Disclosure of identifying information of persons and entitites involved in executions.

- Georgia Supreme Court held that it is was not unconstitutional for the State of Georgia to maintain the confidentiality of the names and other identifying information of the persons and entities involved in executions, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-5-36(d), including those who manufacture the drug or drugs to be used. Owens v. Hill, 295 Ga. 302, 758 S.E.2d 794 (2014).

Trial judge can exercise the jurisdiction vested in the judge under this section in vacation. Mallory v. Chapman, 158 Ga. 228, 122 S.E. 884, 34 A.L.R. 310 (1924).

Effect of involuntary absence of defendant.

- Order of a trial judge fixing a new date for execution of sentence, after the original date has passed, is not void because the defendant is involuntarily absent and has not waived or authorized anyone else to waive the defendant's right to be present at the time and place of resentencing, and the passage of such order is not violative of the defendant's rights under the several provisions of the state and federal Constitutions. McBurnett v. Balkcom, 207 Ga. 452, 62 S.E.2d 180 (1950).

Absence of defendant when new date set does not violate due process.

- Although it was necessary for the defendant to have been present in court when the original sentence of execution was pronounced, as well as during other proceedings throughout the trial, in the absence of waiver, no violation of the due process clause of U.S. Const., amend. 14 appears, when the attack is not on the original sentence, but merely on an order fixing a new date of execution, entered in the defendant's absence, which order became necessary after the date fixed in the original sentence had passed because supersedeas pending the determination of a writ of error, since setting a new date of execution is not a new sentence of the defendant, as to which the judge has no discretion, but merely setting the time. Fowler v. Grimes, 198 Ga. 84, 31 S.E.2d 174, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 784, 65 S. Ct. 266, 89 L. Ed. 626 (1944).

Setting of new date when sheriff has allowed date for execution to elapse.

- Prisoner who has been convicted and sentenced to be executed will not be discharged on habeas corpus because the sheriff permitted the date assigned for the execution to elapse; instead a new date will be assigned. Mallory v. Chapman, 158 Ga. 228, 122 S.E. 884, 34 A.L.R. 310 (1924).

Cited in Williams v. State, 187 Ga. 415, 1 S.E.2d 27 (1939); Smith v. Henderson, 190 Ga. 886, 10 S.E.2d 921 (1940); Parks v. State, 206 Ga. 675, 58 S.E.2d 142 (1950); McLendon v. Balkcom, 207 Ga. 100, 60 S.E.2d 753 (1950).

Authority to transport defendant for physical examination.

- Person in the custody of the sheriff, who has not actually been transported to the penitentiary and delivered to the director, remains with the superior court, and the Board of Pardons and Paroles or the State Board of Corrections (now Board of Offender Rehabilitation) would have no jurisdiction, authority, or power to pass any order directing such a person to be transported to another place for physical examination. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 434.

Custody of Department of Offender Rehabilitation.

- Once the Department of Offender Rehabilitation has obtained custody of a prisoner whose execution date has been stayed and no new execution date has been set, it remains until execution and so long as the sentence is valid. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-188.

Requirements for order establishing new execution date.

- To constitute a facially valid order establishing a new execution date for a condemned person where the original execution date has passed, the order must establish a new execution date within limits set forth in O.C.G.A. § 17-10-40. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-105.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, §§ 747, 748 750.

ALR.

- Effect of permitting day fixed for execution to pass without carrying out sentence, 34 A.L.R. 314.

Voluntary absence when sentence is pronounced, 59 A.L.R.5th 135.