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2018 Georgia Code 19-11-72 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 19-11-72 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 19-11-72

TITLE 19 DOMESTIC RELATIONS

Section 11. Enforcement of Duty of Support, 19-11-1 through 19-11-191.

ARTICLE 2 UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT

19-11-72. Jurisdiction in other proceedings not conferred.

Participation in any proceedings under this article shall not confer upon any court jurisdiction of any of the parties thereto in any other proceeding.

(Ga. L. 1958, p. 34, § 27.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Immunity of petitioner from respondent's state court claim.

- Statute does not provide the petitioner with blanket immunity from jurisdictional exercise by respondent state's court. Balasco v. County of San Diego, 140 Ga. App. 482, 231 S.E.2d 485 (1976).

O.C.G.A. § 19-11-72 provides a nonresident petitioner immunity from the jurisdiction of the responding state's courts if the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-11-40 et seq., procedures have been invoked for its legitimate ends - the enforcement of the duties of support. Earley v. Earley, 165 Ga. App. 483, 300 S.E.2d 814 (1983).

When there was no evidence that a nonresident former husband had initiated a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support, O.C.G.A. § 19-11-40 et seq., proceeding for an illegitimate end, he was immune under O.C.G.A. § 19-11-72 from personal jurisdiction in an action by his former wife to domesticate a Virginia divorce decree and have him held in contempt for nonpayment of support. Riersgard v. Morton, 267 Ga. 451, 479 S.E.2d 748 (1997).

Enforcement only of obligations under valid court order.

- There is no authorization for the provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-11-40 et seq., to be used to force respondent to meet obligation other than under terms of valid court order. Balasco v. County of San Diego, 140 Ga. App. 482, 231 S.E.2d 485 (1976).

Counterclaims precluded.

- Statute precludes counterclaim based on theory that the plaintiff, by initiating the proceeding, submits to jurisdiction generally. Thibadeau v. Thibadeau, 133 Ga. App. 154, 210 S.E.2d 340 (1974); Register v. Kandlbinder, 134 Ga. App. 754, 216 S.E.2d 647 (1975).

O.C.G.A. § 19-11-72 precludes counterclaims based merely on the theory that the plaintiff, by initiating the procedure on behalf of the named defendants, has submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of the responding state for other purposes. Earley v. Earley, 165 Ga. App. 483, 300 S.E.2d 814 (1983).

Proceedings as constituting tort upon respondent.

- "Proceedings" are not "proceedings" under the statute when the proceedings constitute a tort upon a resident respondent. Balasco v. County of San Diego, 140 Ga. App. 482, 231 S.E.2d 485 (1976).

When institution of proceedings under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-11-40 et seq.) results in implication of a tort upon the respondent, jurisdiction is not merely ancillary to the petitioner's initiation of proceedings under those provisions, but rather would be based upon the commission of a tortious act in this state. Balasco v. County of San Diego, 140 Ga. App. 482, 231 S.E.2d 485 (1976).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

C.J.S.

- 6 C.J.S., Appearances, § 46. 21 C.J.S., Courts, §§ 91, 108. 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child, § 204 et seq.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (1958 Act) (U.L.A.) § 31.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 19-11-72

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Riersgard v. Morton, 267 Ga. 451 (Ga. 1997).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 21, 1997 | 479 S.E.2d 748, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 204

...was later transferred to Georgia, the court denied the motion and refused to set aside the judgment. In so doing, the court concluded that Riersgard “did not invoke the URESA procedure toward a legitimate end and is therefore not immune under OCGA § 19-11-72 from the exercise of jurisdiction by this court.”1 *452We granted Riersgard’s application for a discretionary appeal posing the question of whether the trial court erred when it found that Riersgard was subject to in personam jurisdiction in Georgia....
...rt case only if the nonresident once resided in Georgia. Since it is uncontroverted that Riersgard has never lived in Georgia, jurisdiction must fail. Smith v. Smith, 254 Ga. 450 (330 SE2d 706) (1985). 2. Riersgard argues that the provision in OCGA § 19-11-72, conferring immunity from jurisdiction, applies in this case because he did not institute the URESA procedure toward an illegitimate end....
...d been paying support. Subsequently, the County filed another URESA complaint containing the same allegations as in the first suit. The respondent filed a counterclaim alleging malicious use of process, and the County asserted immunity based on OCGA § 19-11-72....
...ong-arm statute, OCGA § 9-10-91 (2). The Court of Appeals reasoned that [t]here must be some balancing between a petitioner’s right to proceed against a record respondent without a concomitant submission to the forum’s jurisdiction under [OCGA § 19-11-72] and a respondent’s freedom from judicial harassment by a nonresident’s abuse of provisions of URESA....
...In fact, the URESA court did not find anything other than conflicting evidence and did not place blame on either party. Because the record does not support a finding that Riersgard initiated the URESA proceeding for an illegitimate end, Riersgard is immune from jurisdiction under OCGA § 19-11-72. 3....
...en who live in Georgia, and wrote letters to the URESA court judge, he has purposefully availed himself of the laws of Georgia and could reasonably expect to be haled into a Georgia court. Since we have held that Riersgard has immunity based on OCGA § 19-11-72 with regard to the URESA action, we only need to consider whether Riersgard’s phone calls and letters subject him to personal jurisdiction in this state. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred solely from the use of interstate communications...
...of the nonresident’s state. 4. Riersgard was not subject to in personam jurisdiction in Georgia. It follows that the trial court erred in denying Riersgard’s motion to set aside the judgment. Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur. OCGA § 19-11-72 reads: “Participation in any proceedings under this article shall not confer upon any court jurisdiction of any of the parties thereto in any other proceeding.”