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2018 Georgia Code 19-3-6 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 19-3-6 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 19-3-6

TITLE 19 DOMESTIC RELATIONS

Section 3. Marriage Generally, 19-3-1 through 19-3-68.

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

19-3-6. Effect of restraints on marriage; when valid.

Marriage is encouraged by the law. Every effort to restrain or discourage marriage by contract, condition, limitation, or otherwise shall be invalid and void, provided that prohibitions against marriage to a particular person or persons or before a certain reasonable age or other prudential provisions looking only to the interest of the person to be benefited and not in general restraint of marriage will be allowed and held valid.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 1652; Code 1868, § 1696; Code 1873, § 1697; Code 1882, § 1697; Civil Code 1895, § 2410; Civil Code 1910, § 2929; Code 1933, § 53-107.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

It is public policy of this state to maintain family relation and to permit the settlement of matrimonial differences for that purpose. Evans v. Hartley, 57 Ga. App. 598, 196 S.E. 273 (1938); McClain v. McClain, 237 Ga. 80, 227 S.E.2d 5 (1976).

Termination of alimony in event of remarriage.

- Provision for permanent alimony which provided that in the event the wife should obtain a divorce and should marry again, or should marry again in the event of the death of her husband, the alimony should terminate was not violative of law and contrary to public policy in that it was in restraint of marriage. Watson v. Burnley, 150 Ga. 460, 104 S.E. 220 (1920).

Agreement incorporated into a divorce decree providing for termination of the former wife's equity in real property upon her remarriage does not act as a restraint on marriage. Gordin v. Gordin, 249 Ga. 371, 290 S.E.2d 921 (1982).

Fact that a termination-upon- remarriage provision in a final judgment and decree originated in the jury's verdict rather than from an agreement of the parties is a distinction without legal significance. A trial court does not err by allowing the jury to return the verdict including the termination provision, or in entering judgment on the verdict. Gordin v. Gordin, 249 Ga. 371, 290 S.E.2d 921 (1982).

When agreement to divorce held void.

- Any agreement between husband and wife, prior to a separation, that they will live separate and apart, or that either or both will obtain a divorce, and any agreement to otherwise promote a dissolution of the marriage relation, is against public policy and void, and consideration founded thereon is illegal, but a contract between husband and wife, providing for the wife's maintenance, made after a separation has taken place, is valid and enforceable. Craig v. Craig, 53 Ga. App. 632, 186 S.E. 755 (1936).

Contract for attorney's fee void when contingent on procuring divorce.

- Contract for the payment of a fee to an attorney contingent upon the attorney procuring a divorce for the attorney's client or contingent in amount upon the amount of alimony to be obtained is void as against public policy. Evans v. Hartley, 57 Ga. App. 598, 196 S.E. 273 (1938).

Contract for attorney's fee void when fee to be paid from alimony recovered.

- Contract by wife to pay her solicitors part of alimony to be recovered by her in a suit for divorce, as compensation for their services in such suit, is void as against public policy. Evans v. Hartley, 57 Ga. App. 598, 196 S.E. 273 (1938).

Attorney may recover reasonable value of services when contract void.

- When an attorney's contract for compensation for services rendered a married woman was void as against public policy, the attorney could recover what the attorney's services were reasonably worth. Evans v. Hartley, 57 Ga. App. 598, 196 S.E. 273 (1938).

Foreign judgment given full faith though based on separation agreement void in this state.

- Although a North Carolina judgment which was incorporated into a Georgia divorce decree on the issues of alimony, child support, and custody was based on a separation contract which included a provision not to contest a later divorce which contract was clearly void as against the public policy of this state, the North Carolina alimony judgment was entitled to full faith and credit and the trial court did not err in incorporating it in the divorce decree. Cannon v. Cannon, 244 Ga. 299, 260 S.E.2d 19 (1979).

Apprenticeship of female not void when she becomes 18 as being in restraint of marriage. Dent v. Cock, 65 Ga. 400 (1880).

Employment contract not void when restraint on marriage reasonable.

- Employment contract which provided that a woman employee was to be employed as a teacher only so long as she did not marry was not void because the contract provision was a reasonable one and the restraint on marriage was incidental to the primary lawful purpose of the contract. Huiet v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 70 Ga. App. 233, 28 S.E.2d 83 (1943).

Limitation of appointment to such time as executrix remains widow is not void as an illegal restraint against marriage. Bruce v. Fogarty, 53 Ga. App. 443, 186 S.E. 463 (1936).

Provision in will prohibiting share in estate if daughter married designated individual was not "in terrorem" but was specific valid restraint not tending to discourage marriage. Taylor v. Rapp, 217 Ga. 654, 124 S.E.2d 271 (1962).

Statute has nothing to do with adoption standards.

- Public policy of the state as enunciated by the General Assembly is to consider the best interest of the child when determining whether he or she should be adopted, O.C.G.A. § 19-8-18(b); in stating that marriage is encouraged, O.C.G.A. § 19-3-6 forbids most efforts to restrain or discourage marriage by contract, condition, limitation, or otherwise, and § 19-3-6 has nothing to do with the standards the courts must apply in determining whether to allow a child to be adopted. In re Goudeau, 305 Ga. App. 718, 700 S.E.2d 688 (2010).

Meretricious relationship defense did not apply to a promise to marry.

- Because the object of a promise to marry was not illegal or against public policy, O.C.G.A. § 19-3-6, the fact that a man and woman were living together before and after a marriage proposal was only collateral to the promise to marry, and the meretricious relationship defense provided by O.C.G.A. § 13-8-1 was inapplicable to the promise to marry. Kelley v. Cooper, 325 Ga. App. 145, 751 S.E.2d 889 (2013).

Cited in Graham v. McRae, 147 Ga. 49, 92 S.E. 871 (1917); Sims v. Sims, 245 Ga. 680, 266 S.E.2d 493 (1980); Daniel v. Daniel, 250 Ga. 849, 301 S.E.2d 643 (1983).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 52 Am. Jur. 2d, Marriage, § 114 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 17A C.J.S., Contracts, §§ 245, 246.

ALR.

- Conditions, conditional limitations, or contracts in restraint of marriage, 122 A.L.R. 7.

What constitutes contract between husband or wife and third person promotive of divorce or separation, 93 A.L.R.3d 523.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 19-3-6

Total Results: 3  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 265 Ga. 161 (Ga. 1995).

Cited 27 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 14, 1995 | 454 S.E.2d 517

...age. Compare Grovenstein v. Effingham County, 262 Ga. 45, 47 (1) (414 SE2d 207) (1992). That general law provides that "[m]arriage is encouraged by the law. Every effort to restrain or discourage marriage . . . shall be invalid and void. . . ." OCGA § 19-3-6....
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Dove v. Dove, 680 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. 2009).

Cited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 15, 2009 | 285 Ga. 647, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 2276

...SEARS, Chief Justice. We granted appellant Paul Dove's application for interlocutory appeal to consider whether the trial court erred by ruling that the parties' prenuptial agreement was unenforceable because it was required to be attested by two witnesses under OCGA § 19-3-63 but was not....
...Lauri Dove has filed a cross-appeal, contending that the trial court erred in ruling that the prenuptial agreement satisfied the criteria of Scherer v. Scherer . [1] For the reasons that follow, we conclude the trial court erred in ruling that OCGA § 19-3-63 applies to the prenuptial agreement but did not err in ruling that Scherer was satisfied. Case No. S09A0197 1. OCGA § 19-3-63 provides, in relevant part, that "[e]very marriage contract in writing, made in contemplation of marriage ......
...uable consideration. [14] Prenuptial agreements settling property rights at death have uniformly been considered to be in contemplation of marriage and have uniformly been considered valid in this State and elsewhere. [15] 4. The predecessor to OCGA § 19-3-63 was first enacted in 1863. Since then, it has been brought forward in identical language into the Codes of 1868, 1873, 1882, 1895, 1910, 1933, and 1981. When it first enacted the predecessor to OCGA § 19-3-63 in 1863 and when it brought it forward into each succeeding Code, the legislature did so based on case law approving of prenuptial agreements transferring property at death on the ground such agreements were in contemplation of marriage....
...ce and thus void. [17] Because our legislature is presumed to enact statutes with full knowledge of existing law, including court decisions, [18] it defies common sense and logic to conclude that, when the legislature enacted the predecessor to OCGA § 19-3-63 in 1863 and brought it forward into each succeeding Code, it intended it to apply to void prenuptial agreements....
...[21] In Scherer, in deciding the circumstances under which prenuptial agreements made in contemplation of divorce would not violate the public policy of this State, this Court did not specify that it was necessary for such agreements to comply with OCGA § 19-3-63 in order to comply with public policy. Thus, this Court must have considered and rejected the proposition that such a prerequisite existed. Moreover, although the dissent states that we have explicitly acknowledged that the applicability of OCGA § 19-3-63 to prenuptial agreements settling alimony is an open question, this is not accurate. In Scherer, instead of specifying that prenuptial agreements had to comply with OCGA § 19-3-63 to be valid, we specified that courts should employ three definitive criteria in making this determination....
...Since Scherer, we have stated that "[t]he three-part test we adopted in Scherer is consistent with the standards governing the enforcement of antenuptial agreements that prevail throughout most of the nation today." [23] In Chubbuck, although we noted that the issue whether OCGA § 19-3-63 applied to prenuptial agreements settling alimony was raised before the trial court, [24] we also stated in Chubbuck that "[w]e have been unable to find a case in which an antenuptial agreement made in contemplation of divorce has been rul...
...d demonstrates that this Court has viewed these criteria as exhaustive. [26] To hold such agreements void now unless attested by two witnesses would do a disservice to the bench and bar and to the litigants involved. Furthermore, a holding that OCGA § 19-3-63 applies to prenuptial agreements settling alimony would put this State in the distinct minority of states that require witnesses to prenuptial agreements settling alimony issues....
...ot added one. [28] Moreover, it appears that most other states have adopted a test similar to the one we adopted in Scherer for determining the validity of such agreements. [29] 6. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in ruling that OCGA § 19-3-63 applies to prenuptial agreements settling alimony....
...is state's longstanding statutory mandate that all prenuptial agreements be attested in writing by at least two witnesses. The majority defends its creation of that special status by making a disingenuous semantical argument, by misinterpreting OCGA § 19-3-63 as inflexibly applying only *844 to agreements settling property rights at death, by completely disregarding the clear intent of Scherer v....
...635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982), to limit the enforceability of modern prenuptial agreements more strictly than other marriage contracts, and by inexplicably relying on a modern uniform act which the General Assembly of Georgia has not seen fit to pass. 1. "OCGA § 19-3-63 states that `(e)very marriage contract in writing, made in contemplation of marriage, ......
...plation of divorce." Accordingly, prenuptial agreements settling the parties' rights in the event of a divorce clearly come within the plain terms of a statute which expressly applies to contracts made "in contemplation of marriage." 2. Neither OCGA § 19-3-63 nor any other section of Article 3, OCGA § 19-3-60 et seq., limits its application to marriage contracts which involve a transfer of property....
...To the contrary, we have held that a prenuptial agreement which waives each spouse's rights in the other's property either before or after death and which does not contemplate a conveyance of property is an enforceable marriage contract pursuant to OCGA § 19-3-62(b)....
...eements "are not absolutely void as against public policy," but "should not be given carte-blanche enforcement." Scherer v. Scherer, supra at 640(2), 641(3), 292 S.E.2d 662. Of particular interest, the first part of the Scherer test, similar to OCGA § 19-3-63, seeks to prevent fraud or duress in the execution of prenuptial agreements....
...Furthermore, we have continued to "recognize[] the importance of marriage as a social institution and the vital public policy interests that can be undermined by antenuptial agreements. [Cits.]" Blige v. Blige, 283 Ga. 65, 67(2), 656 S.E.2d 822 (2008). See also OCGA § 19-3-6 ("Marriage is encouraged by the law....
...In light of that continuing public policy and my understanding of marriage contracts as expressed in this state's statutory and case law, I can only conclude that a prenuptial agreement which waives spousal rights upon divorce constitutes a marriage contract subject to the provisions of Article 3, including OCGA § 19-3-63....
...uptial agreements settling alimony issues would do a disservice to the bench and bar, who have supposedly viewed the Scherer criteria as exhaustive, fails to recognize explicit acknowledgments by both the bench and bar that the applicability of OCGA § 19-3-63 was an open question....
...a subject of the appeal. We granted an interlocutory appeal here in order to resolve the very issue which was left open in Chubbuck. Moreover, the majority's holding causes substantial confusion by raising additional questions, such as whether OCGA § 19-3-63 applies to prenuptial agreements which deal with both divorce and death, or which define each spouse's marital and separate property rights during marriage. The antenuptial agreement here was signed by the parties and one witness—the notary public.... Because two witnesses did not sign the antenuptial agreement here, on its face it does not satisfy the plain requirement of [OCGA § 19-3-63], and it is invalid and unenforceable....
...[15] 1 Clark at 48, 53; Sieg 265 Ga. at 385-386, 455 S.E.2d 830; Carr, 250 Ga. at 107, n. 1, 296 S.E.2d 560; Nally, 74 Ga. 669 (1885); Neves, 50 U.S. at 207; Vason, 53 Ga. at 423-425; Merritt, 6 Ga. at 573. [16] Brown v. Ransey, 74 Ga. 210, 215 (1885) (noting that then OCGA § 19-3-63 was enacted based on Blake v....
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Daniel v. Daniel, 301 S.E.2d 643 (Ga. 1983).

Cited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 19, 1983 | 250 Ga. 849

...uld violate public policy. After hearing argument of counsel, the trial court ruled that the waiver was enforceable. We agree. Relying on OCGA § 1-3-7 (Code Ann. § 102-106), the husband contends that enforcement of the waiver would contravene OCGA § 19-3-6 (Code Ann....