Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...1985), for a proposition which was not addressed in C.C. In C.C., the issue was whether the state had the right to appeal trial court orders in juvenile cases to the district courts of appeal under either article V, section 4(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution or sections 924.07 and 924.071, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...and Jones, as Chief Justice Boyd in his special concurrence to Jones recognized, is that they directly conflict with decades of well-established case law. In State v. Harris, 136 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1962), we addressed the controlling issue here of whether section 924.07, limiting the right of the state to take appeals from adverse decisions in criminal proceedings to those enumerated, also limited the right of the state to obtain review by certiorari of nonappealable orders. With unmistakable clarity, we held: The statute [section 924.07] deals only with direct appeals in criminal proceedings and clearly does not and was not intended to proscribe the authority of the state to seek either common law certiorari now exercised by the district courts or constitutional certiorari of the variety now exercised by this Court....

...Dumas, 363 So.2d 568 (Fla. *257 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 372 So.2d 471 (1979) (grants common law certiorari review of interlocutory order in criminal proceeding); State v. Gibson, 353 So.2d 670 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (treating state appeal of nonappealable order under section 924.07 as petition for certiorari and granting review); State v. Wilcox, 351 So.2d 89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (treating state appeal of nonappealable order under section 924.07 as petition for certiorari and granting review); State v. Caivano, 304 So.2d 139 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 314 So.2d 774 (1975) (treating state appeal of nonappealable order under section 924.07 as petition for certiorari and granting review); State v....

...2d DCA 1969) (granting state certiorari review of nonappealable discovery order); State v. Williams, 227 So.2d 253 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), cert. denied, 237 So.2d 180 (1970) (granting certiorari review of nonappealable discovery orders and citing Harris as authority for proposition that sections 924.07 and 924.071 do not limit state's right to seek certiorari review of interlocutory orders); State v. Staley, 97 So.2d 147 (Fla. 2d DCA 1957) (granting certiorari review of order from circuit court acting in its appellate capacity); State v. Atwell, 97 So.2d 125 (Fla. 2d DCA 1957) (holding that section 924.07 does not limit state's right to seek certiorari review and granting review of order from circuit court acting in its appellate capacity)....

...is overinclusive, the appellate courts will be unnecessarily intruding, thereby delaying the trial process. Thus, short of omniscience, it is necessary to devise a solution which retains a degree of discretionary, i.e., certiorari, review. Sections 924.07 and 924.071, Florida Statutes (1985) and Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.130 and 9.140, in pertinent part, identify the most common interlocutory orders for which appeal by right is always appropriate and for which appellate intrusion into the trial process is justified....

...The state cannot appeal an acquittal whereas a defendant may appeal a conviction. Consequently, without an ameliorating rule, the state has no remedy, adequate or otherwise, for the erroneous suppression of evidence when an acquittal occurs. Rule 9.140(c)(1)(B) and section 924.071(1) provide a remedy for the state even though a reciprocal interlocutory right of appeal is not provided to the defendant for an erroneous refusal to suppress evidence....

...Rogers & Baxter, Certiorari in Florida, 4 U.Fla.L.Rev. 477 (1951); Haddad, The Common Law Writ of Certiorari in Florida, 29 U.Fla.L.Rev. 207 (1977). [2] This does not mean that we and the legislature should not continue to review and amend sections 924.07 and 924.071 and rules 9.130 and 9.140 in order to identify additional rulings from which the right of appeal is appropriate....

...inevitable. See Judicial Coordinating Council, Court Reporting: A Report to the Supreme Court of Florida (1982). [2] If the state had wanted to contest the holding that appellant's confession was inadmissible, it could have taken a pretrial appeal. § 924.071(1), Fla. Stat. (1981). Moreover, if the state had wanted to establish the admissibility of the confession in case of a new trial, it could have cross-appealed the ruling in connection with this appeal by appellant. § 924.07(4), Fla....

...ge justifies a continuation in custody. If he has been released on bail he and his sureties shall be exonerated; if money or bonds have been deposited as bail such money or bonds shall be refunded. (f) Order Dismissing. For the purpose of construing Section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (1969), F.S.A., the statutory term "order quashing" shall be taken and held to mean "order dismissing." (g) Motion for Continuance....

...smissed charges if the dismissal were reversed, such as in cases involving the socalled "single transaction rule." Item (E) refers to the popularly known "speedy trial rule," and items (F), (G), and (H) track the balance of state appellate rights in section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...In this he incorrectly stated the law as is evident by the fact that when this conviction is reversed, the prosecution will have another opportunity to try to convict this appellant. Furthermore, there are several grounds upon which the State may appeal in a criminal case. Section 924.07, Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...Deeno Kitchen, Tallahassee, for appellees. ON REHEARING GRANTED AND ORIGINAL OPINION WITHDRAWN ADKINS, Justice. This is a direct appeal from the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District (State v. Smith and Figgers, 254 So.2d 402, which held that Fla. Stat. § 924.07(8), F.S.A., authorizing appeals by the State from pretrial orders is unconstitutional on the ground that the jurisdiction of the District Court to entertain such interlocutory appeals may be granted only by rule of this Court....

...Has the Supreme Court so provided? We conclude that it has not. "The sole provision promulgated by the Supreme Court for appellate review of pretrial orders in criminal cases is found in Rule 6.3 subd. b, 32 F.S.A.(1) "[1] Rule 6.3, subd. b, Florida Appellate Rules, reads: "`b. Appeals pursuant to Section 924.071, Florida Statutes 1967, shall be taken within the time prescribed in subsection a....

...Such appeals shall be given priority on the docket.' This Rule breathes life into alegislative Act(2) which purports to permit appellate review of a pretrial order which quashes a search warrant, suppresses evidence obtained by search and seizure, or suppresses a confession or admission made by a defendant. "[2] F.S. § 924.071, F.S.A. "The legislature has sought to provide appellate review of other pretrial orders entered in criminal cases(3) through enactment of Section 924.07(8), which provides: "[3] F.S. § 924.07(8), F.S.A....

...rovide for interlocutory review. Any statute purporting to grant interlocutory appeals is clearly a declaration of legislative policy and no more. Until and unless the Supreme Court of Florida adopts such statute as its own (as it did with regard to Section 924.071), the purported enactment is void." "[4] Levin and Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U.Pa.L.Rev....

...smissed charges if the dismissal were reversed, such as in cases involving the socalled "single transaction rule." Item (E) refers to the popularly known "speedy trial rule," and items (F), (G), and (H) track the balance of state appellate rights in section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Gen., Tallahassee, for appellant. Robert T. Adams, Jr., Marianna, for appellee. KOGAN, Justice. The state appeals an order granting a new penalty phase in the capital trial of Thewell Eugene Hamilton. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. See § 924.07(1)(b), Fla....

...o. The state brought an appeal from the trial court's judgment and the district court of appeal dismissed the appeal. The issue before us is whether the state is entitled to appellate review of the trial court's order granting judgment of acquittal. Section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1981), authorizes appeals by the state in criminal cases as follows: The state may appeal from: (1) An order dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof; (2) An order granting a new trial; (3) An ord...

...5, prior to the 1956 revision, the single court of general appellate jurisdiction of major cases. [5] In Whidden v. State, 159 Fla. 691, 32 So.2d 577 (1947), this Court said, "The state's right to appeal is purely statutory, and is found in Sections 924.07 and 924.08, Fla....

...ho had obtained judgment in their favor in prosecutions by indictment, whether by the judgment of the court or the verdict of a jury. State v. Burns, 18 Fla. 185, 187 (1891). In view of this virtual prohibition of the common law, we can see sections 924.07 and 924.071 as strictly limited and carefully crafted exceptions designed to provide appellate review to the state in criminal cases where such is needed as a matter of policy and where it does not offend against constitutional principles....

...(1983) (bond validations); § 382.45, Fla. Stat. (1983) (appeals of judicial action on petition for certification of birth facts). Having determined that the state's right of appeal is governed by statute, we now come to the remaining question of whether either section 924.07 or section 924.071 provides for an appeal by the state in the circumstances of this case....

...The respondent's request for a court-ordered judgment of acquittal was part of a combined motion which also included a motion for new trial under rule 3.600 and a motion for arrest of judgment under rule 3.610. The state may appeal an order granting a new trial by virtue of section 924.07(2) and may appeal an order in arrest of judgment under section 924.07(3). But it is clear that the court's order was in response to respondent's motion for judgment of acquittal and was in fact a judgment of acquittal. Nowhere in sections 924.07 or 924.071 is provision made for appeal by the state from an order granting a judgment of acquittal....

...(c) If the jury returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict, the defendant's motion may be made or renewed within ten days after the reception of a verdict, and the jury is discharged or such further time as the court may allow. [4] Section 924.071, Florida Statutes (1981), provides additional grounds for appeal by the state in criminal cases, none of which is applicable here: (1) The state may appeal from a pretrial order dismissing a search warrant, suppressing evidence obtain...

...ILLEGAL SENTENCE" WITHIN THE MEANING OF RULE 3.800(a); AND, IF SO, CAN THE STATE PROPERLY SEEK TO HAVE SUCH A SENTENCE INCREASED TO THE GUIDELINES RANGE BY FILING A MOTION UNDER RULE 3.800(a) AFTER THE STATE HAS FOREGONE APPEALING THE SENTENCE UNDER SECTION 924.07(1)(i), FLORIDA STATUTES, AND RULE 9.140(c)(1)(J)? Id., at 117....

...At oral argument, the State conceded, and we agree, that Gartrell's initial sentence was not an "illegal sentence" within the meaning of rule 3.800(a). However, the State argues that this Court should approve the increased sentence because, had the State appealed the downward departure sentence under section 924.07(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1991), and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(J), the sentence would have been reversed as an unauthorized downward departure....

...illegal sentence nor a calculation error was involved in this case, rule 3.800(a) was clearly the improper vehicle for the State to use. The State should have appealed the sentence imposed as being "outside the range recommended by the guidelines." § 924.07(1)(i), Fla....

...William R. Wade, Milton, for Appellee. BROWNING, J. The State of Florida appeals the trial court's ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict finding Robert E. Williams guilty of possession of cocaine. We have jurisdiction. § 924.07(1)(j), Fla....

...to transcribe his notes of the proceedings ... The cost of such stenographic report and copies shall be paid by the defendant if he takes the appeal and by the county if the state takes the appeal, except that if the state appeals under authority of Section 924.07(4)....

...ompanion case of State v. Creighton, 469 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1985), have found it lacking in legal merit. The state also argues that it may appeal the orders in question pursuant to the statutes providing for appellate review in criminal cases. Sections 924.07 and 924.071, Florida Statutes (1981), provide as follows: 924.07 Appeal by state — The state may appeal from: (1) An order dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof; (2) An order granting a new trial; (3) An order arresting judgment; (4) A ruling on a question of law when the defendant i...

...han one appeal under this subsection in any case. Such appeal shall embody all assignments of error in each pretrial order that the state seeks to have reviewed. The state shall pay all costs of such appeal except for the defendant's attorney's fee. 924.071 Additional grounds for appeal by the state; time for taking; stay of cause....

...I concur with that portion of the majority opinion that holds that the state does not have a constitutional right of appeal. State v. Creighton, 469 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1985). I dissent to the remainder of the opinion and would hold that the state's right of appeal in criminal cases, provided by sections 924.07 and 924.071, Florida Statutes (1981), [1] applies to parallel situations arising *147 in juvenile delinquency cases. Juvenile delinquency cases are analogous to criminal cases and I find that the legislature intended for sections 924.07 and 924.071 to apply when the state seeks to appeal a trial court ruling in a juvenile delinquency case. In the case of respondent C.C., the order the state sought to appeal was an order excluding from evidence the confession or incriminating statements of the accused. In criminal cases, the state is given the right to appeal such an order by section 924.071(1)....

...judgment, [3] such authority is provided by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(B). Where an order in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is directly analogous and comparable to an order of which appellate review is authorized by sections 924.07 or 924.071 in criminal cases, I believe the legislative intent is to authorize appellate review of the order....

...In the case of respondent E.V., the state seeks to appeal the order dismissing the delinquency petition on double jeopardy grounds. The record does not reveal specifically the reasoning supporting the dismissal. It is my view that this order of dismissal of a delinquency petition comes within the scope of section 924.07(1), the statutory provision authorizing appeal by the state from any "order dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof." See Fla.R.App.P....

...I would therefore hold that the state is entitled to appeal the order. In the case of respondent C.A.Q., the order in question was a suppression of physical evidence on grounds of illegal search and seizure. In criminal cases, the state may appeal such a suppression order before proceeding to trial. § 924.071(1); Fla.R.App.P....

...and S.E., the order sought to be appealed is an order dismissing the petition for an adjudication of juvenile delinquency. The order is analogous to an order dismissing an indictment or information in a criminal case. I therefore find that an appeal is provided for by section 924.07(1) and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(A)....

...conferred right of appeal applicable to these cases. I would answer the certified question by stating that the state is entitled to appellate review of adverse final judgments and orders in juvenile delinquency cases to the same extent that sections 924.07 and 924.071 provide a right to such review of parallel orders and judgments in criminal cases....

...y be had before final judgment must be resolved by determining whether such interlocutory appeal is authorized by rule of this Court. *148 Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.; R.J.B. v. State, 408 So.2d 1048 (Fla. 1982). ALDERMAN, J., concurs. NOTES [1] 924.07 and 924.071, Florida Statutes (1981), provide as follows: 924.07 Appeal by state — The state may appeal from: (1) An order dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof; (2) An order granting a new trial; (3) An order arresting judgment; (4) A ruling on a question of law when the defendant i...

...han one appeal under this subsection in any case. Such appeal shall embody all assignments of error in each pretrial order that the state seeks to have reviewed. The state shall pay all costs of such appeal except for the defendant's attorney's fee. 924.071 Additional grounds for appeal by the state; time for taking; stay of cause....

...ll be released on his own recognizance pending the appeal if he is charged with a bailable offense. [2] Here the delinquency petition was dismissed when the state said it could not proceed, thus arguably lending the disposition greater finality. See § 924.07(1); Fla.R.App.P....

...ly to juveniles, so Gould is inapposite to the juvenile arena. While the Court stated in C.C. that there was no legislative intent to have chapter 924 apply to juveniles, we were concerned in that case with only two specific sections of chapter 924: section 924.07 and section 924.071....

...KOGAN, C.J. and ANSTEAD, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 924.34, Florida Statutes (1995), is identical to section 924.34, Florida Statutes (1989). [2] These two sections set out the general instances in which the state has a right to appeal. [3] Sections 924.07 and 924.071 are substantially the same in the current statutes....

...Thereafter, we entered an order continuing the stay of execution pending disposition of this appeal by the state. We first address our jurisdictional authority to hear the state's appeal. Appellee urges that appellate review of a criminal proceeding is not available except as specified in section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1981), which contains no provision authorizing appeal by the state from an order granting post-conviction relief....

...Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Richard L. Polin, Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals and Consuelo Maingot, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Respondent. PARIENTE, C.J. This case presents the issue of whether section 924.07, Florida Statutes (2004), authorizes a State appeal from a post-trial order reducing a charge pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.620....

...Exposito, 854 So.2d 674, 675 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). However, the Third District certified conflict with the Fourth District Court of Appeal decision in State v. Richars, 792 So.2d 570, 571 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). [1] Based on the plain language of the statute, we hold that section 924.07 does not authorize a State appeal from a post-trial order reducing a charge....

...Exposito argued on appeal that the Third District was without jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal. Exposito relied on Richars, in which the Fourth District held that a State appeal from a post-trial order reducing a charge to a lesser-included offense pursuant to rule 3.620 was not authorized under section 924.07. The Third District declined to follow Richars, relying instead on its decision in State v. Hankerson, 482 So.2d 1386 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). See Exposito, 854 So.2d at 675. In Hankerson, the Third District held that section 924.07 authorized a State appeal from a pretrial order reducing a charge of robbery to theft....

...The court reasoned that "[a]nalytically, an order reducing a charge set forth in the information or indictment to some lesser-included charge is, despite its label, an order dismissing the charge in the information." Hankerson, 482 So.2d at 1387. In Exposito, the Third District found that rationale dispositive and held that section 924.07 authorized a State appeal from a post-trial order reducing Exposito's conviction to a lesser-included offense....

...State, 505 So.2d 418, 421 (Fla.1987); see also State v. Gaines, 770 So.2d 1221, 1227 n. 8 (Fla.2000) (recognizing that the "State's right to appeal an adverse ruling is a limited one that is strictly governed by statute"). Thus, the issue we must decide is whether the State was authorized under section 924.07 to appeal a post-trial order reducing a charge pursuant to rule 3.620. [3] Section 924.07 provides: *528 (1) The state may appeal from: (a) An order dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof or dismissing an affidavit charging the commission of a criminal offense, the violation of probation, the violation of community control, or the violation of any supervised correctional release....

...(m) An order withholding adjudication of guilt in violation of s. 775.08435. (2) An appeal under this section must embody all assignments of error in each pretrial order that the state seeks to have reviewed. The state shall pay all costs of the appeal except for the defendant's attorney's fees. § 924.07, Fla....

...State, 750 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1999). Further, "statutes which afford the government the right to appeal in criminal cases should be construed narrowly." State v. Jones, 488 So.2d 527, 528 (Fla.1986). The Third District held in this case that the State was authorized under section 924.07(1)(a) to appeal the trial court's order reducing the charge under rule 3.620 because "an order reducing a charge set forth in the information or indictment to some lesser-included charge is, despite its label, an order dismissing the charge in the information." Exposito, 854 So.2d at 675 (quoting Hankerson, 482 So.2d at 1387). The State argues that this Court should approve the Third District's decision or, in the alternative, hold that the State has authority to appeal under section 924.07(1)(j) because a post-trial reduction to a lesser-included offense is in effect a judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict. In contrast, the Fourth District held in Richars that it did not have jurisdiction to consider a similar State appeal because none of the provisions of section 924.07(1) expressly authorize such an appeal. See 792 So.2d at 571. We conclude that the plain language of section 924.07(1) does not authorize the State to appeal an order reducing the charge under rule 3.620....

...[6] Absent from this comprehensive list is authorization for the State to appeal a post-trial order adjudicating the defendant guilty of a lesser included offense under rule 3.620. Further, although the Legislature has on several occasions expanded the State's opportunities to appeal in criminal cases by amending section 924.07(1), [7] the Legislature has not chosen to amend section 924.07(1) to expressly authorize an appeal of a post-trial order reducing the charge on which the defendant is convicted. The Third District has implicitly acknowledged the lack of express authority in section 924.07(1) for an appeal of an order reducing a charge after trial by concluding that the State's appeal in this case was authorized as an appeal from "[a]n order dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof" as provided for in section 924.07(1)(a). Relying exclusively on its prior decision in Hankerson, the Third District reasoned that the order in this case was included within section 924.07(1)(a) because an order reducing the charge is, "[a]nalytically" and "despite its label," an order dismissing the information on the offense charged....

...to which the defendant's motion was filed, authorizes motions to dismiss, not motions to reduce." Id. Thus, the defendant's labeling of the motion as one to reduce rather than to dismiss did not control the appealability of the pretrial order under section 924.07(1)(a)....

...Thus, unlike the order at issue in Hankerson, which under rule 3.190(c)(4) could only have been a dismissal of the greater charge, an order under rule 3.620 reduces the charge on which the defendant is adjudicated guilty. Further supporting the conclusion that section 924.07(1)(a) does not authorize a State appeal in this case is our decision in Ramos....

...which the defendant was convicted pursuant to rule 3.620. See 505 So.2d at 418. [9] In Ramos, we addressed two issues arising from two separate Third District decisions. See id. The first concerned whether the State had the statutory authority under section 924.07(4), Florida Statutes (1983), [10] to cross-appeal from a post-trial order reducing a charge to a lesser offense....

...Ramos filed a motion to dismiss the State's cross-appeal in the Third District, arguing that the State was not authorized to cross-appeal an order granting a rule *531 3.620 motion to reduce the convicted offense. See id. at 419. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the appeal was authorized under section 924.07(4)....

...the cross-appeal depends entirely on the existence of an appeal." Id. at 421 (quoting Ramos v. State, 469 So.2d 145, 146-47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)) (alteration in original). Ramos supports our holding in this case. Had the State's appeal of the order reducing the charge been authorized under section 924.07(1)(a) as an appeal from "[a]n order dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof," the Court would have held that the State could maintain its cross-appeal regardless of the fact that the defendant dismissed the main appeal. [11] We also reject the State's argument that it had the authority to appeal in this case under section 924.07(1)(j). In advancing this position, the State essentially employs the same analysis used by the Third District in concluding that the appeal was authorized under subsection (1)(a). However, section 924.07(1) does not grant the State the right to appeal from an order that "effectively" dismisses the information or an order that is in "legal effect" a judgment of acquittal....

...WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. CANTERO, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which WELLS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. *532 CANTERO, J., specially concurring. I concur with the majority's holding that the plain language of section 924.07, Florida Statutes (2004), does not authorize the State to appeal a trial court order reducing a criminal charge under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.620....

...one charged, the court shall not grant a new trial but shall find or adjudge the defendant guilty of the lesser degree or lesser offense necessarily included in the charge, unless a new trial is granted by reason of some other prejudicial error. [4] § 924.07(1)(j), Fla. Stat. (2004). [5] § 924.07(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004). [6] § 924.07(1)(c), Fla....

...87-243, § 46, at 1658, Laws of Fla. The amendment to subsection (1)(d) was held unconstitutional. See Page v. State, 677 So.2d 55, 56 (Fla. 1st DCA), approved on other grounds, Page v. State, 684 So.2d 817 (Fla.1996). In 1992, this Court held that section 924.07 did not authorize an appeal from an order denying restitution....

...ded offense pursuant to rule 3.620." Ramos, 505 So.2d at 420. [10] This provision allowed the State to appeal "[a] ruling on a question of law when the defendant is convicted and appeals from the judgment." In 1987, this subsection was renumbered as section 924.07(1)(d). See ch. 87-243, § 46, at 1658, Laws of Fla. [11] As previously noted, in response to Ramos, the Legislature added the second sentence to section 924.07(1)(d), which was subsequently held unconstitutional by the First District in Page....

...We have for review State v. Gaines, 731 So.2d 7 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal dismissed the State's appeal because it violated the constitutional prohibition against placing a defendant in double jeopardy and, on rehearing, declared section 924.07(1)( l ), Florida Statutes (1997), unconstitutional....

...in jeopardy, he cannot be retried." Id. On this basis, the Fourth District granted the motion to dismiss the appeal. See id. After the Fourth District rejected the State's appeal on double jeopardy grounds, the State petitioned for rehearing, citing section 924.07(1)( l ) as independent statutory authority for the appeal. Section 924.07(1)( l ) provides that the State may appeal an "order or ruling suppressing evidence or evidence in limine at trial." In denying the State's motion for rehearing, the Fourth District held section 924.07(1)( l ) unconstitutional, reasoning that "nothing in the Florida Constitution ......

...the drug charge, the State's case against Gaines had come to end. Thus, the State claims that the trial court's order suppressing evidence was not a non-final order, but rather a final order of suppression and dismissal, which can be appealed under section 924.07(1)( l )....

...The fact that the order granting the motion to suppress was contained in the same written order as the order of dismissal does not convert the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress into an independent final order that is immediately appealable. Accordingly, we address whether section 924.07(1)( l ) may provide the State with the authority to appeal a non-final order without violating the Florida Constitution. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 924.07(1)( l ) Article V, section 4(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution vests in this Court exclusive power to determine the authority of district courts of appeal to hear appeals of non-final orders in both civil and criminal cases: District c...

...reme court or a circuit court. They may review interlocutory orders in such cases to the extent provided by rules adopted by the supreme court. (Emphasis supplied.) In State v. Smith, 260 So.2d 489, 489 (Fla.1972), we held that another subsection of section 924.07 [1] was unconstitutional because "the jurisdiction of the District Court to entertain such interlocutory appeals may be granted only by rule of this Court." In Smith, we relied on the prior constitutional provision, article V, section...

...als may be taken from interlocutory orders." Id. Consistent with our prior case law and the unequivocal language of article V, section 4(b)(1), we find that this Court alone has the power to define the scope of interlocutory appeals, and, therefore, section 924.07(1)( l ) is unconstitutional to the extent that it provides the State with the right to an interlocutory appeal not provided by court rule....

...See Gaines, 731 So.2d at 9 n. 2. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the decision of the Fourth District. It is so ordered. WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur. ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] Section 924.07(8), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...viewable by the district courts of appeal. (Emphasis supplied.) In 1972, the current article V, section 4(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution was adopted. See Fla. SJR 52-D (1972) at 100. [3] The statutory authority for rule 9.140(c)(1)(A) is found in section 924.07(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides that the State may appeal from "[a]n order dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof or dismissing an affidavit charging the commission of a criminal offense, the violat...

...jury's verdict." Id. at 345, 95 S.Ct. 1013. Thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause would not be violated because any error could be corrected without subjecting the defendant to a second trial. See id. [10] These rules parallel the statutory provisions in section 924.07(1)(b) and (1)(j), Florida Statutes (1999).

...o appeal the order granting appellee's motion for judgment of acquittal after the jury verdict. Prior to July 1, 1987, the state did not have the right to appeal such orders. State v. Brown, 330 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Effective July 1, 1987, Section 924.07, Florida Statutes, was amended to provide the state with the right to appeal from orders granting judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict....

...ntent to the contrary, a law is presumed to act prospectively. Walker & LaBerge, Inc. v. Halligan, 344 So.2d 239, 241 (Fla. 1977). Because the legislature made no clear statement concerning retroactive or prospective application of this statute, see Section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1987), and Chapter 87-243, Sections 46 and 76, Laws of Florida, resort must be made to the rules of statutory construction....

...ion for new trial; her remaining motions are DENIED. ZEHMER, J., concurs. WENTWORTH, Senior Judge, concurs, participating upon assignment, in substitution for NIMMONS, J. NOTES [1] In so saying, we find no merit in the ex post facto argument raised. Section 924.07 neither creates a new crime nor increases the punishment therefor....

...[2] Harris has raised a collateral issue pertaining to the State's authority to appeal the habitual offender sentencing issue to the district court. According to Harris, because the original sentence imposed by the trial court was not illegal, the State lacked the authority to prosecute an appeal on this issue. See § 924.07(1)(e), Fla....

...ion in custody. If the defendant has been released on bail, the defendant and the sureties shall be exonerated; if money or bonds have been deposited as bail, such money or bonds shall be refunded. (f) Order Dismissing. For the purpose of construing section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (1969), the statutory term "order quashing" shall be taken and held to mean "order dismissing." (g) Motion for Continuance....

...*1263 (b) Substantially the same as section 909.02, Florida Statutes, except changes name of "motion to quash" to "motion to dismiss." This conforms to the terminology of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The statute authorizing the state to appeal from certain orders, section 924.07, Florida Statutes, should be amended by substituting the words "motion to dismiss" for "motion to quash." (c) Combines the substance of sections 909.01 and 909.06, Florida Statutes....

...justifies a continuation in custody. If he has been released on bail he and his sureties shall be exonerated; if money or bonds have been deposited as bail such money or bonds shall be refunded. (f) Order Dismissing. — For the purpose of construing Section 924.07 (1), Florida Statutes, the statutory term "order *146 quashing" shall be taken and held to mean "order dismissing." (g) Motion for Continuance....

...Committee Note: (a) New; devised by committee. (b) Substantially same as 909.02, except changes name of "motion to quash" to "motion to dismiss." This conforms to Federal rules terminology. The statute authorizing the state to appeal from certain orders, 924.07, should be amended by substituting the words "motion to dismiss" for "motion to quash." (c) Combines the substance of 909.01 and 909.06....

...d charges if the dismissal were reversed, such as in cases involving the so-called *870 "single transaction rule." Item (E) refers to the popularly known "speedy trial rule," and items (F), (G), and (H) track the balance of state appellate rights in section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...The conditions of such probation were that he pay to the fine and forfeiture fund of the county three thousand dollars within three years and report each year to spend sixty days in jail, beginning November 1st of each year. The state has appealed pursuant to the authority of Fla. Stat. § 924.07(5), F.S.A., and assigned the conditions of probation as error....

...195, 116 S.E.2d 349; Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 1967 Colo.L.Rev. 181 at 184 and 120-23. Since it is apparent for the foregoing reasons that the state is not appealing from a sentence the appeal must be dismissed. *71 Fla. Stat. § 924.07(5), F.S.A....

...on of the appeal in the government's favor would not require a retrial of the defendant on remand. Scott, 437 U.S. at 91, footnote 7, 98 S.Ct. at 2194, footnote 7. In the Florida courts an acquittal, once entered, is not subject to appellate review. Section 924.07, Florida Statutes; State v....

...ismissed charges if the dismissal was reversed, such as in cases involving the so-called "single transaction rule". Item (E) refers to the popularly known "speedy trial rule", and items (F), (G) and (H) track the balance of State appellate rights in Section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...he right to appeal from a final judgment in a criminal case," thus implicitly recognizing the comparability of criminal and juvenile cases when the state is affected by an adverse final order and seeks to appeal. One of the state's arguments is that section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1981), [2] providing *1275 for appeals by the state from various adverse final orders and judgments in criminal cases, also applies when the state is adversely affected by a final order in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. Implicit in the state's argument is the further argument that section 924.07(1), providing for an appeal by the state from an order dismissing an indictment or information, encompasses an order discharging a criminally accused person on grounds of violation of the right to speedy trial. It is clear that such an order in a criminal case is applicable pursuant to the cited statutory authority. The state argues that section 924.07(1) applies as well in juvenile delinquency proceedings because such proceedings are analogous to criminal prosecutions and are in the nature of a criminal prosecution. I agree with this argument of the state and would hold that the state's right of appeal in criminal cases, conferred by section 924.07, also applies in juvenile delinquency cases. Where section 924.07 explicitly provides that the state may appeal an adverse final judgment or order of a trial court in a criminal case, it impliedly confers such an appeal right with respect to any analogous or corresponding final judgment or order in a juvenile delinquency case....

...In response to the first certified question, I would say that it is not the constitution that confers the right of appeal in this case. State v. Creighton, 469 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1985). The state's right of appeal is a matter of general law. It has been provided for by the legislature in section 924.07....

...I would quash the decision of the district court of appeal and remand the case to that court with directions to provide the appellate review to which the state is entitled. ALDERMAN and EHRLICH, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.014(1), (2)(b)1., Fla. Stat. (1979). [2] Sections 924.07 and 924.071, Florida Statutes (1981), provide as follows: 924.07 Appeal by state....

...than one appeal under the subsection in any case. Such appeal shall embody all assignments of error in each pretrial order that the state seeks to have reviewed. The state shall pay all costs of such appeal except for the defendant's attorney's fee. 924.071 Additional grounds for appeal by the state; time for taking; stay of cause....

...In the instant case, prior to the first demand for speedy trial, the State had appealed the granting of a motion to suppress by the appellant. The appeal was taken in January of 1969 and disposed of in March of 1969, three days after the beginning of the spring term of court. Florida Statute § 924.071, F.S.A., authorizes the State to appeal motions to suppress which are granted to defendants....

...As set out before, conduct by parties in a criminal case which results in superseding or staying trial court proceedings has been held to toll the running of speedy trial rights. See, Carroll, Meeks and Bryant, supra . Examples are: (1) Appeals by the State under F.S. § 924.071, F.S.A....

...1972), a case decided under the speedy trial statute and partially under the rule, the First District Court of Appeal distinguished between interlocutory appeals by the State which actually stay trial court proceedings and those which do not. Florida Statute § 924.071, F.S.A., provides for an automatic stay of proceedings when the State appeals adverse orders on motions to suppress evidence and confessions, and evidence illegally seized. Other adverse orders on pretrial motions may be appealed under F.S. § 924.07, F.S.A., and no stay results....

...On petition for rehearing, the State alleged that it did not have in its possession the material mentioned or referred to and contended that it would be unreasonable to impose upon the State the duty to obtain and produce such records for the defendant. The petition for rehearing was denied. Pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 924.07(8), F.S.A., the State filed a notice of appeal seeking a review of this order....

...missed charges if the dismissal were reversed, such as in cases involving the so-called "single transaction rule." Item (E) refers to the popularly known "speedy trial rule," and items (F), (G), and (H) track the balance of state appellate rights in section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Rehearing Denied April 10, 1969. *417 Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Arden M. Siegendorf, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for appellant. William M. Moran, Miami, for appellee. McNULTY, Judge. The State of Florida brings an Interlocutory Appeal, pursuant to § 924.07(1) F.S.A., from an order of the trial court entered on the defendant-appellee's Motion to Suppress certain evidence....

...386; it is civil rather than criminal in nature even though sought in behalf of one charged *301 with, or convicted of, a crime. Frederick v. Rowe, 105 Fla. 193, 140 So. 915; State ex rel. Deeb v. Fabisinski, 111 Fla. 454, 152 So. 207, 156 So. 261; Snell v. Mayo, Fla., 80 So.2d 330; 15 Fla.Jur. 387. Section 924.07(6), F.S.A. (enacted as Section 286, Chapter 19554, Acts of 1939) provides: "924.07....

...An appeal may be taken by the state from: "* * * "(6) Judgment discharging prisoner on habeas corpus." Without reference to whether proceedings in habeas corpus are to be civil or criminal in nature, Sweat, Sheriff v. Hixon et al., Fla. 1950, 45 So.2d 190, held that since the foregoing Section 924.07(6) was a part of Criminal Procedure Act that the then twenty (20) day limitation for appeals by the State (§ 924.10, F.S.A.) controlled the time limit for the appeal in habeas corpus and dismissed the appeal as untimely....

...al; and Section 79.11, Florida Statutes, is of no application under our present practice and procedure. State ex rel. Callahan v. Mitchell, Fla. 1964, 170 So.2d 290. Section 79.11, F.S.A. has been fully superseded by the Florida Appellate Rules, and Section 924.07(6), F.S.A., and Article V of the Constitution....

...*536 Appellate review of any order or judgment entered by a trial court is not a right derived from the common law; it is derived from the sovereign. State v. Smith, 260 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1972). The state's right to seek appellate review in a criminal case is purely statutory and is found in Florida Statute 924.07....

...ent of acquittal in a criminal proceeding. In oral argument which was directed by this court, the state conceded that the sole statutory language which might be construed to authorize the instant appeal is stated in subsection (1) of Florida Statute 924.07, viz: "An order dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof;" and then reasons that the instant order may be construed as being within the purview of the cited rule....

...Clein, appellee here and defendant below, was informed against by the County Solicitor of Dade County for an alleged violation of F.S. § 847.01, F.S.A. Defendant filed a motion to quash the indictment. From an order granting defendant's motion to quash, the State appeals under authority of F.S. § 924.07, F.S.A....

...eal in Mullin held that the existing Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(d)(2) requires a trial court to extend or toll the speedy trial period under those circumstances enumerated in the rule. [3] Further, the Cannon court rejected the contention that section 924.071(2), Florida Statutes, grants the state an automatic stay, reasoning: [I]t is obvious that the portion of Fla. Stat. § 924.071(2), which provides for an automatic stay during the pendency of such an appeal has been superseded by the provisions of the rule... . A contrary ruling would mean that the state could automatically deprive a defendant of the benefits of the Speedy Trial Rule, which did not exist when Fla. Stat. § 924.071(2) was adopted, merely by filing an appeal from an order of suppression and without any judicial determination that the appeal was not frivolous or had not been taken simply for the purpose of securing such a delay....

...the circumstances, tolls the speedy trial rule. On the other hand, both the Second District Court of Appeal in State v. Smail and the First District Court of Appeal in State v. Pearce held that an interlocutory appeal filed by the state pursuant to section 924.071 automatically tolls the speedy trial time, and consequently no trial court order is necessary. The Pearce court rejected the argument that rule 3.191(d)(2) superseded the automatic stay provisions of section 924.071, as adopted by Florida Appellate Rule 6.3.b., and stated: [T]he speedy trial rule's provisions . . may be seen as having a purpose . . *974 to permit the trial court to grant or deny an extension of the speedy trial period and a stay of the trial when the State proposed an interlocutory appeal in circumstances justified by § 924.07 but not by § 924.071(1). [Footnote omitted.] 336 So.2d at 1277. We disagree with the interpretation stated in Smail and Pearce that section 924.071(2) automatically stays the right to a speedy trial. Neither a rule of this Court nor an act of the legislature can change the constitutional right to a speedy trial. It is our view that existing rule 3.191(d)(2) and section 924.071(2) do not contradict each other. They each concern different matters. Section 924.071(2) is confined to the automatic staying of trial court proceedings when the state appeals certain pretrial orders....

...state, we conclude that the equities are balanced and the parties evenly pitted against each other in these matters involving speedy trial under Fla. Stat. § 915.01, F.S.A. The state exercised its right to appeal under the provisions of Fla. Stat. § 924.07, F.S.A., providing in part: "§ 924.07....

...— An appeal may be taken by the state from: "(1) An order quashing an indictment or information or any count thereof; * * *" Interestingly, no stay of proceedings is automatically invoked by statute or rule when such an appeal is taken. Instead, the automatic stay proceeding afforded the state is contained in Fla. Stat. § 924.071, F.S.A., providing in pertinent part: "(1) The state may appeal from a pretrial order quashing a search warrant or suppressing evidence * * * or suppressing a confession or admission made by a defendant....

...ial *871 under Fla. Stat. § 915.01(2), F.S.A. If the accused has not invoked the statute then no rights accrue thereunder and his trial status remains in limbo. The state, obviously, is on notice of either occurrence. However, turning to Fla. Stat. § 924.071, F.S.A., if evidence is suppressed or a search warrant quashed, the information or indictment naturally remains as the official accusation against the accused, but if the state appeals the proceedings are automatically stayed until this issue is disposed of on appeal....

...Naturally, a party who affirmatively seeks a stay, and receives it, should be chargeable with its consequence, the same as with a continuance, when considering the applicability of the speedy trial statute. The state's appeal, however, was not taken under the purview of Fla. Stat. § 924.071, F.S.A., and the time for speedy trial having been invoked by petitioner continued to run....

...Vickers, Jacksonville, for appellant. Louis O. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, and Steven E. Rohan, Asst. Public Defender, for appellee. WIGGINTON, Judge. The State of Florida has appealed a pretrial discovery order rendered in this case pursuant to the authority of F.S. Section *552 924.07(8), F.S.A....

...conducting the trial of a case. Our holding there simply was that the petitioner had failed to show that the trial judge's order constituted a substantial departure from the essential requirements of law. The State now takes this appeal pursuant to Section 924.07(8(, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., seeking reversal of that portion of the trial court's order construing the word "possession" to include "constructive possession" in the manner aforesaid....

...dants all sworn statements of such witnesses taken by the state, and (3) similarly submit all documents and legal papers which the state intends to use at the trial. This part of the order is not such an order as will support an appeal by the state. Section 924.07, Fla....

...Wilcox, a felony offender, on unsupervised probation for a period of one year. This is a nonappealable order, but we have elected to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari. The state may appeal those orders, rulings, sentences, and judgments specifically enumerated in Section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1975). [1] Section 924.07(5), "[t]he sentence, on the ground that it is illegal," is only arguably applicable to the facts of this appeal....

...rging a prisoner on habeas corpus; (7) An order adjudicating a defendant insane under the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure; or (8) All other pretrial orders, except that it may not take more than one appeal under this subsection in any case. Sec. 924.07, Fla. Stat. (1975). Additional grounds for appeal by the state are set out in Sec. 924.071 (1975)....

...ffender [2] (§ 775.084, Fla. Stat.), adjudicated him guilty of escape and placed him on straight probation [3] for 15 years, with conditions including 6 months confinement in the county jail. The State appeals the probation disposition. We reverse. Section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes, provides that the state may appeal from (e) a sentence, on the ground that it is illegal and (i) a sentence imposed outside the range recommended by the guidelines authorized by section 921.001....

...As the habitual felony offender statute (§ 775.084(4)(a)2., Fla. Stat.) mandates a "sentence" of "a term of years", the placing of the defendant on straight probation in lieu of sentence (§ 948.01(3), Fla. Stat.) constitutes an unauthorized and "illegal" sentence which the State is entitled to appeal under section 924.07(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(I)....

...as appealable"). "The state's right to appeal is purely statutory. Whidden v. State, 159 Fla. 691, 32 So.2d 577 (1947); State v. Brown, 330 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)." State v. C.C., 476 So.2d 144, 145 (Fla.1985). Only in the circumstances it specifies does section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1995), confer on the state the right to appeal in criminal cases. With respect to a judgment of acquittal, subsection (1)(j) provides that "[t]he state may appeal from ... [a] ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict. " § 924.07(1)(j), Fla....

...The same rule obtains when acquittal rests on a judicial determination, after jeopardy has attached and before a verdict is returned, that the evidence does not establish the fact of the crime. Against this background, we have also to consider whether another provision of section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1995), confers authority on the state to take an appeal in the present case....

...law when the defendant is convicted and appeals from the judgment. Once the state's cross-appeal is instituted, the appellate court shall review and rule upon the question raised by the state regardless of the disposition of the defendant's appeal. § 924.07(1)(d), Fla....

...Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959), we decline to construe the general language of subsection (1)(d) as overriding the specific provision in subsection (1)(j), which authorizes appeals only from judgments of acquittal granted "after a jury verdict." § 924.07(1)(j), Fla....

...a "final revocation" rather than a modification or continuation of the original sentence. In short, the court in the instant case imposed a new sentence. By downwardly departing from the sentencing guidelines, the state had authority to appeal under section 924.07(1)(i), Florida Statutes [1] and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(K)....

...ions and agreed at hearings held below that the above factual allegations were true. The trial court, accordingly, entered orders dismissing the above informations. The state appealed these dismissals, which appeal we have jurisdiction to entertain. § 924.07(1), Fla....

...Gen., Tallahassee, Gary O. Welch, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant. James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, Bartow, Deborah K. Brueckheimer, Asst. Public Defender, Clearwater, for appellee. FRANK, Judge. The State's appeal, initiated in accordance with Section 924.07(9), Florida Statutes (1983), focuses upon the propriety of the lower court's determination to mitigate or depart "downward" from the sentencing guidelines prescribed in Rule 3.701 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure....

...detain him, and if the defendant responds to the detention with a battery upon the detaining officer, the defendant may then be guilty of violating the statute. Appellee has also moved this court to dismiss the state's appeal. While recognizing that Section 924.07(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1989), expressly permits the state to appeal a "ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict," and that the ruling in the case at bar was made after the verdict's return, appellee argues that because the motions to which the ruling related were made before the verdict, the provisions of the statute therefore apply only if a motion for JOA is made after the jury returns its verdict. We find no merit to this argument. Section 924.07(1)(j) expressly authorizes the state to appeal from a ruling following a jury verdict....

...Solomon, Miami, Henry Gonzalez, Tampa, for appellees. Before HENDRY, HUBBART and KEHOE, JJ. HUBBART, Judge. This is an appeal from an order of the trial court dismissing an information based on double jeopardy grounds. We have jurisdiction to entertain the subject appeal. § 924.07(1), Fla....

...Ramos then filed a motion to dismiss the state's cross-appeal on the grounds that appeal of a judgment of acquittal is not authorized by statute and would violate his constitutional right against double jeopardy. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the state's cross-appeal was authorized by section 924.07(4), Florida Statutes (1983), which provides that the state may appeal a "ruling on a question of law when the defendant is convicted *420 and appeals from the judgment." The district court also held that the cross-appeal was not a violation of the right against double jeopardy....

...sser included offense pursuant to rule 3.620. [2] The trial court's action was taken in response to three post-trial motions filed by Ramos: a motion for new trial, a renewed motion for acquittal and a motion for a reduced judgment under rule 3.620. Section 924.07(4), Florida Statutes (1983), provides that the state may appeal from "a ruling on a question of law when the defendant is convicted and appeals from the judgment." The issue is whether, pursuant to this statutory authority, [3] the sta...

...n exclusion of evidence. The Supreme Court found no merit in the appellant's contentions on review of the evidence and issues at trial. The Court then said: "For the same reason we think the State should prevail on the cross appeal, taken under sec. 924.07(4), by which is questioned the action of the court in reducing the offense to manslaughter." 59 So.2d at 40....

...er the jury had found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder, regardless of whether it was called a judgment of acquittal or a reduction of judgment to a lesser offense under rule 3.620, was a "ruling on a question of law" within the meaning of section 924.07(4)....

...Upon dismissal of his appeal, Ramos renewed his motion to dismiss the state's cross-appeal. The district court found dismissal of the cross-appeal proper. Ramos v. State, 469 So.2d 145 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). The state argues that a cross-appeal under section 924.07(4) survives the dismissal of the main appeal....

...We have repeatedly held that the State's right to appeal is not a matter of right and is purely statutory. Ramos v. State, 505 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1987); State v. Creighton, 469 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1985); Whidden v. State, 159 Fla. 691, 32 So.2d 577 (1947). The State's authority to appeal is now set forth in sections 924.07 and 924.071, Florida Statutes (1989). These sections read as follows: 924.07 Appeal by state....

...(j) A ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict. (2) An appeal under this section shall embody all assignments of error in each pretrial order that the state seeks to have reviewed. The state shall pay all costs of such appeal except for the defendant's attorney's fee. 924.071 Additional grounds for appeal by the state; time for taking; stay of cause....

...A defendant in custody whose case is stayed either automatically or by order of the court shall be released on his own recognizance pending the appeal if he is charged with a bailable offense. (Emphasis added.) Our case law clearly establishes that section 924.07 is the only basis upon which the State may appeal as a matter of right and that appeals can be taken only in the express categories contained in section 924.07....

...In the instant case, the State alternatively sought review by certiorari, which the district court below denied. We also note that the district court did not reach the question of review if the trial court had denied restitution without stating any reasons. Clearly, section 924.07 does not specifically provide an appeal for a denial of an order of restitution. Section 924.07(1)(e) does, however, provide that the State may appeal from an "illegal" sentence....

...ustody. If hethe defendant has been released on bail, hethe defendant and histhe sureties shall be exonerated; if money or bonds have been deposited as bail, such money or bonds shall be refunded. (f) Order Dismissing. For the purpose of construing Ssection 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (1969), the statutory term "order *267 quashing" shall be taken and held to mean "order dismissing." (g) Motion for Continuance....

...(b) Substantially the same as section 909.02, Florida Statutes, except changes name of "motion to quash" to "motion to dismiss." This conforms to the terminology of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The statute authorizing the state to appeal from certain orders, section 924.07, Florida Statutes, should be amended by substituting the words "motion to dismiss" for "motion to quash." (c) Combines the substance of sections 909.01 and 909.06, Florida Statutes....

...Public Defender, for appellee. Before HUBBART, COPE and GODERICH, JJ. HUBBART, Judge. The state appeals a sentence which departs downward from the sentencing guidelines based on a "drug deviation." We have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal and reverse. § 924.07(1)(i), Fla....

...recommended guidelines sentence. Two years after enacting subsection 958.04(3) the legislature amended the second sentence of that paragraph to read: "A sentence imposed outside of such guidelines shall be subject to appeal pursuant to s. 924.06 or s. 924.07." Ch. 87-110, § 3, Laws of Fla. [3] The district court considered the effect of the 1987 amendment in the instant case. It reasoned that, by removing the phrase "by the defendant" and adding a reference to section 924.07, [4] the legislature intended to allow the state to appeal a youthful offender sentence which is less than the recommended guidelines sentence and, in effect, reversed Diers....

...idelines pursuant to s. 921.001 unless reasons are explained in writing by the trial court judge which reasonably justify departure. A sentence imposed outside of such guidelines shall be subject to appeal pursuant to s. 924.06 [by the defendant] or s. 924.07 [by the state]....

...A sentence imposed outside of such guidelines shall be subject to appeal by the defendant pursuant to s. 924.06. Ch. 85-288, § 20, Laws of Fla. In 1987, the legislature amended the last sentence of that subsection to state: A sentence imposed outside of such guidelines shall be subject to appeal pursuant to s. 924.06 or s. 924.07. Ch. 87-110, § 3, Laws of Fla. By eliminating the words "by the defendant" and adding the reference to section 924.07 (which provides for state appeals), the legislature obviously intended that the state would have the right to appeal sentences imposed outside of the guidelines....

...958, Fla. Stat. (1989). [2] § 921.001, Fla. Stat. (1989); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701. [3] The 1987 amendment also deleted the words "clear and convincing" from the first sentence of § 958.04(3), but that wording change is not pertinent to this case. [4] § 924.07, Fla....

...indictment, information, or affidavit. [1] It was pursuant to this rule that appellees moved and the court dismissed the informations pending against them because of the State's refusal to disclose the name and address of its confidential informant. Section 924.07(1) provides that an appeal may be taken by the State from an order quashing an information, [2] and Rule 1.190(f), Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that for the purpose of construing F.S. Section 924.07(1), F.S.A....

...All defenses available to a defendant by plea, other than not guilty, shall be made only by motion to dismiss the indictment, information or affidavit, whether the same shall relate to matters of form, substance, former acquittal former jeopardy, or any other defense." [2] F.S. § 924.07(1), F.S.A. "An appeal may be taken by the state from: (1) An order quashing an indictment or information or any count thereof;" [3] Rule 1.190(f), Rules of Criminal Procedure. "Order Dismissing. For the purpose of construing Section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes, the statutory term "order quashing" shall be taken and held to mean "order dismissing." [4] Treverrow v....

...Characterization when made is not as important as the legal effect at the time of ruling. Both of these motions, however, test the extent of error in the course of a proceeding. A & P Bakery Supply and Equipment Co. v. H. Hexter & Son, Inc., 149 So.2d 883 (3d Dist. Ct.App.Fla. 1963). [2] Section 924.07(2), Fla....

...The Third District noted that the State is authorized by statute "to appeal two types of sentences: 1) a sentence that is illegal, and 2) a sentence imposed `below the lowest permissible sentence established by the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921.'" Id. at 1181 (quoting § 924.07(1)(e), (i), Fla....

...t obtain review of the sentence either by direct appeal or by certiorari. Id. at 1182. Here, the mitigated sentences of probation constituted a downward departure from the minimum permissible sentence of *505 6.625 years in prison. Thus, pursuant to section 924.07(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2003), the State is authorized to appeal the sentences because they are "below the lowest permissible sentence established by the Criminal Punishment Code." See State v....

...ion of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v. Chaves-Mendez, 809 So.2d 910 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), on a question of law. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The conflict issue concerns whether the State is authorized under section 924.07, Florida Statutes (2009), to appeal a sentence that is otherwise legal on the ground that the trial court improperly initiated a plea dialogue with a defendant without invitation of either party....

...The district court dismissed the appeal, holding that the State cannot appeal the sentence imposed on McMahon even though the district court agreed that the trial court improperly initiated plea discussions with the defendant. McMahon, 47 So.3d at 369-70 . The court noted that neither section 924.07, Florida Statutes (2009), which sets forth the specific circumstances under which the State may take an appeal in a criminal case, nor Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c) authorizes the State to appeal from a sentence on the ground that the trial court improperly initiated a plea dialogue....

...To support its conclusion, the Fourth District relied in part on its prior decision in State v. Figueroa, 728 So.2d 787 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), which held that “a trial court’s initiation of plea discussions does not render an otherwise legal sentence ‘illegal’ for purposes of a state appeal” under section 924.07 or rule 9.140(c)....

...ANALYSIS “The State’s right to appeal in a criminal case must be ‘expressly conferred by statute.’” Exposito v. State, 891 So.2d 525, 527 (Fla.2004) (quoting Ramos v. State, 505 So.2d 418, 421 (Fla.1987)). The State’s authority to appeal a criminal case is set forth in sections 924.07 and 924.071, Florida Statutes (2009). 3 Section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (2009), authorizes the State to appeal in a criminal case in the following circumstances: (1) The state may appeal from: (a) An order dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof or dismissing an af...

...(m) An order withholding adjudication of guilt in violation of s. 775.08435. (2) An appeal under this section must embody all assignments of error in each pretrial order that the state seeks to have reviewed. The state shall pay all costs of the appeal except for the defendant’s attorne/s fee. § 924.07, Fla....

...(2008) (emphasis added). These limitations on the State’s right to appeal in a criminal case are not new; the State’s right to appeal in criminal cases historically has been extremely limited. See, e.g., State v. Burns, 18 Fla. 185 (1881). Statutes such as section 924.07 “which afford the government the right to appeal in criminal cases should be construed narrowly.” Exposito, 891 So.2d at 528 (quoting State v....

...Therefore, we are not at liberty to judicially modify the authorizing statute to extend to the State authority to appeal a sentence based on any grounds other than those specifically specified by the Legislature. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c), which serves as the procedural counterpart to section 924.07, Florida Statutes, lists the same types of orders that the State may appeal in a criminal case....

...alogue without invitation of a party. 6 *475 We further hold that an otherwise legal sentence resulting from such a plea dialogue is not rendered illegal for purposes of appeal by the State where an improper court-initiated plea dialogue does occur. Section 924.07 does not provide for such an appeal and we cannot modify or extend the statute by reading that authorization into the statute....

...sregard of *477 the statutory procedure. However, the question is whether this is simply an error in the sentencing process for which the State is not authorized to appeal or whether the error renders the sentence “illegal” thus qualifying under section 924.07 for a State appeal....

...ncing scoresheet, and because the trial court was not mandated to impose an HFO sentence even if a hearing had been held and McMahon was proven to qualify, the sentence in this case is not “illegal.” Most importantly, neither section 775.084 nor section 924.07 provides for a State appeal from a sentence imposed after the trial court denies a request for an HFO hearing. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s procedural error in disregarding the mandates of the habitual felony offender statute do not render McMahon’s sentence illegal or otherwise appealable by the State under section 924.07, Florida Statutes....

...Ass'n, Inc. v. Devon Neighborhood Ass'n, Inc., 67 So.3d 187 , 189 n. 1 (Fla.2011) (citing Wallace v. Dean, 3 So.3d 1035, 1040 (Fla.2009); Rosen v. Fla. *472 Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 802 So.2d 291, 292 (Fla.2001)). . The grounds for appeal by the State set forth in section 924.071, Florida Statutes (2009), are not applicable in this case. Section 924.071 provides for state appeals from certain pretrial orders and delineates when a stay is applicable during such appeal....

...We do not disapprove of Chaves-Mendez in its entirety because the sentence that was appealed by the State in Chaves-Mendez was an improper downward departure sentence. See Chaves-Mendez, 809 So.2d at 910 (Sawa-ya, J., concurring and concurring specially). *475 Such a sentence is clearly appealable by the State. See § 924.07(l)(i), Fla....

...We recognize that this definition of "illegal sentence" was stated in the context of an appeal from a defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. However, we discern no practical or legal rationale that would require application of a different definition when determining if the State is authorized under section 924.07(l)(e) to appeal a "sentence, on the ground that it is illegal.” § 924.07(l)(e), Fla....

...cedure in all courts which shall include "a requirement that no cause shall be dismissed because an improper remedy has been sought." It is agreed that had notice of appeal been filed instead of petition for writ of certiorari, the authorizations in Section 924.07, F.S....

...For these reasons, we conclude that the petition for writ of certiorari must be denied. The State has failed to show that the order excluding collateral crime evidence was a departure from the essential requirements of the law. Petition denied. ALLEN and LEWIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The state has a right under section 924.07(1)( l ) to appeal an order excluding collateral crime evidence, but this statute applies only in appeals from county court to circuit court....

..."It is therefore adjudged and ordered that the verdict of guilty in this case be, and the same is hereby vacated and set aside, and * * * the Motion of the defendant for a New Trial * * * is hereby granted * * *." The State of Florida has appealed from this ruling. Section 924.07, Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A....

...cumentary evidence produced." Note: The above is the verbiage of the Florida Immunity Statute in effect from January 1, 1971, to June 2, 1971, the period during which the subject subpoenas were issued and which controls here. [5] See Florida Statute 924.07(1) F.S.A., Florida Statute 59.06(5)(b) F.S.A., and F.A.R....

...1042, 62 L.Ed.2d 770 (1980). Further, under Rule 3.190(c), pursuant to which the trial court acted, the only relief which may be granted is dismissal of the indictment or information. An order granting such relief may be appealed by the State. Fla.R.App.P. 9.140; § 924.07, Fla....

...the elements of the writ are satisfied? This opinion is final upon its release and no petition for rehearing will be entertained. Appeal dismissed. NOTES [1] Since habeas corpus is a civil proceeding, we must wonder about the necessity of including Section 924.07(6), Florida Statutes (1981) as a basis for a state appeal in a criminal case....

...for certiorari. Without explaining the distinction, the court then stated that "we have no doubt that it can restrict the state in seeking review by certiorari of adverse decisions in criminal cases just as it has limited its right to appeal through Section 924.07." supra at 634....

...Nevertheless, the supreme court on occasion has utilized the "all writs" provision to issue the "common law" writ of certiorari. See 3 Fla.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 462 (1978). [7] The supreme court, in State v. Harris, supra at 634 made the statement that Section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1961): deals only with direct appeals in criminal proceedings and clearly does not and was not intended to proscribe the authority of the state to seek either common law certiorari now exercised by the district courts or constitutional certiorari of the variety now exercised by this court....

...An appeal may be taken by the state only within 30 days after the order or sentence appealed from is entered, except that when the defendant takes an appeal from the judgment the state may, not later than 10 days after the defendant files his assignments of error and serves a copy thereof, take an appeal authorized by Section 924.07(4), Florida Statutes....

...When an appeal is taken by the state by filing a notice of appeal, a filing fee of $25.00 shall be transmitted to the clerk of the appellate court by the Board of County Commissioners of the county in which the trial court is located. "b. Appeals pursuant to Section 924.071, Florida Statutes 1967, shall be taken within the time prescribed in subsection a above, or prior to the commencement of the trial whichever is sooner....

...The second motion sought to dismiss count II of the information (a misdemeanor charge) on speedy trial grounds. The trial court heard these motions and granted them in a single order from which the state now appeals. We have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. § 924.07(1), Fla....

...ons of this subsection and of the pendency of any such proceeding. Rule 3.190 (Pretrial Motions) is amended largely to correct technical issues, including deleting the definition for the phrase "order quashing," currently in subdivision (f), because section 924.07, Florida Statutes (2009), Appeal by state, no longer refers to "quashing"; renumbering subdivisions (g) through (k); and specifically identifying the contents required to be included in a motion to suppress a confession or admission illegally obtained....

...ng), which is an entirely new rule. This rule would authorize the State to file a motion for rehearing from any order that is currently appealable by the State as an interlocutory appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c) or sections 924.07 or 924.071, Florida Statutes (2009)....

...If such physical evidence is known to exist, upon defendant's motion of counselspecifying the physical evidence to be tested, the court may postpone the proceeding and order DNA testing. (e)-(j) [No change] RULE 3.190. PRETRIAL MOTIONS (a)-(e) [No change] (f) Order Dismissing. For the purpose of construing section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (1969), the statutory term "order quashing" shall be taken and held to mean "order dismissing." (g)(f) Motion for Continuance....

...rder by the court. These circumstances include: (1)-(6) [No change] (m)-(p) [No change] Committee Notes [No change] RULE 3.192. MOTIONS FOR REHEARING When an appeal by the state is authorized by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140, or sections 924.07 or 924.071, Florida Statutes, the state may file a motion for rehearing within 10 days of an order subject to appellate review....

...Richard W Ervin, Atty. Gen., Edward S. Jaffry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant. William Lamar Rose, Fort Myers, for appellee. SPOTO, I.C., Associate Judge. This appeal is taken by the appellant, State of Florida, pursuant to the authority granted by Section 924.07, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and raises the question of double jeopardy....

...e certified questions as indicated above. AFFIRMED. COBB and PETERSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(b)(4)(A). [2] § 316.193, Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] Form 1514 (1982). [4] Form 1514 (rev. 1986). [5] Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(b)(4)(A) and 9.160; § 924.07(1)(h), Fla....

...[a]ccordingly, we reverse appellant's illegal sentence"); Lewis v. State, 532 So.2d 1340, 1341 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (sentencing was illegal because of the absence of written reasons for departure). The dissent does not agree that such sentences are illegal, pointing to sections 924.06 and 924.07, Florida Statutes (1991), and rule 9.140(c)(1)(J), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, as authority....

...ILLEGAL SENTENCE" WITHIN THE MEANING OF RULE 3.800(a); AND, IF SO, CAN THE STATE PROPERLY SEEK TO HAVE SUCH A SENTENCE INCREASED TO THE GUIDELINES RANGE BY FILING A MOTION UNDER RULE 3.800(a) AFTER THE STATE HAS FOREGONE APPEALING THE SENTENCE UNDER SECTION 924.07(1)(i), FLORIDA STATUTES, AND RULE 9.140(c)(1)(J)? AFFIRMED....

...ses. Section 924.06, Florida Statutes (1991), provides that a defendant may appeal from "(d) A sentence, on the ground that it is illegal; or (e) A sentence imposed outside the range recommended by the guidelines authorized by s. 921.001. Similarly, section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (1991), says that the state may appeal from "(e) The sentence, on the ground that it is illegal" and "(i) A sentence imposed outside the range recommended by the guidelines." The common ingredient in both sets of s...

...That statute, too, was repealed with the adoption of the procedural rules. Rule 3.800 was taken directly from sections 921.24 and 921.25. These statutes predated the sentencing guidelines. When, however, the sentencing guidelines were adopted, the legislature added provisions to sections 924.06 and 924.07 allowing appeals of guidelines departure sentences....

...ause of a violation of the speedy trial rule. Her contention — bottomed on the premise that the order of prohibition being appealed was entered in a criminal case — is that the State's right to appeal is not, as it must be, expressly authorized by Section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1987), or Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c) and that, therefore, the appeal must be dismissed....

...[1] *208 Her petition for writ of prohibition instituted an original proceeding in the circuit court which challenged the jurisdiction of the county court judge. Art. V, § 5(b), Fla. Const.; Fla.R.App.P. 9.100. The prohibition proceeding does not become a criminal case subject to Section 924.07 simply because the defendant sought to prohibit the continued prosecution of a criminal case against her....

...Because orders of discharge and orders of dismissal are likewise indistinguishable, the present appeal — were it in a criminal case — would then come within the express authority given to the State to appeal "[a]n order dismissing an indictment or information." § 924.07(1) Fla....

...authorized by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(E), which provides that the State may appeal an order "discharging a defendant pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191 [the speedy trial rule]." Despite occasional references to subsection (8) of section 924.07, Florida Statutes, which provides that the State may appeal from "[a]ll other pretrial orders," as the authority for the State's appeal from an interlocutory order, see, e.g., State v. Nieman, 433 So.2d 572 (reciting that the court had jurisdiction over the State's appeal from an order discharging the defendant on speedy trial grounds under several statutes and rules, including Section 924.07(8)), the right to review of interlocutory orders is conferred solely by the Supreme Court of Florida under its rulemaking power....

...rant, suppresses evidence obtained by search and seizure, or suppresses a confession or admission made by a defendant. The legislature has sought to provide appellate review of other pretrial orders entered in criminal cases [4] through enactment of Section 924.07(8), which provides: "All other pretrial orders, except that it may not take more than one (1) appeal under this subsection in any case * * *" The Supreme Court has not as of this date adopted or implemented this legislative declaration of public policy....

...[5] The Constitution does not authorize the legislature to provide for interlocutory review. Any statute purporting to grant interlocutory appeals is clearly a declaration of legislative policy and no more. Until and unless the Supreme Court of Florida adopts such statute as its own (as it did with regard to Section 924.071), the purported enactment is void....

...NOTES [1] Witnesses that may be used by the State for identification of the persons involved in the perpetration of the crime alleged to have been committed by defendants. [2] Rule 6.3, subd. b, Florida Appellate Rules reads: "b. Appeals pursuant to Section 924.071, Florida Statutes 1967, shall be taken within the time prescribed in subsetion a. above, or prior to the commencement of the trial whichever is sooner. The procedure for such appeals shall be as provided in Rule 4.2. Such appeals shall be given priority on the docket." [3] F.S. § 924.071, F.S.A. [4] F.S. § 924.07(8), F.S.A....

...BOYD, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. BOYD, Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Although I expressed the dissenting view in State v. C.C . that the state could appeal a dismissal of a juvenile delinquency petition under the statutory authority contained in section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (1981), I agree that the majority opinion in that case settled the matter and that specific statutory authority for appeals by the state in juvenile cases is lacking....

...the right to appeal a "[r]uling on a question of law when a convicted defendant appeals his judgment of conviction." Fla.R.App.P. 9.140(c)(1)(H). See Sands v. State, 328 So.2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (holding State has authority to cross-appeal under Section 924.07(4), Florida Statutes (1975), containing identical language)....

...are persons "under sentence of imprisonment" for purpose of statute allowing such status to be considered an aggravating circumstance); State v. McGraw, 474 So.2d 289 (Fla.3d DCA 1985) (invalid order of probation constitutes "illegal sentence" under Section 924.07(5), Florida Statutes, appealable by State)....

...nging the sentence. NOTES [1] Curiously, the defendant has not moved to dismiss the State's appeal on the ground that its right of appeal lies only from "[a] sentence imposed outside the range recommended by the guidelines authorized by s. 921.001." § 924.07(9), Fla. Stat. (1985). Since the matter is one of jurisdiction, we, sua sponte, have considered it, and conclude that "a sentence" as used in Section 924.07(9) includes an order of probation even as "[t]he sentence" as used in Section 924.07(5) includes probation....

...by two years community control. The two written reasons indicated to justify the downward departure were that the defendant (a) was only nineteen years of age and (b) had no prior *1002 criminal or juvenile record whatsoever. Purportedly pursuant to section 924.07(5), Florida Statutes (1985), the state now seeks review of the sentence....

...Jur.2d Statutes § 182, and that later enactments control earlier ones, 49 Fla.Jur.2d Statutes § 181, lead to the determination that section 958.04(3) takes precedence both over the 1984 general amendment to the guidelines, see The Florida Bar, 451 So.2d at 824, and over section 924.07(5) under which the state has the broad and general right to appeal from downward departures....

...the circumstances in shooting him, the court withheld adjudication of guilt and placed defendant on probation for one year. The state then pursued an appeal in this court. We first note that the state cannot appeal the order of the trial court under Section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...e taking of the property, where, as in the present case, force is used to overcome a victim's resistance to the attempted asportation. [3] The State's right to seek appellate review is purely statutory. State v. Creighton, 469 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1985). Section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1983), gives the State the right to appeal such a dismissal order....

...3d DCA 1996); State v. Parisi, 660 So.2d 372 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); State v. Moore, 630 So.2d 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); and State v. Bowland, 604 So.2d 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). We do not agree. Neither Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c), nor section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1995), authorizes the state to appeal such an issue....

...ribution for valid political purposes, to aid Rodenbaugh in his election campaign for the office of sheriff of Pinellas County in which he was engaged during most of the period designated. Review sought is pursuant to and comes within the purview of section 924.07, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., authorizing an appeal by the state in a criminal action under certain conditions....

...tatus form," albeit signed by the judge and deposited by the clerk in the court file, constitutes a final, appealable order under the rule. Consequently, we have jurisdiction in this cause under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(A) and section 924.07(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...a statute with which we are not presently concerned. [4] We find nothing in Part 6 of the rules which specifically prohibits a defendant from taking a cross-appeal in those instances where the main appeal has been taken by the State pursuant to F.S. § 924.07(1), F.S.A....

...Remanded with directions. CARROLL, DONALD K., Chief Judge, and RAWLS, J., concur. NOTES [1] F.S. § 836.05, F.S.A. [2] "Appeal by state. An appeal may be taken by the State from: (1) An order quashing an indictment or information or any count thereof." F.S. § 924.07(1), F.S.A....

...rady rule. Respondents offer one additional argument for dismissing the State's petition. It is urged that the State's attempted use of common law certiorari to appeal an interlocutory criminal order violates the legislative intent behind Fla. Stat. § 924.071, 1967, in that its enumeration of the instances the State may appeal from adverse decisions prior to trial was meant to be exclusive; and further that this interlocutory procedure effectuates a denial of respondents' right to a speedy trial. Our Supreme Court has interpreted Fla. Stat. 1967, § 924.07, F.S.A., to which § 924.071 is clearly supplementary, to deal only with direct appeals and has no effect on common law or constitutional certiorari....

...and that later enactments control earlier ones, 49 Fla.Jur.2d Statutes § 181, lead to the determination that section 958.04(3) takes precedence both over the 1984 general amendment to the guidelines, see The Florida Bar, 451 So.2d at 824, and over section 924.07(5) under which the state has the broad and general right to appeal from downward departures....

...1332, 1336, 1 L.Ed.2d 1442 (1957). Accordingly, we reject petitioner's argument that a discharge of an affidavit of a violation of probation should be construed as equivalent to dismissing an information or indictment, thereby bringing such an appeal within the ambit of section 924.07, Florida Statutes....

...State, 486 So.2d 588 (Fla. 1986); Jones v. State, 477 So.2d 566 (Fla. 1985); State v. G.P., 476 So.2d 1272 (Fla. 1985). Finally, I dissent to the Court's holding that the final order in this case was not appealable pursuant to statutory authority. Section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (1983), provides that the state may appeal an "order dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof." In Whidden v. State, 159 Fla. 691, 32 So.2d 577 (1947), a decision heavily relied upon when we decided State v. Creighton, this Court construed section 924.07(1) and specifically held that it encompassed the dismissal of an affidavit charging the commission of a criminal offense....

...s dismissed" which was entered by the Metropolitan Judge on February 19, 1964, was a final order upon which the circuit judge could prohibit the prosecution as a double jeopardy. The State may not appeal a final order of acquittal or not guilty. See § 924.07, Fla. Stat., F.S.A. However, the State may appeal an order quashing an affidavit. Whidden v. State, 159 Fla. 691, 32 So.2d 577 (1947); see also § 924.07(1) Fla....

...State, 370 So.2d 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); State v. Wilcox, 351 So.2d 89 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). We reverse the order placing McGraw on a non-reporting probation and remand for resentencing. McGraw contends that the order of probation is not an illegal sentence appealable under section 924.07(5), Florida Statutes (1983) on the theory that probation is not a sentence....

...(probationary) disposition, see Villery v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 1981), such a distinction is immaterial to the question of whether the state has the right to appeal a given order. We hold that for purposes of section 924.07(5) and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(I), sentence means a dispositive order upon conviction, which includes probation....

...se — battery — upon a defense motion *1389 filed pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4). Such an order, in our view, is the functional equivalent of a dismissal of an information or any count thereof and is accordingly appealable by the state under Section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (1983), based on the authority of State v....

...The court by such an order has, in fact, dismissed a count in an information charging second degree murder which the above rule plainly empowers it to do where, as here, the undisputed material facts in the cause do not establish a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant. Indeed, to accept the state's appeal under Section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (1983), as we have done, on the theory that it is an appeal from an order dismissing an information or any count therein — necessarily requires us to reject the state's argument that the order under review is unauthorized under Fla.R.Crim.P....

...3d DCA 1986), released simultaneously with this opinion, as authority. I respectfully dissent for two reasons. First, I reject the proposition that merely by calling a reduction a dismissal, the court may permit the state to appeal an otherwise unappealable order. § 924.07, Fla....

...ge justifies a continuation in custody. If he has been released on bail he and his sureties shall be exonerated; if money or bonds have been deposited as bail such money or bonds shall be refunded. (f) Order Dismissing. For the purpose of construing Section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (1969), the statutory term "order quashing" shall be taken and held to mean "order dismissing." Nowhere does the rule authorize either the filing of a motion to reduce the charge or the granting of such a motion by the trial court....

...I discern no reason for assuming such an oversight. If, however, the majority's presumption is valid, the responsibility to correct this omission rests, not with this court, but with the legislature and the supreme court. In conclusion, I would dismiss the state's appeal as improper under section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...NOTES [1] This order took place before the new trial of defendant. The state also attacks the jurisdiction of the court to have entered the order granting the new trial. However, the record reveals that the state made no attempt to appeal from the order granting the new trial as provided for by Fla. Stat. § 924.07, F.S.A., and the state cannot now argue the point.

...Because the sentence imposed was an illegal one, it could be corrected at any time. Rule 3.800(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. The order of the trial court which struck the restitution requirement is not an order which may be appealed by the state pursuant to section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1990) or Rule 9.140, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure....

...e circuit court to review certain non-final orders entered in county court criminal proceedings. We deny the petition. This case involves a jurisdictional oddity that exists only for nonfinal orders issued in county court criminal proceedings. Under section 924.07(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(2), the State had the right to file a notice of appeal from county court to circuit court to review these orders....

...The defendants immediately moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that it was actually an untimely appeal. The circuit court agreed and entered an order dismissing the appellate *974 proceeding. The State now challenges that order of dismissal in this court. Section 924.07(1)(h), Florida Statutes, was adopted in 1969 and authorizes the State to appeal from "all other pretrial orders, except that it may not take more than one appeal under this subsection in any case." See ch. 69-15, § 1, Laws of Fla.; ch. 87-243, § 46, Laws of Fla. (re-designating § 924.07(8) as § 924.07(1)(h))....

...SC05-1007 (Fla. June 3, 2005). However, district courts of appeal and circuit courts obtain their appellate jurisdiction from two distinctly different sections of article V. As a result, the State's statutory right to seek review of nonfinal orders provided in section 924.07(1)(h) must be analyzed quite differently in the two courts....

...Thus, only the legislature can authorize circuit court jurisdiction over nonfinal orders entered in county courts; the supreme court cannot independently authorize circuit court review of nonfinal orders by its rulemaking authority. As a result of these differing clauses in the constitution, section 924.07(1)(h) is an unconstitutional intrusion by the legislature into the supreme court's rulemaking authority in the context of an appeal from circuit court to district court....

...The State appeals from an order dismissing the information against appellees Pearce and Kinner on the ground they were not given a speedy trial as required by Rule 3.191, R.Cr.P. The 180-day period prescribed by the Rule expired during the State's interlocutory appeal, pursuant to § 924.071, F.S., from an earlier order granting appellees' motion to suppress certain evidence....

...e matter, that its stay order was a nullity and that, 180 days having long since passed, Pearce and Kinner were entitled to discharge. Upon our initial consideration of this case, we were of the view that the State's interlocutory appeal pursuant to § 924.071, [1] F.S., and Rule 6.3 b, F.A.R., perfected an automatic stay of the case in the trial court and that application to the trial court for extension of the speedy trial period, Rule 3.191(d)(2)(iv), R.Cr.P., was unnecessary. We reasoned that the Supreme Court adopted § 924.071 when it promulgated Appellate Rule 6.3 b [2] and thus made effective the statute's provision for an automatic stay....

...Noting that the speedy trial rule adopted in February 1971 [3] permits the trial court to order an extension of the speedy trial period for "a period of reasonable and necessary delay ... for interlocutory appeals," Rule 3.191(d)(2)(iv) R.Cr.P., the Cannon court held that the rule superseded the automatic stay provisions of § 924.071, F.S....

...judicial determination that the appeal was not frivolous or had not been taken simply for the purpose of securing such a delay." 322 So.2d at 127. We remain of the view that Rule 6.3 b, F.A.R., preserves the automatic stay provisions *1277 of former § 924.071(2), F.S., notwithstanding that the speedy trial rule otherwise countenances extensions only on order of the trial court....

...The contrary interpretation proceeds from the impression that the 1971 speedy trial rule could have had no purpose, in providing for orders to extend the trial time during interlocutory appeals, except to nullify by that inconsistent measure the automatic stay previously afforded the State by former § 924.071(2)....

...We do not conceive that the speedy trial rule must necessarily be given that effect, nor that it should be if another course is possible. When the Supreme Court adopted the speedy trial rule in 1971, there were as now two statutes on the books authorizing appeals by the State in criminal cases: § 924.07 and § 924.071. The context and language of § 924.071(2) indicate a legislative purpose to stay the case automatically only if the State's interlocutory appeal is one authorized by § 924.071(1), i.e., taken from an order "dismissing a search warrant, suppressing evidence obtained by search and seizure, or suppressing a confession or admission made by a defendant." [6] The legislature did not provide an automatic stay during an interlocutory appeal by the State under § 924.07, from an order dismissing less than all counts of an indictment or information, an order granting a new trial or "other pretrial orders." Sec. 924.07(1), (2), (8), F.S. In this light, the speedy trial rule's provision for court-ordered extensions during interlocutory appeals may be seen as having a purpose other than to repeal the automatic stay afforded by former § 924.071(2). That purpose was to permit the trial court to grant or deny an extension of the speedy trial period and a stay of the trial when the State proposed an interlocutory appeal in circumstances justified by § 924.07 but not by § 924.071(1). [7] We therefore need not presume that criminal Rule 3.191(d)(2)(iv) was intended to excise from § 924.071, made effective by appellate Rule 6.3 b, the automatic stay which theretofore was integral. There are practical reasons so to reconcile the provisions of § 924.071(2), F.S., and Rule 3.191(d)(2)(iv), R.Cr.P., rather than to find intractable conflict there. First, we must recognize that ordinarily there will be no appealable order under § 924.071 until a substantial portion of the speedy trial period has run....

...It will therefore frequently be difficult if not impossible to render an appellate decision within the unextended period for speedy trial. See State v. Wilson, 305 So.2d 232 (Fla.App. 3d, 1974), cert. den. 314 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1975). Therefore, given the State's right to appeal the interlocutory orders described in § 924.071(1), an automatic stay of the trial and a corresponding extension of the speedy trial period is essential to the effectiveness of the appeal....

...Cullen, 253 So.2d 861 (Fla. 1971). Obviously, such matters as the substance of the State's appeal and the unreasonableness of the appellate delay will be better judged after the appeal, when all the facts are known, than before. The present appeal was authorized by § 924.07(1), F.S., because it was taken from a final order dismissing an information....

...Our opinion filed June 29, 1976, is withdrawn and this opinion substituted in its place. The prayer of appellees' petition for rehearing is DENIED. The order dismissing this prosecution is REVERSED. BOYER, C.J., and MILLS, J., concur. NOTES [1] Sec. 924.071(2): "An appeal by the state from a pretrial order shall stay the case against each defendant upon whose application the order was made until the appeal is determined." [2] Rule 6.3 b: "Appeals pursuant to Section 924.071, Florida Statutes 1967, shall be taken within [30 days] ......

...1972), the Supreme Court adopted this court's opinion that: "`This Rule [6.3 b, F.A.R.] breathes life into a legislative Act which purports to permit appellate review of a pretrial order which ... suppresses evidence obtained by search and seizure [§ 924.071, F.S.]......

...[4] In re Florida Appellate Rules, 211 So.2d 198, 300 (Fla. 1968). [5] E.g., "[T]he last expression of the Legislature will prevail in cases of conflicting statutes... ." Albury v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 295 So.2d 297, 300 (Fla. 1974). [6] The title of the bill enacted as § 924.071 likewise indicates that the automatic stay is limited to "such appeals" as are authorized by the Act, Ch. 67-123, Fla.Laws. [7] While the interlocutory appeal features of § 924.07 were ineffective under Art....

...e was promulgated in February 1971 and was not determined until later that year in State v. Smith, 254 So.2d 402 (Fla.App. 1st, 1971), quashed on other grounds, 260 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1972). The ineffectiveness of the interlocutory appeal provisions of § 924.07 is therefore no reason to disregard the part they played in formulating the speedy trial rule....

...lable. We granted appellant's petition for rehearing May 31, 1989, and directed that a petition for certiorari be filed. Having considered the filings of the parties on rehearing, we now conclude that the order under review is appealable pursuant to section 924.07(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...ilor a sentence appropriate to each defendant appearing in court." See Ecenrode v. State, 576 So.2d 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). Appellant also argues that the CPC is unreasonable because it permits the state to appeal a downward departure sentence, see § 924.07(1)(i), Fla....

...The minimum mandatory term of imprisonment required by section 775.087(2) shall apply. We certify this decision to be in conflict with Whitehead v. State, supra . SENTENCE VACATED and REMANDED. FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., and COWART, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1983): The State may appeal from: * * * * * * (5) The sentence, on the ground that it is illegal....

...The state appeals from an order of the trial court dismissing an information filed against the defendant which charged him with false imprisonment in violation of section 787.02, Florida Statutes (1979). We have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. § 924.07(1), Fla....

...ot change the nature of the contract for purposes of the defense in section 812.014(3), Florida Statutes. Stevens, 680 So.2d at 570. [3] Any such ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict is appealable by the State. See § 924.07(1)(j), Fla....

...t is interlocutory, and cites State v. Lee, 170 So.2d 464 (2d Dist.Ct.App.Fla. 1965), in support of that contention. Since the Lee decision, the rules have been amended to provide that, for the purposes of appeal by the State under the provisions of Section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes 1967, F.S.A., an "order quashing" shall be taken and held to mean "order dismissing." [7] Lee is no longer applicable....

...Respondents are prohibited from proceeding further in the pending appeal. It is so ordered. CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur. THORNAL, J., concurs for reasons herein and in our decision in State v. Kahler, Fla., 224 So.2d 272, filed May 28, 1969. ERVIN, C.J., and ROBERTS and BOYD, JJ., dissent. NOTES [1] § 924.07, Fla. Stat. (1967), F.S.A., provides: "An appeal may be taken by the state from: (1) An order quashing * * * an information * * *." [2] Rule 6.6(a), Fla.App.R., provides: "Service. If the appeal is taken by the state, except under authorization of Section 924.07(4), Florida Statutes, a copy of the notice of appeal shall be served by the prosecuting attorney on the defendant, if his place of residence is known, and on the counsel, if any, who appeared for him at the trial." § 924.13, Fla....

...State, 188 So.2d 836 (Fla.App. 1966) but observes that it "decline[s] to follow the holding therein." We agree with the decision of the Third District in Shedaker . [7] Rule 1.190(f), Fla.R.Crim.P., states: "ORDER DISMISSING. For the purpose of construing Section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes, the statutory term `order quashing' shall be taken and held to mean `order dismissing.'"

...d by double jeopardy. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus. 1 . Rl-24 (Vol. 5, at 644). 2 . Rl-24 (Vol. 5, at 645). In 1987, the Florida legislature amended Fla.Stat. § 924.07 to include subsection (l)(j), which provides that the state may appeal from "[a] ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict.” 3 ....

...This policy "has deep roots in the common law, for it was generally understood, at least in this country, that the sovereign had no right to appeal an adverse criminal judgment unless expressly authorized by statute to do so." Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 245, 101 S.Ct. 1657, 68 L.Ed.2d 58 (1981). Section 924.07, Florida Statutes (2009), sets forth "strictly limited and carefully crafted exceptions designed to provide appellate review to the state in criminal cases where such is needed as a matter of policy and where it does not offend against constitutional principles." Creighton, 469 So.2d at 740. The only mention of a "judgment of acquittal" in the statute is contained in subsection 924.07(1)(j), which provides that "[t]he state may appeal from . . . [a] ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict." (Emphasis added). Section 924.07 is crafted so as not to violate the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against placing a defendant in double jeopardy....

...Stone moved for a judgment of acquittal under rule 3.380(a), arguing that the "evidence" was "insufficient to warrant a conviction." The state had presented no evidence. The trial judge granted the motion. *283 The court's ruling on the defense motion was an "acquittal" within the meaning of subsection 924.07(1)(j); consistent with double jeopardy jurisprudence, it was the ruling of a judge that "actually represent[ed] a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged." Smith, 543 U.S. at 468, 125 S.Ct. 1129 (quoting Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349). Because it was not a "ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict," the ruling was not appealable under section 924.07....

...amount to a dismissal of his indictment since there was no evidence for the trial court to evaluate, preventing the court from actually making a decision on the merits. If deemed a "dismissal" of the indictment, then the order is appealable under subsection 924.07(1)(a)....

...The trial court granted the motion and entered a "judgment of acquittal" on the charge, even though the defendant had actually moved to dismiss based on a defect in the information. Id. at 725-26. The first district determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the state's appeal under section 924.07(1)(a), holding that the court's order was "tantamount to a dismissal, [because] it was premised on the trial court's misperception that the [s]tate had failed to set forth a legally sufficient charge [in the information], not on the th...

...1982). The state's problems with the case arose after the jury had been selected and sworn. In sum, we hold that the circuit court's ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal before a jury verdict is not one *285 that the state may appeal under section 924.07....

...m in the photo lineup was unreliable. After his conviction, the trial court refused to sentence appellant as a habitual offender. Because the trial court's refusal was based upon a statutory interpretation, this issue is appealable by the state. See § 924.07(1)(d), Fla....

...illegal sentence nor a calculation error was involved in this case, rule 3.800(a) was clearly the improper vehicle for the State to use. The State should have appealed the sentence imposed as being "outside the range recommended by the guidelines." § 924.07(1)(i), Fla....

...As to Counts 2 and 3, the trial court disagreed with Espinoza and found instead that the conduct at issue qualifies as a financial transaction but, nonetheless, granted the motion on the basis Espinoza lacked the requisite intent to be guilty of money laundering. This timely appeal followed. 2 III. JURISDICTION Pursuant to section 924.07(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2016), and *1062 Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(A), the State is permitted to appeal the trial court's order dismissing the information. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(A) ("The state may appeal an order [ ] dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof ...."; see also § 924.07(1)(a) (using identical language as that found in Rule 9.140(c)(1)(A) to grant the State a right to appeal a trial court's order dismissing an information)....

State to appeal is fixed and circumscribed by Section 924.07 Florida Statutes, 1941, (same F.S.A.), which

...t order, certain out-of-state witnesses for the defendant for the purpose of taking their discovery deposition after said witnesses had been listed by the state as potential state witnesses in the case. We have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. § 924.07(1), Fla....

...ating a traffic hazard) to justify a warrantless traffic stop. The court construed Hilton I and the evidence of record to require granting Appellee's motion to suppress. The State timely sought review of that ruling. We have jurisdiction pursuant to section 924.07(1)( l ), Florida Statutes (2004), and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(B) (authorizing State to appeal "an order ......

...le for trial and therefore was not entitled to the benefits of the speedy trial rule. The applicable law specifically provides that an appeal by the State shall not stay the operation of an order in favor of the defendant except as provided in F.S., Section 924.071(2), F.S.A., or when the appeal is from an order granting a new trial....

...rematurely filed. For the foregoing reasons, the writ of prohibition is denied but without prejudice to the right of appellant to renew in the trial court his motion for discharge if he is so advised. JOHNSON and SPECTOR, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] F.S. § 924.07, F.S.A....

...James, 626 So.2d 259, 261-62 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (noting that despite semantics used in trial court, dismissal of counts based on court's misperception of pleading defect in State's information did not constitute acquittal based on evidence). We have jurisdiction pursuant to section 924.07(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004); Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(A); and State v....

...The state has appealed. The defendant first argues that the state may not appeal an order denying restitution. For this proposition he relies on State v. MacLeod, 600 So.2d 1096 (Fla.1992). We disagree. Subsequent to the MacLeod decision, the legislature amended section 924.07, Florida Statutes, to authorize a state appeal from "[a]n order denying restitution under s. 775.089." § 924.07(1)(k), Fla.Stat. (1995); ch. 93-37, § 14, Laws of Fla. The order under review is properly viewed as being an order denying restitution. Since the order under review was entered long after paragraph 924.07(1)(k) went into effect, the order is appealable....

...The court gave no reason for a "downward departure sentence." The first issue we must address is whether this court has jurisdiction to review an order modifying probation as an appeal. Because of the procedural prematurity noted above, an appeal by the state would be timely. [2] However, sections 924.07 and 924.071, Florida Statutes (2005), list the orders in criminal cases that the state can appeal....

...Trial courts have discretion to render such orders pursuant to section 948.06, Florida Statutes, uncompromised by the sentencing guidelines. Petition for Writ of Certiorari DENIED. PETERSON and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(c)(3). [2] Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(c)(3). [3] § 924.07(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2005). [4] § 924.07(1)(i), Fla....

...king an otherwise false birth certificate if he affixes thereto the name of a fictitious public *764 office. [2] The trial court agreed and dismissed the information. The state appeals from this order, which appeal we have jurisdiction to entertain. § 924.07(1), Fla....

...Daniels, Public Defender; Carl S. McGinnes, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellee. PADOVANO, Judge. This case is before the court on the defendant's motion to dismiss the state's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The issue raised by the motion is whether section 924.07(1)(k), Florida Statutes, authorizes an appeal by the state from an order denying in part and granting in part a claim for restitution....

...o recover $1,875.00 on behalf of the victim. Following an evidentiary hearing on the state's motion, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay restitution of $535.00. The state appealed the order and the defendant now seeks to dismiss the appeal. Section 924.07(1)(k), Florida Statutes, authorizes the state to appeal "[a]n order denying restitution under s....

...In response, the state argues that an order rejecting a claim of restitution in part is nonetheless a "denial" within the meaning of the statute. Specifically, the state contends that the legislative intent to include partial denials within the scope of the statute is evident when section 924.07(1)(k) is interpreted in conjunction with subsection 775.089(1)(b)1 of the restitution statute....

...The court may properly resort to extrinsic aids and the various rules of statutory construction to determine the intent of the legislature only if the applicability of the statute is not clear. See Holly, supra . We cannot determine the legislative intent of section 924.07(1)(k) by reading the text of the statute alone....

...restitution when the parties concede the victim is entitled to restitution in some amount. To resolve this ambiguity we must look beyond the terms of the statute itself. Based on several related principles of statutory construction, we conclude that section 924.07(1)(k) must be interpreted to allow an appeal by the state from an order partially denying a claim for restitution....

...The first of these principles is that the court must construe a statute in conjunction with other statutes pertaining to the same subject matter. See Ferguson v. State, 377 So.2d 709 (Fla.1979); Smith v. Crawford, 645 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Section 924.07(1)(k) does not exist in isolation, but rather it is a part of the overall statutory procedure for the recovery of restitution. Hence, the legislative intent in enacting section 924.07(1)(k) is more clearly revealed by a review of section 775.089, the restitution statute it was designed to implement....

...ent of the legislature in enacting a statute by considering other statutes enacted in the same legislative session. See Gulley v. Pierce, 625 So.2d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Lincoln v. Florida Parole Commission, 643 So.2d 668 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). When section 924.07(1)(k) was added as a part of the statute on criminal appeals, the legislature also amended the restitution statute to include subsection 775.089(1)(b)1....

...Section 775.089(1)(b)1 states: If the court does not order restitution, or orders restitution of only a portion of the damages, as provided in this section, it shall state on the record in detail the reasons therefor. It is apparent from the language of this statute that section 924.07(1)(k) includes an order partially denying a claim for restitution within the class of restitution orders that are appealable by the state....

...Finally, our interpretation is consistent with the rule that remedial statutes must be construed liberally to advance the intended remedy. See Connor v. Division of Elections, 643 So.2d 75 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Martin County v. Edenfield, 609 So.2d 27 (Fla.1992). Section 924.07(1)(k), like other statutes granting the right to appeal, is remedial....

...enforce a right or redress an injury, it is apparent that the statutory amendment granting the state the right to appeal from orders granting motions for judgment of acquittal after jury verdicts is remedial...." Id. at 597-598. A liberal reading of section 924.07(1)(k) supports our conclusion that the legislature intended to allow the right to appeal an order partially denying restitution. In summary, we hold that the state has a right to appeal the order in the present case under section 924.07(1)(k), Florida Statutes....

...5th DCA 1993) (relying on Scott and holding that, even though the motion had been prompted by the trial judge, the state could appeal the dismissal of an indictment pursuant to a motion made by the defendant after jeopardy had attached). We hold that we have jurisdiction pursuant to section 924.07(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...This is an appeal by the State of Florida from an order granting a motion to dismiss an information under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4) entered in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida. We have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. § 924.07(1), Fla....

...Appellees also argue that the order under review is not appealable by the state. *712 Again we disagree. The state, like the defendant, is authorized to take an appeal from an adverse final order in postconviction proceedings. State v. White, 470 So.2d 1377 (Fla. 1985); § 924.07(6) Fla....

...We find no abuse of the court's sentencing discretion in reducing the period of incarceration below that recommended by the guidelines, so the sentence appealed from is AFFIRMED. COBB, C.J., and COWART, J., concur. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction. See § 924.07(9), Fla....

...State, 661 So.2d 1193 (Fla.1995); State v. Mancino, 714 So.2d 429 (Fla. 1998); Carter v. State, 786 So.2d 1173 (Fla.2001). [2] Chapter 924, Florida Statutes, entitled "Appeals and Collateral Review," includes a provision that authorizes the state to appeal an illegal sentence. See § 924.07(1)(e), Fla....

...e jury's verdict of first-degree murder. [1] We deny the motion to dismiss. The short answer to Ramos' motion is that a trial court's determination that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict is a ruling on a question of law, and Section 924.07(4), Florida Statutes (1983), and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(H) expressly authorize the State to cross-appeal from a "ruling on a question of law" when, as here, the defendant appeals his judgment of conviction. See Mixon v. State, 59 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1952) (cross-appeal by State under Section 924.07(4), Florida Statutes (1951), of trial court's reduction of conviction to manslaughter after jury verdict of second-degree murder; conviction affirmed and reduction of offense reversed with directions to enter judgment in accordance with jury verdict). [2] Nothing in State v. Brown, 330 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), upon which the defendant relies, dictates a different result. Even accepting, arguendo, Brown's holding that the State's right to appeal is purely statutory, [3] Section 924.07(4), Florida Statutes (1983), clearly authorizes the State's cross -appeal, [4] notwithstanding that, as Brown holds, Section 924.07 does not authorize the State's direct appeal from a similar ruling....

...prove beyond every reasonable doubt that the defendant, a man with no prior criminal past, acted with premeditation uninfluenced or uncontrolled by a dominating passion." (citations omitted). The correctness of this ruling is not now before us. [2] Section 924.07(4), Florida Statutes (1951), the authority for the State's cross-appeal in Mixon, provided that the State may appeal from "[a] ruling on a question of law adverse to the state where the defendant was convicted and appeals from the judgment" and is substantially the same as Section 924.07(4), Florida Statutes (1983), which provides that the State may appeal from "[a] ruling on a question of law when the defendant is convicted and appeals from the judgment." [3] Whether the Florida Constitution independently affords the...

...NDING ON DIRECT APPEAL OR OTHERWISE NOT YET FINAL WHEN THE OPINION WAS RELEASED? In light of our resolution of the issue raised by appellant, we decline to address the issue raised by the state on cross-appeal, notwithstanding the second sentence of section 924.07(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...We are of the view that, to the extent the statute purports to dictate to the courts what issues must be addressed, regardless of necessity, it constitutes a violation of the separation of powers. However, we also certify the following to be a question of great public importance: IS SECTION 924.07(1)(d), FLORIDA STATUTES (1995), AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPAL OF SEPARATION OF POWERS TO THE EXTENT THAT IT PURPORTS TO MANDATE THAT AN APPELLATE COURT MUST RULE UPON ISSUES RAISED BY THE STATE IN A CROSS-APPEAL, REGARDLESS OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE DEFENDANT'S APPEAL? AFFIRMED....

...ON MOTION TO DISMISS JORGENSON, Judge. The trial court issued a pretrial order suppressing certain identification testimony on the basis that the procedures employed tainted the identification. The state seeks review of that order; we regretfully decline to grant review. Section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1983), provides that the state may appeal from certain types of orders. It also provides a general provision which allows the state to appeal "[a]ll other pretrial orders, except that it may not take more than one appeal under this subsection in any case... ." § 924.07(8), Fla....

...*598 authority of Hornbeck v. State, Fla. 1955, 77 So.2d 876. Nevertheless, we cannot make such a decision because we must hold that we have no jurisdiction of this appeal. An appeal may be taken by the State from an order granting a new trial. See § 924.07 (2) Fla....

...[2] At the close of the State's case, the county judge had granted motions for judgment of acquittal as to counts one and three. These rulings are not reviewable. See Hudson v. State, 711 So.2d 244, 246 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) ("Read in the context of the double jeopardy provisions in [the state and federal constitutions, section 924.07(1)(j), Florida Statutes] plainly contemplates appeal from a judgment of acquittal only if the judgment of acquittal follows a guilty verdict.")....

...[8] To obtain review of the county court's grant of appellees' motion as to count two and concomitant declaration that section 370.093(2)(b) was unconstitutional, the State should have appealed directly here originally, instead of to circuit court. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const. See § 924.07(1)(c) & (j), Fla....

...The State filed this appeal. The record does not contain an order which actually dismisses the information. As noted, we issued an order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed. The State has filed a response. It argues that the order is appealable under section 924.07(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1989) and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(A)....

...alable order and, since no timely appeal had been taken from that order, the appeal should be dismissed. The Supreme Court ruled defendant was correct and dismissed the State's appeal. The Supreme Court held that the first order was appealable under section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1965). That statute provided in pertinent part: An appeal may be taken by the State from: (1) An order quashing an indictment or information or any count thereof. By comparison section 924.07 now provides in pertinent part: (1) The State may appeal from: (a) An order dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof. [1] We believe the language in the 1965 version and the present version of section 924.07 is indistinguishable....

...Before HAVERFIELD, C.J., and HENDRY and HUBBART, JJ. HUBBART, Judge. This is an appeal by the state from an order of the Dade County Circuit Court vacating a prior criminal conviction under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850. We have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. § 924.07(2), Fla....

...The state's right to appeal in a criminal case, however, is not a matter of right and is available only as provided by statute. See State v. MacLeod, 600 So.2d 1096 (Fla.1992); Ramos v. State, 505 So.2d 418 (Fla.1987); Whidden v. State, 159 Fla. 691, 32 So.2d 577 (1947). Our case law clearly establishes that section 924.07 is the only basis upon which the state may appeal as a matter of right and that appeals may be taken only in the express categories contained in section 924.07. MacLeod, 600 So.2d at 1098. Section 924.07, in turn, authorizes the state to appeal two types of sentences: 1) a sentence that is illegal, and 2) a sentence imposed "below the lowest permissible sentence established by the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921." See *1182 § 924.07(e) & (i), Fla.Stat....

...entering into future plea agreements. Swett, 772 So.2d at 52. That case, however, is distinguishable from the case at bar because the reduced sentence, entered by the trial court, constituted a "departure sentence" which is clearly appealable under section 924.07(1)(i), Fla.Stat....

...State, 544 So.2d 308 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (contract principles applied to substantial assistance agreements), but the legislature has left us no choice. We strongly urge the Florida legislature to study this issue and consider an appropriate amendment to section 924.07 in light of the factual scenario presented in this case....

...Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(B) authorizes appeals from pretrial orders suppressing admissions. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const. (declaring interlocutory orders reviewable by district courts of appeal "to the extent provided by rules adopted by the supreme court"). Section 924.07(1)( l ), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), also provides that the state may take an appeal from an "order ......

...not trustworthy. Thus, we affirm the trial court on cross-appeal. Having determined Shorter has not shown reversible error by the trial court, the judgment and sentence for both offenses are affirmed. Affirmed. CIKLIN and GERBER, JJ., concur. . See § 924.07(l)(d), Fla....

...encing guidelines pursuant to section 921.001 unless reasons are explained in writing by the trial court judge which reasonably justify departure. A sentence imposed outside of such guidelines shall be subject to appeal pursuant to section 924.06 or section 924.07....

...o s. 921.001 unless clear and convincing reasons are explained in writing by the trial court judge which reasonably justify departure. A sentence imposed outside of such guidelines shall be subject to appeal by the defendant pursuant to s. 924.06 or s. 924.07....

..., I sentenced him on the guidelines. I mitigated it." Id. The defendant moved to dismiss the state's appeal arguing that the mitigation order was not appealable. The appellate court disagreed, finding that the order under review was appealable under section 924.07(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1987), which authorizes the state to appeal "[t]he sentence, on the ground that it is *1244 illegal"....

...sentenced him on the guidelines. I mitigated it.” Id. The defendant moved to dismiss the state’s appeal arguing that the mitigation order was not appealable. The appellate court disagreed, finding that the order under review was appealable under section 924.07(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1987), which authorizes the state to appeal “[t]he sentence, on the ground that it is *1244 illegal”....

...l court to impose a sentence within the sentencing guidelines shall be subject to appellate review pursuant to chapter 924. The extent of departure from a guideline sentence shall not be subject to appellate review." Section 924.06(1)(d) and (e) and section 924.07(1)(e) and (i), Florida Statutes (1987), provide that either a defendant or the state, may appeal from an illegal sentence or from a sentence imposed outside the range recommended by the guidelines authorized by section 921.001....

...uittal of racketeering; and we reverse Clark's sentences and remand for resentencing pursuant to the guidelines. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing. RYDER, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND and LAZZARA, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 924.07(1)(j), Fla....

...start searching now all the different crevasses to be sure there’s not a crack rock there. I don’t think that’s what the law is designed for. The state is permitted to appeal a judgment of acquittal entered after a jury verdict. See § 924.07(j), Fla....

...a Constitution: b. The subject of solicitation is not expressed in the title in contravention of Article III, Section 6, Florida Constitution. * * * * * * [6] Mixon v. State, 59 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1952); Ramos v. State, 457 So.2d 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Section 924.07(4) Fla....

...COBB, C.J., and COWART, J., concur. NOTES [1] Defendants assert that there is no authority for an appeal by the State on this issue. We disagree. The order is appealable as an adjunct to the order granting the motion to suppress, which latter order is clearly appealable under section 924.071(1), Florida Statutes (1985), or alternatively, is appealable as a pre-trial order under section 924.07(8)....

...ch authorizes certification if the order is appealable under rule 9.140(c). The order in this case, which denies the State's motion in limine, is not such an order. *269 The State argues that we have jurisdiction to review this pre-trial order under section 924.07(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2004) which purports to allow the state to appeal "other pre-trial orders," and section 924.07(1)( l ), which allows the state to appeal "an order or ruling suppressing evidence or evidence in limine at trial." As is apparent from our earlier discussion, however, our constitution grants the power to authorize non-final appeals to district courts of appeal to our supreme court. Although some provisions of section 924.07(1) have been adopted in rule 9.140(c) by the Florida Supreme Court, the portions relied on by the State have not been adopted by rule and are unconstitutional as to appeals to district courts of appeal....

...Unlike the present case, in which the pretrial ruling concerned the admissibility of an excited utterance of a witness, those cases involved the suppression of evidence obtained by search and seizure, which the state is permitted to appeal under rule 9.140(c)(1)(B). The provisions in section 924.07(1) relied on by the State in this case are not unconstitutional as to the appeal of non-final orders from county court to circuit court....

...Article V, § 5(b) of the Florida Constitution provides that circuit courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals "when provided by general law." This order does appear to fall within the category of "other pre-trial orders," which the state can appeal to circuit court under section 924.07(1)(h)....

CASANUEVA, Judge. The State of Florida appeals the grant of a motion for judgment of acquittal as to count one after a jury verdict finding Andrew P. Tovar, acting as a principal, guilty of felony battery. See § 924.07(l)(j), Fla....

...In the present case, the suppression was not conditioned on the defendant agreeing to a mistrial, and we thus have no alternative but to dismiss the appeal. DELL and GUNTHER, JJ., concur. ON MOTION FOR REHEARING KLEIN, J. The state's motion for rehearing raises, for the first time, section 924.07(1)( l ), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides *9 that the state may appeal "an order or ruling suppressing evidence or evidence in limine at trial." Although we do not normally address issues raised for the first time on motions for...

...They may review interlocutory orders in such cases to the extent provided by rules adopted by the supreme court. [emphasis added] There is nothing in the Florida Constitution which authorizes the legislature to allow review of non-final orders by district courts of appeal. Accordingly, section 924.07(1)( l ) is unconstitutional....

...The motion for rehearing is denied. [2] DELL and GUNTHER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] There is no provision in our rules for a dismissal under these circumstances. This order should have granted defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. [1] Both sections 924.07 and 924.071 contain provisions, other than the one on which the state relies in this case, which also purport to authorize the appeal of non-final orders....

...ligation “to eliminate any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” The state filed a timely notice of appeal to this court. An order granting a motion for a judgment of acquittal after a guilty verdict in a criminal case is renewable by appeal. See § 924.07(l)(j), Fla....

...De Jerinett, 283 So.2d 126 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 287 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1973). For the reasons stated, and upon the authorities cited, the trial court's order is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. NOTES [1] § 924.07(1), Fla....

...to both counts of the amended information, insofar as the motion challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's findings that defendant "had in his possession a semiautomatic firearm and its high-capacity detachable box magazine." Section 924.07(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1989), permits the state to appeal "[a] ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict." See State v....

...1st DCA), review denied, 581 So.2d 1308 (Fla. 1991). Likewise, because the minimum sentence specified in Section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1989), is mandatory, if the state's argument were to prove correct, the sentences imposed by the trial court would be illegal. Section 924.07(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1989), permits the state to challenge a sentence "on the ground that it is illegal." See generally Zimmerman v....

...bery to the lesser included offenses of petit theft or resisting a merchant. The trial court denied the motion for new trial, but reduced the Defendant's conviction to resisting a merchant pursuant to Rule 3.620, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 924.07, Florida Statutes (2000), sets forth what the state can appeal....

....140(c)(1)(D), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. We disagree. The trial court's ruling on a rule 3.620 motion does not result in an acquittal, only in a conviction of a lesser offense. Because the State's right to appeal is purely statutory, and section 924.07 does not authorize an appeal from this order, we have no jurisdiction....

...State, 639 So.2d at 612. [1] The threshold question in the present case is whether the sentencing order entered in this case is one which the State may appeal. Here, the trial court imposed a guidelines sentence, which is not a sentence the State may appeal. See § 924.07(1)(i), Fla. Stat. (1993). The State argues that the absence of mandatory findings renders the sentence illegal. See id. § 924.07(1)(e)....

...as a habitual offender, but the trial court has already made the decision to sentence defendant under the guidelines, not as a habitual offender. There is no basis for vacating the guidelines sentence, which is a legal and permissible one. See id.; § 924.07(1)(i), Fla....

...ion orders does not render the dispositions "illegal" for purposes of a State appeal... ." 630 So.2d at 583. [2] The refusal to make habitual offender findings does not fall within any other category which may be the subject of a State appeal. See §§ 924.07, 924.071, Fla....

...necessary. Geohagen v. State, 639 So.2d at 612. [2] The statutory language at issue in F.G. providing the State the right to appeal an illegal sentence was substantially identical to the statutory provision at issue here. See 630 So.2d at 583 n. 3; § 924.07(1)(e), Fla....

...The case was initially treated as a petition for writ of certiorari. However, because the state can appeal an order discharging a prisoner on habeas corpus, we redesignate this case as an appeal and treat the petition and response as the briefs and the appendix as the record on appeal. § 924.07(l)(f), Fla....

...tioner/Appellant. James L. Eisenberg and Kai Li Aloe Fouts of Eisenberg and Fouts, P.A., West Palm Beach Florida, for Respondent/Appellee. QUINCE, J. We have on appeal a decision from the Fourth District Court of Appeal declaring invalid portions of section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (2003), as applied to appeals to the district courts....

...For the reasons explained below, we reverse the decision of the district court and hold that the district courts of appeal have discretionary jurisdiction over nonfinal appeals certified by the county court to be of great *702 public importance when the order is one that is otherwise appealable to the circuit court under section 924.07, Florida Statutes....

...The district court initially granted jurisdiction but after the case was fully briefed, the court ultimately decided to dismiss the appeal and transfer the case to the circuit court. The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter, reasoning that "[a]lthough some provisions of section 924.07(1) have been adopted in rule 9.140(c) by the Florida Supreme Court, the portions relied upon by the State have not been adopted by rule and are unconstitutional as to appeals to district courts of appeal." State v....

...See Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602, 607 (Fla.2004). DISCUSSION The issue before this Court involves the jurisdiction of the district courts of appeal and the interplay of article V, section 4(b) of the Florida Constitution with section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(4), 9.030(c)(1)(B), and 9.140(c)....

...In other words, the circuit court's appellate jurisdiction to hear appeals by the State of nonfinal orders is controlled by authorization from the Legislature. The general law enacted by the Legislature that governs State appeals and that would govern the State's right to appeal under rule 9.140(c)(2) is section 924.07, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...the district courts of appeal. However, because constitutionally appeals to the circuit courts are governed by general law, these statutory provisions control the kind of orders that may be appealed to the circuit court. The general law, pursuant to section 924.07(1)(h), grants the State the right to appeal "[a]ll other pretrial orders, except that it may not take more than one appeal under this subsection in any case." In addition, section 924.07(1)( l ) allows the State to appeal "[a]n order or ruling suppressing evidence or evidence in limine at trial." The State could therefore appeal to the circuit court a county court order that falls under either of the above-quoted provisions of section 924.07....

...unty court, the district court relied on the fact that the type of order being appealed, the denial of a motion in limine, was not an authorized motion that the State could directly appeal to a district court of appeal. The court further opined that section 924.07 could not be used to expand the list of appealable orders delineated in rule 9.140(c)(1). We need not reach this issue, however, because it is clear that section 924.07 is constitutional as applied to appeals from the county court to the circuit court because the Legislature has the authority to determine the appeals that may be taken to the circuit court....

...This provision states in pertinent part: "The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction not vested in the county courts, and jurisdiction of appeals when provided by general law. " (Emphasis added.) [3] The State also argues that the order is appealable pursuant to section 924.07(1)(h). However, we need not make a determination on this issue because the order clearly falls under 924.07(1)( l ).

...My reading of these cases does not lead me to the same conclusion. Gaines involved an appeal from a dispositive suppression order; not a petition for certiorari. The court's focus was on whether a dispositive suppression order issued after the trial had begun could be appealed and whether section 924.07(1)( l ), Florida Statutes (1997), was unconstitutional because it allowed for such an appeal....

...and a close reading of the opinion reveals that the district court had jurisdiction in that case because each of the consolidated cases involved the imposition of a downward departure sentence. The state was permitted to appeal under Florida Statute section 924.07(1)(i), (1995)....

...trial court rendered an illegal sentence when it refused to make habitual defender findings as required under section 775.084, Florida Statutes, (1993). The court held that, as in F. G., the procedural error does not make the sentence illegal under section 924.07(1)(e), Florida Statutes, *788 (1993). The trial court's error did not fall within any provision under which the state can appeal. Finally, in an appeal almost identical to the one at issue, the first district held that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c) and section 924.07 do not authorize the state to appeal when the trial court enters into its own plea agreement with the defendant....

...We are compelled to dismiss the instant appeal. “‘The State’s right to appeal in a criminal case must be ‘expressly conferred by statute.’’” State v. Maddex, 159 So. 3d 267, 269 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (quoting Exposito v. State, 891 So. 2d 525, 527 (Fla. 2004)). Section 924.07, Florida Statutes, permits the State to appeal an illegal sentence and a sentence that is below the lowest permissible sentence as established by the Criminal Punishment Code. See § 924.07(1)(e), (i), Fla. Stat....

...The State filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari with the Second District Court of Appeal, which the Second District granted. The Second District’s Discussion of Jurisdiction The Second District acknowledged that the State had no right of appeal in this case, as section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (2011), and its procedural counterpart, Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c), set forth the limited circumstances in which the State has a right to appeal and neither the statute nor the rule specificall...

...seek certiorari from a decision of a district court in which that court in a criminal -7- case rules adversely to the [S]tate and favorably to an accused,” and ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs. Id. This Court determined that section 924.07 restricted the State from directly appealing to this Court following an adverse decision of a district court in a criminal proceeding, but that section 924.07 did not limit the State’s right to seek certiorari review in this Court....

...tter of right.” Id. On review, this Court approved the decision of the district court, finding no constitutional right for the State to appeal adverse final orders of a circuit court, including in juvenile cases, and also determining that section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1981), which provided the State the right to appeal certain adverse -8- criminal dispositions, does not apply to juvenile proceedings....

...In a very brief opinion, this Court approved the district court’s decision. Id. In an extensive dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alderman and Erlich joined, Chief Justice Boyd reiterated his concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion in C.C., in which he determined that section 924.07 provides the State with the right to appeal in juvenile delinquency cases; on this premise, he reserved judgment on the issue regarding the State’s right to seek a writ of certiorari....

...4th DCA 1989) (contract principles applied to substantial assistance agreements), but the legislature has left us no choice. We strongly urge the Florida legislature to study this issue and consider an appropriate amendment to section 924.07 in light of the factual scenario presented in this case.[7] Jordan, 783 So....

...CANADY, J., dissenting. I would approve the result reached by the Second District Court of Appeal on the ground that the trial court’s order terminating probation—an order that violates the law—was subject to review and correction under section 924.07(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2011)....

...d to which she had been sentenced is inconsistent with the requirements of the law. The order illegally curtailed the sanction imposed under the plea agreement. The order should be treated as a “sentence” that is appealable by the State under section 924.07(1)(e) “on the ground that it is illegal.” The unduly restrictive interpretation contained in our caselaw of the State’s right of appeal under section 924.07(1)(e) flows from a category mistake by which the definition of “illegal sentence” under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 is imported into the wholly dissimilar context of section 924.07, and the plain meaning of the statute is thereby cast aside. See State v. McMahon, 94 So. 3d 468, 479 (Fla. 2012) (Canady, C.J., dissenting). The Court has never provided a plausible explanation for the transposition to the section 924.07 context of the illegal sentence definition developed under rule 3.800. For the reasons expressed in my dissent in McMahon, I would recede from McMahon....

...Sofka, 702 So.2d 1243, 1245 (Fla.1997) ("However, `[c]ourts are bound to take notice of the limits of their authority and if want of jurisdiction appears at any stage of the proceedings, original or appellate, the court should notice *916 the defect and enter an appropriate order.'") (citation omitted). Section 924.07(1)(e)(i), Florida Statutes (2008), permits the State to challenge a sentence "on the ground that it is illegal" or one that is "imposed below the lowest permissible sentence established by the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921." Neither of these grounds apply in this case....

...tute is constitutional. Appellee contends the State does not have the statutory authority to appeal the trial court’s order and that we should dismiss this appeal. For the reasons explained below, we hold that the State has the authority, under section 924.07(5), Florida Statutes (2014), to appeal the sentence as illegal....

...case must be ‘expressly conferred by statute.’” Exposito v. State, 891 So. 2d 525, 527 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Ramos v. State, 505 So. 2d 418, 421 (Fla. 1987)). The State contends that its authority to appeal the final order below is found in section 924.07(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2014), which provides: 2 By contrast, and under limited circumstances, the State may seek certiorari review of a nonfinal order where the State’s ability to present its case is significantly impaired....

...violation of s. 775.08435. (Emphasis added). The initial question then, is whether a mandatory civil penalty, contained within the same section of a criminal statute, is considered a part of the “sentence” within the meaning of section 924.07(1)(e), such that the State can appeal, as an illegal sentence, the trial court’s failure to impose this mandatory penalty. 6  1....

...The State appealed this as an illegal sentence, contending section 948.01(3), Florida Statutes (1983), mandates reporting probation upon conviction of a felony.6 McGraw argued that, because probation is not a “sentence,” the State did not have the right to appeal under section 924.07. We held to the contrary: 6 “Conviction” in this context includes a withhold of adjudication following a finding of guilt....

...probation, have the supervision and control of the defendant. (Emphasis added). 9  McGraw contends that the order of probation is not an illegal sentence appealable under section 924.07(5), Florida Statutes (1983) on the theory that probation is not a sentence....

...Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1981), such a distinction is immaterial to the question of whether the state has the right to appeal a given order. We hold that for purposes of section 924.07(5) and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(I), sentence means a dispositive order upon conviction, which includes probation. McGraw, 474 So....

...il penalty, which is expressly included within section 796.07 as part of the mandatory sanctions a trial court must impose upon a defendant who solicits another to commit prostitution, is a part of the defendant’s “sentence” for purposes of section 924.07(5), and the State therefore has the authority to appeal, as an illegal sentence, the trial court’s failure to impose this mandatory penalty. 2....

...493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562. Therefore, I am for affirmance of the action of the trial court, but as to the appellee Buchanan for the views outlined above. HENDRY, J., concurs in the opinion and Judge BARKDULL's special concurring opinion. NOTES [1] See Section 924.07(1) Fla....

...ismissed charges if the dismissal was reversed, such as in cases involving the so-called "single transaction rule." Item (E) refers to the popularly known "speedy trial rule," and items (F), (G) and (H) track the balance of State appellate rights in Section 924.07, Fla....

...Butterworth, Attorney General; Trisha E. Meggs, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant. R. Vinson Barrett of Eubanks & Barrett, Tallahassee, for Appellee. BENTON, J. The state appeals the post-trial grant of motions to dismiss and for judgment of acquittal. See §§ 924.07(1)(a) and (j), Fla....

...the case went to the jury. The state has made no effort to appeal the order granting the motion for judgment of acquittal as to section 849.09(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1999). See Hudson v. State, 711 So.2d 244, 246 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (holding that section 924.07(1)(j) "plainly contemplates appeal from a judgment of acquittal only if the judgment of acquittal follows a guilty verdict")....

...Based on that, the Defendant's motion to reduce the charges from Trafficking in Cannabis to Possession with Intent, a third degree felony, is well taken. The motion is granted." R. at 78. Exposito challenges the State's right to this appeal. Exposito argues that this court has no jurisdiction as section 924.07, Florida Statutes (2000) does not authorize an appeal by the State from a reduction of charge. Exposito relies on State v. Richars, 792 So.2d 570 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Therein, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that section 924.07, Florida Statutes (2000) does not authorize an appeal from an order granting a motion to reduce a charge under rule 3.670, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure....

...3d DCA 1986), this court in dealing with a pretrial order reducing a charge stated: "Analytically, an order reducing a charge set forth in the information or indictment to some lesser-included charge is, despite its label, an order dismissing the charge in the information." Hankerson at 1387. As section 924.07 authorizes the State to appeal orders dismissing an indictment or information or any count therein, we conclude that we have jurisdiction over the State's appeal....

...*1150 Reversed and remanded for new trial; question of great public importance certified. CASANUEVA and BLACK, JJ., Concur. . See art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const, (providing authority of district courts of appeal to hear appeals of right from final judgments or orders); § 924.07(l)(j), Fla....

...ainst whom such judgment of guilty of a felony was rendered." We accede to the transfer of the case by the District Court and accept jurisdiction of the appeal. See Grove Press, Inc. v. State ex rel. Gerstein (Fla.App.), 152 So.2d 177. Also see F.S. Section 924.07(4), F.S.A....

...done, the setter brought Campbell inside the unit to show Campbell some of his work. They then left, though Campbell went back, allegedly to turn off the lights. Subsequently, Campbell returned to the sundeck and made a phone call before the ex- 1See § 924.07(1)(j), Fla....

...*987 Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Heidi Milan Caballero, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Robert Godfrey, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee. Before COPE and GREEN, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. Pursuant to section 924.07(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2007), which provides that it may appeal from "[a] sentence imposed below the lowest permissible sentence established by the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921," otherwise known as the sentencing guidelines, the state seeks review of what it says is a downward departure sentence....

...Wainwright, 290 So.2d 58, 59 (Fla.1974), the difference in the location of imprisonment, while it may be a sideways departure, does not qualify as a sentence " below the lowest permissible sentence" [emphasis added] under the guidelines, as provided by the only arguable authority for this appeal, section 924.07(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...dispute, no valid basis for a downward departure was established in any way, 3 the trial court, having revoked probation, sentenced Martinez to only B64 days in the county jail, followed by reinstatement of probation. 4 The State appeals pursuant to section 924.07(l)(i), Florida Statutes (2010), and we reverse....

...The judgment incorrectly identifies the offense as robbery with a deadly weapon rather than the offense for which he was actually convicted. On remand, this scrivener's error should be corrected. The State has filed a cross-appeal in this case pursuant to section 924.07(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(J)....

...State, 698 So.2d 555 (Fla. 2d DCA), approved, 703 So.2d 1062 (Fla.1997). Although this might be an appropriate subject for consideration by The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, we decline to rule on this issue in this case. Section 924.07(1)(d), on its face, might seem to give the State the right to receive review of this issue in this case....

...This is not an issue that became moot while the case was pending on appeal, but rather an issue that was moot from the start. Thus, the State is attempting to ask this court for an advisory ruling on an issue that is not a controversy in this case. We conclude that the right of cross-appeal created by section 924.07(1)(d) does not expand this court's scope of review to permit it to issue advisory holdings on such issues....

..., pertaining to the authority of a school principal to delegate responsibility for control and direction of students. (2) Section 24 relates to reports of accidents of vessels in or upon entering into or exiting from the water. (3) Section 46 amends section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1985), relating to appeals by the state....

...LaFave has forcefully argued, and we agree, that the State has no right of appeal in this case. The State’s right to appeal in a criminal case is available only as provided by statute. See State v. McMahon, 94 So.3d 468 (Fla.2012); State v. MacLeod, 600 So.2d 1096, 1097 (Fla.1992). Section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (2011), sets forth the limited circumstances in which the state has a right to appeal. Rule 9.140(c) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure “serves as the procedural counterpart to section 924.07 [and] lists the same types of orders that the State may appeal in a criminal case.” McMahon, 94 So.3d at 473 . Neither the statute nor the rule specifically provides the State with a right to appeal a circuit court order granting early termination of probation. Pursuant to section 924.07(l)(e) and (i) and rule 9.140(c)(l')(M), the State may appeal an illegal sentence or a downward departure sentence....

...As a result of the motion, the circuit court converted the defendant’s prison sentence to sex offender probation. 890 So.2d at 504 . We held that because the new modified sentence constituted a downward departure sentence, an appeal was authorized pursuant to section 924.07(l)(i)....

...of a negotiated plea agreement with the State. 890 So.2d at 505 . LaFave’s situation is distinguishable from the defendant’s situation in Brooks because LaFave’s early termination of probation cannot be construed as a sentence for purposes of section 924.07(l)(e) and (i), even under the most tortured legal reasoning. Because the law is clear that the categories enumerated in section 924.07 are the only bases upon which the State may appeal as a matter of right, see, e.g., McMahon, 94 So.3d at 471 ; MacLeod, 600 So.2d at 1098 , and because none of the enumerated categories are applicable in this case, we therefore conclud...

...In Harris , the Florida Supreme Court was asked “whether the state has the right to seek certiorari from a decision of a district court in which that court in a criminal case rules adversely to the state and favorably to an accused.” Id. at 634 . The court rejected the defendant’s assertion that section 924.07 somehow limited the state’s right to seek certiorari review, stating that “[t]he statute deals only with direct appeals in criminal proceedings and clearly does not and was not intended to proscribe the authority of the state to se...

...had a means for appellate review pursuant to statute. See, e.g., State v. Gibson, 353 So.2d 670, 671 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (reviewing order withholding adjudication of guilt and placing defendant on probation; noting that order was not appealable under section 924.07 because it was not an order imposing sentence, but treating case as a petition for writ of certiorari); State v....

...The state appealed the trial court's decision to this court, but the court issued an order directing the state to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In response, the state argued that the appeal is authorized by section 924.07(1)(k), Florida Statutes (2000), which provides that the state may appeal from "an order denying restitution under section 775.089 ." Counsel for the child contends that section 924.07(1)(k) applies only to appeals in adult criminal cases and that there is no comparable provision in Chapter 985 that would authorize an appeal from a restitution order in a juvenile case....

...Because the Florida Constitution does not afford the state a right to appeal, the state can appeal a final order in a criminal case or a juvenile delinquency proceeding only if there is a statute authorizing the appeal. The state contends that the appeal is authorized by section 924.071(1)(k), but this statute applies exclusively to appeals in adult criminal cases....

...The supreme court applied the rule in Creighton and other cases holding that the state's right to appeal is purely statutory, and ultimately concluded that the state's appeal was correctly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Following the decision McLeod, the Legislature enacted section 924.071(1)(k), Florida Statutes, which authorizes the state to appeal an order denying restitution....

...nces which are individually less than the LPS and for which a basis for departure has not been established. See § 921.002(1)(h) ("A sentence may be appealed on the basis that it departs from the [CPC] only if the sentence is below the [LPS] ...."), § 924.07(1)(i), Fla....

...—whether the defendant has met the burden of establishing sufficient factual support for a valid legal ground." State v. Kelleher, 142 So. 3d 958, 959 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (emphasis added) 1 We have jurisdiction. See § 924.07(1)(i), Fla....

defendants.” The state has taken an authorized appeal. § 924.07, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. The defendants operated a convalescent

...uld be denied because the State had the right to appeal from the Circuit Judge’s order and, therefore, certiorari would not lie. (2) That the judgment entered in the case by the Circuit Judge was not final and, therefore, certiorari would not lie. Section 924.07, Florida Statutes 1955, F.S.A., provides the only grounds upon which the State may appeal in a criminal case....

...The victims were taken from various rooms, held at gunpoint, and tied, thereby preventing them from summoning assistance. Clearly, the armed trespass could have been committed without tying the victims. Thus, the court abused its discretion in granting the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. Section 924.07(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1995), provides that the state may appeal from a “ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict.” *414 The defendant argues that notwithstanding this statutory grant of authority, a state appeal of a judgment of acquittal runs afoul of double jeopardy....

BLACK, Judge. The State of Florida appeals the sentence imposed after the postconviction court granted Carolyn Stewart’s motion to modify sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c). We have jurisdiction. § 924.07(l)(e), Fla....

...was in excess of the statutory maximum.7 Pursuant to Rule 9.140(c)(1)(M), Fla. R. App. P., the State may appeal from an order “imposing an unlawful or illegal sentence or imposing a sentence outside the range permitted by the sentencing guidelines.” Moreover, pursuant to section 924.07(1)(e), Florida Statutes, the State may appeal from “[t]he sentence, on the ground that it is illegal.” Because the 6 The trial court did not initially impose a habitual violent felony offender designation because Santiago’s att...

...harges if the dismissal were reversed, such as in cases involving the so-called “single transaction rule.” Item (E) refers to the popularly known “speedy trial rule,” and items (F), (G), and (H) track the balance of state appellate rights in section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...is that this court lacks jurisdiction over the State’s appeal. Pickersgill acknowledges that the State’s ability to appeal is statutory, and the State may appeal “[a] ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict.” § 924.07(1)(j), Fla....

...2004) (when construing a statute, this court “must give the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, and is not at liberty to add words . . . that were not placed there by the Legislature”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 5  The plain language of section 924.07(1)(j) provides that the State may appeal from a ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal “after a jury verdict.” See State v. Hartzog, 575 So. 2d 1328, 1331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (“Section 924.07(1)(j) expressly authorizes the state to appeal from a ruling following a jury verdict. Obviously, if the words of a statute are unambiguous, judicial interpretation should not displace the clearly stated intent.”). The plain language of section 924.07(1)(j) does not state “after a jury verdict has been recorded,” “after a jury verdict has been rendered,” “after a jury verdict has been published,” “after the discharge of the jury,” or contain any other such qualifying...

...3d DCA 2017) (order granting a renewed motion for judgment of acquittal was not appealable, as it was entered after the “jury could not reach a verdict, and the court declared a mistrial”). None of the cases cited by Pickersgill as authority for his construction of “after a jury verdict” involved section 924.07(1)(j)—they all involved situations where there was a defect in the jury’s verdict, in the manner of delivering the verdict, in the verdict form, or in the jury’s deliberations. Further support for our rejection of Pickersgil...

PER CURIAM. ■ This is an appeal by the state from an order entered by the trial court dismissing an information under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c)(4). We have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.; § 924.07(1), Fla.Stat....

prosecution in the circuit court, as authorized by § 924.07 (8) Fla.Stat., F.S.A.1969. The challenged order

...d upon the appellee-defendants were vacated and another sentence imposed. The question was raised in these causes as to whether the procedure on the part of the state by which the issues herein are presentable to this court is by way of appeal under Section 924.07(5), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which provides for an appeal from “the sentence, on the ground that it is illegal,” or whether the issue is presentable, if at all, by common law certiorari....

...�s motion to serve his sentence in a South Florida correctional facility between West Palm Beach and Everglades. We reverse. As a preliminary matter, the Defendant argues that the State does not have the right to appeal the Order in question because Section 924.07, Florida Statutes (2002), does not permit an appeal of this Order....

...locutory order, or, alternatively, that common law certiorari permits review. The state’s right of appeal in criminal cases depends on statutory authorization and is governed strictly by statute. State v. Creighton, 469 So.2d 735, 740 (Fla. 1985). Section 924.07(l)(j), Florida Statutes (1991), provides that the state may appeal from a ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict. Here, however, because the jury deadlocked, there was no verdict. Thus, no appeal is authorized by section 924.071....

...case. The jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter. The defendant then moved for a new trial and the trial court in granting said motion stated that the “verdict of the jury is contrary to law and the weight of the evidence.” Pursuant to Section 924.07(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the state then took this appeal and assigned as error the granting of a new trial....

insufficiency. The state appealed, as authorized by § 924.07(1) Fla.Stat., F.S.A. Under § 2-51 of the Code

PER CURIAM. Appeal dismissed. See Fla.Stat. § 924.07 (8) (1969), F.S.A....

...rial judge’s acting on his own motion. Two questions concern us: the first concerns our jurisdiction. Redden moves to dismiss the State’s appeal on the ground that our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Smith, 2 to the effect that Fla. Stat. § 924.07 , F.S.A., (1971) is unconstitutionally intrusive upon the Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority, 3 leaves no valid basis for an appeal by the State....

the verdict. Such a claim is not authorized. Section 924.07(1)(j), Florida Statutes, provides that “[t]he

...Trucking v. Pennell, 614 So. 2d 1083, 1085 (Fla. 1993) (“[W]hen the judge reserves ruling on a mistrial motion until after the trial, or the motion is not made until after the discharge of the jury, then the motion must be considered a motion for new trial.”). Section 924.07(1)(b), Florida Statutes, therefore, provides the State authority to appeal....

...in custody. If the defendant has been released on bail, the defendant and the sureties shall be exonerated; if money or bonds have been deposited as bail, suehthe money or bonds shall be refunded. (f) Order Dismissing. For the purpose of construing section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (1969), the statutory term “order quashing” shall be taken and held to mean “order dismissing.” (g) Motion for Continuance....

...(b) Substantially the same as section 909.02, Florida Statutes, except changes name of “motion to quash” to “motion to dismiss.” This conforms to the terminology of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The statute authorizing the state to appeal from certain orders, section 924.07, Florida Statutes, should be amended by substituting the words “motion .to dismiss” for “motion to quash.” (c) Combines the substance of sections 909.01 and 909.06, Florida Statutes....

...dge quashing an affidavit purporting to charge a criminal offense of which the county judge had trial jurisdiction is reviewable by the circuit court on appeal by the state. The state’s right to appeal is purely statutory, and is found in Sections 924.07 and 924.08, Fla. Stat. 1941 (same F.S.A.). Section 924.07 is as follows: “924.07....

LOPEZ, Associate Justice. The State of Florida, as authorized by Section 924.07, Florida Statutes,' F.S.A., challenges on this appeal the order of the Criminal Court of Record for the County of Broward, State of Florida,....

...Sua sponte, we dismiss this appeal by the state from the final order denying Defendant’s restitution in a juvenile proceeding. Although the criminal statutes now provide the state may appeal an order denying restitution under section 775.089, see § 924.07(l)(k), Fla.Stat....

under the statutory authority contained in section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (1981), I agree that the

...Once the trial court has been invited to participate, it may "actively discuss potential sentences and comment on proposed plea agreements." Id. at 514. Although it is improper for a trial court to initiate a plea discussion, neither Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c) nor section 924.07, Florida Statutes (2009), authorizes the state to appeal court-initiated plea agreements....

...y to the crimes charged. Id. at 787. This court determined that a trial court's initiation of plea discussions does not render an otherwise legal sentence "illegal" for purposes of a state appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c) or section 924.07....

jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(A); § 924.07(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2022). Trevino did not file

...CRENSHAW, Judge. The State of Florida appeals an order dismissing a charge of principal to robbery with a firearm against Kaylesha Brannic.1 On appeal, the State argues that the 1 We have jurisdiction. See § 924.07(1)(a), Fla....

...ly to juveniles, so Gould is inapposite to the juvenile arena. While the Court stated in G.C. that there was no legislative intent to have chapter 924 apply to juveniles, we were concerned in that case with only two specific sections of chapter 924: section 924.07 and section 924.071....

...HARDING, J., concurs in result only with an opinion, in which KOGAN, C.J. and ANSTEAD, J., concur. . Section 924.34, Florida Statutes (1995), is identical to section 924.34, Florida Statutes (1989). . These two sections set out the general instances in which the state has a right to appeal. . Sections 924.07 and 924.071 are substantially the same in the current statutes....

...Regardless of the descriptive language of any statute or rule of court, the subject “Order” which allegedly passes on the validity of a state statute must necessarily qualify as a final judgment; otherwise, under the Constitution it could not be directly appealed here. For purposes of appeal by the state under Fla.Stat. § 924.07(1) (1967), F.S.A., the statutory term “order quashing” shall mean the same as “order dismissing.” Cr....

...But see State v. Harris, 136 So.2d 633 (Fla.1962). Even if the state’s right to appeal is determined to be statutory, chapter 924, Florida Statutes (1981), grants the state a right to appeal from “an order dismissing an indictment or information....” § 924.07(1), Fla.Stat....

...The court thereupon sentenced appellee to life imprisonment, after having adjudicated her guilty of second degree murder. The State’s motion for rehearing regarding the sentence was denied. Believing that the sentence imposed was illegal, the State appealed. See Section 924.07(5), Florida Statutes (1975)....

(holding State has authority to cross-appeal under Section 924.07(4), Florida Statutes (1975), containing identical

...Within forty days from the date an appeal is taken by the defendant, he shall file the appeal record with the clerk of the appellate court and serve a copy thereof upon the attorney general, even though the state may also have appealed under authority of Section 924.07(4), Florida Statutes, by filing either a notice of appeal or cross assignments of error, unless the time is extended by a judge of the lower court or a judge or justice of the appellate court, as the case may be; provided that no exten...

...The lowest permissible sentence under the Criminal Punishment Code was 37.8 months. We find that appellee’s sentence was legal and within the range established by the Criminal Punishment Code. Therefore, we are without jurisdiction to entertain the State’s appeal of the sentence imposed. See § 924.07(e), (i), Fla....

State. Authority for such procedure is pursuant to § 924.07(4), Fla.Stat., which provides in substance that

PER CURIAM. The state has filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 924.07(l)(h), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...termination of the defendant’s probation. The defendant responds that we lack jurisdiction and should dismiss because there is no appealable order. The State replies that we have jurisdiction, pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(O) and section 924.07(1)(k), Florida Statutes (2012), as the order essentially denied restitution. We agree with the State. “The State’s right to appeal in a criminal case must be ‘expressly conferred by statute.’” Exposito v. State, 891 So. 2d 525, 527 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Ramos v. State, 505 So. 2d 418, 421 (Fla. 1987)). Section 924.07 authorizes circumstances where the State may appeal in a criminal case. “[L]imitations on the State’s right to appeal in a criminal case are not new; the State’s right to appeal in criminal cases historically has been extremely limited.” State v....

...2012). The State’s notice of appeal states: “NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the State of Florida, Plaintiff/Appellant, appeals to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, State of Florida, the Final Order denying Restitution, in the above-styled cause, rendered June 20, 2013.” (Emphasis added). Under section 924.07(1)(k), the State may appeal “[a]n order denying restitution under s. 775.089.” § 924.07(1)(k), Fla....

primary offense. The state appealed pursuant to section 924.-07(1), Florida Statutes, and Fla.R.App.P. 9.140(e)(l)(I)

...y and setting aside the verdict of the jury of guilty was entered. The State contends that once the jury is discharged, the court cannot then direct a verdict of acquittal, and that, therefore, such order is appealable under the provisions of F.S.A. § 924.07....

...1 Defendant filed an appeal and then filed a motion to correct a sentencing error (the prosecution costs) pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). The State then cross-appealed the judge’s ruling granting relief. The defendant then voluntarily dismissed his appeal. Section 924.07, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140 set forth what matters may be appealed by the State. Section 924.07(1)(d) permits the State to appeal a question of law when the defendant appeals, and permits the State appeal to continue even when the defendant dismisses the appeal....

...by the state from an order suppressing physical evidence.” The trial court granted the motion and extended the speedy trial period for thirty days. On March 23, 2000, the state again moved for another extension which was denied. The state appeals. Section 924.07(1)©, Florida Statutes (1999), provides that the “state may appeal from ......

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal by the state from an order granting a new trial based on § 932.-38, Fla.Stat.1969 (now § 925.07, Fla.Stat., F.S.A.) See § 924.07, Fla.Stat.1969 (now § 924.07, Fla.Stat., F.S.A....

...oney order payable to the clerk of the appellate court, with the clerk of the lower court unless the appellant is adjudged insolvent prior to the time of such filing; provided, however, that the state may, at its option, take an appeal authorized by Section 924.07 (4), Florida Statutes, by filing cross assignments of error, with such clerk in lieu of filing a formal notice of appeal....

denying restitution to the insurance company. Section 924.07(l)(k), Florida Statutes (1995), explicitly

BARKDULL, Judge. The State seeks review of a criminal court order quashing an information. See: § 924.07(1), Fla.Stat., F.S.A....

effectively dismissed the information under section 924.07(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes (2018) and Florida

...O.A. sentence which was below the guidelines. In 1987, however, the legislature rather pointedly effected a complete reversal of the Diers result 3 by removing the “by the defendant” qualification of the right to appeal and adding a reference to 924.07, the statute which provides for state criminal appeals. Thus, the last sentence of 958.-04(3) now reads: A sentence imposed outside of such guidelines shall be subject to appeal pursuant to s. 924.06 or s. 924.07....

...We reach this conclusion by applying ordinary and common sense rules of statutory construction to the problem at hand: 1. There seems to be no doubt that the repeal of the limitation of the right of appeal “by the defendant” and the specific addition of section 924.07(l)(i), Florida Statutes (1989), 4 which authorizes state appeals from departure sentences, had the self-evident effect of overruling Diers and permitting state review of an issue like this one....

...That can only involve the requirement that the sentence be based upon legally satisfactory written reasons. 2. This determination is mandated also by the express terms of the 1987 amendment. As we have seen, the amendment not only deleted “by the defendant,” it added a reference to an appeal pursuant to “924.07.” To reiterate, the latter provision states in part that: (1) The state may appeal from: ⅝ ⅝ ⅜ ⅛ ⅜: ⅝ (i) A sentence imposed outside the range recommended by the guidelines authorized by s. 921.001. § 924.07(l)(i), Fla....

...3d DCA 1982), we strongly admonish counsel not to repeat this conduct. . It is undisputed that the defendant-appellee qualifies for treatment under the statute. . Diers expressly declined to rule upon the effect of this subsequent legislation. See Diers, 532 So.2d at 1271 n.*. . 924.07 Appeal by state.— (1) The state may appeal from: ****** (i) A sentence imposed outside the range recommended by the guidelines authorized by s. 921.001. § 924.07(l)(i), Fla.Stat....

...of this statute would be corrected by the appellate courts, and under some circumstances it can be. See, e.g., State v. Rincon, 273 So. 3d 1101 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (reversing a trial court’s dismissal of a violation of probation 2  Section 924.07, Florida Statutes (2024), “is the only basis upon which the State may appeal as a matter of right and . . . appeals can be taken only in the express categories contained in section 924.07.” State v. MacLeod, 600 So. 2d 1096, 1098 (Fla. 1992). “Statutes such as section 924.07 ‘which afford the government the right to appeal in criminal cases should be construed narrowly.’” State v....

...because ‘[t]o do so would be an abrogation of legislative power.’” Id. at 472- 73 (quoting Hill v. Davis, 70 So. 3d 572, 575 (Fla. 2011)). The Florida Legislature has authorized the State to appeal orders dismissing an affidavit charging a violation of probation. § 924.07(1)(a); see also State v....

...This is not one of those circumstances because the trial court here modified McKinney’s probation rather than revoking it or dismissing the affidavit of violation. Thus, its order functionally evades appellate review due to the limitations imposed in section 924.07, Florida Statutes....

...2016). 3 conviction. See State v. McGraw, 474 So. 2d 289, 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (holding that the State is authorized to appeal “a dispositive order upon conviction, which includes probation” as an illegal sentence pursuant to section 924.07). By contrast, § 924.07 does not authorize appeals of orders modifying probation....

...Folkes, 190 So. 3d 118, 119 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“An order reinstating, continuing, or modifying a defendant’s probation or community control, entered following a violation of the terms, is not, however, a ‘sentence’ within the meaning of [§ 924.07].”); State v....

...Prac., Appellate Practice § 27:34 n.10 (2024 ed.) (“[W]hen the court merely modifies but does not revoke probation or community control, the state has no right to appeal such an order because it does not constitute a sentence.”). 4  Accordingly, because § 924.07 does not authorize the State to appeal orders modifying probation, we dismiss.3 Dismissed. 3 We are also unable to treat the State’s appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari....

...te’s appellate rights. 2 It is therefore true, as Judge Schwartz points out in his special concurrence, that the fate of the State’s cross-appeal is left to the defendant. This result follows, however, from the fact that our controlling law, see § 924.07(4), Fla.Stat....

...in a new trial if the defendant succeeds in securing one on his appeal,” we cannot so limit the State’s right of cross-appeal in light of the direct and binding authority of Mixon v. State, 59 So.2d 38 (Fla.1952) (on State’s cross-appeal under Section 924.07, Florida Statutes, reversing reduced manslaughter conviction and ordering reinstatement of jury verdict of second-degree murder)....

PER CURIAM. We treat the State’s interlocutory appeal, pursuant to section 924.07(l)(h), Florida Statutes (1991), as a petition for writ of certiorari and deny relief because the State failed to show that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law....

PER CURIAM. The basic question involved in this motion to dismiss the State’s appeal taken pursuant to the provisions of F.S. Section 924.07, F.S.A., is whether the order of September 3rd, 1965, the pertinent portions of which read as follows, viz.: “THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing upon the Defendant’s Motion to ■Quash the Information, and the Court having heard...

...It is conceded by the parties that if the above ■ order is an appealable order under the statute above, the notice of appeal herein was filed too late to vest jurisdiction in •this Court. We hold the order is appealable under the provisions of Section 924.07. This conclusion is inescapable when Section 924.07 is considered alongside Section 909.05 ■which provides: “If the motion to quash is sustained the court may order that another information be filed * * *....

...Pennell, 614 So. 2d 1083, 1085 (Fla. 1993) (“[W]hen the judge reserves ruling on a mistrial motion until after the trial, or the motion is not made until after the discharge of the jury, then the motion must be considered a motion for new trial.”). Section 924.07(1)(b) of Florida Statutes, therefore, provides the State authority to appeal....

...We agree that the orders are not appealable. The State’s right to appeal in a criminal case is wholly dependent on statutory authorization, and this Court must construe the statute narrowly. Exposito v. State, 891 So. 2d 525, 527-28 (Fla. 2004). The plain language of sections 924.066 and 924.07, Florida Statutes (2018), does not authorize these appeals. The State argues that the orders denying the motions to rescind are appealable as orders granting postconviction relief. See § 924.066(2), Fla....

...orders denying the State’s motions to rescind merely found that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the orders granting resentencing. The State also argues that the orders denying its motions to rescind are appealable as orders imposing an illegal sentence. See § 924.07(1)(e), Fla....

PER CURIAM. DENIED. See section 924.07(2), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...The adjudicating language of the order appealed is: “That the defendant’s motion to Quash' herein be granted.” No order quashing the information appears to have been entered, hence the case is still pending as no final judgment has been entered. Section 924.07(1) F.S.A....

...years’ imprisonment not only violate the express terms of the previously approved plea agreement between the State and defendant, but also fall below the lowest permissible sentence under the Criminal Punishment Code. As a result, the State is authorized to appeal pursuant to section 924.07(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2021), which specifically provides that “[t]he state may appeal from: ....

...llant that the cross appeal should be dismissed because the Court is without jurisdiction to consider the cross appeal. The right of the State to appeal in criminal cases is provided and limited by Section 286 of the Fla. Criminal Procedure Act, now Section 924.07 F.S....

...es, court of county judge, court of justice of the peace and county courts.” The State contends here that because the defendant was convicted of a felony in the Criminal Court of Record, the State has the right of appeal under sub-paragraph (d) of Section 924.07, supra....

...As to Counts 2 and 3, the trial court disagreed with Espinoza and found instead that the conduct at issue qualifies as a financial transaction but, nonetheless, granted the motion on the basis Espinoza lacked the requisite intent to be guilty of money laundering. This timely appeal followed. 2 III. JURISDICTION Pursuant to section 924.07(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2016), and *1062 Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(A), the State is permitted to appeal the trial court's order dismissing the information. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(A) ("The state may appeal an order [ ] dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof ...."; see also § 924.07(1)(a) (using identical language as that found in Rule 9.140(c)(1)(A) to grant the State a right to appeal a trial court's order dismissing an information)....

judgment of acquittal. We disagree. Pursuant to section 924.07(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1993), the state may

McCORD, Judge. This is an appeal under § 924.07, Florida Statutes, from an order granting appellee’s

...to this Court’s mandate,1 vacates Efren Yero’s sentence and directs that Yero be resentenced at a future sentencing hearing. Yero has moved to dismiss the instant appeal, claiming that the January 30, 2019 order is not one of the enumerated appealable orders set forth in section 924.07(1) of the Florida Statutes (2019) and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1). We agree with Yero and, therefore, dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The State does not argue that the order falls into any category of appeals authorized by section 924.07(1) or rule 9.140(c)(1)....

...pellate jurisdiction when none exists. The Florida Legislature has expressly and clearly delineated the parameters of this Court’s jurisdiction to hear appeals brought by the State; we have jurisdiction to review only those orders enumerated in section 924.07(1) and rule 9.140(c)(1). See State v....

...seek appellate review in criminal cases. The State’s right to appeal adverse judgments or orders in a criminal case must be “expressly conferred by statute.” Exposito v. State, 891 So. 2d 525, 527 (Fla. 2004) (citations omitted); see also § 924.07, Fla. Stat; § 924.071, Fla....

...2d 1103 (Fla. 1996). Faithfully adhering to these principles, the majority panel properly concludes the resentencing order before us is “not one of the enumerated appealable orders set 6 forth in section 924.07(1) of the Florida Statutes (2019) and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1).” Maj....

State of Florida, has appealed pursuant to Fla.Stat. 924.07, F.S.A. a final order of the trial court quashing

...If complaints can be successfully suppressed, municipal action can be short-circuited. Upon authority of Zalla v. State, supra, the judgment is reversed with directions to quash the writ and dismiss the petition. Reversed. . The right to appeal is granted by Section 924.07 (6), F.S.A....

a discovery violation committed by the state. § 924.-07(1), Fla.Stat. (1979). Although we share the trial

of the issue would not be effectuated. .See § 924.07(l)(k), Fla. Stat. (2005) (giving the state the

...tion in custody. If the defendant has been released on bail, the defendant and the sureties shall be exonerated; if money or bonds have been deposited as bail, the money or bonds shall be refunded. (f) Order Dismissing. For the purpose of construing section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (1969), the statutory term “order quashing” shall be taken and held to mean “order dismissing.” (g) Motion for Continuance....

...(b) Substantially the same as section 909.02, Florida Statutes, except changes name of “motion to quash” to “motion to dismiss.” This conforms to the terminology of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The statute authorizing the state to appeal from certain orders, section 924.07, Florida Statutes, should be amended by substituting the words “motion to dismiss” for “motion to quash.” (c) Combines the substance of sections 909.01 and 909.06, Florida Statutes....

...James P. Judkins and Larry D. Simpson of Judkins, Simpson & High, Tallahassee, for Appellee Odom. Stephen S. Dobson, III, and Richard H. Smith of Dobson, Davis & Smith, Tallahassee, for Appellee Sansom. PER CURIAM. Citing in its notice of appeal to section 924.07, Florida Statutes (2009), as its jurisdictional authority for doing so, the state appeals the lower tribunal's "Order on Motions to Dismiss" in two related criminal proceedings....

...lsifying the Appropriations Act, and the perjury charge *1268 against defendant Richburg [1] are hereby granted. In all other respects, the motions are denied. In support of their motions to dismiss the state's appeals, appellees argue that although section 924.07(1)(a) and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(A) contain identical language authorizing the state to appeal from orders "dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof," the indictments here have not been dismissed nor has any count of those indictments been dismissed....

...Moreover, the same court subsequently relied on this reasoning in another case to conclude that the state could likewise appeal an order that reduced charges post-trial, but the Supreme Court reversed in Exposito v. State, 891 So.2d 525 (Fla.2004), holding that section 924.07(1) does not grant the state the right to appeal from an order that "effectively" dismisses an information that is "in legal effect a judgment of acquittal." Id....

cross appeal an illegal sentence pursuant to section 924.-07(l)(e), Florida Statutes, the instant sentence

appeal granted to the State by statute. See Section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1977). The occasions upon

...State, Fla.1971, 251 So.2d 866 . Such conclusion, however, overlooks several important factors. Carroll established that the time within which trial of the accused was to have commenced was not tolled since the state took an appeal under Fla.Stat. 924.07, F.S....

PER CURIAM. Dismissed. See § 924.07(l)(e), Fla....

...Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Barbara J. Wolfe, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Dismissed. See § 924.07(1)(e), Fla....

...State, 452 So.2d 955 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). If the trial court does impose a sentence which, when coupled with the six sentences we affirm today, results in a total sentence outside the recommended guidelines, either party may appeal after resentencing. § 924.-06(l)(e) and § 924.07(9), Fla.Stat....

...in a criminal case must be ‘expressly conferred by statute.’” Exposito v. State, 891 So. 2d 525, 527 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Ramos v. State, 505 So. 2d 418, 421 (Fla. 1987)). The State’s statutory authority to appeal is set forth in sections 924.07 and 924.071, Florida Statutes (2016). State v. McMahon, 94 So. 3d 468, 472 (Fla. 2012); see Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(c) (listing the same types of orders the State may appeal in a criminal case). The only mention of “judgment of acquittal” in the two statutes is subsection 924.07(1)(j), which provides that “[t]he state may appeal from . . . [a] ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict.” § 924.07(1)(j); see also Fla....

.... . granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict.”) 3  The State’s right to appeal is limited, both in the statute and the rule, to post- verdict judgments of acquittal. § 924.07(1)(j); Fla....

...prohibitions against placing a defendant in double jeopardy.” State v. Stone, 42 So. 3d 279, 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). The trial court order granting Lundy’s renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal is not an order that the State may appeal. Section 924.07(1)(j) provides that the State may appeal a judgment of acquittal only “after a jury verdict.” In Lundy’s case, however, the trial court’s ruling came after the jury was deadlocked; no verdict had been rendered. See State v. Fudge, 645 So. 2d 23, 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (“[B]ecause the jury deadlocked, there was no verdict . . . [and] [t]hus, no appeal is authorized by section 924.07(1) [sic].”); see also Hudson v. State, 711 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (“[Section 924.07(1)(j)] plainly contemplates appeal from a judgment of acquittal only if the judgment of acquittal follows a guilty verdict.”). The State responds to these authorities by arguing that the trial court’s order was, in substance, an order granting a motion to dismiss, which is appealable under section 924.07(1)(a)....

...as an order granting a motion for a judgment of acquittal prior to a jury verdict—a non-appealable order. A trial court order granting a “motion for judgment of acquittal before a jury verdict is not one that the state may appeal under section 924.07.” Stone, 42 So. 3d at 284-85....

PER CURIAM. The State appeals Appellee’s downward departure sentences. We have jurisdiction. § 924.07(1)®, Fla....

State from an order granting a new trial. See § 924.-07(2) Fla.Stat., F.S.A. But no provision is made

simply is not “ripe” for review at this point. Section 924.07(8) provides, that the state may appeal once

...herefore required to sentence the defendant to a minimum term of three years incarceration and a minimum fine in the amount of $50,000. Accordingly, we reverse. This court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal by the state from an illegal sentence. See § 924.07(1)(e), Fla....

appeal. One of the state’s arguments is that section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1981),2 provid*1275ing for

by statute rather’ than by the constitution. Section 924.07(1), Florida Statutes (1981), provides in pertinent

...harges if the dismissal were reversed, such as in cases involving the so-called “single transaction rule.” Item (E) refers to the popularly known “speedy trial rule,” and items (F), (G), and (H) track the balance of state appellate rights in section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...companion case of State v. Creighton, 469 So.2d 735 (Fla.1985), have found it lacking in legal merit. The state also argues that it may appeal the orders in question pursuant to the statutes providing for appellate review in criminal eases! Sections 924.07 and 924.071, Florida Statutes (1981), provide as follows: 924.07 Appeal by state — The state may appeal from: (1) An order dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof; (2) An order granting a new trial; (3) An order arresting judgment; (4) A ruling on a question of law when the defendant...

...one appeal under this subsection in any case. Such appeal shall embody all assignments of error in each pretrial order that the state seeks to have reviewed. The state shall pay all costs of such appeal except for the defendant’s attorney’s fee. 924.071 Additional grounds for appeal by the state; time for taking; stay of cause.— -, (1) The state may appeal from a pretrial order dismissing a search warrant, suppressing evidence obtained by search and seizure, or suppressing a confession *146 or admission made by a defendant....

...The first trial of the defendants resulted in a mistrial. The second trial resulted in a verdict of guilty. The court granted defendants’ motion for a new trial on the ground that the assistant county solicitor had committed reversible error in his summation to the jury. As authorized by F.S.A. § 924.07(2) the state appealed the order granting a new trial....

...1 In contrast, an order granting a Rule 3.800(c) motion that reduces a sentence imposed pursuant to a negotiated plea constitutes an appealable order. As this Court concluded in State v. Jordan, 783 So. 2d 1179, 1181 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), the State, pursuant to section 924.07, Florida Statutes, is authorized “to appeal two types of sentences: 1) a sentence that is illegal, and 2) a sentence imposed ‘below the lowest permissible sentence established by the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921.’” A reduced sentence granted by a trial court which constitutes a downward departure sentence is appealable by the State under section 924.07(1)(a), Florida Statutes....

HUBBART, Judge. This is an appeal by the state from an order of the trial court dismissing one count of an information in a criminal prosecution. We have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal, § 924.07(1), Fla.Stat....

...in felony cases in certain circumstances and provides that the withholding of adjudication in violation of the statute is subject to appellate review under chapter 924. See § 775.08435(1), (3), Fla. Stat. (2004). Chapter 2004-60, section 2, amended section 924.07, Florida Statutes, to add an “order withholding adjudication of guilt in violation of s. 775.0843” to the list of orders the State may appeal. See § 924.07(l)(m), Fla. Stat. (2004). With minor modifications consistent with section 924.07(l)(m), we adopt proposed new subdivision (c)(l)(L) to provide for a State appeal of an order “withholding adjudication of guilt in violation of general law.” Current subdivisions (c)(l)(L), (c)(l)(M), (c)(l)(N), and (c)(l)(0) are relet-tered as indicated in the appendix to this opinion....

...harges if the dismissal were reversed, such as in cases involving the so-called “single transaction rule.” Item (E) refers to the popularly known.“speedy trial rule,” and items (F), (G), and (H) track the balance of state appellate rights in section 924.07, Florida Statutes (1975)....

PER CURIAM. Upon consideration, the court has determined that the order being appealed is not an order appealable by the state. See § 924.07, Fla....

defendant then voluntarily dismissed his appeal. Section 924.07, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Appellate

REED, Chief Judge. Under F.S., § 924.07(1), F.S.A., 1971, the state appeals from an order dismissing

...The state appealed the trial court’s decision to this court, but the court issued an order directing the state to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In response, the state argued that the appeal is authorized by section 924.07(1)(k), Florida Statutes (2000), which provides that the state may appeal from “an order denying restitution under section 775.089 .” Counsel for the child contends that section 924.07(1)(k) applies only to appeals in adult criminal cases and that there is no comparable provision in Chapter 985 that would authorize an appeal from a restitution order in a juvenile case....

...Because the Florida Constitution does not afford the state a right to appeal, the state can appeal a final order in a criminal case or a juvenile delinquency proceeding only if there is a statute authorizing the appeal. The state contends that the appeal is authorized by section 924.071(1)(k), but this statute applies exclusively to appeals in adult criminal cases....

...The supreme court applied the rule in Creighton and other cases holding that the state’s right to appeal is purely statutory, and ultimately concluded that the state’s appeal was correctly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Following the decision McLeod, the Legislature enacted section 924.071(1)(k), Florida Statutes, which authorizes the state to appeal an order denying restitution....

...nces which are individually less than the LPS and for which a basis for departure has not been established. See § 921.002(1)(h) ("A sentence may be appealed on the basis that it departs from the [CPC] only if the sentence is below the [LPS] ...."), § 924.07(1)(i), Fla....

...appealing additional-offense sentences which are individually less than the LPS and for which a basis for departure has not been established. See § 921.002(1)(h) ("A sentence may be appealed on the basis that it departs from the [CPC] only if the sentence is below the [LPS] . . . ."), § 924.07(1)(i), Fla....

...In that case, the petitioner sought to obtain his-release from the custody of the Sheriff of Duval County in habeas corpus proceedings, and an order requiring his release was entered by the lower court. On appeal to this court by the State, as authorized by Section 924.07(6), Fla.Stat.1953, F.S.A., it was held that the appeal was not timely filed because not filed within twenty days *331 of the date of the order appealed from, as required by Section 924.10, Fla.Stat.1953, F.S.A....

...s, as provided in this section, it shall state on the record in detail the reasons therefor. Appellee contends, as a preliminary matter, that the State has not preserved this argument. Accordingly, we must first address the question of preservation. Section 924.07(l)(k), Florida Statutes, expressly authorizes a state appeal from an order denying restitution under section 775.089....

must wonder about the necessity of including Section 924.07(6), Florida Statutes (1981) as a basis for

...As an expert it comes well within the qualifications of this witness to state, from his personal observation and from the testimony adduced, that the house was used as a lottery check-up point. We find no error in such testimony. On the cross-appeal, taken under section 924.07(4), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the state has attacked an instruction given by the trial court....