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2018 Georgia Code 44-13-1 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 44 PROPERTY

Section 13. Exemptions from Levy and Sale, 44-13-1 through 44-13-120.

ARTICLE 1 CONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTIONS

44-13-1. Amount of exemption; who may claim exemption; what charges enforceable.

Except as otherwise provided in this article, there shall be exempt from levy and sale by virtue of any process whatever under the laws of this state any real or personal property or both of a debtor in the amount of $5,000.00 or $21,500.00 for real or personal property that is the debtor's primary residence. No court or ministerial officer in this state shall ever have jurisdiction or authority to enforce any judgment, execution, or decree against property set apart under this Code section, including such improvements as may be made thereon from time to time, except for taxes, for the purchase money of the property, for labor done on the property, for material furnished for the property, or for the removal of encumbrances on the property.

(Ga. L. 1868, p. 27, § 1; Code 1873, § 2002; Code 1882, § 2002; Civil Code 1895, § 2827; Civil Code 1910, § 3377; Code 1933, § 51-101; Ga. L. 1976, p. 346, § 1; Ga. L. 1983, p. 1170, § 2; Ga. L. 2012, p. 1030, § 1/SB 117.)

The 2012 amendment, effective May 2, 2012, added "or $21,500.00 for real or personal property that is the debtor's primary residence" at the end of the first sentence of this Code section.

Law reviews.

- For note discussing property exempt from execution, see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 814 (1978). For comment on Roquemore v. Goldstein, 100 Ga. App. 591, 112 S.E.2d 24 (1959), see 12 Mercer L. Rev. 280 (1960).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

General Consideration

Not question respecting title to land.

- The title to the property in which a homestead is sought to be set is not directly involved, and therefore, the question raised by the application and objections urged by a creditor of the applicant is not one respecting title to land, so as to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution of this state. Adams v. Bishop, 174 Ga. 262, 162 S.E. 531 (1932).

Effect of exemption on title.

- When the exemption is set apart to the bankrupt by the bankruptcy court, the title is in the bankrupt precisely as it was before. Novak v. O'Neal, 201 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1953).

Effect of setting apart homestead is not to change the title but only the use during the life of the wife and the minority of the children; where in such circumstances the husband dies intestate before termination of the homestead, the property will remain his estate and descend to his heirs by inheritance, with the right of possession postponed until termination of the homestead. Donalson v. Yeates, 173 Ga. 30, 159 S.E. 856 (1931).

Effect of assignment of homestead property.

- When the property is set apart as exempt, the court of bankruptcy exhausts its jurisdiction over the property, and it remains the property of the bankrupt, unaffected by the bankruptcy proceedings and therefore an assignment thereof, whether before the bankrupt is adjudged a bankrupt, or pending the bankruptcy proceedings, will be unaffected by such proceedings. Novak v. O'Neal, 201 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1953).

Homestead contained in deed to secure debt.

- A deed made to secure a debt conveys the title to land, and a homestead therein will avail nothing as against such title. There is nothing in the debtor upon which a homestead can operate save the equity of redemption; if he never redeems, there is nothing to which it can attach. Rose v. Crane Heating Co., 198 Ga. 295, 31 S.E.2d 717 (1944).

Where bankrupt makes no claim to exemption, or claims only a partial exemption, there can be no proper basis for a determination by the court of bankruptcy which requires that the privilege of exemption be recognized and enforced where not claimed by the party for whose benefit the statute law establishes it. Novak v. O'Neal, 201 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1953).

Waiver.

- When the debtor waives the homestead and exemption, the debtor means that all of debtor's property shall be a security to the creditor for the payment of that debt; and the creditor has a legal right to rely upon all of the debtor's property for the payment of the debt. Rosenthal v. Langley, 180 Ga. 253, 179 S.E. 383, appeal dismissed, 295 U.S. 720, 55 S. Ct. 916, 79 L. Ed. 1674 (1935).

Homestead terminated.

- Where a constitutional homestead on certain property was granted on the application of one individual and, on her death, the property passed by will to her son, who married sister of present owner, following which present owner and her son came to live in the home, no homestead presently exists in the property. Martin v. Fulton County, 213 Ga. 761, 101 S.E.2d 716 (1958).

Jurisdiction of bankruptcy court.

- The court of bankruptcy has jurisdiction to set apart, segregate, and deliver a homestead, but has no jurisdiction to adjudicate whether the property set apart is unencumbered or subject to liens, or to determine the respective priorities of liens, if any exist. Rosenthal v. Langley, 180 Ga. 253, 179 S.E. 383, appeal dismissed, 295 U.S. 720, 55 S. Ct. 916, 79 L. Ed. 1674 (1935).

Sale for purchase price.

- Where exempted property is sold under execution for the purchase price, a creditor not of the class expressly declared superior to homestead cannot claim the proceeds. Walker v. Johnson, 64 Ga. 363 (1879).

Cited in McWatty v. Jefferson County, 76 Ga. 352 (1886); Garmon v. Davis, 63 Ga. App. 815, 12 S.E.2d 209 (1940); In re Dixon, 49 F. Supp. 977 (S.D. Ga. 1943); In re Harrison, 13 Bankr. 293 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).

What Constitutes Homestead Property

Purchase money.

- The specific property for which purchase money is due is liable to a judgment therefor, notwithstanding the same has been set apart under the homestead law; other property exempted is not subject thereto. Loyless & Griffin v. Collins, 55 Ga. 370 (1876).

Where purchase money due.

- A claimant not having paid the purchase money and having no title when claimant applied for the homestead, any homestead set apart to the claimant in this land was not binding upon the original vendor. Blackwell v. Aiken, 73 Ga. 55 (1884); Perdue v. Fraley, 92 Ga. 780, 19 S.E. 40 (1894).

Property purchased with proceeds of homestead.

- Where the property was purchased with the proceeds of a homestead, it was homestead property. Thornton v. Horton, 24 Ga. App. 92, 100 S.E. 41 (1919); Amerson v. Cox, 173 Ga. 477, 160 S.E. 506 (1931).

Money expended before exemption sought.

- Though the exempted land is liable under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-1 for its purchase money, it is not liable for money expended, before any right of exemption was asserted, in paying for improvements and for work and labor done upon the premises. Builders' Lumber Co. v. Hunt, 179 Ga. 367, 176 S.E. 11 (1934).

Improvements.

- O.C.G.A. § 44-13-1 does not make improvements put upon property before the exemption is granted one of the exemptions, but expressly declares the improvements put upon the homestead shall not be subject to levy and sale. Builders' Lumber Co. v. Hunt, 179 Ga. 367, 176 S.E. 11 (1934).

Debts incurred in removing encumbrances.

- Purchase money and debts incurred in removing encumbrances have the same status. McConnell v. Gregory, 146 Ga. 475, 91 S.E. 550 (1917).

The phrase "material furnished therefor," describing one class of debts for which a homestead may be liable, refers to material furnished for the homestead, that is, after the homestead has been set apart, and does not include material furnished to improve the property before it was set apart. Rose v. Crane Heating Co., 198 Ga. 295, 31 S.E.2d 717 (1944).

Necessities.

- Neither an article of necessity furnished for the use of the family nor even stock feed furnished to feed horses, which has been set apart as part of a homestead, comes within the constitutional exceptions under which homestead property may be subjected to sale. McLamb & Co. v. Lambertson, 4 Ga. App. 553, 62 S.E. 107 (1908).

Exemption covering automobile.

- The homestead exemption covering a "Ford automobile" can only have been allowed under the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 44-13-1 and could not be upheld as a statutory or "short" homestead. Gann v. McGee, 19 Ga. App. 13, 90 S.E. 976 (1916).

Who May Claim Exemption

Husband cannot take a homestead in land belonging to his wife; a homestead so set apart is invalid as against a judgment creditor of the wife. Jackson v. Williams, 129 Ga. 716, 59 S.E. 776 (1907).

Widow.

- A widow may have set apart an exemption for herself and minor children from the property if her deceased husband devised to her for life and in trust for such minor children. Birdwell v. Birdwell, 76 Ga. 627 (1886).

A widow cannot as head of a family have land left by her husband set apart as homestead except as to her own interest therein. Madden v. Jones, 75 Ga. 680 (1885).

Aged and infirm person.

- Land of an aged and infirm person set apart to him as a homestead under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-1 is not subject to levy and sale under an execution issued upon a general judgment for permanent alimony. Knox v. Knox, 148 Ga. 253, 96 S.E. 337 (1918).

Guardian of one minor child is the head of a family of minor children. Rountree v. Dennard, 59 Ga. 629, 27 Am. R. 401 (1877).

Unmarried person without dependents is not the "head of a household." Rietz v. Butler, 322 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Ga. 1971).

Bachelor, having no person depending on him for support and maintenance is not the head of a family, and not entitled to a homestead. Calhoun v. McLendon, 42 Ga. 405 (1871).

Partnership.

- No individual exemption can be allowed out of the partnership estate at the expense of the joint creditors, in bankruptcy proceedings. In re Stewart, 23 F. Cas. 51 (D.C. Ga. 1875) (No. 13,420).

Where each partner has applied for and obtained a homestead in the partnership land, the same being assigned in separate parcels, a prior creditor of the partnership cannot enforce a judgment over the homestead right. Harris v. Visscher, 57 Ga. 229 (1876).

Abandoned family.

- Property exempted under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-1 is for the use and benefit of the family of the debtor, to the extent that a member of the debtor's family may enjoy the benefit thereof even though he should abandon her. Rietz v. Butler, 322 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Ga. 1971).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Homestead exemption must be applied for and is not granted solely on basis of information contained in tax return. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 292.

Levy for delinquent motor vehicle ad valorem taxes can be executed against the homestead. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-146.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 31 Am. Jur. 2d, Exemptions, §§ 1-12, 16, 26-32. 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Homestead, §§ 1-21, 23-26, 170.

13A Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Homestead, § 2.

C.J.S.

- 40 C.J.S., Homesteads, §§ 1 et seq., 11 et seq., 140 et seq.

ALR.

- Exemption of proceeds of voluntary sale of homestead, 1 A.L.R. 483; 46 A.L.R. 814.

Scope and import of term "owner" in statutes relating to real property, 2 A.L.R. 778; 95 A.L.R. 1085.

Right of individual partner to exemption in partnership property, 4 A.L.R. 300.

Action for damages against signing spouse for breach of contract to convey homestead signed by one spouse only, 4 A.L.R. 1272; 16 A.L.R. 1036.

Availability of judgment under which exempt property has been seized as a setoff or counterclaim against claim based on the wrongful seizure, 20 A.L.R. 276.

Lien of judgment on surplus in quantity or value of homestead, 32 A.L.R. 1333.

Failure of head of family to claim homestead exemption as affecting other members of the family, 33 A.L.R. 611.

Effect of divorce on homestead, 36 A.L.R. 431; 84 A.L.R.2d 703.

Loss of homestead rights by wife through absence enforced by act of husband, 42 A.L.R. 1162; 129 A.L.R. 305.

What are "tools," "implements," "instruments," "utensils," or "apparatus," with the meaning of debtor's exemption laws, 52 A.L.R. 826.

Right of creditor to attach bankrupt's exempt property after discharge in bankruptcy, 55 A.L.R. 303.

Debtor's exemption of proceeds of insurance on property itself exempt, 63 A.L.R. 1286.

Mechanic's or materialman's lien on homestead, 65 A.L.R. 1192.

Deposit of exempt funds as affecting debtor's exemption, 67 A.L.R. 1203.

Estate or interest in real property to which a homestead claim may attach, 89 A.L.R. 511; 74 A.L.R.2d 1355.

Availability of debtor's exemption to defeat counterclaim or setoff, 106 A.L.R. 1070.

Character of judgment as "debt" within exemption law as affected by nature of cause of action upon which it was recovered, 108 A.L.R. 1042.

Creation of homestead right in real estate as affecting existing judgment lien, 110 A.L.R. 883.

Creation of homestead right in real estate as affecting existing attachment lien, 110 A.L.R. 904.

Character of property as homestead as affected by its use for business as well as residence purposes, 114 A.L.R. 209.

Who are within constitutional or statutory provisions subjecting homestead to claims of laborers, servants, or the like, 114 A.L.R. 767.

One who supports (or is under a duty to support) in whole or part relatives who do not live with him as "head of family," "householder," etc., within homestead exemption statute, 118 A.L.R. 1386.

Creation of homestead right in real estate as affecting previous mortgage, trust deed, or purchase money or vendor's license, 123 A.L.R. 427.

Multiple dwelling house part of which is occupied by owner as subject of homestead, 128 A.L.R. 1431.

Dower and homestead rights as affecting partition proceedings, 159 A.L.R. 1129.

Purchase of homestead as fraud on creditors, 161 A.L.R. 1287.

State law or state court decisions as governing, or as rule of decision in federal court, in passing upon question as to what property passes to trustee in bankruptcy under § 70(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, 16 A.L.R.2d 839.

Operation and effect of antenuptial agreements to waive or bar surviving spouse's right to probate homestead or surviving family's homestead right or exemption, 65 A.L.R.2d 727.

Wife as head of family within homestead or other property exemption provision, 67 A.L.R.2d 779.

Validity of contractual stipulation or provision waiving debtor's exemption, 94 A.L.R.2d 967.

What is "necessary" furniture entitled to exemption from seizure for debt, 41 A.L.R.3d 607.

Recovery of damages for breach of contract to convey homestead where only one spouse signed contract, 5 A.L.R.4th 1310.

Lien of judgment on excess value of homestead, 41 A.L.R.4th 292.

What constitutes state or local law that is applicable on date of filing of bankruptcy petition for purposes of applying 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b)(3)(A) or its predecessor in opt-out states, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 333.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 44-13-1

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Mooney v. Webster, 300 Ga. 283 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 21, 2016 | 794 S.E.2d 31

...ings account (“HSA”) from inclusion in the bankruptcy estate. The questions certified are: (1) Does a debtor’s health savings account constitute a right to receive a “disability, illness, or unemployment benefit” for the purposes of OCGA § 44-13-100 (a) (2) (C)? (2) Does a debtor’s health savings account constitute a right to receive a “payment under a pension, annuity, or similar plan or contract” for the purposes of OCGA § 44-13-100 (a) (2) (E)? *284(3) Is a debtor’s right to receive a payment from a health savings account [one] “on account of illness [or] disability” for the purposes of OCGA § 44-13-100 (a) (2) (E)? We answer the first and second questions in the negative, and consequently, the third question need not be addressed. Background In general, when a debtor files a bankruptcy petition as in the case at bar, the debtor’s property becomes part of the bankruptcy estate....
...As authorized by 11 USC § 522 (b) (2),3 Georgia has opted *285out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions in favor of exemptions under state law; consequently, for debtors who are residents of Georgia, the applicable exemptions are those set forth in OCGA § 44-13-100 (a).4 *286As stated, the property at issue is a HSA....
...Bankruptcy Court”) on June 27,2013. In her Schedule B disclosures, Mooney listed her HSA, valued at $17,570.93. And, on her Schedule C filing, Mooney claimed an exemption from the bankruptcy estate for the full value of her HSA, pursuant to OCGA § 44-13-100 (a) (2) (C) and (E)....
...Mooney then appealed the District Court’s order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (“Eleventh Circuit”), and the Eleventh Circuit certified the above-stated questions after determining that the case turns on an interpretation of Georgia law, i.e., whether the exemptions set forth in OCGA § 44-13-100 (a) (2) (C) and (E) include HSA funds. Discussion As a threshold matter, OCGA § 44-13-100 (a) does not contain any express exemption for HSAs; this is so even though the statutory provision specifies numerous exemptions including those for precisely identified “benefits.” See footnote 4, supra....
...legislative enactment when other exceptions are expressly stated. See Walker v. Walker, 28 Ga. 140, 156 (1859); Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Miller, 424 F3d 1113, 1116 n. 3 (11th *289Cir. 2005). Indeed, as the Bankruptcy Court stated, absent from OCGA § 44-13-100 (a) is the “unequivocal expression of legislative intent” regarding the exemption of HSAs, that is, they are not specifically named as exempt....
...This sets the stage for the arguments made by debtor Mooney and the questions framed by the Eleventh Circuit. The next step in the analysis is the consideration of whether a HSA is a “disability, illness, or unemployment benefit” for the purpose of the exemption provided in OCGA § 44-13-100 (a) (2) (C)....
...plain and ordinary meaning,” viewed in the “context in which it appears.” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013). In other words, the text is to be read in its “most natural and reasonable way” Id. Even though OCGA § 44-13-100 (a) (2) (C) sets forth three types of ‘Tenefits,” the narrower question in the present case is whether a HSA is a “benefit” in regard to “illness.”8 As noted by the Bankruptcy Court, Webster’s Dictionary has defined “bene...
...46, 53 (793 SE2d 49) (2016). Thus, subsections (a) (2) (C) and (a) (2) (E) must be construed consistently with each other and with the applicable precedent of this Court. In Silliman v. Cassell, 292 Ga. 464 (738 SE2d 606) (2013), this Court was called upon to interpret OCGA § 44-13-100 (a) (2) (E), in the context of the exemption of a single-premium fixed annuity from the debtor’s bankruptcy estate....
...This Court concludes, as did the District Court, that a HSA is not a substitute for wages, but rather is “a place to park wages that, if used for qualified healthcare expenses, allows favorable tax treatment.” Consequently, the exemptions provided in OCGA § 44-13-100 (a) (2) (C) and (a) (2) (E) do not apply.12 Decided November 21, 2016. Stone & Baxter, Ward Stone, Jr., Matthew S. Cathey, Thomas T. McClendon, for appellant. Akin, Webster & Matson, Robert M. Matson, for appellee. Conclusion A HSA does not constitute a right to receive a “disability, illness, or unemployment benefit” for the purposes of OCGA § 44-13-100 (a) (2) (C), nor does it constitute a right to receive a “payment under a pension, annuity, or similar plan or contract” for the purposes of OCGA § 44-13-100 (a) (2) (E). Certified questions answered. All the Justices concur. 1983 Ga....
...property listed in... paragraph (2).... (2) Property listed in this paragraph is property that is specified under subsection (d), unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (3)(A) specifically does not so authorize. OCGA § 44-13-100 (a) provides in full: (a) In lieu of the exemption provided in Code Section 44-13-1, any debtor who is a natural person may exempt, pursuant to this article, for purposes of bankruptcy, the following property: (1) The debtor’s aggregate interest, not to exceed $21,500.00 in value, in real property or personal prope...
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Klardie v. Klardie, 697 S.E.2d 207 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 5, 2010 | 287 Ga. 499, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 2175

...operty." Id. at 471, 629 S.E.2d 204 Here, the husband has failed to show that the wife's retirement accounts were not excludable or exempt from the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(12); [3] In re Chilton, 426 B.R. 612 (2010). See also OCGA § 44-13-100(a) (2.1)....
...§ 522(d)(12) provides: (d) The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(2) of this section: ... (12) Retirement funds to the extent that those funds are in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation under section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. [4] OCGA § 44-13-100(a) states: In lieu of the exemption provided in Code Section 44-13-1, any debtor who is a natural person may exempt, pursuant to this article, for purposes of bankruptcy, the following property: (1) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $10,000.00 in value, in real property or personal propert...