Section applies to law enforcement officers.

- Hameen v. State, 246 Ga. App. 599, 541 S.E.2d 668 (2000).

This principle of law has been applied to municipal ordinances. City Council v. Crump, 251 Ga. 594, 308 S.E.2d 180 (1983).

Ignorance of law no excuse for granting relief against consequences of voluntary actions.

- Mere ignorance of law on the part of one who, with full knowledge of all the facts, voluntarily takes steps with regard thereto which operates to one's prejudice, affords no ground for granting one relief against the consequences of one's own folly, though one may in good faith have labored under a misapprehension as to the legal effect of the course one elected to pursue. Atlanta Trust & Banking Co. v. Nelms, 116 Ga. 915, 43 S.E. 380 (1903).

Where a plea amounts to nothing but ignorance of the law, the plea is bad. Jenkins v. German Lutheran Congregation, 58 Ga. 125 (1877).

Ignorance of the law does not commend a suitor in equity, especially where an injunction is sought. Moore v. City of Atlanta, 70 Ga. 611 (1883).

Failure to comprehend the legal effect of making an admission in judicio, in a motion for new trial or in the alternative motion to amend judgment, of the fact that the probate court entered a judgment styled "final order" provided no excuse for the maker, since ignorance of the law excuses no one. Jabaley v. Jabaley, 208 Ga. App. 179, 430 S.E.2d 119 (1993).

Ignorance of glazing requirements.

- Fact that landlord was unaware that state law required safety glazing materials in doors under O.C.G.A. § 8-2-91 is no defense under O.C.G.A.1-3-6. Cornell v. Camellia Corp., 248 Ga. 449, 283 S.E.2d 264 (1981), appeal dismissed, 456 U.S. 901, 102 S. Ct. 1744, 72 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1982).

Defendant not relieved of criminal intent if intended to do prohibited act.

- The fact that the defendant was ignorant of the fact that the defendant was violating the law would not relieve the defendant of criminal intent if the defendant intended to do the act which the General Assembly prohibited (carrying on a "clearinghouse" for the hazarding of money). Wilson v. State, 57 Ga. App. 839, 197 S.E. 48 (1938).

Amendment pleading Act approved after suit instituted.

- Generally, laws take effect from the date of their enactment and ignorance of the law is no excuse; thus, the contention of the petitioners that they were surprised by an amendment pleading an Act approved after the suit was instituted is without merit, and the trial judge did not abuse the judge's discretion in refusing to continue the case to the next term. Crawford v. Irwin, 211 Ga. 241, 85 S.E.2d 8 (1954).

Ignorance of ordinance limiting authority of city attorneys.

- A public sector attorney's authority, like that of any other public officer, is defined and prescribed by law, including municipal ordinances; thus, a city and police officers who had entered a settlement agreement executed by city attorneys on their behalf were not estopped from challenging the agreement on the basis that a city ordinance restricted the apparent authority of the attorneys to execute the agreement, even though the ordinance was not specifically communicated to the opposing party. City of Atlanta v. Black, 265 Ga. 425, 457 S.E.2d 551 (1995).

Cited in Fulenwider v. Forrester, 64 Ga. App. 756, 14 S.E.2d 173 (1941); Cole v. Holland, 219 Ga. 227, 132 S.E.2d 657 (1963); Dyson v. Dixon, 219 Ga. 427, 134 S.E.2d 1 (1963); McRae v. State, 116 Ga. App. 407, 157 S.E.2d 646 (1967); A.M. Kidder & Co. v. Clement A. Evans & Co., 117 Ga. App. 346, 160 S.E.2d 869 (1968); Jones v. Caldwell, 230 Ga. 775, 199 S.E.2d 248 (1973); Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co. v. Central Rigging & Contracting Corp., 684 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1982); Jenga v. State, 166 Ga. App. 36, 303 S.E.2d 170 (1983); North Fulton Community Hosp. v. State Health Planning & Dev. Agency, 168 Ga. App. 801, 310 S.E.2d 764 (1983); Hale v. State, 188 Ga. App. 524, 373 S.E.2d 250 (1988); Davenport v. Nance, 194 Ga. App. 313, 390 S.E.2d 281 (1990); Harris v. Boyd, 193 Ga. App. 467, 388 S.E.2d 60 (1989); Georgia Subsequent Injury Trust Fund v. ITT-Rayonier, Inc., 198 Ga. App. 467, 402 S.E.2d 54 (1991); Nix v. Long Mtn. Resources, Inc., 262 Ga. 506, 422 S.E.2d 195 (1992); Windermere v. Bettes, 211 Ga. App. 177, 438 S.E.2d 406 (1993); Black v. City of Atlanta, 61 F.3d 27 (11th Cir. 1995); Grisson v. State, 237 Ga. App. 559, 515 S.E.2d 857 (1999); Henry v. State, 295 Ga. App. 758, 673 S.E.2d 120 (2009); Ga. State Licensing Bd. for Residential & Gen. Contrs. v. Allen, 286 Ga. 811, 692 S.E.2d 343 (2010); Mecca Constr., Inc. v. Maestro Invs., LLC, 320 Ga. App. 34, 739 S.E.2d 51 (2013).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, § 143 et seq. 27A Am. Jur. 2d, Equity, §§ 68, 69. 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 222. 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, § 875.

C.J.S.

- 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, §§ 94, 95. 82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 313.

ALR.

- Ignorance of legal right to avoid contract or conveyance made during infancy as affecting ratification thereof upon attaining majority, 5 A.L.R. 137.

Unconstitutionality of later statute as affecting provision purporting specifically to repeal earlier statute, 102 A.L.R. 802.

Misrepresentation as to tax law as within rule that party to contract or other instrument may not rely upon misrepresentations as to matters of law, 153 A.L.R. 538.

What law, in point of time, governs as to inheritance from or through adoptive parent, 18 A.L.R.2d 960.

Retrospective effect of statute prescribing grounds of divorce, 23 A.L.R.3d 626.