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2018 Georgia Code 3-2-2 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 3 ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES

Section 2. State Administration and Enforcement, 3-2-1 through 3-2-36.

ARTICLE 1 ADMINISTRATION

3-2-2. Promulgation of rules and regulations generally; forms.

  1. The commissioner may make and publish in print or electronically reasonable rules and regulations not inconsistent with this title or other laws or the Constitution of this state or of the United States for the enforcement of this title and the collection of revenues under this title.
  2. The commissioner shall prescribe the forms which he deems necessary in order to administer and enforce this title.
  3. The authority granted to the commissioner pursuant to this Code section shall be exercised at all times in conformity with Chapter 13 of Title 50, the "Georgia Administrative Procedure Act."
  4. This Code section shall apply with respect to all rules and regulations promulgated by the commissioner pursuant to this title.

(Code 1933, § 5A-302, enacted by Ga. L. 1980, p. 1573, § 1; Ga. L. 2010, p. 838, § 10/SB 388.)

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, annotations decided under from Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Law reviews.

- For article suggesting the inclusion of alcoholic beverage regulation under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, in order to satisfy due process and equal protection requirements, see 1 Ga. St. B.J. 269 (1965).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

- The Twenty-First Amendment removes spirituous liquors and alcohol from the protection of the commerce clause to the extent necessary to allow states to adopt and enforce appropriate laws and regulations dealing with the subject, and thus to burden interstate commerce to this extent. Even in absence of any protection under the Twenty-First Amendment, the sovereign states in the exercise of their reserve police power may, without offending the commerce clause, adopt and enforce necessary laws and regulations to effectuate their own protection against illegal traffic and trade in liquors. Atkins v. Manning, 206 Ga. 219, 56 S.E.2d 260 (1949) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).

Jurisdiction to determine constitutionality of rules.

- Rules of the commissioner promulgated under authority of subsection (h) of Code 1933, § 58-1022 (see now O.C.G.A. § 3-2-2), to control distilled spirits and alcohol are not laws of this state within the meaning of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. V, Sec. III, Para. IV (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. V, Sec. III, Para. II), so as to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction to determine their constitutionality. Brosnan v. Undercofler, 220 Ga. 239, 138 S.E.2d 314 (1964) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).

Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103 makes the commissioner the administrator of the law and empowers the commissioner to promulgate rules to effectuate its administration and enforcement. Atkins v. Manning, 206 Ga. 219, 56 S.E.2d 260 (1949) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).

Rules within legislative authorization.

- Rules relating to transportation of distilled spirits and alcohol, and requiring that shipment thereof from another state through any part of this state to destination in another state must be by common carrier only, accompanied by invoice or bill of lading showing that shipment is made by shipper duly licensed and authorized, and that shipment is made to one licensed and authorized to receive such shipment, and further providing that any violation is misdemeanor, in view of the provisions of law and its expressed purpose to control all traffic or trade in liquor therein defined, come clearly within permissible legislative authorization. Atkins v. Manning, 206 Ga. 219, 56 S.E.2d 260 (1949) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).

Regulations to be in accord with law.

- There can be no rules and regulations made by commissioner, a violation of which would result in seizure, condemnation, and sale of vehicle being used by owner thereof in alleged violation of such rules, where these rules and regulations, made by commissioner, are not in harmony or in accord with the law. State v. Schafer, 82 Ga. App. 753, 62 S.E.2d 446 (1950) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).

Law permitted the state revenue department to promulgate reasonable rules and regulations not inconsistent with the title under which the law fell or other laws, and the regulations challenged by the two associations were not invalid on the ground that the regulations were unauthorized since the regulations governing distribution of malt beverages in Georgia that were challenged were all authorized generally by O.C.G.A. § 3-2-2(a). Ga. Oilmen's Ass'n v. Ga. Dep't of Revenue, 261 Ga. App. 393, 582 S.E.2d 549 (2003).

Violation of administrative rule of commissioner may result in suspension or cancellation of license of offending party or parties, but such rules do not make illegal an act or contract not also prohibited by statute. Gaddy v. Silverman, 86 Ga. App. 239, 71 S.E.2d 277 (1952) (decided under former Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Advertising, § 15. 45 Am. Jur. 2d, Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 1, 2, 22 et seq., 114 seq., 236, 254, 265, 297, 378, 383, 384, 508.

Cases Citing Georgia Code 3-2-2 From Courtlistener.com

Total Results: 20

Garrison v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2024-08-13

Citation: 905 S.E.2d 629, 319 Ga. 711

Snippet: commence, while OCGA §§ 17-3-2, 17-3-2.1, and 17-3-2.2 specify periods that are excluded from the various

Rivera v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2023-10-11

Citation: 317 Ga. 398

Snippet: exception in OCGA § 17-3-2 (2)5 or the DNA exception in OCGA § 5 OCGA § 17-3-2 (2) provides that “[t]he

Jones v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2022-11-02

Citation: 880 S.E.2d 509, 315 Ga. 117

Snippet: 31, 2012, the crime was unknown. See OCGA § 17-3-2 (2) (“The period within which a prosecution must

Sims v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2021-08-24

Citation: 862 S.E.2d 534, 312 Ga. 322

Snippet: 21 OCGA § 17-3-2 (2). He also correctly notes that where the State

Stubbs v. Hall

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2020-03-13

Citation: 840 S.E.2d 407, 308 Ga. 354

Snippet: of property of the ward or beneficiary”); § 17-3-2.2 (providing that “if the victim is a person who

Lewis v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-08-05

Citation: 306 Ga. 455

Snippet: identity was unknown until April 2008. See OCGA § 17-3-2 (2) (a statute of limitations is tolled during any

Lewis v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-08-05

Citation: 831 S.E.2d 771

Snippet: identity was unknown until April 2008. See OCGA § 17-3-2 (2) (a statute of limitations is tolled during any

Jackson v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-06-24

Citation: 306 Ga. 266

Snippet: of Georgia until June 20, 2011.” See OCGA § 17-3-2 (2).4 The gravamen of Jackson’s 4 “The period

Taylor v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-06-24

Citation: 306 Ga. 277

Snippet: not known until April 14, 2013. See OCGA § 17-3-2 (2). Appellant never asserted a statute of limitation

Jackson v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-06-24

Citation: 830 S.E.2d 99, 306 Ga. 266

Snippet: of Georgia until June 20, 2011." See OCGA § 17-3-2 (2).4 The gravamen of Jackson's argument is that,

Taylor v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-06-24

Citation: 830 S.E.2d 90, 306 Ga. 277

Snippet: was not known until April 14, 2013. See OCGA § 17-3-2 (2). Appellant never asserted a statute of limitation

Swanson v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-06-10

Citation: 306 Ga. 153

Snippet: defense of habitation. See OCGA § 16-3-23 (1), (3).2 2 Citing Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291, 297 (687

Riley v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-02-18

Citation: 305 Ga. 163

Snippet: limitation on his non-murder charges under OCGA § 17-3-2 (2). Because we determine that the trial court did

Riley v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2019-02-18

Citation: 824 S.E.2d 249, 305 Ga. 163

Snippet: limitation on his non-murder charges under OCGA § 17-3-2 (2). Because we determine that the trial court did

Stephens v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2018-04-16

Citation: 303 Ga. 530

Snippet: counts other than that one. See id. at 214 (3).2 2. As to Count 1 (felony murder predicated on

Gomillion v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-02-22

Citation: 298 Ga. 505, 783 S.E.2d 103, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 166

Snippet: Bryant’s reason for leaving. See former OCGA § 24-3-2 2 (providing that, “[w]hen, in a legal investigation

State v. Outen

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-10-20

Citation: 296 Ga. 40, 764 S.E.2d 848, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 812

Snippet: commence, while OCGA §§ 17-3-2, 17-3-2.1, and 17-3-2.2 specify periods that are excluded from the various

Harper v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2013-02-18

Citation: 292 Ga. 557, 738 S.E.2d 584, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 299, 2013 WL 593494, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 145

Snippet: OCGA § 17-3-2 (2).5 “The knowledge component of th[e] exception [found in OCGA § 17-3-2 (2)] has been

Higgenbottom v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2011-11-29

Citation: 719 S.E.2d 482, 290 Ga. 198, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 3859, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 944

Snippet: such motions on the basis urged. Under OCGA § 17-3-2(2),[4] the applicable statute of limitation is tolled

Render v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2011-01-10

Citation: 704 S.E.2d 767, 288 Ga. 420, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 61, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 9

Snippet: of the *771 shooting, as permitted by OCGA § 24-3-2.[2] It is true that the exception under OCGA § 24-3-2