"Adverse" construed.

- Possession is "adverse" within the meaning of this statute only as to one who has an immediate right to bring an action to recover lands the possession of which are wrongfully withheld. Futch v. Jarrard, 203 Ga. 47, 45 S.E.2d 420 (1947) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-163).

Applicability of doctrine of prescription.

- Doctrine of prescription applies to any incorporeal right which may be lawfully granted. Davis v. State, 9 Ga. App. 430, 71 S.E. 603 (1911); Smith v. Jensen, 156 Ga. 814, 120 S.E. 417 (1923).

Ripened prescriptive title extinguishes all inconsistent titles.

- When an adverse possessor has held for the requisite period and one's prescriptive title ripens, it extinguishes all other inconsistent titles and itself becomes the true title. Danielly v. Lowe, 161 Ga. 279, 130 S.E. 687 (1925).

Provision that adverse possession shall not run against state is all-inclusive, and it includes all property held by this state whether used for governmental or for proprietary purposes. Grand Lodge, I.O.O.F. v. City of Thomasville, 226 Ga. 4, 172 S.E.2d 612 (1970).

State not barred by statute of limitations.

- No statute of limitations or prescription runs against the state so as to be a bar. Dougherty v. Western & A.R.R., 53 Ga. 304 (1874).

Fraud, to bar prescription, must be actual fraud. Street v. Collier, 118 Ga. 470, 45 S.E. 294 (1903).

Prescription does not run against a county in regard to land held for the benefit of the public. Clark v. McBride, 256 Ga. 308, 348 S.E.2d 634 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Northpark Assocs. No. 2 v. Homard Dev. Co., 262 Ga. 138, 414 S.E.2d 214 (1992).

Prescription may run against wife in favor of husband, though living together, as to property other than home. Bagley v. Forrester, 53 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1931).

Mandamus to require county to maintain road.

- Group of landowners were properly granted a writ of mandamus requiring a county to maintain an adjacent road as the county had acquired title to the road by prescriptive acquisition, abandonment was not an issue, and compliance with O.C.G.A. § 32-3-3(c) did not need to be shown when a roadway was otherwise acquired by prescription; moreover, urging that a county's failure to meet the county's obligation to maintain public roads was an acceptable method of abandoning a roadway would encourage counties to disregard their public duty. Shearin v. Wayne Davis & Co., P.C., 281 Ga. 385, 637 S.E.2d 679 (2006).

Judicial review.

- Trial court did not err in rejecting a property owners' claim of title to a street by adverse possession; because the owners did not provide a transcript of the special master's evidentiary hearing, it was presumed that the evidence supported the relevant findings of the special master adopted by the trial court. Goodson v. Ford, 290 Ga. 662, 725 S.E.2d 229 (2012).

Cited in McLaren v. Irvin, 63 Ga. 275 (1879); Milliken v. Kennedy, 87 Ga. 463, 13 S.E. 635 (1891); Cushman v. Coleman, 92 Ga. 772, 19 S.E. 46 (1894); Sapp v. Cline, 131 Ga. 433, 62 S.E. 529 (1908); Tarver v. Deppen, 132 Ga. 798, 65 S.E. 177, 24 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1161 (1909); Bunger v. Grimm, 142 Ga. 448, 83 S.E. 200, 1916C Ann. Cas. 173 (1914); Stringfield v. Stringfield, 143 Ga. 557, 85 S.E. 754 (1915); Ballenger v. Burton, 147 Ga. 5, 92 S.E. 514 (1917); Brewton v. Brewton, 167 Ga. 633, 146 S.E. 444 (1929); Wright v. Harber, 175 Ga. 696, 165 S.E. 616 (1932); Beeland v. Butler Payne Lumber Co., 48 Ga. App. 619, 173 S.E. 436 (1934); Rocker v. De Loach, 178 Ga. 480, 173 S.E. 709 (1934); Sewell v. Sprayberry, 186 Ga. 1, 196 S.E. 796 (1938); McCrea v. Georgia Power Co., 187 Ga. 708, 1 S.E.2d 664 (1939); Fitzpatrick v. Massee-Felton Lumber Co., 188 Ga. 80, 3 S.E.2d 91 (1939); Stanley v. Laurens County Bd. of Educ., 188 Ga. 581, 4 S.E.2d 164 (1939); Crump v. McEntire, 190 Ga. 684, 10 S.E.2d 186 (1940); Flournoy v. United States, 115 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1940); Lockwood v. Daniel, 193 Ga. 122, 17 S.E.2d 542 (1941); Hardy v. Brannen, 194 Ga. 252, 21 S.E.2d 417 (1942); Holton v. Mercer, 195 Ga. 47, 23 S.E.2d 166 (1942); Holloway v. Woods, 195 Ga. 55, 23 S.E.2d 254 (1942); Harden v. Morton, 195 Ga. 471, 24 S.E.2d 685 (1943); Pittman v. Pittman, 196 Ga. 397, 26 S.E.2d 764 (1943); Patellis v. Tanner, 199 Ga. 304, 34 S.E.2d 84 (1945); Fraser v. Dolvin, 199 Ga. 638, 34 S.E.2d 875 (1945); Barfield v. Vickers, 200 Ga. 279, 36 S.E.2d 766 (1946); Powell v. Moore, 202 Ga. 62, 42 S.E.2d 110 (1947); Browne v. Johnson, 204 Ga. 634, 51 S.E.2d 416 (1949); Key v. Stringer, 204 Ga. 869, 52 S.E.2d 305 (1949); Ballenger v. Houston, 207 Ga. 438, 62 S.E.2d 189 (1950); Harrison v. Durham, 210 Ga. 187, 78 S.E.2d 482 (1953); Phillips v. Wheeler, 212 Ga. 603, 94 S.E.2d 732 (1956); Turner v. McKee, 97 Ga. App. 531, 103 S.E.2d 658 (1958); Hughes v. Heard, 215 Ga. 156, 109 S.E.2d 510 (1959); Blanton v. Moody, 265 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1959); Pridgen v. Coffee County Bd. of Educ., 218 Ga. 326, 127 S.E.2d 808 (1962); Harrison v. Morris, 108 Ga. App. 566, 133 S.E.2d 899 (1963); Little v. Weatherby, 220 Ga. 274, 138 S.E.2d 380 (1964); Reid v. Wilkerson, 222 Ga. 282, 149 S.E.2d 700 (1966); Barnett v. Holliday, 228 Ga. 361, 185 S.E.2d 397 (1971); United States v. Williams, 441 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1971); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Carter, 231 Ga. 5, 200 S.E.2d 113 (1973); Roe v. Doe, 233 Ga. 691, 212 S.E.2d 854 (1975); Jordan v. Way, 235 Ga. 496, 220 S.E.2d 258 (1975); Chancey v. Georgia Power Co., 238 Ga. 397, 233 S.E.2d 365 (1977); Pannell v. Continental Can Co., 554 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977); Swicord v. Hester, 240 Ga. 484, 241 S.E.2d 242 (1978); Crosby v. Jones, 241 Ga. 558, 246 S.E.2d 677 (1978); Killingsworth v. Willis, 244 Ga. 662, 261 S.E.2d 613 (1979); Fuller v. Smith, 245 Ga. 751, 267 S.E.2d 23 (1980); Bailey v. Johnson, 245 Ga. 823, 268 S.E.2d 147 (1980); Atlanta Trailer Mart, Inc. v. Ashmore Foods, Inc., 247 Ga. 254, 275 S.E.2d 336 (1981); Ross v. Lowery, 249 Ga. 307, 290 S.E.2d 61 (1982); Simms v. Candler, 256 Ga. 163, 345 S.E.2d 37 (1986); Tarbutton v. All That Tract or Parcel of Land Known as Carter Place, 641 F. Supp. 521 (M.D. Ga. 1986); Georgia Power Co. v. Irvin, 267 Ga. 760, 482 S.E.2d 362 (1997); Strozzo v. Coffee Bluff Marina Prop., 250 Ga. App. 212, 550 S.E.2d 122 (2001); Small v. Irving, 291 Ga. 316, 729 S.E.2d 323 (2012).

Evidence insufficient for title.

- Evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant had acquired title to a strip of land by actual adverse possession for a period of 20 years since the evidence did not show that the defendant and defendant's predecessors in title had been in physical or corporeal possession of such strip continuously for the period stated. Bradley v. Shelton, 189 Ga. 696, 7 S.E.2d 261 (1940).

When poles and wires were used in the operation of a telephone line or lines over the lands of another, they should be considered as having marked or outlined a general area in use according to the usual or ordinary manner; and if the outer limits of this space remained the same for the prescriptive period of 20 years, the resulting easement would apply at least to such general area, so that the stringing of additional wires anywhere therein consistently with customary location would be permissible as territorially within the easement, whether or not the identical space to be physically occupied by such wires had ever before been so occupied by other wires. Kerlin v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 191 Ga. 663, 13 S.E.2d 790 (1941).

Trial court did not err in denying a landowner's claim that the landowner held prescriptive title to certain property by possession for a period of more than 20 years under O.C.G.A. § 44-5-163 because neither the landowner nor the landowner's spouse cultivated the property or erected any structure or fence upon the land pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-5-165, and the clearing of vegetation did not require a finding that possession had been established; photographs submitted in support of the landowner's claim that a pre-existing fence situated at one end of the property, together with the vegetation lines caused by the clearing and periodic mowing of the property, constituted an enclosure of the property so as to evidence possession could allow the special master to conclude that the asserted enclosure was not so notorious as to attract the attention of every adverse claimant and so exclusive as to prevent actual occupation by another. Bailey v. Moten, 289 Ga. 897, 717 S.E.2d 205 (2011).

Trial court did not err in granting a bank and purchasers summary judgment in a son's action to quiet title to a parcel of land because the son did not gain title to the house on the property through adverse possession; the son had not adversely possessed the property for the requisite 20 years pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-5-161 et seq. Furthermore, the son could not claim adverse possession under color of title, which reduced the required period of possession to seven years because the son's deed did not provide written evidence of title. Haffner v. Davis, 290 Ga. 753, 725 S.E.2d 286 (2012).

Land beyond limits of actual possession excluded.

- Prescriptive title, arising upon actual adverse possession alone, will not include any part of a given tract of land beyond the limits of the actual possession. Ford v. Williams, 73 Ga. 106 (1884); Baker v. White, 136 Ga. 541, 71 S.E. 871 (1911); Rock Run Iron Co. v. Heath, 155 Ga. 95, 116 S.E. 590 (1923); Martin v. Clark, 190 Ga. 270, 9 S.E.2d 54 (1940).

When actual possession impossible.

- When the character of property is such that it is impossible to be in actual possession thereof, title thereto can pass from one to another only by written evidence of title. Rowland v. McLain, 86 Ga. App. 140, 70 S.E.2d 918 (1952).

Notice required.

- To establish title by adverse possession, the claimant must show actual notice of the adverse claim. Coleman v. Coleman, 265 Ga. 568, 459 S.E.2d 166 (1995).

Continuity of possession required for acquisition of prescriptive easement.

- To acquire a prescriptive easement over real property, there must be continuity of possession of the right asserted for the entire period fixed by statute. Vickers v. City of Fitzgerald, 216 Ga. 476, 117 S.E.2d 316 (1960), overruled on other grounds, City of Chamblee v. Maxwell, 264 Ga. 635, 452 S.E.2d 488 (1994).

In order to constitute element of continuity which is essential to adverse possession as the foundation of good prescriptive title, it is not necessary that adverse possession be maintained for the statutory period by the same person, since continuity may just as effectively be shown by the successive bona fide possessions of several persons, provided the requisite privity exists between the people, so as to permit a tacking of their unbroken successive possessions. Blalock v. Redwine, 191 Ga. 169, 12 S.E.2d 639 (1940); Cliett v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 195 Ga. 257, 24 S.E.2d 59 (1943).

In order to show privity between successive occupants, all that is necessary is that one shall have received one's possession from the other by some act of such other person or by operation of law. Blalock v. Redwine, 191 Ga. 169, 12 S.E.2d 639 (1940); Cliett v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 195 Ga. 257, 24 S.E.2d 59 (1943).

Adverse possession of land by promoters or officers of a corporation may be tacked to the adverse possession of the corporation after the corporation's organization and incorporation. Blalock v. Redwine, 191 Ga. 169, 12 S.E.2d 639 (1940).

Privity between successive occupants may be accomplished by a parol agreement or understanding, under which the actual possession of the premises is delivered, as well as by a written conveyance. Cliett v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 195 Ga. 257, 24 S.E.2d 59 (1943).

Prescription may run against wife in favor of husband, though living together, as to property other than home. Bagley v. Forrester, 53 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1931).

Permissive possession cannot be foundation of prescription until there is adverse claim and actual notice to other party. Harris v. Mandeville, 195 Ga. 251, 24 S.E.2d 23 (1943).

Possession was permissive.

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a railroad as to the property owner's adverse possession claim as no evidence showed that the fence served to exclude the railroad from its right-of-way and its track supervisor testified that while it was aware of the fence, it did not consider the fence an encroachment on its right-of-way because the fence did not interfere with the railroad's access to the railroad's property. Fox v. Norfolk S. Corp., 342 Ga. App. 38, 802 S.E.2d 319 (2017).

Abandonment.

- Title once ripened by adverse possession is no longer affected by abandonment. Peeples v. Rudulph, 153 Ga. 17, 111 S.E. 548 (1922).

Possession of church by membership for prescriptive period supports title.

- Possession of the property for use of a church by the constituent membership is possession of the church as such an entity, and if continued adversely for the prescriptive period will support prescriptive title. Slaughter v. Land, 194 Ga. 156, 21 S.E.2d 72 (1942).

Possession, use, and upkeep of road by public as highway for 20 years ripens into prescriptive title. Hyde v. Chappell, 194 Ga. 536, 22 S.E.2d 313 (1942).

Possession by tenant or agent will suffice to support owner's claim of prescriptive title under a parol understanding with the owner. Cliett v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 195 Ga. 257, 24 S.E.2d 59 (1943).

Adverse possession properly granted under both O.C.G.A. §§ 44-5-163 and 44-5-164. - Because a trust's predecessors in interest to a disputed parcel of land maintained public, exclusive, and continuous possession of that tract for the required time frames under both O.C.G.A. §§ 44-5-163 and44-5-164, and the original grantee's hostile possession of the property was done in good faith that a claim of right existed, the trial court did not err in adopting a special master's award and findings that the trust owned the disputed property against the rights of a contesting neighbor. Crawford v. Simpson, 279 Ga. 280, 612 S.E.2d 783 (2005).

When homestead claim does not prevent prescriptive title from ripening.

- When the homestead never became legally operative by reason of a deed made prior to the application for homestead, and since the alleged equitable redemption of the property under such deed was never asserted by proper legal or equitable proceedings, and none of the claimants were shown to be laboring under disabilities, a claim of homestead would not prevent title by prescription from ripening. Slade v. Barber, 200 Ga. 405, 37 S.E.2d 143 (1946).

Evidence of claim of right or title sufficiently avoids summary judgment.

- Because the heirs produced evidence raising a material question of fact as to whether their ancestors possessed certain property for the requisite period of time under a claim of right pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 44-5-161(a),44-5-163, and44-5-165, the record owner was not entitled to summary judgment. Walker v. Sapelo Island Heritage Auth., 285 Ga. 194, 674 S.E.2d 925 (2009).

Beneficiaries cannot prescribe against title conveyed by trustee.

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the property owner on the trust beneficiary's suit to establish certain prescriptive rights to property a trust had sold to the property owner as a sale by a trustee of land held by the trustee in trust for beneficiaries, such as the trust beneficiary, was in effect a sale by the beneficiaries, including the trust beneficiaries, and the beneficiaries could not prescribe against title conveyed by the trustee; accordingly, the trust beneficiary's possession of a portion of the property after the trustee sold the property to the property owner could not be adverse to the property owner. Reasor v. Peoples Fin. Servs., 276 Ga. 534, 579 S.E.2d 742 (2003).

Principle of acquiescence was inapplicable.

- Neighbor's claims of ownership as to a tract of land was denied because the principle of acquiescence was inapplicable to the ownership of a tract of land as a deed to the tract of land undisputedly conveyed the tract of land and the property line was neither in dispute, uncertain, or unascertained during the period in question. Jackson v. Tolliver, 277 Ga. 58, 586 S.E.2d 321 (2003).

Sporadic repairs.

- Trial court properly granted a renter summary judgment and removed an affidavit asserting adverse possession filed by the owner of the first floor of a building with regard to a 1,350 square foot space on the second floor of the building as the renter established that title was acquired via a quit claim deed, that the renter changed the door at the base of the stairwell and had sole access to the second floor space, as well as posted no trespassing signs. The owner of the first floor failed to establish a continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of the space based on sporadic repairs made to the roof of the entire building. MEA Family Invs., LP v. Adams, 284 Ga. 407, 667 S.E.2d 609 (2008).

When there has been no cultivation, enclosure, or act of possession thereon except the occasional cutting of timber of a disputed strip of land, there can be no prescriptive title based on possession of the property for 20 years. Robertson v. Abernathy, 192 Ga. 694, 16 S.E.2d 584 (1941), later appeal, 195 Ga. 704, 25 S.E.2d 424 (1943).

Burden of proof satisfied.

- Because: (1) a landowner continuously and exclusively maintained and used the land in question for more than 20 years accompanied by a claim of right; and (2) a claim that the Dead Man's Statute was violated lacked merit, the landowner established prescriptive title by adverse possession. Murray v. Stone, 283 Ga. 6, 655 S.E.2d 821 (2008).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Adverse Possession, §§ 1 et seq., 7, 13 et seq., 42, 50.

C.J.S.

- 2 C.J.S., Adverse Possession, §§ 66, 200 et seq.

ALR.

- Adverse possession of railroad right of way, 50 A.L.R. 303.

May adverse possession be predicated upon use or occupancy by one spouse of real property of other, 74 A.L.R. 138.

Time during which dominant and servient tracts were in same ownership or under same control as excluded or included in determining easement by prescription, 98 A.L.R. 591.

Adoption as period of prescription for easement the period prescribed by statute of limitations with reference to adverse possession as including condition of color of title or right or other conditions imposed by that statute, 112 A.L.R. 545.

Adverse possession as affected by attempt during period thereof to change, or make more specific, the tract claimed, 115 A.L.R. 1299.

Time when statute of limitations or period of adverse possession of real estate commences to run against or in favor purchaser at judicial sale, 118 A.L.R. 946.

Adverse possession: mortgagee's possession before foreclosure as barring right of redemption, 7 A.L.R.2d 1131.

Acquisition of title to mines or minerals by adverse possession, 35 A.L.R.2d 124.

Possession of mortgagor or successor in interest as adverse to purchaser at foreclosure sale, 38 A.L.R.2d 348.

Adverse possession of landlord as affected by tenant's recognition of title of third person, 38 A.L.R.2d 826.

Adverse possession under parol gift of land, 43 A.L.R.2d 6.

Title by or through adverse possession as marketable, 46 A.L.R.2d 544.

Tax sales or forfeitures by or to governmental units as interrupting adverse possession, 50 A.L.R.2d 600.

Acquisition of title to land by adverse possession by state or other governmental unit or agency, 18 A.L.R.3d 678.

Owner's surveying of land as entry thereon tolling running of statute of limitations for purposes of adverse possession, 76 A.L.R.3d 1202.