retardation as a constitutional bar to execution under section 921.137 . . .

UNITED STATES v. NELSON, 419 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. La. 2006)

. . . . § 921.137; Wash. Rev.Code Ann. § 10.95.030. . . . .

A. WALLS, v. STATE A. v. R., 926 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 2006)

. . . The trial court denied a hearing based on section 921.137, Florida Statutes (2005), the statute prohibiting . . . Id. § 921.137(8). . . .

FERRELL, v. HEAD,, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (N.D. Ga. 2005)

. . . . § 921.137; Ind.Code Ann. § 35-36-9-4; N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A-2005. . . .

RODRIGUEZ, v. STATE v. V. Jr., 919 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2005)

. . . Rodriguez also argues that section 921.137, Florida Statutes (2004), which prohibits imposition of the . . .

PHILLIPS, v. STATE v. V. Jr., 894 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2004)

. . . an evidentiary hearing; (2) resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that section 921.137 . . . Applicability of Section 921.137(1), Florida Statutes (2001) Phillips next asserts that his re-sentencing . . . Nevertheless, we do not preclude Phillips from raising the retroactive application of section 921.137 . . . Section 921.137(1) provides: As used in this section, the term "mental retardation" means significantly . . . Section 921.137, Florida Statutes (2001), was enacted on June 12, 2001. . . . . Section 921.137(4), Florida Statutes (2004), requires proof of mental retardation by clear and convincing . . .

AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, 875 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 2004)

. . . In Atkins, which was decided after the enactment of section 921.137, Florida Statutes, the United States . . . leaves the trial courts obligated to either apply the clear and convincing evidence standard of section 921.137 . . . I also write to suggest that the Legislature amend the burden of proof set forth in section 921.137 in . . . When the Legislature enacted section 921.137 in 2001, the United States Supreme Court had not yet recognized . . . these reasons, I suggest that the Legislature reconsider the burden of proof requirements of section 921.137 . . . In 2001, the Legislature created section 921.137, Florida Statutes, which bars the imposition of death . . . provide the necessary procedure to raise mental retardation as a bar to a death sentence under section 921.137 . . . the proposal together with several eases pending in this Court that raise claims '- based on section 921.137 . . . Section 921.137, Florida Statutes (2003), provides: (1) As used in this section, the term "mental retardation . . . These are: Delaware, see Del.Code Ann. tit. 11 § 4209 (2002); Florida, see § 921.137, Fla. . . . determination be made after a verdict of guilty and after a juiy recommends a sentence of death., See § 921.137 . . .

AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 842 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 2003)

. . . asserts mental retardation as a bar to the imposition of the death penalty under recently enacted section 921.137 . . . will consider that proposal together with several pending cases that raise claims based on section 921.137 . . .

THOMPSON, v. SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,, 320 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003)

. . . . § 921.137 (2001). . . .

BOTTOSON v. MOORE, 824 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 2002)

. . . reach the merits of whether Bottoson’s execution would violate the Eighth Amendment or whether section 921.137 . . .

ATKINS v. VIRGINIA, 536 U.S. 304 (U.S. 2002)

. . . . § 921.137(8) (Supp. 2002); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-131(j) (1997); Ind. . . . Stat. §921.137; Mo. Rev. Stat. §§565.030(4)-(7); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2005. . . . . §921.137; Mo. Rev. Stat. §565.030; 2001-346 N. C. Sess. Laws p. 45. . . .

L. CROOK, v. STATE, 813 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2002)

. . . See ch.2001-202, Laws of Florida (2001) (codified at § 921.137, Fla. Stat. (2001)). . . .

BOTTOSON, v. STATE v., 813 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 2002)

. . . reach the merits of whether Bottoson’s execution would violate the Eighth Amendment or whether section 921.137 . . .