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2018 Georgia Code 40-6-397 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 40-6-397 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 40-6-397

TITLE 40 MOTOR VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC

Section 6. Uniform Rules of the Road, 40-6-1 through 40-6-397.

ARTICLE 15 SERIOUS TRAFFIC OFFENSES

40-6-397. Aggressive driving; penalty.

  1. A person commits the offense of aggressive driving when he or she operates any motor vehicle with the intent to annoy, harass, molest, intimidate, injure, or obstruct another person, including without limitation violating Code Section 40-6-42, 40-6-48, 40-6-49, 40-6-123, 40-6-184, 40-6-312, or 40-6-390 with such intent.
  2. Any person convicted of aggressive driving shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature.

(Code 1981, §40-6-397, enacted by Ga. L. 2001, p. 208, § 1-7.)

Law reviews.

- For annual survey of criminal law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 153 (2004).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Aggressive driving involves specific, intended victims.

- Trial court erred in quashing that part of the indictment that alleged the defendant committed the offense of aggressive driving against three passengers in the other automobile defendant chased, based on the defendant's argument that the offense involved the defendant's manner of driving and was unrelated to the individual occupants of the vehicle; rather, the offense of "aggressive driving" involved specific, intended victims, and, thus, the state was permitted to attempt to prove that the defendant, through the defendant's aggressive driving, targeted not only the other automobile's driver, but also the individual passenger's as well. State v. Burrell, 263 Ga. App. 207, 587 S.E.2d 298 (2003).

Reckless conduct conviction no bar to aggressive driving conviction.

- Defendant's previous conviction for reckless conduct under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-60 did not bar later conviction for aggressive driving under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-397 when both convictions arose out of the same incident. A conviction for aggressive driving did not require proof of fact that the defendant endangered the bodily safety of the other driver and the other driver's family, while reckless conduct conviction did not require proof of fact that the defendant drove with intent to annoy, harass, intimidate, and injure another; thus, each crime required proof of fact that the other did not, so neither offense was included in the other so as to violate the substantive bar against double jeopardy of O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7. Winn v. State, 291 Ga. App. 16, 660 S.E.2d 883 (2008).

Evidence sufficient for conviction.

- Trial court was authorized to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense of aggressive driving when the defendant braked suddenly, causing the car following the defendant to brake also, which caused the third car in line to collide with the car second in line; the evidence also showed that the defendant knew that the driver of the second car was behind the defendant, the passengers in the defendant's car yelled obscenities at the driver of the second car and made obscene gestures toward the second driver, and thereafter, the defendant braked suddenly after telling the defendant's passengers to "watch this." In the Interest of A.M.A., 266 Ga. App. 273, 596 S.E.2d 756 (2004).

Aggressive driving conviction was upheld based on an officer's testimony that the defendant rudely tailgated the officer and became very agitated that the officer was driving slowly. Frasard v. State, 278 Ga. App. 352, 629 S.E.2d 53 (2006).

Evidence that the defendant struck a truck four times in rapid succession and then struck the truck again as the defendant fled the scene was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for aggressive driving. Simmons v. State, 321 Ga. App. 743, 743 S.E.2d 434 (2013).

Insufficient evidence for conviction.

- Defendant's convictions for terroristic acts, aggressive driving, and criminal trespass were reversed on appeal since the only evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of a roadway situation wherein the victim was tailgated and an object was thrown at the victim's car, causing a dent, was a police officer's hearsay testimony that the officer spoke to the defendant's mother, who indicated that the defendant had not been home, and the hearsay statement of the defendant admitting to the tailgating and honking; this evidence was inadmissible hearsay and therefore, relying on the remaining evidence, insufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's convictions. Patterson v. State, 287 Ga. App. 100, 650 S.E.2d 770 (2007).

Challenge rendered moot by acquittal.

- In a defendant's trial for aggressive driving and other charges arising out of a road rage incident, the defendant's claim that the trial court erred by omitting a pronoun representing the gender of a victim when charging the jury on the offense of aggressive driving was moot in light of the jury's acquittal of the defendant on that charge. Adams v. State, 282 Ga. App. 819, 640 S.E.2d 329 (2006).

Cited in State v. Ogilvie, 292 Ga. 6, 734 S.E.2d 50 (2012).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Fingerprinting.

- Georgia Crime Information Center is authorized to collect and file fingerprints of persons charged with a violation of O.C.G.A § 40-6-397. 2001 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2001-11.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 40-6-397

Total Results: 4  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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State v. Ogilvie, 292 Ga. 6 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 5, 2012 | 734 S.E.2d 50, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 3459

...enses but contain a specific intent or fault element. See, e.g., OCGA § 40-6-10 (c) (“Any person who knowingly makes a false statement or certification under Code Section 40-5-71 or this Code section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor....”); OCGA § 40-6-397 (a) (“Aperson commits the offense of aggressive driving when he or she operates any motor vehicle with the intent to annoy, harass, molest, intimidate, injure, or obstruct another person ....
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Bell v. State, 293 Ga. 683 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 9, 2013 | 748 S.E.2d 382, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 2846

...he first degree and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than three years nor more than 15 years”) and (c) (“Any person who causes the death of another person, without an intention to do so, by violating [OCGA § 40-6-397 (aggressive driving) or] any provision of this title other than[, among other sections, OCGA § 40-6-390 (a)] ....
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Derrico v. State, 306 Ga. 634 (Ga. 2019).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Aug 5, 2019

...brosetti on the day of the incident. Deputy Day cited Derrico for aggressive driving, reckless conduct, and improper lane change. 1. Derrico argues that the evidence presented was insufficient to convict him of aggressive driving under OCGA § 40-6-397,1 1 OCGA § 40-6-397 (a) provides in relevant part that“[a] person commits the offense of aggressive driving when he or she operates any motor vehicle with the intent to ....
...change lanes or move right or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety.” 4 Derrico also contends that the trial court should have granted his 3 2. Derrico also argues that OCGA §§ 40-6-397 and 16-5-60 are unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. It is well established that the void for vagueness doctrine of the due process clause requires that a challenged statute or ordinance give a person of ordinar...
...533 (II) (807 SE2d 899) (2017); Slaton v. State, 296 Ga. 122 (2) (765 SE2d 332) (2014); Jackson, 443 U. S. 307 (III) (B). 4 302 Ga. 616, 623 (807 SE2d 861) (2017). (a) Derrico contends that OCGA § 40-6-397 is unconstitutionally vague because the statute contains an open- ended list of violations and the aggressive driving count in his indictment does not include a reference to any of the statutes listed therein.5 Derrico also claims that he was arbitrarily selected for prosecution instead of Ambrosetti. However, we cannot say OCGA § 40-6-397 does not give a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning that Derrico’s conduct — particularly, moving into the emergency lane to then strike Ambrosetti’s car a second time — is prohibited as an attempt to intimidate someone, which violates the plain language of the statute. See OCGA § 40-6-397 (a); Major, 301 Ga....
...5 Count 1 provides in relevant part “[Derrico] did unlawfully operate [a] motor vehicle . . . with the intent to intimidate Felix Ambrosetti . . . in that [Derrico] did move into Felix Ambrosetti’s lane, striking the vehicle Felix Ambrosetti was driving, in violation of OCGA § 40-6-397.” 5 purposeful discrimination which [was] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard, such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Wallace v....
...did not contribute to the verdict”). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. 8 DECIDED AUGUST 5, 2019 --- RECONSIDERATION DENIED SEPTEMBER 3, 2019. OCGA §§ 40-6-397 and 16-5-60; constitutional question. Forsyth State Court....
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Derrico v. State, 831 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. 2019).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Aug 5, 2019

...o and Ambrosetti on the day of the incident. Deputy Day cited Derrico for aggressive driving, reckless conduct, and improper lane change. 1. Derrico argues that the evidence presented was insufficient to convict him of aggressive driving under OCGA § 40-6-397,1 reckless conduct under OCGA § 16-5-60,2 and failure to signal a lane change or turn under OCGA § 40-6-123 (a)3 because he testified that he was innocent and that Ambrosetti was the aggressor....
...307 (III) (B), 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.E.2d 560 (1979). The evidence, as set forth above, was sufficient to authorize a reasonable jury to find Derrico guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offenses for which he was charged. See id.4 2. Derrico also argues that OCGA §§ 40-6-397 and 16-5-60 are unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. It is well established that the void for vagueness doctrine of the due process clause requires that a challenged statute or ordinance give a person of ordinary intelligence fair...
..."Our construction of [these statutes] is consistent with this Court's duty to construe [ ] statute[s] in a manner which upholds [them] as constitutional, if that is possible." (Punctuation and citation omitted.) State v. Cohen , 302 Ga. 616, 623, 807 S.E.2d 861 (2017). (a) Derrico contends that OCGA § 40-6-397 is unconstitutionally vague because the statute contains an open-ended list of violations and the aggressive driving count in his indictment does not include a reference to any of the statutes listed therein.5 Derrico also claims that he was arbitrarily selected for prosecution instead of Ambrosetti. However, we cannot say OCGA § 40-6-397 does not give a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning that Derrico's conduct - particularly, moving into the emergency lane to then strike Ambrosetti's car a second time - is prohibited as an attempt to intimidate someone, which violates the plain language of the statute. See OCGA § 40-6-397 (a) ; Major , 301 Ga....
...See Adkins v. State , 301 Ga. 153, 158 (3) (a), 800 S.E.2d 341 (2017) (stating that "[a] nonconstitutional error is harmless if it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict"). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. OCGA § 40-6-397 (a) provides in relevant part that "[a] person commits the offense of aggressive driving when he or she operates any motor vehicle with the intent to ......
...2781. Count 1 provides in relevant part "[Derrico] did unlawfully operate [a] motor vehicle ... with the intent to intimidate Felix Ambrosetti ... in that [Derrico] did move into Felix Ambrosetti's lane, striking the vehicle Felix Ambrosetti was driving, in violation of OCGA § 40-6-397."