Florida Statutes
Fla. Stat. § 933.09 (2025)
Officer may break open door, etc., to execute warrant.
✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session
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933.09 Officer may break open door, etc., to execute warrant.—The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of the officer’s authority and purpose he or she is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 86
cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1946–2026 · leading case: State v. Bamber, 630 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1994).
State v. Bamber, 630 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1994). “ The officer may break open any outer door, inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after due notice of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance to said house or access to anything therein.”
Kellom v. State, 849 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). “Appellant contends that the officers who executed the search warrant violated the "knock and announce" rule codified in section 933.09, Florida Statutes (2000). We agree and, therefore, reverse and remand with directions that appellant be discharged.”
State v. Robinson, 565 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). “§ 933.09, Fla. Stat. (1987). We affirm the order but certify to the Florida Supreme Court the question of the necessity to exclude this evidence.”
Richardson v. State, 787 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). “Richardson appeals the denial of his dispositive motion to suppress arguing that law enforcement officers failed to comply with section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1999), the "knock and announce" rule, by failing to wait a reasonable amount of time before forcibly entering his…”
State v. Pruitt, 967 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). “Pruitt filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search on the basis that the forced entry violated Florida's knock-and-announce statute, section 933.09, Florida Statutes (2003). The trial court agreed, holding that the twelve-second delay between the knock and…”
Berryman v. State, 368 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). “The second point raises the alleged violation of Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1977), by the police officer in serving the search warrant.”
State v. Manning, 396 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). “In view of the finding, the trial court held that the officers had failed to comply with Section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1977). [1] The State submits that the officers scrupulously observed the procedures enumerated in Section 933.”
State v. Attaway, 870 P.2d 103 (N.M. 1994). “§ 25-129(g) (1991) (searches for alcohol), § 33-565(g) (1993) (searches for narcotics); Fla.Stat. § 933.09 (1991); Ga.Code Ann. § 17-5-27 (Harrison 1990); Haw.”
Carter v. State, 173 So. 3d 1048 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). “See § 933.09, Fla. Stat.; see also Soto v. State, 75 So.”
Wilson v. State, 673 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “" § 933.09, Fla.Stat. (1989). But before forcing entry he is obliged to give notice of his authority, make demand for entry, and be refused, except in "an emergency that meets certain narrowly prescribed conditions.”
State v. Bamber, 592 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). “See § 933.09, Fla. Stat. (1989); Benefield v.”
Hernandez v. State, 863 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). “Hernandez argues that the police violated the Florida and Federal Constitutions and section 933.09, Florida Statutes (1999). We find no error in the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress.”
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