Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...ence on account of his penalty phase testimony, as such reduction or suspension requires substantial assistance in the “identification, arrest, or conviction” of an accomplice—none of which would be a result of his penalty phase testimony. § 921.186, Fla....

...2007), Santisteban v. State, 72 So. 3d 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), and Ritter v. State, 885 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), on a question of law. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), (4), Fla. Const. Because we conclude that orders denying relief under section 921.186, Florida Statutes (2010), the substantial assistance statute, are appealable, we quash the decision below, and we disapprove Cooper. FACTS In September 2008, Darrick McFadden was convict...

...causing great bodily harm or death in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Lee County. For these crimes, McFadden received a fifty-five-year prison sentence.1 In October 2011, the State moved to reduce or suspend McFadden’s sentence pursuant to section 921.186.2 The State explained that it sought McFadden’s assistance in its prosecution of codefendant Carlos McSwain....

...been able to obtain McSwain’s plea and would have had no alternative but to enter a nolle prosequi order. 1. The trial court’s judgment was per curiam affirmed on direct appeal. See McFadden v. State, 17 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (table). 2. Section 921.186 affords the trial court discretion to reduce or suspend a sentence if it finds that the defendant rendered substantial assistance. -2-  The trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s motion to reduce or suspend....

...There’s no question but for him we could not have acquired and achieved the plea that we got. Thus, the State recommended that McFadden’s sentence “be reduced or suspended, completely within your discretion as to the amount, if any.” The trial court expressed concerns pertaining to section 921.186: What are the ramifications of approving things like this? ... Has anyone attacked that statute yet? ... Shouldn’t it be attacked? ... [Y]ou know you’ve always be...

...suspend a defendant’s sentence falls squarely within the discretion of the trial court, see Cooper, 106 So. 3d at 32, we nonetheless hold that we have jurisdiction to review a trial court’s order denying a motion filed pursuant to section 921.186 where the defendant alleges, as McFadden has here, that the trial court misapplied the statute. McFadden, 130 So....

...3d at 698 (citing United States v. Manella, 86 F.3d 201, 203 (11th Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, the district court certified conflict with the First District’s decision in Cooper “[t]o the extent that [the decision] holds that an order denying a motion filed pursuant to section 921.186 is never appealable.” Id. 5....

...prison with credit for time served. -6-  ANALYSIS The question presented is whether a trial court’s denial of a motion to reduce or suspend a sentence filed pursuant to section 921.186, Florida Statutes, is appealable. Because this is a pure question of law, this Court’s review is de novo. Keck v. Eminisor, 104 So. 3d 359, 366 (Fla. 2012). Section 921.186, titled “Substantial assistance,” which became effective on July 1, 2010, provides as follows: Notwithstanding any other law, the state attorney may move the sentencing court to reduce or suspend the sentence...

...any such motion. Upon good cause shown, the motion may be filed and heard in camera. The judge hearing the motion may reduce or suspend the sentence if the judge finds that the defendant rendered such substantial assistance. § 921.186, Fla....

...” Robbins v. Cipes, 181 So. 2d 521, 522 (Fla. 1966) (footnote omitted). A criminal defendant may appeal “orders entered after final judgment.” See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(1)(D). We conclude that an order denying a motion filed under section 921.186 is an appealable final order pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(1)(D)....

...1998) (agreeing that an order withholding adjudication of guilt without placing the defendant on probation is appealable). Accordingly, we quash the Second District’s decision in McFadden, which conditions jurisdiction on -8- whether the defendant claims a misapplication of section 921.186. 130 So. 3d at 698. We also disapprove the First District’s decision in Cooper, which held that orders denying motions filed under section 921.186 are not appealable. 106 So. 3d at 32. Having concluded that McFadden was authorized to appeal the trial court’s ruling under section 921.186, we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to reduce or suspend McFadden’s sentence. “Discretion is abused only when the trial court’s decision is ‘arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.’ ” Gonzalez v....

...law and the prosecutor’s choice to utilize the law, and that the court improperly considered McFadden’s exercise of his right to trial as a factor. The record clearly demonstrates that McFadden provided substantial assistance under section 921.186, as it relates to codefendant McSwain’s plea. Faced with “very unusual and unique difficulties” in the case against McSwain, the State would have had to nolle prosse the charges absent McFadden’s agreement to cooperate, be deposed, and be ready to testify against McSwain. McFadden’s substantial assistance caused McSwain to plead no contest to two manslaughter counts for which he was sentenced to ten years in prison. However, this does not -9- end the analysis as section 921.186 does not mandate the trial court to reduce or suspend a sentence upon a showing of substantial assistance. See § 921.186, Fla. Stat....

...substantial assistance was given by McFadden, speculated that McSwain may withdraw his plea in the future, and noted that McFadden did not provide substantial assistance in the past. Moreover, the trial court was unnecessarily hostile to the enactment of section 921.186, even so far as suggesting, “Shouldn’t it be attacked?” CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we quash the Second District Court’s decision in McFadden, and we disapprove the First District Court’s decision in Cooper....

BLACK, Judge. Darrick L. McFadden appeals the trial court’s order denying the State’s motion filed pursuant to section 921.186, Florida Statutes (2010), to reduce or suspend his sentence for providing substantial assistance....

...We affirm the trial court’s order without comment. In so affirming, however, we certify conflict with the First District’s opinion in Cooper v. State, 106 So.3d 32, 32 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), which holds “that orders denying motions filed pursuant to section 921.186, Florida Statutes, are not appealable.” McFadden argues on appeal that the trial court erred because it based the denial upon the consideration of improper factors....

...Though we agree with the First District that the decision to reduce or suspend a defendant’s sentence falls squarely within the discretion of the trial court, see Cooper, 106 So.3d at 32 , we nonetheless hold that we have jurisdiction to review a trial court’s order denying a motion filed pursuant to section 921.186 where the defendant alleges, as McFadden has here, that the trial court misapplied the statute....

...generally will not lie,” the appellate court’s exercise of jurisdiction to review the order is proper where the defendant has alleged a misapplication of the law). To the extent that Cooper holds that an order denying a motion filed pursuant to section 921.186 is never appealable, we certify conflict....

PER CURIAM. The appellant appeals the denial of a motion to reduce or suspend sentence filed pursuant to section 921.186, Florida Statutes (2010). The state moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order is not appealable. 1 We agree and dismiss the case. Section 921.186, Florida Statutes (2010), reads: Notwithstanding any other law, the state attorney may move the sentencing court to reduce or suspend the sentence of any person who is convicted of violating any felony offense and who provides substan...

...Upon good cause shown, the motion may be filed and heard in camera. The judge hearing the motion may reduce or suspend the sentence if the judge finds that the defendant rendered such substantial assistance, (emphasis added). An order on a motion filed pursuant to section 921.186 is similar to an order entered on a motion to reduce sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c), in that the decision to reduce or suspend is addressed to the discretion of the trial court....

...1st DCA 1990) (holding that, because a motion to reduce sentence was addressed to the discretion of the trial court, “this court ... has no jurisdiction to review the correctness of the trial court’s disposition of the motion”). Accordingly, we hold that orders denying motions filed pursuant to section 921.186, Florida Statutes, are not appealable....

...State, 177 So. 3d 562 (Fla. 2015), is persuasive on this point. In that case, the criminal defendant, McFadden, appealed from the trial court’s denial of his motion to reduce or suspend his sentence under Florida’s “substantial assistance” statute. § 921.186, Fla. Stat. (2010) (“The judge hearing the motion may reduce or suspend the sentence if the judge finds that the defendant rendered such substantial assistance.”). Our supreme court concluded that “an order denying a motion filed under section 921.186 is an appealable final order pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(1)(D).” 3 McFadden, 177 So....