Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under Ga. L. 1937, p. 322 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Applicability to residents and non-residents.

- Because O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20 prohibits both residents and nonresidents from driving any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state without a valid driver's license, defendant's claim that under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-1(15) the defendant could not be considered a resident of Georgia was irrelevant. Chiasson v. State, 250 Ga. App. 63, 549 S.E.2d 503 (2001).

Right to drive is qualified right.

- Right to operate motor vehicle upon public highways of this state is merely qualified right which can be exercised by obtaining a license from the state. Keenan v. Hardison, 245 Ga. 599, 266 S.E.2d 205 (1980); Ward v. State, 188 Ga. App. 372, 373 S.E.2d 65 (1988).

Undocumented aliens.

- Reading the definition of "resident" in O.C.G.A. § 40-5-1(15) and O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20(a) in pari materia, shows that the intention of the General Assembly was not to exempt undocumented aliens from the requirement of obtaining a Georgia driver's license but to permit visitors, with no intention of becoming residents, to drive here without obtaining a Georgia license. Diaz v. State, 245 Ga. App. 380, 537 S.E.2d 784 (2000).

Statutes barring illegal aliens residing in Georgia from obtaining a Georgia driver's license does not deprive the aliens of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. John Doe No. 1 v. Ga. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2001).

Denial of defendant's, an undocumented alien, motion to quash was affirmed because limiting the safe harbor provision of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20 to the production at trial of a Georgia driver's license was a rational part of the enforcement scheme, allowing the presumption created by a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-29(b) to be automatically rebutted only when the evidence that the driver in fact had a valid license when cited was most indisputable and readily evaluated by the factfinder. Castillo-Solis v. State, 292 Ga. 755, 740 S.E.2d 583 (2013).

Mexican driver had no standing to challenge statute as unconstitutional.

- Driver with a Mexican driver's license did not have standing to challenge O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20 as conflicting with the 1943 Convention on the Regulation of Inter-American Automotive Traffic because the Mexican did not have an international license as required by the Convention and O.C.G.A. § 40-5-21(a)(2) and the license the Mexican produced did not meet the requirements of the Convention. Medina v. State, 312 Ga. App. 399, 718 S.E.2d 323 (2011).

Effect of license requirement on right to travel.

- Mere fact of imposing a license requirement does not constitute state infringement on any right of locomotion which an individual may have to travel on public ways as a common-law freeman. Lebrun v. State, 255 Ga. 406, 339 S.E.2d 227 (1986).

Custodial arrest for operating a motor vehicle without a license.

- If an officer stops a vehicle in the good faith belief that a traffic violation has been committed, the officer's ultimate failure to issue a traffic citation will not preclude the traffic offense from evincing the reasonable suspicion which served to justify the officer's initial stop of the vehicle. Once a stop is effected, a defendant is subject to custodial arrest for operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver's license. State v. Chambers, 194 Ga. App. 609, 391 S.E.2d 657 (1990).

City streets constitute highway for purposes of statute.

- Proof that defendant was driving on city streets was sufficient to show defendant was driving on a "highway" so as to sustain a conviction for driving without a license as city streets fit within the broad definition of "highway" under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20 making it a violation to drive without a license. Scott v. State, 254 Ga. App. 728, 563 S.E.2d 554 (2002).

Driving with expired driver's license is a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20(a); O.C.G.A. § 40-5-120(7) (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-5-120(4)) makes such a violation a misdemeanor. Littlejohn v. State, 165 Ga. App. 562, 301 S.E.2d 917 (1983).

Presumption raised by failure to have license in possession.

- There existed no reversible error when the defendant was accused of (and subsequently convicted of) driving a vehicle without a valid license, but the offense on which the jury was charged concerned the failure to have a valid license in one's possession at all times while operating a motor vehicle (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-5-29) and the presumption thereby raised that the driver had no valid license. Roberts v. State, 173 Ga. App. 614, 327 S.E.2d 743 (1985).

Detention based on lack of driver's license was proper.

- Motion to suppress evidence seized from the defendant's car was properly denied because a uniformed officer's initial approach to the car, which had been driven to the scene of a controlled drug buy by a codefendant, was a first-tier police-citizen encounter, the car was already stopped when the uniformed officer approached and asked the codefendant for identification, the codefendant admitted that the codefendant had no driver's license or other identification, and thus the officer had reasonable suspicion that the codefendant was violating the law by driving without a license and was justified in detaining the codefendant from driving off in the vehicle; the officer also had reasonable suspicion of criminal drug activity based on the fact that an informant who was working with police to conduct the drug deal had described a two-door silver Mercedes coupe with dealer tags as the target vehicle belonging to the defendant, and police had confirmed this vehicle was just at the establishment frequented by the defendant, the codefendant drove up in the vehicle just before defendant arrived in a different car, at the very time and place designated for the drug transaction, the codefendant parked near the drug transaction and made hand signals which could have been inferred to have been counter-surveillance signals that the codefendant saw no police and that the transaction could go forward, and, because these circumstances authorized the officer to conduct an investigative detention of the codefendant and the vehicle, the bringing of a drug dog to the scene during that brief detention was proper, and when the drug dog alerted to the vehicle as containing drugs, the subsequent warrantless search of the vehicle was justified. Bowden v. State, 279 Ga. App. 173, 630 S.E.2d 792 (2006).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress because the defendant admitted to the police officer that the defendant had no visa or passport, and that the only documentation the defendant could present was a Mexican driver's license written in Spanish and the Mexican consulate card; thus, the police officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving without a license, and the arrest was lawful. Garcia-Carrillo v. State, 322 Ga. App. 439, 746 S.E.2d 137 (2013).

Traffic stop for compliance not unreasonably prolonged.

- As an officer's questioning of the defendant, after a traffic stop, about the defendant's length of time in Georgia was done to determine whether the defendant was in compliance with O.C.G.A. §§ 40-2-8(a) and40-5-20(a), and did not unreasonably prolong the stop, the defendant's rights under U.S. Const., amend. IV were not violated. Therefore, methamphetamine seized from the defendant's purse during the stop did not have to be suppressed. Sommese v. State, 299 Ga. App. 664, 683 S.E.2d 642 (2009).

Golf carts.

- After the defendant drove a golf cart on a public highway with a suspended license in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20(a), the trial court properly instructed the jury that the defendant had to have a driver's license; the evidence sufficiently supported the suspended license conviction. Coker v. State, 261 Ga. App. 646, 583 S.E.2d 498 (2003).

Safe harbor provision not applicable to driver with learner's permit.

- Because the defendant's learner's permit was not valid for the purpose of driving unsupervised, as the defendant was on the day of a traffic stop, the defendant could not qualify for the safe harbor under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20(a). Colotl v. State, 313 Ga. App. 42, 720 S.E.2d 210 (2011).

Actionable negligence arising from operation without license.

- While it is a violation of state law to operate an automobile without a driver's license, this is actionable negligence only when there is a proximate causal connection between the violation and the injury. Carpenter v. Lyons, 78 Ga. App. 214, 50 S.E.2d 850 (1948) (decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 322).

Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to officer's testimony.

- Appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial with respect to the two misdemeanor traffic violations because the prejudice from trial counsel's failure to object was clear as the officer's hearsay testimony was the only evidence offered to prove the elements of the traffic offenses and had the evidence been excluded, there would not have been sufficient evidence to convict on those offenses. Taylor v. State, 337 Ga. App. 486, 788 S.E.2d 97 (2016).

Evidence sufficient to sustain conviction.

- Evidence was sufficient to find that a defendant violated O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20(a) because it was a matter of common knowledge that "the loop" or "bypass" in a certain area was a public highway, although there was no direct testimony of that fact. Craig v. State, 276 Ga. App. 329, 623 S.E.2d 518 (2005).

Because the defendant admittedly lacked a driver's license, the tag on the car being driven was expired, and the defendant produced no evidence that the car had been recently purchased, and thus fell within the initial 30-day registration period during which a numbered license plate was not required, defendant's convictions were upheld on appeal. Arellano v. State, 289 Ga. App. 148, 656 S.E.2d 264 (2008).

Evidence insufficient to sustain conviction.

- Testimony by a police officer that someone else ran a computer check and determined that defendant did not have a driver's license was not sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for driving without a license. James v. State, 265 Ga. App. 689, 595 S.E.2d 364 (2004).

Because the state failed to present the parties' stipulation to the trier of fact and there was no other evidence that the defendant was driving without a license, insufficient evidence existed to sustain a conviction for driving without a license. Raby v. State, 274 Ga. App. 665, 618 S.E.2d 704 (2005).

Charge to jury.

- Because the defendant was being tried under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20, giving a clarifying charge to the jury on "driving without a license on the person" (see now O.C.G.A. § 40-5-29) was not error. Duckworth v. State, 223 Ga. App. 250, 477 S.E.2d 336 (1996), aff'd, 268 Ga. 566, 492 S.E.2d 201 (1997).

Cited in Smith v. State, 158 Ga. App. 663, 218 S.E.2d 631 (1981); Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 828, 286 S.E.2d 709 (1982); Pfeffier v. State, 173 Ga. App. 374, 326 S.E.2d 562 (1985); Cabral v. White, 181 Ga. App. 816, 354 S.E.2d 162 (1987); Spivey v. Sellers, 185 Ga. App. 241, 363 S.E.2d 856 (1987); Rogers v. State, 206 Ga. App. 654, 426 S.E.2d 209 (1992); Florence v. State, 246 Ga. App. 479, 539 S.E.2d 901 (2000); Rocha v. State, 250 Ga. App. 209, 551 S.E.2d 82 (2001); In the Interest of T. H., 258 Ga. App. 416, 574 S.E.2d 461 (2002); Simmons v. State, 281 Ga. App. 252, 635 S.E.2d 849 (2006); Dunbar v. State, 283 Ga. App. 872, 643 S.E.2d 292 (2007); Lopez v. State, 286 Ga. App. 873, 650 S.E.2d 430 (2007); State v. Torres, 290 Ga. App. 804, 660 S.E.2d 763 (2008); Manhertz v. State, 317 Ga. App. 856, 734 S.E.2d 406 (2012); State v. McCloud, 344 Ga. App. 595, 810 S.E.2d 668 (2018).

Nonresident 16-year-old student.

- Nonresident student is not required to obtain a Georgia driver's license in order to operate a vehicle on the public roads and highways so long as the student is at least 16 years of age and is the holder and possessor of a valid operator's or public chauffeur's license issued by the state of domicile. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-40.

Fingerprinting required for violators.

- Offenses arising under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-20(a) are designated as offenses for which those charged are to be fingerprinted. 2008 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2008-6; 2009 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2009-1.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 100, 102, 112 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 319 et seq., 323, 331 et seq.

ALR.

- Civil rights and liabilities as affected by failure to comply with regulations as to registration of automobile or motorcycle, or licensing of operator, 58 A.L.R. 532; 61 A.L.R. 1190; 78 A.L.R. 1028; 87 A.L.R. 1469; 111 A.L.R. 1258; 163 A.L.R. 1375; 53 A.L.R.2d 850.

Constitutionality and construction of statutes with respect to nonresident motor vehicle operators' or drivers' licenses, 82 A.L.R. 1392.

Validity of statute or ordinance relating to granting or revocation of license or permit to operate automobile, 108 A.L.R. 1162; 125 A.L.R. 1459.

Lack of proper automobile registration or operator's license as evidence of operator's negligence, 29 A.L.R.2d 963.

Construction, applicability, and effect of traffic regulation prohibiting vehicles from passing one another at street or highway intersection, 53 A.L.R.2d 850.

Validity of state statutes, regulations, or other identification requirements restricting or denying driver's licenses to illegal aliens, 16 A.L.R.6th 131.