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Call Now: 904-383-7448If the center receives notice of the filing of an indictment subsequent to the restriction of a record pursuant to this division, the center shall make such record available in accordance with Code Section 35-3-34 or 35-3-35. If the center does not receive notice of a charging instrument within 30 days of the applicable time periods set forth in this division, such record shall be restricted by the center for noncriminal justice purposes and shall be considered sealed.
The center does not receive notice from the arresting law enforcement agency that the offense has been referred to the prosecuting attorney or transferred to another law enforcement or prosecutorial agency of this state, any other state or a foreign nation, or any political subdivision thereof for prosecution and the following period of time has elapsed from the date of the arrest of such individual:
If the offense is a misdemeanor or a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature, two years;
If the offense is a felony, other than a serious violent felony or a felony sexual offense specified in Code Section 17-3-2.1 involving a victim under 16 years of age, four years; or
If the offense is a serious violent felony or a felony sexual offense specified in Code Section 17-3-2.1 involving a victim under 16 years of age, seven years.
The case was referred to the prosecuting attorney but was later dismissed;
The grand jury returned two no bills; or
The grand jury returned one no bill and the applicable time period set forth in division (ii) of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph has expired; and
After indictment or accusation:
Except as provided in subsection (i) of this Code section, all charges were dismissed or nolle prossed;
The individual was sentenced in accordance with the provisions of subsection (a) or (c) of Code Section 16-13-2, and the individual successfully completed the terms and conditions of his or her probation;
The individual pleaded guilty to or was found guilty of a violation of paragraph (2) or (3) of subsection (a) of Code Section 3-3-23 and was sentenced in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c) of Code Section 3-3-23.1, and the individual successfully completed the terms and conditions of his or her probation;
The individual successfully completed a drug court treatment program, mental health treatment program, or veterans treatment program, the individual's case has been dismissed or nolle prossed, and he or she has not been arrested during such program, excluding any arrest for a nonserious traffic offense; or
The individual was acquitted of all of the charges by a judge or jury unless, within ten days of the verdict, the prosecuting attorney demonstrates to the trial court through clear and convincing evidence that the harm otherwise resulting to the individual is clearly outweighed by the public interest in the criminal history record information being publicly available because either:
The prosecuting attorney was barred from introducing material evidence against the individual on legal grounds, including, without limitation, the granting of a motion to suppress or motion in limine; or
The individual has been formally charged with the same or similar offense within the previous five years.
After the filing of an indictment or accusation, an individual's criminal history record information shall not be restricted if:
(Code 1981, §35-3-37, enacted by Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 6-2/HB 1176; Ga. L. 2013, p. 222, § 14/HB 349; Ga. L. 2014, p. 79, § 3/SB 320; Ga. L. 2014, p. 404, § 2-2/SB 382; Ga. L. 2016, p. 443, § 6B-7/SB 367; Ga. L. 2018, p. 550, § 2-8/SB 407.)
The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, in paragraph (j)(1), substituted the present provisions of the first sentence for the former provisions, which read: "When an individual had felony charges dismissed or nolle prossed or was found not guilty of felony charges but was convicted of a misdemeanor offense or offenses arising out of the same underlying transaction or occurrence, such individual may petition the superior court in the county where the arrest occurred to restrict access to criminal history record information for such felony charges within four years of the arrest.", and, near the end of the last sentence, substituted "that the misdemeanor conviction was not a lesser included offense of the felony charge and that the harm otherwise resulting to the individual clearly outweighs the public interest in the criminal history record information being publicly available" for "the charges in question did not arise out of the same underlying transaction or occurrence"; in paragraph (n)(1), substituted "Except as provided in subsection (j) of this Code section, as" for "As" at the beginning of the first sentence; in paragraph (n)(2), in the second sentence, substituted "the request meets the criteria set forth in subsection (h) of this Code section for" for "he or she agrees to", and added the third and fourth sentences; in paragraph (n)(3), substituted the present provisions of the third sentence for the former provisions, which read: "A decision of the prosecuting attorney shall not be upheld if it is determined by clear and convincing evidence that the harm otherwise resulting to the privacy of the individual clearly outweighs the public interest in the criminal history record information being publicly available"; and, in paragraph (n)(4), substituted "of receiving" for "from receiving" in the last sentence. See Editor's notes for applicability.
The 2014 amendments. The first 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, added present paragraph (a)(9); redesignated former paragraph (a)(9) as present paragraph (a)(10); and, near the middle of subparagraph (h)(2)(C), substituted a comma for "or" following "drug court treatment program" and inserted "or veterans treatment program,". The second 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, substituted "shoplifting or refund fraud in violation of Code Section 16-8-14 or 16-8-14.1, as applicable" for "shoplifting in violation of Code Section 16-8-14" in division (j)(4)(B)(xi).
The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, at the end of paragraph (a)(6), added "or to governmental agencies or licensing and regulating agencies pursuant to Code Section 35-3-35"; rewrote subsection (h); and substituted the present provisions of paragraph (j)(5) for the former provisions, which read: "Any party may file an appeal of an order entered pursuant to this subsection as provided in Code Section 5-6-34.".
The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, inserted "court in which he or she was accused or convicted, as applicable, or, if such charge was dismissed, the" in the middle of the first sentence of paragraph (j)(1); substituted "petition the court in which he or she was convicted" for "petition the superior court in the county where the conviction occurred" near the end of the first sentence of paragraph (j)(2); and substituted "petition the court in which" for "petition the superior court in the county where" in the middle of the first sentence of paragraph (j)(3) and near the end of the first sentence of subparagraph (j)(4)(A).
- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2012, a period was added at the end of paragraph (j)(3).
- Ga. L. 1995, p. 139, § 7, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that no local ordinance which was in effect on March 22, 1995, shall be affected by Code Section 16-11-184 until January 1, 1996, at which time, unless enacted subsequent to March 22, 1995, as provided by that Code section, any such ordinance shall be of no further force or effect, and further provides that no ordinance or regulation attempting to regulate firearms in any manner shall be enacted by any county, city, or municipality after July 1, 1995.
Ga. L. 1995, p. 139, § 8, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that subsection (f) of this Code section shall be repealed automatically upon a final judicial determination that such Act is invalid for any reason.
Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 16, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment to this Code section is applicable with respect to notices delivered on or after July 1, 2000.
Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 6-2/HB 1176, effective July 1, 2013, repealed the former Code section and enacted the current Code section. The former Code section was based on Ga. L. 1973, p. 1301, § 6; Ga. L. 1995, p. 139, § 4; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1345, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 3; Ga. L. 2012, p. 775, § 35/HB 942.
Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 9-1/HB 1176, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that Part VI of this Act, which amended this Code section, shall become fully effective on July 1, 2013; provided, however, that for the purpose of preparing for implementation of Part VI of this Act, said part shall become effective on July 1, 2012.
Ga. L. 2013, p. 222, § 21/HB 349, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2013, and shall apply to offenses which occur on or after that date. Any offense occurring before July 1, 2013, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense."
Ga. L. 2014, p. 79, § 1/SB 320, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "The General Assembly recognizes that veterans have provided and continue to provide an invaluable service to our country and this state. In connection with a veteran's service, some servicemen and servicewomen have incurred physical, emotional, or mental impairments which cause or contribute to behaviors that may draw a veteran into the criminal justice system. The General Assembly has determined that having dedicated veterans court divisions is important to address the specialized treatment needs of veterans and that there are resources, services, and treatment options that are unique to veterans that may best facilitate a veteran's reentry into society."
Ga. L. 2014, p. 404, § 3-1/SB 382, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2014, and shall apply to all conduct occurring on or after such date."
- For article on the 2012 enactment of this Code section, see 29 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 290 (2012). For article, "Appeal and Error: Appeal or Certiorari by State in Criminal Cases," see 30 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 17 (2013). For annual survey on criminal law, see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 37 (2014). For article on the 2016 amendment of this Code section, see 33 Georgia St. U.L. Rev. 139 (2016). For note, "Give It to Me, I'm Worth It: The Need to Amend Georgia's Record Restriction Statute to Provide Ex-Offenders with a Second Chance in the Employment Sector," see 52 Ga. L. Rev. 267 (2017).
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code Section 35-3-37, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.
- Recent amendments to Georgia's criminal history record information statute, O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37, are to be applied to information regarding arrests occurring prior to the amendments' effective date as the statute itself made clear that the statute does apply to information regarding arrests pre-dating the amendments, and such application presents no constitutional problem. Mosley v. Lowe, 298 Ga. 363, 782 S.E.2d 43 (2016).
County erred and should have granted the defendant's request to have the defendant's arrest record restricted pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(h) because it was undisputed that the 1996 assault charge against the defendant was nolle prossed and, as such, that disposition did not fall within any of the exceptions enumerated in subsection (i)(1) of the statute and the defendant was eligible for record restriction under the current statute. Mosley v. Lowe, 298 Ga. 363, 782 S.E.2d 43 (2016).
- When "criminal history record information" has been incorporated by a law-enforcement agency into an investigatory case file, it should be open for public inspection unless its disclosure would constitute an invasion of privacy. Napper v. Georgia Television Co., 257 Ga. 156, 356 S.E.2d 640 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).
Hearing was mandatory under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(c). Strohecker v. Gwinnett County Police Dep't, 182 Ga. App. 853, 357 S.E.2d 305 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).
- Petitioner was not entitled to modification or expungement of criminal record to reflect entry of nolle prosequi on certain charges. Drake v. State, 170 Ga. App. 846, 318 S.E.2d 721 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).
- Because the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(m)(2) applied to arrests that pre-dated July 1, 2013, the trial court should have considered the merits of the defendant's motion to seal the clerk's records, and the order denying the defendant's motion to seal the clerk of court's records was vacated. Woodhouse v. State, 336 Ga. App. 880, 785 S.E.2d 429 (2016).
- Trial court erred in dismissing an indictee's appeal from the sheriff's office's refusal to expunge the indictee's record without determining whether the charges had been nolle prossed for a reason set forth in former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(d)(7)(A) through (G). If the charges had not been nolle prossed for one of these reasons, the refusal to expunge could not be affirmed. Grimes v. Catoosa County Sheriff's Office, 307 Ga. App. 481, 705 S.E.2d 670 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).
- Former defendant's petition under O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(j)(2) to expunge the defendant's record was denied; because the defendant had been tried twice already, and the child molestation victim and similar crimes witnesses did not wish to go through a third trial, the prosecutor decided not to press the charges after a reversal for ineffective assistance of counsel. Gibbs v. Bright, 330 Ga. App. 851, 769 S.E.2d 590 (2015).
Because imposition of a sentence upon a plea of nolo contendere was not a dismissal or a nolle prosse, O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(h)(2)(A), providing for restriction of access to certain criminal history records, did not apply to an applicant's plea of nolo contendre to theft by taking; and the applicant's civil rights claim was barred by the statute of limitations, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Nasir v. Gwinnett County State Court, 341 Ga. App. 63, 798 S.E.2d 695 (2017).
- Appeal of a superior court decision reviewing a decision of an agency denying a request to expunge criminal records requires the discretionary appeal procedures of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35. Strohecker v. Gwinnett County Police Dep't, 182 Ga. App. 853, 357 S.E.2d 305 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).
- By the former statute's express provisions, an appeal from the denial of a request to expunge a criminal record under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(d)(6) was as provided in O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19. In such case, the review should be conducted by the court without a jury and should be confined to the record. Grimes v. Catoosa County Sheriff's Office, 307 Ga. App. 481, 705 S.E.2d 670 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).
- Because an appeal of the denial of a motion to seal a criminal record under O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(m) failed to present a viable challenge to the statute's constitutionality, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. II(1), because the challenge (a separation of powers argument, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III, based on the Supreme Court's record-keeping authority under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IX, Para. I, and Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 21.4) was not raised below, jurisdiction was properly before the Court of Appeals, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(12). Doe v. State, 303 Ga. 237, 811 S.E.2d 413 (2018).
- If a criminal record is inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading, a superior court has three available remedies - expungement, modification, or supplementation - so long as the court finds the remedy to be "required by law" and "appropriate." Meinken v. Burgess, 262 Ga. 863, 426 S.E.2d 876 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).
- Expungement should be reserved for exceptional cases based upon competing state and citizen interests, and the fact that the defendant's arrest record did not reflect that the defendant was acquitted by operation of law did not constitute an exceptional circumstance warranting the remedy of expungement instead of modification or supplement. Meinken v. Burgess, 262 Ga. 863, 426 S.E.2d 876 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).
Cited in Sosniak v. State, 292 Ga. 35, 734 S.E.2d 362 (2012).
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Ga. L. 1973, p. 1301, § 6 and former Code Section 35-3-37, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.
- Since information supplied by the Georgia Crime Information Center to local law enforcement agencies may often contain nonconviction data, such as arrests resulting in acquittals, dismissals, or arrests resulting in no prosecutions, such material is of a sensitive nature and disclosure would be an unwarranted invasion of privacy of a citizen. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U81-47 (decided under former Ga. L. 1973, p. 1301, § 6).
Information obtained pursuant to criminal history background check, required by O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129, from taking of fingerprints and checking of these fingerprints with those presently on file with the Georgia Crime Information Center is of a confidential nature and prohibited from public disclosure. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. Op. No. U81-47 (decided under former Ga. L. 1973, p. 1301, § 6).
- Georgia Crime Information Center is permitted to allow private researchers access to criminal history record information and to impose such conditions on that access as the center deems appropriate. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-78 (decided under former Ga. L. 1973, p. 1301, § 6).
- Only superior court judges may order criminal history records to be expunged or otherwise modified, and then only after strict compliance with the procedure set forth in former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(c). 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 89-60 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).
- City of Atlanta Solicitor's office does not have the authority to approve the expungement by an original agency of a criminal arrest record involving a felony or misdemeanor state offense which is dismissed in municipal court and for which no indictment or accusation has been drawn. 1998 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U98-11 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).
Only basis upon which Georgia Crime Information Center shall expunge a record is upon clear finding by court that said record is inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading, and setting forth the factual basis for such finding. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-8 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).
- Center should purge the center's records only when the records are inaccurate. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-110 (decided under former Ga. L. 1973, p. 1301, § 6).
- 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Records and Recording Laws, § 2.
- 76 C.J.S., Records, §§ 76, 82 et seq., 116, 126, 130, 131, 152.
- Judicial expunction of criminal record of convicted adult, 11 A.L.R.4th 956.
Judicial expunction of criminal record of convicted adult in absence of authorizing statute, 68 A.L.R.6th 1.
Judicial expunction of criminal record of convicted adult under statute - General principles, and expunction of criminal records under statutes providing for such relief where criminal proceeding is terminated in favor of defendant, upon completion of probation, upon suspended sentence, and where expungement relief predicated upon type, and number, of offenses, 69 A.L.R.6th 1.
Judicial expunction of criminal record of convicted adult under statute - Expunction under statutes addressing "first offenders" and "innocent persons," where conviction was for minor drug or other offense, where indictment has not been presented against accused or accused has been released from custody, and where court considered impact of nolle prosequi, partial dismissal, pardon, rehabilitation, and lesser-included offenses, 70 A.L.R.6th 1.
Expunction of federal arrest records in absence of conviction, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 652.
Effect of expungement of conviction on § 241(a)(4), (11) of Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 USC § 1251(a)(4), (11)), making aliens deportable for crimes involving moral turpitude or drugs, 98 A.L.R. Fed. 750.
Total Results: 10
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2025-02-18
Citation: 912 S.E.2d 593, 321 Ga. 35
Snippet: traffic offense as defined in Code Section 35-3-37, the Department of Community Supervision shall
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2022-09-20
Citation: 878 S.E.2d 481, 314 Ga. 823
Snippet: judgments or orders entered pursuant to Code Section 35-3-37”); Ga. L. 2007, p. 555, § 2 (adding paragraph (a)
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2021-06-18
Citation: 860 S.E.2d 419, 311 Ga. 739
Snippet: access to his criminal history record. See OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (3). This statute allows criminal history to
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2018-03-05
Snippet: pursuant to OCGA § 35-3-37 (m)1, which appeal was 1 OCGA § 35-3-37 (m) provides:
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2018-03-05
Citation: 811 S.E.2d 413
Snippet: records of a criminal case pursuant to OCGA § 35-3-37 (m)1 , which appeal was originally filed in the
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-03-25
Citation: 298 Ga. 770, 784 S.E.2d 775
Snippet: judgments or orders entered pursuant to Code Section 35-3-37. 4 It is of no moment that the plaintiff’s
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-01-19
Citation: 298 Ga. 363, 782 S.E.2d 43, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 78
Snippet: criminal history record information statute, OCGA § 35-3-37, are to be applied to information regarding arrests
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2012-11-19
Citation: 292 Ga. 35, 734 S.E.2d 362, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 3646, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 945
Snippet: judgments or orders entered pursuant to Code Section 35-3-37. On August 26,2010, by administrative order
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1993-03-15
Citation: 426 S.E.2d 876, 262 Ga. 863, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 1165, 1993 Ga. LEXIS 314
Snippet: incompleteness which is subject to remedy under OCGA § 35-3-37 (c) by the supplementation of his record. However
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1987-05-06
Citation: 356 S.E.2d 640, 257 Ga. 156, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1075, 1987 Ga. LEXIS 728
Snippet: the performance of their official duties. OCGA § 35-3-37 (a) provides, "Nothing in this article shall be