Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 921.161 (2025)

Sentence not to run until imposed; credit for county jail time after sentence; certificate of custodian of jail.

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921.161 Sentence not to run until imposed; credit for county jail time after sentence; certificate of custodian of jail.—

(1) A sentence of imprisonment shall not begin to run before the date it is imposed, but the court imposing a sentence shall allow a defendant credit for all of the time she or he spent in the county jail before sentence. The credit must be for a specified period of time and shall be provided for in the sentence.

(2) In addition to other credits, a person sentenced to imprisonment in custody of the Department of Corrections shall receive credit on her or his sentence for all time spent between sentencing and being placed in custody of the department. When delivering a prisoner to the department, the custodian of the local jail shall certify to it in writing:

(a) The date the sentence was imposed and the date the prisoner was delivered to the department.

(b) The dates of any periods after sentence the prisoner was at liberty on bond.

(d) The offender-based transaction system number or numbers from the uniform arrest report or reports established pursuant to s. 943.05(2).

The certificate shall be prima facie evidence of the facts certified.

History.—s. 1, ch. 63-457; ss. 19, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 125, ch. 70-339; s. 1, ch. 70-441; s. 1, ch. 73-71; s. 14, ch. 77-120; s. 25, ch. 79-3; s. 13, ch. 86-187; s. 1544, ch. 97-102; s. 3, ch. 2000-179.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 500 cases (11 in the last 5 years), 1964–2026 · leading case: Kronz v. State, 462 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1985).

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Kronz v. State, 462 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1985). · cites it 11× “161(2), Fla. Stat. (1969). Clearly, the incarceration referred to in that statute could have been only in a Florida county jail.”

Johnson v. State, 60 So. 3d 1045 (Fla. 2011). · cites it 5× “800(a), Johnson and Joyner claimed — notwithstanding the terms of their plea agreements — that they were entitled to relief because section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (2006), created a statutory right to credit for time served while awaiting sentencing and they did not receive…”

Tal-Mason v. State, 515 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1987). · cites it 11× “4th DCA 1986), which expressly declared valid section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (1985).”

State v. Cregan, 908 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 2005). · cites it 7× “Fraser involved the following certified question: "When the trial court sentences a defendant to a period of time under the Department of Corrections, pursuant to a violation of community control, can he be given credit for time served on community control under section 921.161,…”

Gethers v. State, 798 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). · cites it 7× “We doubt that the legislature wrote section 921.161 to reward recidivism. Nothing in Daniels compels a different interpretation of the statute.”

State v. Mancino, 714 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1998). · cites it 4× “800 since section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (1995) affirmatively mandates that no sentence may be imposed without crediting a defendant with jail time already served.”

United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992). · cites it 2× “See Fla. Stat. § 921.161 (1991) ("A sentence of imprisonment shall not begin to run before the date it is imposed, but the court imposing a sentence shall allow a defendant credit for all of the time he spent in the county jail before sentence.”

Ransone v. State, 48 So. 3d 692 (Fla. 2010). · cites it 5× “ANALYSIS Section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (2004), sets forth the parameters for how the running of a sentence is calculated, including how pre-sentence jail-time credit is awarded.”

Martin v. State, 525 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). · cites it 11× “By motion, the appellant claimed before the trial court that while she was given proper credit for time served as to one of her convictions, such credit should have been applied equally as to each of her concurrent sentences.”

ILKHANI v. Lamberti, 50 So. 3d 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). · cites it 15× “Appellant, Michael Ilkhani, appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition for writ of mandamus in which he sought an order requiring the Broward Sheriffs Office (BSO) to prepare a Sheriffs Certificate pursuant to section 921.161, Florida Statutes, following his release…”

Green v. State, 450 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). · cites it 10× “Nothing in section 921.161, Florida Statutes (1981), requires, or even suggests, this construction.”

Cordova v. State, 855 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). · cites it 11× “See § 921.161(1), Fla. Stat. (2001). Regarding the question of credit for time served subsequent to sentencing, we affirm the order without prejudice to the defendant to exhaust his administrative remedies within the Department of Corrections.”

Show all 500 citing cases →

— 921.161(1) — 356 cases

Johnson v. State, 60 So. 3d 1045 (Fla. 2011). “800(a), Johnson and Joyner claimed — notwithstanding the terms of their plea agreements — that they were entitled to relief because section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (2006), created a statutory right to credit for time served while awaiting sentencing and they did not receive…”

Tal-Mason v. State, 515 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1987). “4th DCA 1986), which expressly declared valid section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (1985).”

Kronz v. State, 462 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1985). “161(2), Fla. Stat. (1969). Clearly, the incarceration referred to in that statute could have been only in a Florida county jail.”

State v. Mancino, 714 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1998). “800 since section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (1995) affirmatively mandates that no sentence may be imposed without crediting a defendant with jail time already served.”

Gethers v. State, 798 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). “We doubt that the legislature wrote section 921.161 to reward recidivism. Nothing in Daniels compels a different interpretation of the statute.”

— 921.161(2) — 29 cases

Cordova v. State, 855 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). “See § 921.161(1), Fla. Stat. (2001). Regarding the question of credit for time served subsequent to sentencing, we affirm the order without prejudice to the defendant to exhaust his administrative remedies within the Department of Corrections.”

Kronz v. State, 462 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1985). “161(2), Fla. Stat. (1969). Clearly, the incarceration referred to in that statute could have been only in a Florida county jail.”

Reynolds v. State, 590 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

Brown v. State, 427 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).

ILKHANI v. Lamberti, 50 So. 3d 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). “Appellant, Michael Ilkhani, appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition for writ of mandamus in which he sought an order requiring the Broward Sheriffs Office (BSO) to prepare a Sheriffs Certificate pursuant to section 921.161, Florida Statutes, following his release…”

— 921.161(2)(a) — 1 case

Grant v. State, 837 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

— 921.161(2)(b) — 2 cases

— 921.161(4) — 1 case

Martin v. State, 525 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). “By motion, the appellant claimed before the trial court that while she was given proper credit for time served as to one of her convictions, such credit should have been applied equally as to each of her concurrent sentences.”

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