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2018 Georgia Code 44-7-14 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 44 PROPERTY

Section 7. Landlord and Tenant, 44-7-1 through 44-7-119.

ARTICLE 1 IN GENERAL

44-7-14. Tort liability of landlord.

Having fully parted with possession and the right of possession, the landlord is not responsible to third persons for damages resulting from the negligence or illegal use of the premises by the tenant; provided, however, the landlord is responsible for damages arising from defective construction or for damages arising from the failure to keep the premises in repair.

(Civil Code 1895, § 3118; Civil Code 1910, § 3694; Code 1933, § 61-112; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 44.)

History of section.

- This Code section is derived from the decisions in J.B. White & Co. v. Montgomery, 58 Ga. 204 (1877), and Freidenburg & Co. v. Jones, 63 Ga. 612 (1879).

Cross references.

- Liability of owners and occupiers of land, § 51-3-1 et seq.

Law reviews.

- For article surveying torts law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 271 (1982). For survey article on tort law for the period from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 425 (2003). For note advocating reasonable man standard for tort liability of landlord, see 23 Emory L.J. 1051 (1974). For note, "Don't Let the Bed Bugs Bill: Landlord Liability for Bed Bug Infestations," see 34 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 479 (2018). For comment on Martin v. Medlin, 81 Ga. App. 602, 59 S.E.2d 519 (1950), see 13 Ga. B.J. 240 (1950).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

General Consideration

Origin of section.

- Under this statute, which is a mere codification of the principles laid down in J.B. White & Co. v. Montgomery, 58 Ga. 204 (1877), and Freidenburg & Co. v. Jones, 63 Ga. 612 (1879), a landlord is responsible to third persons both for damage arising from defective construction and for damage arising from failure to keep the premises in repair. As to positive misfeasance in construction, landlord is subject to the same rule which is announced in Mayor of Brunswick v. Braxton, 70 Ga. 193 (1833). Monahan v. National Realty Co., 4 Ga. App. 680, 62 S.E. 127 (1908) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14).

Public policy.

- General Assembly has consistently expressed the public policy of this state as one in favor of imposing upon the landlord liability for damages to others from defective construction and failure to keep one's premises in repair. The expressed public policy in favor of landlord liability is matched by an equally strong and important public policy in favor of preventing unsafe residential housing. Thompson v. Crownover, 259 Ga. 126, 381 S.E.2d 283 (1989).

O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 provided remedy to member of military and spouse, who lived in military base housing, and recovery was not barred under the "activity incident to service" doctrine. Elliott ex rel. Elliott v. United States, 877 F. Supp. 1569 (M.D. Ga. 1992), aff'd, 13 F.3d 1555 (11th Cir. 1995).

Construction of section.

- Properly construed, this statute does not make a landlord responsible as an insurer, but liable only in the event the landlord fails to comply with the landlord's statutory duty of keeping the premises in repair. Birdsey v. Greene, 176 Ga. 688, 168 S.E. 564 (1933) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14).

O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 makes it clear that a landlord who relinquishes possession of the premises cannot be liable to third parties for damages arising from the negligence of the tenant. Colquitt v. Rowland, 265 Ga. 905, 463 S.E.2d 491 (1995); Johnson v. Loy, 231 Ga. App. 431, 499 S.E.2d 140 (1998).

Landlord not insurer of tenant's safety.

- Even though the landlord is under a duty to keep the premises in repair pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 44-7-13 and44-7-14, the landlord is not an insurer of the tenant's safety. Ethridge v. Davis, 243 Ga. App. 11, 530 S.E.2d 477 (2000).

Purpose of section.

- Statute was designed simply to embody a rule of law which was well settled and well understood at the time of the law's codification, and not to enlarge the duty devolving upon landlords with respect to the making of repairs nor to impose upon the landlord a harsher rule of responsibility than that to which the landlord were already subject. Ocean S.S. Co. v. Hamilton, 112 Ga. 901, 38 S.E. 204 (1901); Birdsey v. Greene, 176 Ga. 688, 168 S.E. 564 (1933); Howell Gas of Athens, Inc. v. Coile, 112 Ga. App. 732, 146 S.E.2d 145 (1965) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14).

Modification of common law.

- Statute changed the rule which had been applied under the common law for under the common law the burden of repairing was upon the tenant. Roach v. LeGree, 18 Ga. App. 250, 89 S.E. 167 (1916); Wallace v. Adams, 47 Ga. App. 144, 169 S.E. 852 (1933) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14).

Relationship of landlord and tenant required.

- When a party enters upon land under a contract of purchase, prior to the consummation of the sales transaction, a landlord and tenant relationship does not come into existence, and, absent this relationship, the provisions of this statute concerning the liability of a landlord to third persons cannot apply. MacKenna v. Jordan, 123 Ga. App. 801, 182 S.E.2d 550 (1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14).

Liability of out-of-possession owner limited.

- When a plaintiff, injured when the plaintiff fell from an amusement ride, has presented no evidence to contradict a defendant's showing that it was out of possession of the amusement park, the defendant's tort liability is limited by O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14, which states that a landlord is not liable for the negligence of a tenant toward third persons; as the alleged negligence in this action was the tenant's, the landlord's motion for summary judgment would be granted. Fraley ex rel. Fraley v. Lake Winnepesaukah, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1986).

After a minor child was bitten by another tenant's dog, an action by the mother of the child against the owner of the apartment complex and the apartment's leasing agent resulted in summary judgment against the mother, as the out-of-possession landlord's only liability to third persons was that of O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14, which was inapplicable; there was no showing that either the owner or agent had any type of knowledge of the dog's propensities or viciousness, and the agent was therefore not shown to be liable on any claim arising under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. Griffiths v. Rowe Props., 271 Ga. App. 344, 609 S.E.2d 690 (2005).

Trial court erred in denying the lessor's motion for summary judgment on the premises liability claim brought by a tree trimmer and spouse after the tenants asked for help to get a chainsaw unstuck from a tree because regardless of any actions taken by the tenants, the lessor was not liable for faulty construction or a failure to repair. Barclay v. Stephenson, 337 Ga. App. 365, 787 S.E.2d 322 (2016).

Suitability for intended use.

- There is in this state, as at common law (the statute not having changed this rule), no implied covenant that the premises are suitable for the purpose for which they are leased, or for the particular use for which they are intended by the tenant; the only modification of this rule in Georgia is as to the duty of the landlord to "keep the premises in repair." Childers v. Speer, 63 Ga. App. 848, 12 S.E.2d 439 (1940).

Implied covenant of suitability for the intended use has crept into the law only to the extent that this statute places upon such landlord a duty to keep the premises in repair, which must necessarily imply that state of repair which is reasonably necessary to make the premises fit for the use intended by the lessee and known to the lessor. Point Apts., Inc. v. Bryant, 99 Ga. App. 110, 107 S.E.2d 684 (1959) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14).

From former Code 1933, §§ 61-111 and 61-112 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 47-7-13 and47-7-14) has been derived the principle that suitability for the use "intended by the lessee and known to the lessor" was assured. Thus, a jury question existed as to the suitability of a lock to prevent burglaries. Warner v. Arnold, 133 Ga. App. 174, 210 S.E.2d 350 (1974).

Persons present by invitation of tenant.

- Tenant's family, tenant's guests, servants, employees, or others present by the tenant's express or implied invitation, stand in his shoes and are controlled by the rules governing the right to recover for injuries arising from a landlord's failure to keep the premises in repair. Archer v. Blalock, 97 Ga. 719, 25 S.E. 391 (1896); Williams v. Mayes, 46 Ga. App. 142, 166 S.E. 876 (1932); Wallace v. Adams, 47 Ga. App. 144, 169 S.E. 852 (1933); Chamberlain v. Nash, 54 Ga. App. 508, 188 S.E. 276 (1936); Dobbs v. Noble, 55 Ga. App. 201, 189 S.E. 694 (1937); Rogers v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 111 Ga. App. 792, 143 S.E.2d 438 (1965); Yates v. Crumbley, 116 Ga. App. 366, 157 S.E.2d 295 (1967); Black v. New Holland Baptist Church, 122 Ga. App. 606, 178 S.E.2d 571 (1970).

Actions by invitees.

- While actions by invitees of tenants against landlords for failure to repair premises are based on this statute, the rationale of the basis for the actions is the same as if the duty had been a general common-law duty. University Apts., Inc. v. Uhler, 84 Ga. App. 720, 67 S.E.2d 201 (1951) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14).

Liability for nuisance.

- If the nuisance existed upon the premises when the lease was made, the landlord is liable, but if the tenant continues the nuisance after the tenant obtains exclusive possession and control, the tenant alone is liable for the nuisance's continuance. Robertson v. Liggett Drug Co., 81 Ga. App. 850, 60 S.E.2d 268 (1950); Howell Gas of Athens, Inc. v. Coile, 112 Ga. App. 732, 146 S.E.2d 145 (1965).

Contractual stipulations.

- When lessees accepted the premises in the condition in which the premises were at the time of the lease, as suitable for the purpose intended, and further relieved the landlord of any obligation to repair except after written notice, these provisions in the contract constituted a "stipulation to the contrary" relieving the lessor of any duty to repair the premises except after notice to the lessor by the tenants. Point Apts., Inc. v. Bryant, 99 Ga. App. 110, 107 S.E.2d 684 (1959).

Owner of property not used as a "dwelling place" can contract to avoid the duties to repair and improve the property. Groutas v. McCoy, 219 Ga. App. 252, 464 S.E.2d 657 (1995).

Proximate cause of injury.

- In order to recover, a tenant is required to show not only that the landlord breached the landlord's statutory duty to keep the premises in repair, but that such breach was the proximate cause of the tenant's injury. Brown v. RFC Mgt., Inc., 189 Ga. App. 603, 376 S.E.2d 691 (1988); Jones v. Campbell, 198 Ga. App. 83, 400 S.E.2d 364 (1990).

Defective construction defined.

- Construction which is not strong enough to stand the strain of ordinary use is defective construction. Monahan v. National Realty Co., 4 Ga. App. 680, 62 S.E. 127 (1908).

Neither the mere juxtaposition of a toilet and elevator nor the absence of lights in the passageway to the toilet at night constitutes defective construction. Smith v. Inman, 32 Ga. App. 24, 122 S.E. 632 (1924).

Repair defined.

- Word repair contemplates an existing structure or thing which has become imperfect, and means to supply in the original existing structure that which is lost or destroyed, and thereby restore it to the condition in which it originally existed. Childers v. Speer, 63 Ga. App. 848, 12 S.E.2d 439 (1940).

Responsibility not waived.

- As between a landlord and tenant, the responsibility for damages may be waived, but no such waiver results from a provision which merely refers to a defective condition amounting to an affirmative act of the landlord committed during the term of the tenancy and resulting in the creation of a defect which would not otherwise have existed. Kulman v. Sulcer, 99 Ga. App. 28, 107 S.E.2d 674 (1959), overruled on other grounds by George v. Hercules Real Estate Servs., 795 S.E.2d 81 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).

Pleading.

- Allegation that the defendant knew or ought to have known of the defective condition of the premises is an allegation, when construed most strongly against the pleader, that the defendant had no knowledge and was negligent in failing to know or discover the alleged defective condition. Echols v. Patterson, 60 Ga. App. 372, 4 S.E.2d 81 (1939).

Failure to state cause of action.

- Petition alleging that the owner had fully parted with possession and the right of possession but failing to allege that the damages were from injuries due to defective construction or to a failure to keep the premises in repair did not state a case against the owner. Reddien v. C.M.S. Realty Co., 75 Ga. App. 848, 44 S.E.2d 825 (1947).

Tenant's knowledge of condition requiring dismissal of petition.

- When it appears from the allegations of a petition, brought by a tenant against a landlord for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the landlord's failure to repair, that the tenant had knowledge of the defective and unsafe condition of the premises, having discussed the unsafe and defective condition thereof with a carpenter sent by the landlord to repair other portions of the rented premises, a motion to dismiss the petition was properly sustained although the petition contained allegations that the tenant was without fault, in that the tenant did not know of the defective and unsafe condition of the steps, and in the exercise of ordinary care could not have discovered the unsafe condition of the steps. Upchurch v. Coggins, 70 Ga. App. 205, 27 S.E.2d 869 (1943).

Question for trier of fact as to what are common areas.

- Question of whether a particular area of an apartment building - i.e., a patio deck behind an apartment, from which a tenant fell after the railing gave way - was a common area over which the landlord retained a qualified right of possession, rendering the landlord liable for failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises safe, or was an area which was in the exclusive possession of the tenant, rendering the landlord liable for failure to repair in the face of a notice of defect, was a matter for determination by the trier of fact, thus the court properly instructed the jury as to both legal theories. Andres v. Roswell-Windsor Village Apts., 777 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1985).

Setting aside verdict.

- In an action for damages for injuries to a tenant alleged to have been caused by defective premises, a verdict for the plaintiff will not be set aside on the ground that the landlord could not have discovered the defect allegedly causing the injury in the repairing of another defect of which notice was given to the landlord, when the evidence is sufficient to authorize the finding that the defect allegedly causing the injury was in existence at the time the premises were leased to the tenant, and that the landlord could have discovered the defect by the exercise of ordinary care, as in such a case the landlord's duty to discover the defect arose from the landlord's duty under the law not to lease premises having a latent defect discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care, and the landlord was thus charged regardless of notice. Dodge v. Huggins, 62 Ga. App. 724, 9 S.E.2d 844 (1940).

Owner had relinquished control.

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to warehouse owner who leased premises to tenant who installed skateboard ramp from which invitee fell and was injured as the record was devoid of evidence that the warehouse owner had not fully relinquished possession of the premises to the tenant; thus, the invitee could not show that the warehouse owner had a duty it owed to the invitee. Ray v. Smith, 259 Ga. App. 749, 577 S.E.2d 807 (2003).

Trial court did not err in granting landlord summary judgment in a patron's action to recover damages for injuries the patron sustained in a restaurant owner's parking lot on the ground that the landlord had fully parted with possession of the leased property and could not be held liable for the patron's injuries pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 because the evidence the patron offered was insufficient to create an issue of fact as to whether the landlord was an out-of-possession landlord; the owner had exclusive control of the parking lot where the patron's injury occurred, and there was no evidence that the landlord contractually undertook to remain in possession of any common areas on the property, let alone over the parking lot where the patron's injury occurred. Lake v. APH Enters., LLC, 306 Ga. App. 317, 702 S.E.2d 654 (2010).

Landlord was not liable for injuries a patron sustained in a restaurant owner's parking lot because although the landlord was responsible by verbal lease for the main structure, while the owner was responsible for maintaining the area where the injury occurred, and the landlord retained limited entry or inspection rights that were unrelated to the cause of the injuries, such limited rights did not evidence such dominion and control of the premises so as to vitiate the landlord's limited liability imposed by O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 and replace it with the liability imposed by O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. Lake v. APH Enters., LLC, 306 Ga. App. 317, 702 S.E.2d 654 (2010).

Cited in Augusta-Aiken Ry. & Elec. Corp. v. Hafer, 21 Ga. App. 246, 94 S.E. 252 (1917); Gledhill v. Harvey, 55 Ga. App. 322, 190 S.E. 61 (1937); McCrory Stores Corp. v. Ahern, 65 Ga. App. 334, 15 S.E.2d 797 (1941); Townsend & Ghegan Enters. v. W.R. Bean & Son, 117 Ga. App. 109, 159 S.E.2d 776 (1968); Scarboro Enters., Inc. v. Hirsh, 119 Ga. App. 866, 169 S.E.2d 182 (1969); Ragland v. Rooker, 124 Ga. App. 361, 183 S.E.2d 579 (1971); Espy v. Miller Bros. Co., 126 Ga. App. 98, 189 S.E.2d 911 (1972); Moody v. Southland Inv. Corp., 126 Ga. App. 225, 190 S.E.2d 578 (1972); Kaplan v. Sanders, 136 Ga. App. 902, 222 S.E.2d 630 (1975); Thompson-Weinman & Co. v. Brock, 144 Ga. App. 346, 241 S.E.2d 279 (1977); Daniel v. Georgia Power Co., 146 Ga. App. 596, 247 S.E.2d 139 (1978); Porter v. Moschella, 152 Ga. App. 678, 263 S.E.2d 538 (1979); Bradley v. Godwin, 152 Ga. App. 782, 264 S.E.2d 262 (1979); Wilner's, Inc. v. Fine, 153 Ga. App. 591, 266 S.E.2d 278 (1980); Mills v. Bonanza Int'l Corp., 160 Ga. App. 104, 286 S.E.2d 337 (1981); Vizzini v. Blonder, 165 Ga. App. 840, 303 S.E.2d 38 (1983); Atkins v. Tri-Cities Steel, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 349, 304 S.E.2d 409 (1983); Davis v. Smith, 169 Ga. App. 635, 314 S.E.2d 471 (1984); Schuster v. Plaza Pac. Equities, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Bettis v. Ryle, 176 Ga. App. 88, 335 S.E.2d 399 (1985); Shepherd v. Holmes, 184 Ga. App. 648, 362 S.E.2d 396 (1987); Whipper v. McLendon Movers, Inc., 188 Ga. App. 249, 372 S.E.2d 820 (1988); Barlow v. Brant, 206 Ga. App. 313, 425 S.E.2d 309 (1992); Stephens v. Ernie's Steakhouse of Stone Mt., Inc., 215 Ga. App. 166, 450 S.E.2d 275 (1994); Culberson v. Lanier, 216 Ga. App. 686, 455 S.E.2d 385 (1995); Walker v. Sturbridge Partners, Ltd., 221 Ga. App. 36, 470 S.E.2d 738 (1996); Doe v. Prudential-Bache/A.G. Spanos Realty Partners, 222 Ga. App. 169, 474 S.E.2d 31 (1996); Doe v. Briargate Apts., Inc., 227 Ga. App. 408, 489 S.E.2d 170 (1997); Standard Mgt. Co. v. Scott, 229 Ga. App. 36, 493 S.E.2d 216 (1997); Asbell v. BP Exploration & Oil, Inc., 230 Ga. App. 700, 497 S.E.2d 260 (1998); Myers v. Harris, 257 Ga. App. 286, 570 S.E.2d 600 (2002); Norman v. Jones Lang LaSalle Ams., Inc., 277 Ga. App. 621, 627 S.E.2d 382 (2006).

Duties of Landlord

1. In General

Construed with § 51-3-1. - Word "owner," as used in former Civil Code 1910, § 4420 (see O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1), was not synonymous with "landlord," as the latter word was used in former Civil Code 1910, § 3694 (see O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14), and since the owner of land has fully parted with both possession and right of possession by any lawful contract of rental, the landlord's liabilities are those prescribed by former Civil Code 1910, § 3694. Augusta-Aiken Ry. & Elec. Corp. v. Hafer, 21 Ga. App. 246, 94 S.E. 252 (1917); Dobbs v. Noble, 55 Ga. App. 201, 189 S.E. 694 (1937); Edwards v. Lassiter, 67 Ga. App. 368, 20 S.E.2d 451 (1942); Goettee v. Carlyle, 68 Ga. App. 288, 22 S.E.2d 854 (1942); Rothberg v. Bradley, 85 Ga. App. 477, 69 S.E.2d 293 (1952); Maloof v. Blackmon, 105 Ga. App. 207, 124 S.E.2d 441 (1962); Howell Gas of Athens, Inc. v. Coile, 112 Ga. App. 732, 146 S.E.2d 145 (1965); Powell v. United Oil Corp., 160 Ga. App. 810, 287 S.E.2d 667 (1982); Cooperwood v. Auld, 175 Ga. App. 694, 334 S.E.2d 22 (1985).

Retention of the right to enter the leased premises in emergencies and during business hours for landlord related purposes did not evidence such dominion and control of the premises so as to vitiate appellee's limited liability under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 and replace it with liability imposed by O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1. Godwin v. Olshan, 161 Ga. App. 35, 288 S.E.2d 850 (1982).

Landlord was not liable for injuries to a tenant suffered as the result of the independent criminal conduct of a third party which occurred within the premises over which the tenant had complete control; the owner's duty to the tenant was limited to that imposed under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14, i.e., a duty to ensure that the leased premises were properly constructed and maintained, and it was not the duty owed under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, pertaining to the landlord's duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping common areas safe. Plott v. Cloer, 219 Ga. App. 130, 464 S.E.2d 39 (1995).

Retention of right to approve tenant insurance policies did not evidence such dominion and control of the premises so as to vitiate appellee's limited liability under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 and replace it with the liability imposed by O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, which pertains to the duty of an owner or occupier of land to invitees. Godwin v. Olshan, 161 Ga. App. 35, 288 S.E.2d 850 (1982).

Liability generally.

- If, after notice of the defective condition of the premises and after the lapse of a reasonable time in which to make the needed repairs, the repairs are not made, the landlord will be liable to the tenant or a member of the tenant's family for damages occasioned by the disrepair of the premises, if the injured party's own negligence did not bring about the injury. Veal v. Hanlon, 123 Ga. 642, 51 S.E. 579 (1905).

O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 imposes liability upon a landlord for damages that arise from defective construction or the landlord's failure to keep the premises in repair. Flores v. Strickland, 259 Ga. App. 335, 577 S.E.2d 41 (2003).

Duty and liability for repair.

- Landlord is not an insurer, but the landlord is under a legal duty to keep the rented premises in repair, and is liable in damages to a person who receives injury while lawfully upon the premises and who is in the exercise of due care, if the injury arises because of the defective construction of a building erected on the premises by the landlord, or because of the landlord's failure to repair defects of which the landlord knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence ought to know. Stack v. Harris, 111 Ga. 149, 36 S.E. 615 (1900); Ocean S.S. Co. v. Hamilton, 112 Ga. 901, 38 S.E. 204 (1901); Monahan v. National Realty Co., 4 Ga. App. 680, 62 S.E. 127 (1908); Crook v. Foster, 142 Ga. 715, 83 S.E. 670 (1914); Marr v. Dieter, 27 Ga. App. 711, 109 S.E. 532 (1921); Birdsey v. Greene, 176 Ga. 688, 168 S.E. 564 (1933); Oglesby v. Rutledge, 67 Ga. App. 656, 21 S.E.2d 497 (1942).

Trial court erred in granting an apartment owner and a manager summary judgment in a tenant's action to recover damages for the personal injuries the tenant sustained from carbon-monoxide poisoning because the owner and manager could be liable for the actions of a construction company's workers even if the company, which was orally hired to assist in the clean up of the owner's apartments, was an independent contractor; the evidence showed that a temporary tarp repair the workers performed was completed so negligently that a defect in the premises was created, and some evidence showed that the company and its workers were not independent contractors. In placing a temporary tarp on the roof of the tenant's apartment, the company was performing the duty of the owner and manager to repair the premises by stopping a leak until a more permanent repair could be effected. Atkins v. MRP Park Lake, L. P., 301 Ga. App. 275, 687 S.E.2d 215 (2009).

Trial court erred in granting an apartment owner and a manager summary judgment in a tenant's action to recover damages for the personal injuries the tenant sustained from carbon-monoxide poisoning on the ground that the tenant had equal knowledge with the owner and manager that the vents of the apartment were covered because some evidence showed that other agents of the owner and manager had superior knowledge of the defect, and the evidence was disputed as to whether the tenant had equal knowledge; an employee of the owner and manager supervised the emergency repairs of the apartment and was constantly walking the property to check on those repairs, and should have seen the vent pipe problem. Atkins v. MRP Park Lake, L. P., 301 Ga. App. 275, 687 S.E.2d 215 (2009).

Although O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 provided that an out-of-possession landlord was responsible for damages arising from the failure to keep the premises in repair, the plaintiff's equal or superior knowledge of the defect defeated premises liability based on the statute. Cottingham v. Sapp, 344 Ga. App. 651, 811 S.E.2d 442 (2018).

Degree of diligence required in keeping the premises safe does not consist in either slight diligence or of extraordinary diligence, but rather consists of ordinary care, such as a prudent householder might reasonably be expected to exercise. Cuthbert v. Schofield, 35 Ga. App. 443, 133 S.E. 303 (1926); Black v. New Holland Baptist Church, 122 Ga. App. 606, 178 S.E.2d 571 (1970).

Due care required in making repairs.

- Landlord making repairs on the rented premises, either voluntarily or in compliance with the landlord's statutory obligation, is required to use due care to leave the repaired portion free from defects. McGee v. Hardacre, 27 Ga. App. 106, 107 S.E. 563 (1921); later appeal, 33 Ga. App. 43, 125 S.E. 383 (1924); Marr v. Dieter, 27 Ga. App. 711, 109 S.E. 532 (1921); Hill v. Liebman, Inc., 53 Ga. App. 462, 186 S.E. 431 (1936); Oglesby v. Rutledge, 67 Ga. App. 656, 21 S.E.2d 497 (1942).

Liability for latent defects.

- Landlord is liable for injuries to the tenant arising from latent defects unknown to the tenant, existing at the time of the lease, provided the landlord actually knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care on the landlord's part might have known, of their existence. Oglesby v. Rutledge, 67 Ga. App. 656, 21 S.E.2d 497 (1942).

When rented premises become out of repair, it is the duty of the landlord to repair the same on notice by the tenant, and where, after such notice and before repairs are made, a tenant is injured by some latent defect which the repairs might have disclosed, but which in the exercise of ordinary care the tenant is not put on notice of, and which is in apparently sound condition, the plaintiff is not thereby precluded from recovery. Harris v. Edge, 92 Ga. App. 827, 90 S.E.2d 47 (1955).

Landlord was not liable for any faulty construction of a premises since an alleged defect, the uneven steps and small landing, was simply a latent defect in existence at the time the landlord purchased the property which the landlord did not build. Rainey v. 1600 Peachtree, L.L.C., 255 Ga. App. 299, 565 S.E.2d 517 (2002).

Liability for patent defects.

- In the absence of an express contract to do so, a landlord is under no duty to repair a patent defect in the rented premises since the defect's existence was known to the tenant at the time the rent contract was entered into; and subsequent notice by a tenant of the existence of such a defect would not place upon the landlord any duty of inspection or repair. Chamberlain v. Nash, 54 Ga. App. 508, 188 S.E. 276 (1936); Barnes v. Thomas, 72 Ga. App. 827, 35 S.E.2d 364 (1945).

Landlord is liable for damages when the repairs the landlord has a duty to make are completed negligently so that a defect in the premises remains despite the attempted repair. However, when the worker hired is an independent contractor, the landlord is not liable for the negligent acts of the worker during the course of the repairs. Mason v. Gracey, 189 Ga. App. 150, 375 S.E.2d 283 (1988).

Landlord has a duty to keep premises in repair, and if defects render premises unsafe or uninhabitable, a landlord may not avoid duties created by statutes or by housing codes even though the defect is patent. Roth v. Wu, 199 Ga. App. 665, 405 S.E.2d 741 (1991).

Common area defect.

- When the allegedly defective condition on an owner's property involved the common area of a parking lot and not the residential living area over which tenant had dominion, and there was no assertion that the landowner violated any applicable statute or housing code, liability was properly predicated upon O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 and not O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14. Commerce Properties, Inc. v. Linthicum, 209 Ga. App. 853, 434 S.E.2d 769 (1993).

Liability for dangerous condition.

- When a portion of leased premises is dangerously out of repair and such condition is known to a tenant who continues to use that area, a tenant cannot recover from the landlord for damages resulting from the condition; but the severity of the doctrine of assumption of risk has been ameliorated in cases when the doctrine's application would make the tenant "a captive" in the tenant's own home. Carey v. Bradford, 218 Ga. App. 325, 461 S.E.2d 290 (1995).

When a dangerous area is tenant's only access or only safe or reasonable access to the home, tenant's equal knowledge of the danger does not excuse the landlord of damages caused by a failure to keep the premises in repair. Carey v. Bradford, 218 Ga. App. 325, 461 S.E.2d 290 (1995).

Questions for jury.

- Whether landlord who was aware of a defective gas heater failed to exercise reasonable care to repair the heater, and whether the condition of the heater constituted a violation of the housing code, were questions for the jury. Thompson v. Crownover, 259 Ga. 126, 381 S.E.2d 283 (1989).

After learning that its back-up generator was irreparable, determining whether the landlord acted negligently, breached the statutory duties as landlord, or violated local ordinances or housing codes were questions for the jury. McCullough v. Briarcliff Summit, 237 Ga. App. 630, 516 S.E.2d 353 (1999).

Landlord is not an insurer of the tenant's safety. Black v. New Holland Baptist Church, 122 Ga. App. 606, 178 S.E.2d 571 (1970); Warner v. Arnold, 133 Ga. App. 174, 210 S.E.2d 350 (1974).

Liability to invitee of tenant.

- Landlord is liable to one lawfully present on the rented premises, by invitation of the tenant, for injuries arising from defective construction, or from failure to keep the premises in repair, since the defect is known to the landlord or in the exercise of reasonable diligence could have been known, and the injured person was personally in the exercise of due care. Ross v. Jackson, 123 Ga. 657, 51 S.E. 578 (1905); Crossgrove v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 30 Ga. App. 462, 118 S.E. 694 (1923); See § 4420. Mattox v. Lambright, 31 Ga. App. 441, 120 S.E. 685 (1923); Ramey v. Pritchett, 90 Ga. App. 745, 84 S.E.2d 305 (1954); Spence v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 195 Ga. App. 294, 393 S.E.2d 1 (1990).

An out-of-possession landlord's tort liability to third persons is determined under the bases set forth in O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 and it was error to assess liability based upon principles of common law negligence. Martin v. Johnson-Lemon, 271 Ga. 120, 516 S.E.2d 66 (1999), reversing Lemon v. Martin, 232 Ga. App. 579, 502 S.E.2d 273 (1998).

In a personal injury action arising from a fall suffered by a lessee's visitor from a pull-down staircase, because no questions of fact remained as to an out-of-possession landlord's liability for failure to repair, defective construction, or failure to warn, the landlord was properly granted summary judgment as to those issues. Gainey v. Smacky's Invs., Inc., 287 Ga. App. 529, 652 S.E.2d 167 (2007).

Liability of landlord to third persons.

- Landlord's liability to a third person who is injured on property which was relinquished by rental or under a lease is determined by O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14. Younger v. Dunagan, 318 Ga. App. 554, 733 S.E.2d 81 (2012).

Liability for unforeseen and extraordinary causes.

- Landlord is not liable to the tenant for damages to the tenant's goods resulting from unforeseen and extraordinary causes unless so stipulated in the contract at the time of renting. Guthman v. Castleberry, 49 Ga. 272 (1873); Lumpkin v. Provident Loan Soc'y, Inc., 15 Ga. App. 816, 84 S.E. 216 (1915).

Contractual modification of landlord's liability.

- Liability of a landlord arising from failure to keep the premises in repair may be limited as between the parties by a lease containing contrary stipulations. Tribble v. Somers, 115 Ga. App. 847, 156 S.E.2d 130 (1967).

No exemption from responsibility.

- Knowledge required for liability may be constructive as well as actual for a landlord or the landlord's agent charged with the duty to repair cannot exempt oneself from responsibility merely by remaining ignorant of the facts out of which one's duty arises. Bazemore v. Burnet, 117 Ga. App. 849, 161 S.E.2d 924 (1968).

Suspension of liability until tenant gives notice.

- When a tenant has exclusive possession of the property and there is no covenant to repair or right of entry to inspect or repair, the law suspends the liability of the lessor as to injuries from defects existing at the time of the lease which the lessor could not have discovered by the exercise of ordinary care, those known to the tenant at the time, or patent and discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care, and those arising after the tenancy began until notice by the tenant. City of Dalton v. Anderson, 72 Ga. App. 109, 33 S.E.2d 115 (1945).

Landlord with qualified possession.

- When the landlord retains qualified possession of the rented premises for the purpose of supervising the building, collecting the rents, and making repairs, the landlord is liable for an injury resulting from a defective condition of the building, if the landlord has actual notice of such defective condition, or if, in the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care and diligence, the landlord ought to have known of the defect. Monahan v. National Realty Co., 4 Ga. App. 680, 62 S.E. 127 (1908); Davis v. Hall, 21 Ga. App. 265, 94 S.E. 274 (1917); Marr v. Dieter, 27 Ga. App. 711, 109 S.E. 532 (1921); White v. Thacker, 89 Ga. App. 656, 80 S.E.2d 699 (1954).

Reservation of limited right to enter.

- Mere presence of a lease clause reserving the right to enter for repairs and inspection cannot impose a general duty to exercise ordinary care in making reasonable inspections of those areas of the building over which the landlord retained neither a right to control nor the duty to repair. Ladson Invs. v. Bagent, 151 Ga. App. 24, 258 S.E.2d 718 (1979).

Person may be landlord without being owner. Hill v. Liebman, Inc., 53 Ga. App. 462, 186 S.E. 431 (1936).

Tenant must be free from negligence.

- It is presumed that the premises leased are in a condition suitable for the purposes for which they were rented, and if such is not the case, and damage results therefrom to the tenant, the landlord is liable, provided the landlord has had notice of the defective condition of the premises and has failed after a reasonable time to make the necessary repairs, and provided also that the tenant has not been guilty of such negligence as to bar a recovery of the tenant. Black v. New Holland Baptist Church, 122 Ga. App. 606, 178 S.E.2d 571 (1970).

Monitoring lessee's compliance with covenant to repair.

- Fact that lessee was obligated under terms of lease to maintain premises in safe condition cannot be held to have placed any duty upon lessor to monitor lessee's compliance. Ragsdale v. Harris, 162 Ga. App. 888, 293 S.E.2d 475 (1982).

Lessor's liability when trademark signs displayed at gas stations.

- Distinctive colors and trademark signs are displayed at gasoline stations by independent dealers of petroleum products suppliers, and represent no more than notice to the motorists that a given company's products are being marketed at the station, and do not render lessor company liable for lessee's failure to maintain premises in safe condition. Ragsdale v. Harris, 162 Ga. App. 888, 293 S.E.2d 475 (1982).

Illegal use of property by sign company unauthorized by landlord.

- Under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-11, a tenant such as a sign company has no right beyond the use of the land actually conveyed or rented. Furthermore, under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14, the landlord and neighbor of plaintiffs was not responsible for the tenant's, the sign company's, illegal use of the neighbor's property or airspace. Powell v. Norman Elec. Galaxy, Inc., 255 Ga. App. 407, 565 S.E.2d 591 (2002).

2. Knowledge or Notice

Liability predicated upon knowledge.

- Landlord's liability is predicated upon actual or constructive knowledge of the defective condition. Stack v. Harris, 111 Ga. 149, 36 S.E. 615 (1900); Ocean S.S. Co. v. Hamilton, 112 Ga. 901, 38 S.E. 204 (1901); Monahan v. National Realty Co., 4 Ga. App. 680, 62 S.E. 127 (1908); Wall Realty Co. v. Leslie, 54 Ga. App. 560, 188 S.E. 600 (1936); Dobbs v. Noble, 55 Ga. App. 201, 189 S.E. 694 (1937); Echols v. Patterson, 60 Ga. App. 372, 4 S.E.2d 81 (1939); Turner v. Long, 61 Ga. App. 785, 7 S.E.2d 595 (1940); Home Owners Loan Corp. v. Brazzeal, 62 Ga. App. 683, 9 S.E.2d 773 (1940); Upchurch v. Coggins, 70 Ga. App. 205, 27 S.E.2d 869 (1943); Ball v. Murray, 91 Ga. App. 686, 86 S.E.2d 706 (1955); National Distrib. Co. v. Georgia Indus. Realty Co., 106 Ga. App. 475, 127 S.E.2d 303 (1962); Fincher v. Fox, 107 Ga. App. 695, 131 S.E.2d 651 (1963); Howell Gas of Athens, Inc. v. Coile, 122 Ga. App. 732, 146 S.E.2d 145 (1965); Tribble v. Somers, 115 Ga. App. 847, 156 S.E.2d 130 (1967); Bazemore v. Burnet, 117 Ga. App. 849, 161 S.E.2d 924 (1968).

In a personal injury action, because an injured party failed to show that the landlords could not have had constructive notice of the deteriorated condition of the steps upon which that party fell and was injured, the landlords were not liable for their failure to keep the premises in repair. Thus, the landlords were properly granted summary judgment as to the issue of liability for the party's injuries. Stelter v. Simpson, 288 Ga. App. 402, 655 S.E.2d 237 (2007).

Effect of notice.

- Notice of a defect given by the tenant to the landlord charges the landlord with notice of such other defects as might reasonably be discovered upon an inspection to repair the defect of which notice was given. Cone v. Lawhon, 61 Ga. App. 797, 7 S.E.2d 597 (1940); Home Owners Loan Corp. v. Brazzeal, 62 Ga. App. 683, 9 S.E.2d 773 (1940); Dempsey v. Smith, 108 Ga. App. 88, 132 S.E.2d 233 (1963); Tribble v. Somers, 115 Ga. App. 847, 156 S.E.2d 130 (1967).

Duration of notice.

- Notice may be actual or constructive but, if the latter, it must be shown to have existed for such a length of time, or under such circumstances, as to put the owner of the building on notice before the owner will be liable for resulting injuries. Fincher v. Fox, 107 Ga. App. 695, 131 S.E.2d 651 (1963).

Liability without actual notice.

- Owner may be held liable for injuries arising from failure to maintain building in proper repair, even without actual notice of the defect if, in the exercise of ordinary care, the landlord should have known of the defect. Home Owners Loan Corp. v. Brazzeal, 62 Ga. App. 683, 9 S.E.2d 773 (1940).

Defective construction by landlord.

- If a defective structure is built by the landlord or under the landlord's direction, the landlord's knowledge of the defective condition will be conclusively presumed. Fuller v. Louis Steyerman & Sons, 46 Ga. App. 830, 169 S.E. 508 (1933); Dobbs v. Noble, 55 Ga. App. 201, 189 S.E. 694 (1937); Robertson v. Liggett Drug Co., 81 Ga. App. 850, 60 S.E.2d 268 (1950).

When the tenant erected a swimming pool after the landlord had relinquished possession and control over the property, the landlord was not liable for injuries sustained by a guest of the tenant even though the landlord was aware of the construction of the pool. Colquitt v. Rowland, 265 Ga. 905, 463 S.E.2d 491 (1995).

Defective construction by predecessor.

- If a defective structure has been built by a predecessor in title of the landlord or some other person not acting under the landlord's supervision or direction, before the landlord can be held responsible, it must appear that the landlord actually knew or by the exercise of ordinary diligence could have and should have known of the improper construction before the tenancy was created. Ross v. Jackson, 123 Ga. 657, 51 S.E. 578 (1905); Dobbs v. Noble, 55 Ga. App. 201, 189 S.E. 694 (1937); Upchurch v. Coggins, 70 Ga. App. 205, 27 S.E.2d 869 (1943); Barnes v. Thomas, 72 Ga. App. 827, 35 S.E.2d 364 (1945); National Distrib. Co. v. Georgia Indus. Realty Co., 106 Ga. App. 475, 127 S.E.2d 303 (1962).

If a building was defectively constructed by a predecessor in title, and the landlord knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence could have known of the building's improper construction before the tenancy was created, the landlord would be answerable to the tenant, or to any one lawfully on the premises by invitation of the tenant, for injuries sustained by reason of the landlord's failure to put the premises in a safe condition, if the person sustaining the injuries could not have avoided the injuries by the exercise of ordinary care. Savage v. Flagler Co., 258 Ga. 335, 368 S.E.2d 504 (1988).

Trial court erred by denying a landlord summary judgment because the evidence showed that the ramp was not built by the landlord or the tenant but by a prior lessee who did not obtain the landlord's approval before construction; thus, since the ramp was not constructed by or under the supervision or direction of the landlord, liability was precluded under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14. Cowart v. Schevitz, 335 Ga. App. 715, 782 S.E.2d 816 (2016).

In a tenant's claim for injuries against the tenant's landlord after a staircase collapsed, the trial court erred in disregarding the tenant's expert's opinion that a pre-purchase structural inspection would have led the landlord to discover the defects; although the expert was not a home inspector, the expert was a licensed residential and commercial contractor. However, the trial court properly concluded that failure to warn is not a ground upon which an out-of-possession landlord can be held liable under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 and, therefore, summary judgment was proper. Pajaro v. S. Ga. Bank, 339 Ga. App. 334, 793 S.E.2d 209 (2016).

Landlord's knowledge at time of leasing.

- If it appears that the landlord had actual knowledge of a latent defect at the time of leasing, the duty to repair has already arisen. Howell Gas of Athens, Inc. v. Coile, 112 Ga. App. 732, 146 S.E.2d 145 (1965).

Landlords had no superior knowledge of gun in tenant's leased premises.

- In a wrongful death suit, because the record was devoid of any evidence that the landlords knew that a tenant, a nephew, had left a gun accessible and loaded on the day a visiting youth was shot, or any other occasion, a trial court erred in denying summary judgment for the landlords; since the landlords knew or should have known that the nephew would have friends occasionally come to visit at the leased premises, the landlords, as possessors of the land, would have been subject to liability for the youth's fatal injury by the loaded shotgun if, but only if, the landlords knew or had reason to know of the hazard in the nephew's loft room and then failed to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe or to warn visitors, which such superior knowledge of the hazard on the part of the landlords was not shown. McCullough v. Reyes, 287 Ga. App. 483, 651 S.E.2d 810 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 178 (Ga. 2008).

Knowledge of tenant irrelevant to liability to third persons.

- As respects third persons lawfully upon the premises, the landlord is liable notwithstanding the tenant knew of the defective condition causing the injury. Greene v. Birdsey, 47 Ga. App. 424, 170 S.E. 681 (1933).

Equal means of knowledge of patent defect.

- When a condition amounted to a patent defect, recovery would be precluded, since a landlord is not liable for injuries to a tenant resulting from a defect existing at the inception of the lease, if the tenant had means of knowledge equal to those of the landlord. Bazemore v. Burnet, 117 Ga. App. 849, 161 S.E.2d 924 (1968).

Notice to landlord's agent.

- Notice of the defective condition of the property when given to the agent with whom the tenant dealt under the instructions of the landlord, and to whom the rents were paid, is notice to the landlord. Wall Realty Co. v. Leslie, 54 Ga. App. 560, 188 S.E. 600 (1936).

Jury question of city's possession of premises.

- When a plaintiff slipped and fell on a recently waxed floor and was injured, and suit was brought against the city as landlord, the tenant, and the cleaning service that waxed the floor, the evidence presented to the trial court was sufficient to raise questions of fact requiring jury resolution as to whether the city had parted with possession of the premises and whether the city had any knowledge (actual or constructive) of the alleged defect. City of Swainsboro v. Riner, 195 Ga. App. 390, 393 S.E.2d 519 (1990).

Landlord not charged with notice of furnace hazard.

- When the premises were destroyed by a fire originating from a furnace, the landlord, who had no actual knowledge of any furnace problem, could not be charged with notice that the removal of exterior asbestos shingles may have created a hazard with the furnace. Harris v. Sloan, 199 Ga. App. 340, 405 S.E.2d 68, cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 906, 405 S.E.2d 68 (1991).

Property company without notice of alleged defect not liable.

- Property company was not liable for negligence after an apartment fire because, even assuming that the alleged defect existed and caused the fire, the company lacked notice of the condition. There was no evidence that the stove lacked drip pans when the victim moved into the apartment and the company was never told of a problem with the stove. Haynes v. Kingstown Props., Inc., 260 Ga. App. 102, 578 S.E.2d 898 (2003).

Landlord had no actual or constructive knowledge of defect.

- In a social guest's suit for personal injuries brought against the tenants of certain real property as well as the property owner and the owner's property management company, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the property owner as there was no evidence that the property owner had actual or constructive knowledge of any problem with the condition of or construction of the deck that fell while the guest was standing upon the deck. Silman v. Assocs. Bellemeade, 294 Ga. App. 764, 669 S.E.2d 663 (2008), aff'd, 286 Ga. 27, 685 S.E.2d 277 (2009).

Condominium unit owner was not liable for a neighbor's claims of negligence and nuisance, when the owner's hot water heater ruptured and flooded the neighbor's unit, because the owner did not know that the water heater was defective and, as an out-of-possession landlord who rented the condominium unit to another party that occupied the unit, the owner had no duty to maintain the hot water heater under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14. Karle v. Belle, 310 Ga. App. 115, 712 S.E.2d 96 (2011).

Trial court erred by denying a building owner's motion for summary judgment under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 in an employee's action to recover damages for injuries the employee sustained when the door to a handicap bathroom stall the employee used at work fell off of the door's hinges because there were no facts demonstrating that the owner should have discovered and repaired the hinge on the bathroom stall door before the employee's injury; the owner received no complaints about bathroom stall hinges before the employee's injury and discovered no problems with other bathroom stall hinges afterward. Watts & Colwell Builders, Inc. v. Martin, 313 Ga. App. 1, 720 S.E.2d 329 (2011).

Under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14, an absentee landlord was not liable for a failure to repair a latent defect unless the landlord had knowledge of the defect and the consequent necessity for repairs. Because the landlords testified that the landlords were unaware of any abnormality regarding the height of the top stair in their home or that the landlord violated any building code, the landlord disproved the knowledge element of the tenant's claims and were entitled to summary judgment. Martin v. Hansen, 326 Ga. App. 91, 755 S.E.2d 892 (2014).

Out-of-possession landlord was not liable to the tenant's guests for injuries suffered when the house's back deck collapsed because pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14, the landlord was liable only for a third party's damages that resulted either from faulty construction of the premises or from the landlord's failure to repair the premises. The landlord had no notice of the defect, and was not liable for faulty construction because the landlord had hired a contractor to build the deck. Aldredge v. Byrd, 341 Ga. App. 300, 799 S.E.2d 263 (2017).

3. Inspection

No duty to inspect.

- After tenant had moved into the house, landlord was under no duty to inspect the premises for the purpose of making repairs. Dobbs v. Noble, 55 Ga. App. 201, 189 S.E. 694 (1937); Cone v. Lawhon, 61 Ga. App. 797, 7 S.E.2d 597 (1940); City of Dalton v. Anderson, 72 Ga. App. 109, 33 S.E.2d 115 (1945); Davis v. City of Atlanta, 84 Ga. App. 572, 66 S.E.2d 188 (1951); Ramey v. Pritchett, 90 Ga. App. 745, 84 S.E.2d 305 (1954); Howell Gas of Athens, Inc. v. Coile, 112 Ga. App. 732, 146 S.E.2d 145 (1965); Tribble v. Somers, 115 Ga. App. 847, 156 S.E.2d 130 (1967); Black v. New Holland Baptist Church, 122 Ga. App. 606, 178 S.E.2d 571 (1970).

Liability not dependent upon inspection.

- When the landlord has fully parted with the possession of the premises, the landlord owes no duty to inspect the premises and make repairs until the landlord has notice of the defective condition but the landlord is responsible to others for damages arising from defective construction, or for damages for failure to keep the premises in repair. Fuller v. Louis Steyerman & Sons, 46 Ga. App. 830, 169 S.E. 508 (1933).

When duty to inspect arises.

- When the landlord is notified that the premises are out of repair, it becomes the landlord's duty to inspect and investigate in order that the landlord may make such repairs as the safety of the tenant requires. Garner v. La Marr, 88 Ga. App. 364, 76 S.E.2d 721 (1953).

Duty created by inspection.

- Whether or not owner was under the duty to inspect for latent defects, having actually made such inspection, the owner was under the duty to make such repairs as may have been called for by the knowledge so obtained. Home Owners Loan Corp. v. Brazzeal, 62 Ga. App. 683, 9 S.E.2d 773 (1940).

Proper application of the landlord's duty to inspect premises does not, under any theory, result in making the landlord liable for a latent defect in the premises simply because the defect existed at the time of the lease. Cowart v. Schevitz, 335 Ga. App. 715, 782 S.E.2d 816 (2016).

4. Miscellaneous Consideration

Liability for acts of tenant.

- When the landlord has by lease parted fully with possession and right of possession of the leased premises, although the landlord retains therein the right to enter, examine and repair the premises, the landlord is not liable to third persons for injuries received as a result of the tenants' negligent or illegal use thereof. Leonard v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 86 Ga. App. 635, 72 S.E.2d 93 (1952); Howell Gas of Athens, Inc. v. Coile, 112 Ga. App. 732, 146 S.E.2d 145 (1965).

Liability for tenant's nuisance.

- Landlord who has leased premises to a tenant is not liable for a nuisance maintained upon the premises by the tenant. Howell Gas of Athens, Inc. v. Coile, 112 Ga. App. 732, 146 S.E.2d 145 (1965).

Lease contract provision relieving landlord of obligation to keep premises in repair is not effective as against third persons lawfully on the premises, even if the tenant knew of the defective condition. Flagler Co. v. Savage, 258 Ga. 335, 368 S.E.2d 504 (1988).

When tenant makes repairs.

- Owner of property is liable for injuries caused by defective repairs made by the tenant in possession since the law imposes upon the owner the duty of making such repairs, or when the tenant is authorized by the owner to make the repairs. Byne v. Mayor of Americus, 6 Ga. App. 48, 64 S.E. 285 (1909).

Out-of-possession landlord not responsible for injury to tenant's employee.

- When the employee fell from a ladder while working for a restaurant located in a mall, the mall owner was entitled to summary judgment on the employee's tort claim, as the mall owner was an out-of-possession landlord, and merely retained the right to approve the restaurant's construction of an improvement to the premises without having in any way supervised or directed construction. Cowart v. Crown Am. Props., 258 Ga. App. 21, 572 S.E.2d 706 (2002).

Liability of landlord for acts of a cotenant.

- In respect to each other cotenants are strangers; if damage to one tenant be caused, not by any act or negligence to repair of the landlord, but by the fault exclusively of the cotenant, such cotenant, and not the landlord, would be liable. J.B. White & Co. v. Montgomery, 58 Ga. 204 (1877); Adair v. Allen, 18 Ga. App. 636, 89 S.E. 1099 (1916).

Liability for toxic fumes from tenant's business.

- Because defendants, the owner and manager of a shopping center, had parted with possession of premises used by a tenant as a manicurist business, the defendants were not liable to plaintiff for injuries caused by toxic fumes escaping from the business. Diffley v. Marshall's at E. Lake, 227 Ga. App. 343, 489 S.E.2d 123 (1997).

Liability of landlord for dog bite.

- Landlord was not liable for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when a tenant's dog bit the plaintiff since the landlord had relinquished possession of the property to the tenant. Webb v. Danforth, 234 Ga. App. 211, 505 S.E.2d 860 (1998).

Out-of-possession landlord could not be held liable for severe injuries that the tenant's pit bulls inflicted on a next door neighbor, who also rented a house owned by the landlord, because under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14, the landlord's only duty to third persons was for defective construction of the premises or the landlord's failure to keep the premises in repair. Ranwez v. Roberts, 268 Ga. App. 80, 601 S.E.2d 449 (2004).

Trial court properly awarded a landlord summary judgment in a postal worker's personal injury suit alleging injuries from a dog owned by a tenant because the landlord was entitled to the protection of O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 since it was the tenant's dog and the landlord had no right of possession to the premises under the lease; thus, the landlord had no liability to third persons for the negligence of the tenant. Younger v. Dunagan, 318 Ga. App. 554, 733 S.E.2d 81 (2012).

In the plaintiff's suit against a landlord and the tenants for severe injuries the plaintiff sustained in an attack by the tenants' two dogs, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the landlord because the tenants informed the landlord that the latch on the fence's front gate was broken; and there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff's injuries arose from the tenants' dogs escaping their enclosure and then attacking the plaintiff as a result of the landlord's failure to repair the latch on the fence's front gate. Matta-Troncoso v. Tyner, 343 Ga. App. 63, 806 S.E.2d 10 (2017).

Liability of agent.

- Agent who undertakes the sole and complete control and management of the principal's premises is liable to third persons, to whom a duty is owing on the part of the owner, for injuries resulting from the agent's negligence in failing to make or keep the premises in a safe condition. Ramey v. Pritchett, 90 Ga. App. 745, 84 S.E.2d 305 (1954).

Liability of executor.

- Executor, who by will is given authority to manage and rent a building for the benefit of the executor and other legatees, may be held liable as such executor for injuries resulting from a defective condition of the rented premises, under the legal rules which control individuals; but unless some duty or right of control over the property is vested in the executor beyond the executor's mere representative power, the executor is not personally liable. Dobbs v. Noble, 55 Ga. App. 201, 189 S.E. 694 (1937).

Liability for rape of tenant.

- Because the record contained some evidence that the duties of the landlord's employee included looking out for the safety of the apartment premises and the residents, there remained questions as to whether the landlord had assumed a duty to provide security for the apartment complex and whether that duty had been performed in a nonnegligent manner, and the granting of summary judgment in favor of the landlord, in an action by the victim for damages for injuries, was inappropriate. Cooperwood v. Auld, 175 Ga. App. 694, 334 S.E.2d 22 (1985).

Child of tenant.

- When a child was killed by a defect of which the landlord had notice, in a porch of a mill of which the child's stepfather was tenant, the child being lawfully upon the porch, the landlord was liable. Crook v. Foster, 142 Ga. 715, 83 S.E. 670 (1914).

Landlord owning adjacent premises.

- Statute applies when the tenant sues the landlord for negligence arising out of legal duties claimed to be owed plaintiff by reason of defendant's ownership of the adjacent premises and not based upon the landlord-tenant relationship as to the leased unit. Stamsen v. Barrett, 135 Ga. App. 156, 217 S.E.2d 320 (1975) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14).

Lights in common areas.

- In the absence of a contract or statutory obligation to do so, a landlord is not under a duty to maintain lights in the corridor or upon the stairway. Chamberlain v. Nash, 54 Ga. App. 508, 188 S.E. 276 (1936).

Rats.

- Nuisance of rats and their bringing food into an office is not such a defect as the landlord is liable for. Lumpkin v. Provident Loan Soc'y, Inc., 15 Ga. App. 816, 84 S.E. 216 (1915).

Toilet.

- It is the duty of the landlord to keep the premises free from the consequences arising ordinarily from the use of a toilet, which becomes a private nuisance when not properly used and attended to; and if the landlord fails, and from such cause damage ensues, the landlord is liable. Marshall v. Cohen, 44 Ga. 489, 9 Am. R. 170 (1871).

Failure to repair locks.

- Genuine issue of material fact existed, precluding summary judgment, as to whether an apartment landlord was negligent in not changing the locking mechanism screws on doors after a neighborhood watch meeting since door safety was discussed in the presence of apartment managers. Demarest v. Moore, 201 Ga. App. 90, 410 S.E.2d 191 (1991).

What amounts to eviction.

- Grant of summary judgment to an apartment management company on its counterclaim for unpaid rent was affirmed as its alleged failure to provide security or to properly repair the tenant's lock did not constitute acts of a grave and permanent character committed with the intention of depriving the tenant of the use of their apartment without unreasonable interruption nor did they render the apartment uninhabitable. George v. Hercules Real Estate Services, Inc., 339 Ga. App. 843, 795 S.E.2d 81 (2016).

Lack of smoke detector.

- Even if the lack of a smoke detector rendered a leased mobile home defective, the owner of the real property on which the mobile home was located did not violate a duty to supply a smoke detector since a third party owned the mobile home and rented the mobile home to the tenants. Crowder v. Larson, 236 Ga. App. 858, 513 S.E.2d 771 (1999).

Since the jury was not required to believe testimony that a property owner had installed smoke detectors in the owner's rental property, and other testimony authorized the jury's finding that the owner breached the duty under O.C.G.A. § 25-2-40 to install smoke detectors, O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14 did not insulate the owner from liability for the wrongful death of tenants in a fire. Gordon v. Fleeman, 298 Ga. App. 662, 680 S.E.2d 684 (2009).

Stairways.

- Summary judgment for a landlord in a negligence action arising out of a tenant's fall on the outside stairs was affirmed since the tenant had equal knowledge of the accumulation of leaves on the stairs, had used the stairs several times that day without incident, and had not reported the condition to the landlord; the necessity rule was inapplicable as the tenant, the tenant's wife, and the tenants' son had used the exterior stairs many times without incident, including several times earlier that same day, no evidence indicated that the steps were inherently unsafe or otherwise in a state of disrepair, and the tenant's own evidence indicated that the alleged danger did not constitute a known hazard. Flores v. Strickland, 259 Ga. App. 335, 577 S.E.2d 41 (2003).

Assault of club patron in parking lot.

- Owners of property, in the onwers' capacity as a landlord, when a club patron was assaulted in the parking lot by an unruly patron who had been physically removed from the club were not liable under a negligence theory as the landlord's right to inspect the premises was not equivalent to the right to possess the premises; rather, the landlord had parted with possession of the leased premises. Boone v. Udoto, 323 Ga. App. 482, 747 S.E.2d 76 (2013).

Rights and Duties of Tenant

Tenant's duty of care.

- Only duty of care resting on the tenant is to refrain from using those portions of the premises which are patently defective or dangerous. Krapf v. Sternberg, 48 Ga. App. 130, 172 S.E. 69 (1933); Turner v. Long, 61 Ga. App. 785, 7 S.E.2d 595 (1940); Bixby v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 74 Ga. App. 626, 40 S.E.2d 677 (1946); Ween v. Saul, 88 Ga. App. 299, 76 S.E.2d 525 (1953).

Tenant must plead and prove notice.

- In order to sustain a cause of action against a landlord for failure to keep the premises in repair, the tenant must allege and prove that the tenant has given the landlord notice of the defective condition of the premises. Guthman v. Castleberry, 48 Ga. 172 (1873); Stack v. Harris, 111 Ga. 149, 36 S.E. 615 (1900); Roach v. LeGree, 18 Ga. App. 250, 89 S.E. 167 (1916); Wallace v. Adams, 47 Ga. App. 144, 169 S.E. 852 (1933).

No duty to examine property.

- While the tenant must avoid obvious dangers, the law does not impose upon the tenant the duty of making a thorough examination of the landlord's property in order to ascertain hidden dangers. Dessau v. Achord, 50 Ga. App. 426, 178 S.E. 396 (1935).

Negligence of tenant.

- Tenant by remaining in the untenantable premises is guilty of such negligence as barred a recovery. Veal v. Hanlon, 123 Ga. 642, 51 S.E. 579 (1905); Clements v. Blanchard, 141 Ga. 311, 80 S.E. 1004, 17 L.R.A. 993 (1914).

Assumption of risk.

- By electing to use a stairway at night, when the lighting was out, a tenant assumed the risk of injury as a matter of law and was thus barred from recovery. Wells v. Citizens & S. Trust Co., 199 Ga. App. 31, 403 S.E.2d 826, cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 907, 403 S.E.2d 826 (1991).

Tenant's liability for nuisance.

- If the nuisance grew out of the failure of the landlord to make the repairs, this could not relieve the tenant for the nuisance as the tenant might have made the repairs and charged them to the landlord, and the tenant might set off their reasonable value against the rent due the landlord unless the tenant was bound by contract with the landlord, to make the repairs. Vason v. City of Augusta, 38 Ga. 542 (1868); Gardner v. Rhodes, 114 Ga. 929, 41 S.E. 63, 57 L.R.A. 749 (1902).

Nuisance maintained by tenant.

- When a nuisance is maintained by a tenant, the landlord is not responsible for the nuisance, unless license is given by the landlord to the tenant. The tenant maintaining the nuisance would be liable to one injured as a result thereof. Robertson v. Liggett Drug Co., 81 Ga. App. 850, 60 S.E.2d 268 (1950).

Damages recoverable.

- Damages proximately resulting from a breach of a landlord's covenant to make repairs are recoverable by the tenant. Atlanta Baggage & Cab Co. v. Loftin, 88 Ga. App. 98, 76 S.E.2d 92 (1953).

Damages not recoverable.

- Humiliation, mortification, and a shock are not such injuries as may be redressed because of the landlord's failure to repair. Davis v. Hall, 21 Ga. App. 265, 94 S.E. 274 (1917).

Knowledge of husband not imputed to wife.

- When the plaintiff had no notice or knowledge of the defective condition of the steps, which was a latent defect, the plaintiff would not be precluded from recovering for injuries arising therefrom merely because the plaintiff's spouse, who was the tenant, knew of the condition of the steps. Wall Realty Co. v. Leslie, 54 Ga. App. 560, 188 S.E. 600 (1936).

Negligence not imputable to child.

- Child of three years of age is conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence, and any negligence of the tenant in failing to prevent the tenant's child from using the alleged defective portion of the premises would not be imputable to the child in an action maintained in the child's own behalf. Oglesby v. Rutledge, 67 Ga. App. 656, 21 S.E.2d 497 (1942).

Questions for jury.

- Tenant may continue in premises with knowledge of a defect therein, unless the defect is plainly dangerous, and whether the tenant's knowledge of the defect is sufficient to charge the tenant with knowledge of the danger is a question to be determined by the jury. Krapf v. Sternberg, 48 Ga. App. 130, 172 S.E. 69 (1933); Dessau v. Achord, 50 Ga. App. 426, 178 S.E. 396 (1935).

Fact that landing floor broke through, when used in the ordinary manner by the plaintiff, together with the fact of the floor's condition as shown by the exhibits and openness of the inspection, made it a jury question as to whether or not the floor's defective condition could have been known to the owner by the exercise of ordinary care. Home Owners Loan Corp. v. Brazzeal, 62 Ga. App. 683, 9 S.E.2d 773 (1940).

Invitee of theatre house.

- One who is in the control of a building which one uses as a show house, to which the public are invited for one's profit, and who assumes the construction of the plastering therein, is liable to an invitee injured by the falling of the plastering because of defects in its construction, of which one had knowledge or of which one ought to have known in the exercise of ordinary care. Bonita Theatre v. Bridges, 31 Ga. App. 798, 122 S.E. 255 (1924).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 624 et seq.

Liability of an Owner or Operator of a Self-Service Filling Station for Injury or Death of a Business Invitee on the Premises, 46 POF3d 161.

Landlord Liability for Criminal Attack on Tenant, 35 Am. Jur. Trials 1.

C.J.S.

- 52A C.J.S., Landlord and Tenant, §§ 893 et seq., 917 et seq.

ALR.

- Proximate cause as determining landlord's liability, where injury results to a third person from a nuisance that becomes such only upon tenant's using the premises, 4 A.L.R. 740.

Breach of lessor's covenant to repair as ground of liability for damages for personal injuries to tenant, or one in privity with latter, 8 A.L.R. 765; 78 A.L.R.2d 1238.

Liability of owner to licensee or invitee for conditions on premises recently vacated by tenant, 10 A.L.R. 244.

Effect of noninhabitability of leased dwelling or apartment, 13 A.L.R. 818; 29 A.L.R. 52; 34 A.L.R. 711.

Rights and remedies of tenant who remains in possession of all or part of the premises against landlord for interfering with his possession or enjoyment, 20 A.L.R. 1369; 28 A.L.R. 1333; 64 A.L.R. 900.

What is unavoidable or inevitable casualty or accident within provision of lease, 24 A.L.R. 1461.

Liability of landlord for personal injuries due to defective halls, stairways, and the like, for use of different tenants, 25 A.L.R. 1237.

Liability of landlord for injury to person or property of tenant, or his privies, from defects in heating or lighting plant or plumbing, 26 A.L.R. 1253; 52 A.L.R. 864.

Rights and remedies of tenant upon landlord's breach of covenant to repair, 28 A.L.R. 1448; 28 A.L.R.2d 446.

Necessity of notice to landlord as condition of asserting breach of express covenant to repair, 28 A.L.R. 1525.

Measure of damages for breach of landlord's covenant to heat, or furnish hot water for, premises leased for business or manufacturing purposes, 28 A.L.R. 1550.

Tenancy as relieving landlord from liability for injury to third person in street due to snow or ice, 29 A.L.R. 181.

Landlord's liability to one injured while using, for a purpose for which it was not intended, property remaining in the former's control, 30 A.L.R. 1390; 49 A.L.R. 564; 12 A.L.R.2d 217.

Transfer or devolution of reversion as carrying lessee's covenants to repair, or to yield up in repair, 34 A.L.R. 782.

Liability of landlord for personal injuries due to defective halls, stairways, and the like, for use of different tenants, 39 A.L.R. 294; 58 A.L.R. 1411; 75 A.L.R. 154; 97 A.L.R. 220.

Liability of the landlord for damage to the property of a tenant due to defective condition of foundation, walls, or roof of building intended for use of different tenants, 43 A.L.R. 1292.

Landlord's responsibility for injury to stranger due to tenant's negligence as to doors, guards, etc., provided by former, but in tenant's possession and control, 47 A.L.R. 846.

Landlord's responsibility to third persons for conditions created during tenancy as affected by renewal of the lease, or a new lease subject to the original lease, 49 A.L.R. 1418.

Landlord's liability for damage to property of third person by operations of tenant, 53 A.L.R. 327.

Acts of other tenants as chargeable to landlord, 58 A.L.R. 1049.

Contributory negligence of plaintiff as defense to action for personal injuries on account of defective condition of part of the premises within the landlord's control, 58 A.L.R. 1428.

Permissive character of use as affecting landlord's liability to a tenant, or one in privity with him, for personal injuries received in part of premises remaining in landlord's control, 58 A.L.R. 1433.

Liability of landlord for personal injuries due to defective accessories to the leased premises which had passed into the possession of the tenant, 58 A.L.R. 1453.

Liability of owner or occupant for condition of covering over opening or vault in sidewalk, 62 A.L.R. 1067; 31 A.L.R.2d 1334.

Lease of property as affecting owner's liability for failure to provide fire escapes as required by law, 77 A.L.R. 1273.

Validity, construction, application and effect of provision of lease exempting landlord from liability on account of condition of property, 84 A.L.R. 654.

Landlord's liability for injuries to strangers outside premises as affected by covenant to repair or reservation of right to enter to make repairs, 89 A.L.R. 480.

Employment of independent contractor as affecting landlord's liability for personal injury to tenant or to one in like case with tenant, 90 A.L.R. 50; 162 A.L.R. 1111.

Statute requiring property to be kept in good repair as affecting landlord's liability for personal injury to tenant or his privies, 93 A.L.R. 778; 17 A.L.R.2d 704.

Liability of one exercising the rights of an owner of realty for injuries due to its condition, as affected by want of legal title, 96 A.L.R. 1068; 130 A.L.R. 1525.

Duty of landlord to instruct tenant as to use of appliances furnished with premises, 97 A.L.R. 216.

Who is a stranger or third person within the rule regarding landlord's liability to stranger or third person where premises are in a ruinous condition or condition amounting to a nuisance when leased, 110 A.L.R. 756.

Duty to guard against operation of elevator by unauthorized person, 117 A.L.R. 989.

Lease by municipality of property intended for use and benefit of public as affecting its duty and responsibility in respect of the manner and conditions of operation and maintenance of the property by the lessee, 129 A.L.R. 1163.

Lessor's liability for personal injuries to tenant or occupant where premises are let furnished, 139 A.L.R. 261.

Res ipsa loquitur as applicable in action against landlord for injury to person or property due to condition of premises, 145 A.L.R. 870.

Landlord's liability for injury to person or damage to property as affected by his making of repairs in absence of obligation to do so, 150 A.L.R. 1373.

Covenant respecting condition of premises as requiring indemnity for amount paid or liability incurred on account of injury to third person or his property, 157 A.L.R. 623.

Lease of premises as affecting owner's liability for injury arising out of condition in highway connected with use of property, 160 A.L.R. 825.

Breach of lessor's agreement to repair as ground of liability for personal injury to tenant or one in privity with latter, 163 A.L.R. 300; 78 A.L.R.2d 1238.

Liability of a lessor or his property for damages resulting from lessee's sale of intoxicating liquor, 169 A.L.R. 1203.

Liability of landlord to one using fire escape for other than intended purpose, 12 A.L.R.2d 217.

Liability of landlord for injury to or death of employee of tenant, occasioned by negligent construction, maintenance, or operation of elevator, 19 A.L.R.2d 272.

Liability of tenant occupying abutting premises for injury from ice formed on sidewalk by discharge of rain or melted snow thereon because of condition existing on premises, 22 A.L.R.2d 738.

Landlord's liability for injury or death due to defects in exterior stairs, passageways, areas, or structures used in common by tenants, 26 A.L.R.2d 468; 67 A.L.R.3d 490; 65 A.L.R.3d 14; 68 A.L.R.3d 382.

Landlord's liability for injury to tenant's person or property caused by water overflowing from defective appliances in other premises of landlord, 26 A.L.R.2d 1044.

Liability for injuries occasioned by falling of awning or the like, 34 A.L.R.2d 486.

Landlord's duty under express covenant to repair, rebuild, or restore, where property is damaged or destroyed by fire, 38 A.L.R.2d 682.

Liability of landlord for injury or death of third person on street or highway by nuisance created by tenant for month to month, year to year, or the like, 39 A.L.R.2d 973.

Tenant's capacity to sue independent contractor, as third-party beneficiary, for breach of contract between landlord and such contractor for repair or remodeling work, 46 A.L.R.2d 1210.

Liability of landowner for injury or death of child caused by cut or puncture from broken glass or other sharp object, 47 A.L.R.2d 1048.

Lessor of building as invitee of lessee, with respect to latter's duty and liability to former for personal injuries occasioned by condition of premises, 47 A.L.R.2d 1439.

Liability of landlord to tenant or member of tenant's family, for injury by animal or insect, 67 A.L.R.2d 1005.

Liability for injury or damage from escaping refrigerant, 74 A.L.R.2d 894.

Liability for injury to person in street by glass falling from window, door, or wall, 81 A.L.R.2d 897.

Landlord's liability for personal injury or death of tenant or his privies from plumbing system or equipment, 84 A.L.R.2d 1143.

Landlord's liability for personal injury or death of tenant or privies from water heater, 84 A.L.R.2d 1190.

Landlord's liability for personal injury or death of tenant or his privies from heating system or equipment, 86 A.L.R.2d 791.

Landlord's liability for personal injury or death of tenant or privies from electrical system or equipment, 86 A.L.R.2d 838.

Modern status of rule requiring actual knowledge of latent defect in leased premises as prerequisite to landlord's liability to tenant injured thereby, 88 A.L.R.2d 586.

Liability of owner or operator of shopping center to patrons for injuries from defects or conditions in sidewalks, walks, or pedestrian passageways, 95 A.L.R.2d 1341.

Liability of owner or occupant of building for personal injury or death of person in street resulting from objects falling or thrown from building interior, 97 A.L.R.2d 1431.

Effect, on nonsigner, of provision of lease exempting landlord from liability on account of condition of property, 12 A.L.R.3d 958.

Validity, construction, and effect of provision of lease exempting landlord or tenant from liability on account of fire, 15 A.L.R.3d 786.

Landlord's liability to tenant's business patron injured as a result of defective condition of premises, 17 A.L.R.3d 422.

What constitutes "public" use affecting landlord's liability to tenant's invitees for defects in leased premises, 17 A.L.R.3d 873.

Premises liability: proceeding in the dark as contributory negligence, 22 A.L.R.3d 286.

Landlord's liability for damage to tenant's property caused by water, 35 A.L.R.3d 143.

Liability of landlord for injury or death occasioned by swimming pool maintained for tenants, 39 A.L.R.3d 824.

Modern status of rules as to existence of implied warranty of habitability or fitness for use of leased premises, 40 A.L.R.3d 646.

Landlord's failure to repair as aggravated negligence or similar fault, 40 A.L.R.3d 795.

Tenant's right, where landlord fails to make repairs, to have them made and set off cost against rent, 40 A.L.R.3d 1369.

Liability of owner or operator of park for mobile homes or trailers for injuries caused by appliances or other instruments on premises, 41 A.L.R.3d 324.

Liability of owner or operator of trailer camp or park for injury or death from condition of premises, 41 A.L.R.3d 546.

Tenant's obligation under lease as basis of tort liability to third persons, 44 A.L.R.3d 943.

Validity of exculpatory clause in lease exempting lessor from liability, 49 A.L.R.3d 321.

Landlord's liability to tenant or tenant's invitees for injury or death due to ice or snow in areas or passageways used in common by tenants, 49 A.L.R.3d 387.

Liability of owner or operator for injury caused by door of automatic passenger elevator, 63 A.L.R.3d 893.

Modern status of landlord's tort liability for injury or death of tenant or third person caused by dangerous condition of premises, 64 A.L.R.3d 339.

Liability of owner or operator for injury caused by failure of automatic elevator to level at floor, 64 A.L.R.3d 1020.

Landlord's liability for injury or death due to defects in areas of building (other than stairways) used in common by tenants, 65 A.L.R.3d 14.

Liability of landlord for personal injury or death due to inadequacy or lack of lighting on portion of premises used in common by tenants, 66 A.L.R.3d 202.

Landlord's liability for personal injury or death due to defects in appliances supplied for use of different tenants, 66 A.L.R.3d 374.

Landlord's liability for injury or death due to defects in exterior steps or stairs used in common by tenants, 67 A.L.R.3d 490.

Landlord's liability for injury or death due to defects in interior steps or stairs used in common by tenants, 67 A.L.R.3d 587.

Landlord's liability for injury or death due to defects in outside walks, drives, or grounds used in common by tenants, 68 A.L.R.3d 382.

Landlord's liability to tenant's child for personal injuries resulting from defects in premises, as affected by tenant's negligence with respect to supervision of child, 82 A.L.R.3d 1079.

Failure of landlord to make, or permit tenant to make, repairs or alterations required by public authority as constructive eviction, 86 A.L.R.3d 352.

Res ipsa loquitur as applicable in actions for damage to property by the overflow or escape of water, 91 A.L.R.3d 186.

Liability for injuries in connection with ice or snow on nonresidential premises, 95 A.L.R.3d 15.

Tenant's agreement to indemnify landlord against all claims as including losses resulting from landlord's negligence, 4 A.L.R.4th 798.

Liability of owner of store, office, or similar place of business to invitee falling on tracked-in water or snow, 20 A.L.R.4th 438.

Applicability of exculpatory clause in lease to lessee's damages resulting from defective original design or construction, 30 A.L.R.4th 971.

Landlord's tort liability to tenant for personal injury or property damage resulting from criminal conduct of employee, 38 A.L.R.4th 240.

Strict liability of landlord for injury or death of tenant or third person caused by defect in premises leased for residential use, 48 A.L.R.4th 638.

Legal aspects of speed bumps, 60 A.L.R.4th 1249.

Landlord and tenant: violation of statute or ordinance requiring landlord to furnish specified facilities or services as ground of liability for injury resulting from tenant's attempt to deal with deficiency, 63 A.L.R.4th 883.

Landlord's liability to third person for injury resulting from attack on leased premises by dangerous or vicious animal kept by tenant, 87 A.L.R.4th 1004.

Landlord's liability for injury or death of tenant's child from lead paint poisoning, 19 A.L.R.5th 405.

Liability of owner or operator of shopping center, or business housed therein, for injury to patron on premises from criminal attack by third party, 31 A.L.R.5th 550.

Landlord's liability for failure to protect tenant from criminal acts of third person, 43 A.L.R.5th 207.

Apportionment of liability between landowners and assailants for injuries to crime victims, 54 A.L.R.5th 379.

Liability of owner, operator, or other parties, for personal injuries allegedly resulting from snow or ice on premises of parking lot, 74 A.L.R.5th 49.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 44-7-14

Total Results: 8  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Thompson v. Crownover, 377 S.E.2d 660 (Ga. 1989).

Cited 75 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 9, 1989 | 259 Ga. 126

...nother statute that imposed a duty of reasonable care on landlords. "[The landlord] is responsible to others for damages arising from defective construction, or for damages from failure to keep the premises in repair." Ga. L. 1895, § 3118 (now OCGA § 44-7-14)....
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Colquitt v. Rowland, 463 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. 1995).

Cited 39 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 13, 1995 | 265 Ga. 905

...Upon review by certiorari, we hold that Colquitt cannot be liable because Rogers erected the pool after Colquitt relinquished possession and control of the premises. 1. A landlord's liability to a third person who is injured on property which was relinquished by rental or under a lease is determined by OCGA § 44-7-14....
...rsh and unwanted rule. See Goettee v. Carlyle, 68 Ga. App. 288, 293, 22 S.E.2d 854 (1942). The record demonstrates that Rogers erected the pool after Colquitt relinquished possession and control over the property. Thus, Rowland cannot rely upon OCGA § 44-7-14 to hold Colquitt liable....
...It thus imposes contractual, but not tort, liability on a landlord. See, e.g., West View Corp. v. Thunderbolt Yacht Basin, Inc., 208 Ga. 93, 96(1)(b), 65 S.E.2d 167 (1951); Roberts v. Roberts, 205 *493 Ga.App. 371, 372(1), 422 S.E.2d 253 (1992). It is OCGA § 44-7-14 which deals with a landlord's tort liability "to third persons for damages." We recognize that our courts have often cited OCGA § 44-7-13 (and its predecessor, Code Ann. § 61-111) along with OCGA § 44-7-14 (and its predecessor, Code Ann....
...NOTES [1] See, e.g., Elijah A. Brown Co. v. Wilson, 191 Ga. 750, 13 S.E.2d 779 (1941) (responsibility of landlord for personal injuries under Code Ann. § 61-111 is not absolute); Mason v. Gracey, 189 Ga.App. 150, 153, 375 S.E.2d 283 (1988) (OCGA §§ 44-7-13 and 44-7-14 impose liability for damages resulting in defects in the premises); Vizzini v....
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Flagler Co. v. Savage, 368 S.E.2d 504 (Ga. 1988).

Cited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 1, 1988 | 258 Ga. 335

...negligence or illegal use of the premises by the tenant; provided, however, the landlord is responsible for damages arising from defective construction or for damages arising from the failure to keep the premises in repair. [Emphasis supplied.] OCGA § 44-7-14....
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Martin v. Johnson-Lemon, 516 S.E.2d 66 (Ga. 1999).

Cited 28 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 3, 1999 | 271 Ga. 120, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 1768

...the statutory bases for an out-of-possession landlord's liability to third persons injured on leased property. We conclude that, because an out-of-possession landlord's tort liability to third persons is determined under the bases set forth in OCGA § 44-7-14, the Court of Appeals erred by assessing liability in this case under principles not set forth in the statute, including common law principles of ordinary negligence....
...bility of an out-of-possession landlord. Accordingly, we reverse. 1. As conceded by the parties, at all times relevant to this matter, Martin was an out-of-possession landlord. Hence, he is subject to tort liability only under the provisions of OCGA § 44-7-14, which states that: Having fully parted with possession and the right of possession, the landlord is not responsible to third persons for damages resulting from the negligence or illegal use of the premises by the tenant; provided, however...
...rth the general duty owed by an occupier of land to invitees, and is inapplicable to this matter. [5] "A landlord's [tort] liability to a third person who is injured on property which was relinquished by rental or under a lease is determined by OCGA § 44-7-14." [6] By applying the principles described in section 51-3-1 to Martin in this case, the Court of Appeals erroneously expanded the potential liability of out-of-possession landlords well beyond the intended legislative scope. 2. Under the clear language of OCGA § 44-7-14, Martin, as an out-of-possession landlord, cannot be held liable for damages in tort resulting from a third party's use of the swimming pool, unless it is shown that the damages occurred due to Martin's failure to repair the pool, or due to his defective construction of the pool....
...In considering whether Martin breached his statutory duty to repair, the Court of Appeals erred by stating that Martin could be held responsible under the Code for damages resulting from "negligent maintenance" of the pool. [8] By its plain and unambiguous terms, OCGA § 44-7-14 does not impose a duty of maintenance on an out-of-possession landlord, only a duty of repair. In this regard, too, the Court of Appeals erroneously expanded the scope of an out-of-possession landlord's potential tort liability to third persons, as set forth in section 44-7-14. (b) Regarding Martin's potential liability under section 44-7-14 for defective construction, "`the liability of a landlord for defective construction exists only in cases where the structure is built by him in person or under his supervision or direction.'" [9] Appellee alleges that the failure to...
...sign. Our case law does not define what degree of involvement is required before an out-of-possession landlord will be deemed to have "supervised or directed" construction on leased premises, thereby subjecting him or herself to liability under OCGA § 44-7-14....
...ployment agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that under the facts of this case, Martin's actions in connection with the swimming pool's construction did not, in and of themselves, subject him to tort liability for "defective construction" under OCGA § 44-7-14....
...Toole [12] and Queen v. Craven. [13] Only one of these cases, Hickman, concerns a tort suit brought by a tenant against a landlord. Moreover, neither Hickman nor Queen discusses the statutory limitations placed upon the liability of an out-of-possession landlord by OCGA § 44-7-14 and its predecessor Code sections....
...The dissent also relies upon the general provision that "for every right, there shall be a remedy." [14] However, notwithstanding this general provision, the legislature has opted to expressly limit the potential liability of out-of-possession landlords by enacting OCGA § 44-7-14. The argument urged by the dissent would effectively eviscerate section 44-7-14, and render the limitations imposed therein null and void....
...As we conclude in Divisions 1 and 2 above, any alteration or expansion of an out-of-possession landlord's statutory liability must emanate from the legislature and not from the courts of this State. 4. This Court's ruling in Flagler Co. v. Savage, supra, that notwithstanding the provisions of OCGA § 44-7-14, an out-of-possession landlord may be held liable for damages resulting from defective construction performed by a predecessor-in-title is not applicable to the facts of this case....
...defendant-landlord. Therefore, I dissent. Ms. Alice Johnson-Lemon brought this wrongful death action against John Martin. Because Martin is an out-of-possession landlord, the majority correctly holds that his liability must be determined under OCGA § 44-7-14, rather than OCGA § 51-3-1. Tribble v. Somers, 115 Ga.App. 847, 849, 156 S.E.2d 130 (1967). Pursuant to OCGA § 44-7-14, Martin can be held liable "for damages arising from defective construction or for damages arising from the failure to keep the premises in repair." (Emphasis supplied.) The evidence shows that Ms....
...ty for a failure to repair the pool. The alleged defect is in the original design and is not in the subsequent maintenance of the pool. However, I submit that the majority incorrectly concludes that Martin, as owner, cannot be held liable under OCGA § 44-7-14 for construction of the allegedly defective pool....
...Thus, I believe that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Citing Flagler Co. v. Savage, 258 Ga. 335, 337(2), 368 S.E.2d 504 (1988) and Ross v. Jackson, 123 Ga. 657, 659, 51 S.E. 578 (1905), the majority nevertheless concludes that Martin could not be liable under OCGA § 44-7-14 for defective construction because he did not personally build the pool and it was not built under his personal "supervision or direction." However, the majority misconstrues both Flagler Co....
...and Ross as authority for the proposition that a landlord must take such an active role in the construction in order to be held liable for a defect in a completed and accepted project. Nothing in either case supports the conclusion that OCGA § 51-2-5(6) is applicable in an action brought against a landlord under OCGA § 44-7-14. Instead, it is clear that, in both of those cases, this Court was simply attempting to distinguish between the two theories of liability imposed upon a landlord by OCGA § 44-7-14....
...han negligent repair, since the pool was built at his express personal direction by the independent contractor. Because he owned the property at the time the pool was built and he directed that it be constructed, Martin can be held liable under OCGA § 44-7-14 if he accepted that improvement from the independent contractor in its allegedly defective condition....
...However, according to the majority, she also cannot sue Martin because he hired an independent contractor to build the pool. At least until today, the Georgia courts have never sanctioned such an anomalous result. Heretofore, the injured plaintiff could bring suit against the landlord under OCGA § 44-7-14 on the theory that he accepted the independent contractor's defectively constructed project....
...y [the pool company] designed it," or "the pool came with that." [11] This conclusion is consistent with the law regarding respondeat superior, which, while not directly on point, is nonetheless instructive. As a general matter, consistent with OCGA § 44-7-14, an employer is not responsible under respondeat superior for the acts of an independent contractor, unless the contractor is subject to the immediate direction and control of the employer....
...[16] At first glance, Flagler's limited exception to the statutory limits of an out-of-possession landlord's tort liability, where alleged defective construction was performed by a predecessor-in-title, would appear to contradict the precise terms of OCGA § 44-7-14....
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Motel Props., Inc. v. Miller, 436 S.E.2d 196 (Ga. 1993).

Cited 27 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 1, 1993 | 263 Ga. 484, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 3880

...n relinquished to another, the owner or occupier of those premises cannot be held liable under OCGA § 51-3-1. E.g., Beavers v. Moore, 200 Ga. App. 323 (408 SE2d 124) (1991); Green v. Moreland, 200 Ga. App. 167 (4) (407 SE2d 119) (1991). Accord OCGA § 44-7-14 (landlord who has fully parted with possession and the right of possession not liable to third parties for tenant's negligent or illegal use of premises where damages did not arise from defective construction or a failure to keep premises in repair)....
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Cham v. Eci Mgmt. Corp., 856 S.E.2d 267 (Ga. 2021).

Cited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 2021 | 311 Ga. 170

...rented.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 11 For this reason, Georgia law has long excepted landlords from general landowner liability with respect to premises possessed by tenants; this exception is now codified in OCGA § 44-7-14, which provides: Having fully parted with possession and the right of possession, the landlord is not responsible to third persons for damages resulting from the negligence or illegal use of the premises by the...
...from defective construction or for damages arising from the failure to keep the premises in repair.4 See also Colquitt, 265 Ga. at 906 (“A landlord’s liability to a third person who is injured on property which was relinquished by rental 4 OCGA § 44-7-14 has been interpreted narrowly. We have held, for instance, that OCGA § 44-7-14 does not include a “duty of maintenance,” and we have stated that “any alteration or expansion of an out-of-possession landlord’s statutory liability must emanate from the legislature and not from the courts of this State.” Martin v....
...See also Langley v. MP Spring Lake, LLC, 307 Ga. 321, 326 (834 SE2d 800) (2019) (“[T]he duties imposed by OCGA § 44-7-13 sound only in contract, not in tort . . . .”). 12 or under a lease is determined by OCGA § 44-7-14.”); Birdsey v. Greene, 176 Ga. 688, 689-690 (168 SE 564) (1933) (summarizing the history of the predecessor to OCGA § 44-7-14).5 In many instances, a landlord’s plot of land contains both areas that are possessed by the landlord (such as the common areas of an apartment complex) and areas possessed by tenants (i.e., the apartments themselves)....
...In such cases, a landlord’s tort liability for a danger on its property is determined by the area where that danger lurks. If the dangerous condition that ultimately causes an injury is located in an area the landlord still possesses, then liability under OCGA § 51-3-1 et seq. applies, and OCGA § 44-7-14 does not apply by its own terms. See OCGA § 44-7-14 (applying to landlords 5 The language in OCGA § 44-7-14 has remained virtually unchanged since it was first codified in 1895....
...mages from failure to keep the premises in repair.”); Georgia Code of 1910, § 3694 (same). See also Roach v. Le Gree, 18 Ga. App. 250, 251 (89 SE 167) (1916) (stating that, at common law, before Georgia embraced the principle now codified in OCGA § 44-7-14, “the tenant, and not the landlord, was bound to make all necessary repairs, unless there was an express stipulation to the contrary in the rental contract.”). 13 who have “fully parted with possession and the right of possession”); Langley v....
...ury is caused by a condition of the premises over which the premises owner/occupier has some degree of control, such as a static condition or passive defect.”). 14 landlord’s liability derives from OCGA § 44-7-14 and not from OCGA § 51-3-1.7 See Martin v. Johnson-Lemon, 271 Ga. 120, 123 (516 SE2d 66) (1999) (where the injury occurred on leased property possessed by tenant, landlord’s liability was governed by OCGA § 44-7-14, and OCGA § 51-3-1 did not apply)....
...possession of the premises where plaintiff’s decedent was injured, it was not necessary to decide whether the decedent was a licensee on the premises; the only question was whether landlord was liable for 7 In other words, a landowner’s liability under OCGA § 44-7-14 derives from his status as a “landlord,” but his liability under OCGA § 51-3-1 derives from his status as an “owner or occupier of land.” See Langley, 307 Ga....
...at 326 (“The relationship between an owner and an invitee is separate from the relationship between a landlord and a tenant. Those relationships involve distinct statutory duties . . . even though a person’s status as a tenant may also make that person an invitee to the property.”). By its terms, OCGA § 44-7-14 imposes no duty on the tenant, but the tenant may be liable under OCGA § 51- 3-1 for defects on premises possessed or “occupie[d]” by the tenant. 15 defective construction or failure to repair under predecessor to OCGA § 44-7-14). (b) Decisional Law Relating to Premises Liability. A number of decisions from the Court of Appeals on which the parties in this case rely have failed adequately to consider or explain the distinction between these two mutually exclusive sources of liability — OCGA § 51-3-1 et seq. and OCGA § 44-7-14 — which has created some confusion with respect to premises liability law as it is applied to landlords and tenants and which led the Court of Appeals in this case astray....
...premises in repair.” Id. To support this proposition, the Court of Appeals cited three cases from this Court that dealt with an out-of- possession landlord’s liability under the predecessor statute to 17 OCGA § 44-7-14.8 Based on this reasoning, the Crossgrove court ultimately concluded that the lawsuit could proceed under the landlord-tenant theory of liability because the complaint sufficiently alleged a landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff’s father and the company. See Crossgrove, 30 Ga. App. at 465-466. Crossgrove’s statement about guests standing in the tenant’s “shoes” applied under the facts of that case to determine an out-of- possession landlord’s liability under what is now OCGA § 44-7-14.9 But in later cases, the Court of Appeals cited this “stands-in-the- shoes” proposition in a different statutory context: assessing a landlord’s premises liability under OCGA § 51-3-1 — that is, liability for injuries that ar...
...at 718; Ocean S.S. Co. v. Hamilton, 112 Ga. 901, 903 (38 SE 204) (1901). 9 We express no opinion as to whether Crossgrove was correct in that regard. It appears that Crossgrove was elaborating on our statement in Ross that under the predecessor to OCGA § 44-7-14, a landlord would be “answerable to the tenant, or to any one lawfully on the premises by invitation of the tenant.” See also Crook, 142 Ga. at 718 (under predecessor to OCGA § 44-7-14, landlord “‘is liable in damages to a person who receives injury while lawfully upon the premises’”) (quoting Ross). 18 possession....
..., referred to the invitee/licensee distinction — derived from the language in OCGA § 51-3-1 et seq. — in circumstances where an injury arose on tenant-possessed property and where the landlord’s liability should have been premised on OCGA § 44-7-14 instead. See, e.g., Silman v....
...was correct to assess the tenants’ liability under OCGA § 51-3-1 et seq. See Silman, 294 Ga. App. at 764. 11 We recognize that there may be situations where someone described as a “landlord” has not “fully parted with possession and the right of possession,” OCGA § 44-7-14, in which case such “landlord’s” liability properly would be analyzed under OCGA § 51-3-1 et seq....
...First, the Brown court should have made clear where the alleged cause of the injury lay — whether in an area possessed by the tenant or in an area possessed by the landlord — because that fact determines the source of the landlord’s liability: either OCGA § 44-7-14 (if possessed by a tenant) or OCGA § 51-3-1 et seq....
...For this reason, and contrary to the Plaintiffs’ argument, the stands-in-the-shoes principle announced in Crossgrove has no bearing in this case. As discussed above, that principle originated in the context of landlord-tenant liability under the predecessor to OCGA § 44-7-14. And even if that principle is sound in the context of OCGA § 44-7-14, we are aware of no cases (and Plaintiffs offer none) in which this Court has extended it to premises liability under OCGA § 51-3-1, and we see no reason to do so here — especially since nothing in the text of OCGA § 51-3- 1 et seq....
...at 437. 33 PETERSON, Justice, dissenting. In a thoughtful and scholarly opinion, the majority correctly explains the distinction between the two primary sources of landlord liability ⸺ OCGA § 51-3-1 et seq. and OCGA § 44-7-14 ⸺ that have often been conflated in our courts....
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Tyner v. Matta-Troncoso, 826 S.E.2d 100 (Ga. 2019).

Cited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 11, 2019 | 305 Ga. 480

...ed her as she was walking her own dogs approximately two blocks away from the Thorntons' rental house. On August 20, 2014, the Mattas amended their complaint by adding Gregory B. Tyner, the Thorntons' landlord, alleging that he was liable under OCGA § 44-7-142 for failing to keep the rental property in repair....
...as were not required to produce evidence that "Tyner [was] aware of the dogs' vicious propensities." Matta-Troncoso v. Tyner , 343 Ga. App. 63, 66-68, 806 S.E.2d 10 (2017). The Court of Appeals further concluded that Tyner could be liable under OCGA § 44-7-14 because that statute did not limit a landlord's liability to injuries occurring on a leased premises, and that there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Matta-Troncoso's injuries "arose from" Tyner's failure to repair the gate latch. Id. at 68-70, 806 S.E.2d 10 (referencing portion of OCGA § 44-7-14 that provides that a "landlord is responsible for damages arising from defective construction or for damages arising from the failure to keep the premises in repair") (emphasis supplied). We granted Tyner's petition for certiorari and pos...
...chapter owned or kept the dog); see also Martin v. Johnson-Lemon , 271 Ga. 120, 123, 516 S.E.2d 66 (1999) (Court of Appeals erred by implicitly analyzing an action against an out-of-possession landlord under an inapplicable code section and not OCGA § 44-7-14 )....
...Identifying this misguided application of OCGA § 51-2-7 does not, however, resolve the question before us today. That is because the Court of Appeals went on to hold that the grant of summary judgment in Tyner's favor was erroneous even under OCGA § 44-7-14 because "there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [Matta-Troncoso's] injuries arose from the Thorntons' dogs escaping their enclosure and then attacking [Matta-Troncoso] as a result of Tyner's failure to repair the latch on the fence's front gate." *104Matta-Troncoso , 343 Ga. App. at 70, 806 S.E.2d 10. We disagree. Looking to OCGA § 44-7-14 and the record before us, we conclude that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to Tyner's liability because there is no evidence that Tyner was aware that the Thorntons' dogs had any harmful tendencies or propensities, and it therefore was not reasonably foreseeable that Matta-Troncoso's injuries could "aris[e] from" Tyner's failure to repair the broken gate latch. The Mattas brought a negligence claim against Tyner under OCGA § 44-7-14, a statute that pertains to out-of-possession landlords and governs claims of negligence for failure to repair. Assuming that OCGA § 44-7-14 can be used to hold out-of-possession landlords liable for injuries resulting from dog bites,6 it remains "well established that to recover for injuries caused by another's negligence, a plaintiff must show four elements: a duty, a breach of that duty, causation and damages." Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC v. J.B. , 300 Ga. 840, 841, 797 S.E.2d 87 (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, Tyner had a statutory duty to "keep the premises in repair." OCGA § 44-7-14....
...es because the Thorntons had "superior knowledge to their landlord regarding the dogs' temperament" and because **485Tyner's failure to repair the latch did not cause the dogs to escape from the yard. The Mattas, on the other hand, contend that OCGA § 44-7-14 contains no express knowledge requirement, and it is therefore "doubtful that Plaintiffs even need to show evidence of propensity to recover [damages]." According to the Mattas, the statute requires only that "Plaintiffs show evidence that...
...re must be evidence that the injuries were proximately caused by the breach of the duty." Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC , 300 Ga. at 841, 797 S.E.2d 87. See also Jones v. Campbell , 198 Ga. App. 83, 86, 400 S.E.2d 364 (1990) (to recover under OCGA § 44-7-14, "a tenant is required to show not only that the landlord breached his statutory duty to keep the premises in repair, but that such breach was the proximate cause of [the] injury") (alterations in original; citation and punctuation omitted)....
...a defendant could reasonably foresee that an injury would result from his act or omission. Smith v. Finch , 285 Ga. 709, 712, 681 S.E.2d 147 (2009). Georgia courts have applied that general rule in other cases evaluating negligence claims under OCGA § 44-7-14. See, e.g., Gale v. N. Meadow Assoc. Joint Venture , 219 Ga. App. 801, 803, 466 S.E.2d 648 (1995) (affirming summary judgment for landlord under "the landlord's limited liability under OCGA § 44-7-14," because there was no evidence of prior acts from which the landlord could have "reasonably foreseen the attack" by a co-worker) (citation and punctuation omitted) (physical precedent only); Jones , 198 Ga. App. at 85, 400 S.E.2d 364 (in case brought under OCGA § 44-7-14, affirming summary judgment for *105landlord for injuries caused when tenant fell in sinkhole on leased property because "[t]here was no evidence to show that the [landlords], any more than the [tenants], should reasonably have foreseen the creation of such a hole appearing by the continuing erosion of the stream embankment").7 **486Our Court of Appeals, moreover, has acknowledged the role of foreseeability where negligence is alleged in the dog-bite context, including under OCGA § 44-7-14....
...nature of a particular dog and proof of his owner's knowledge of that individual's deviation from presumptive harmlessness.") (citations omitted). In light of this presumption, plaintiffs seeking to hold out-of-possession landlords liable under OCGA § 44-7-14 for injuries caused by their tenants' dogs must therefore present some evidence showing that the landlord had knowledge of the dogs' tendencies or propensities to do harm in order to demonstrate reasonable foreseeability....
...In proving vicious propensity, it shall be sufficient to show that the animal was required to be at heel or on a leash by an ordinance of a city, county, or consolidated government, and the said animal was at the time of the occurrence not at heel or on a leash. OCGA § 51-2-7. OCGA § 44-7-14 provides: Having fully parted with possession and the right of possession, the landlord is not responsible to third persons for damages resulting from the negligence or illegal use of the premises by the tenant; provided, however, the lan...
...The Thorntons did not move for summary judgment, and at the time appellate briefs were filed in this case, the Mattas' claims against the Thorntons remained pending in the trial court. The Mattas, in fact, concede in their brief here that their "claims against Tyner are pled under OCGA § 44-7-14 and no claim was made against Tyner pursuant to OCGA § 51-2-7." Specifically, the Court of Appeals invoked OCGA § 51-2-7 for the proposition that "[i]n proving vicious propensity, it shall be sufficient to show that the animal was requi...
...90, 92, 410 S.E.2d 191 (1991). We thus reject Tyner's argument that Colquitt v. Rowland , 265 Ga. 905, 463 S.E.2d 491 (1995), controls here. Colquitt stands for the proposition that after a landlord has relinquished possession and control of the premises, the landlord cannot be held liable under OCGA § 44-7-14 to third parties for injuries caused by a dangerous condition erected by the tenant-in that case, a swimming pool....
...That the alleged defect was the broken gate latch, however, does not mean that the dogs are irrelevant to the issue of proximate causation under the facts of this case. Our conclusion also aligns with our previous explanation that the General Assembly enacted OCGA § 44-7-14 to "limit the potential liability of out-of-possession landlords," and that "any alteration or expansion of an out-of-possession landlord's statutory liability must emanate from the legislature and not from the courts of this State."Martin , 271 Ga....
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Tyner v. Matta-tronscoso, 305 Ga. 480 (Ga. 2019).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 11, 2019

...Citing OCGA § 51-2-7, the Court of Appeals reasoned that because there was evidence that the dogs were unleashed in violation of a local ordinance, the Mattas were not required to produce evidence that “Tyner [was] aware of the 2 OCGA § 44-7-14 provides: Having fully parted with possession and the right of possession, the landlord is not responsible to third persons for damages resulting from the negligence or illegal use of the premises by the tenant; p...
...claims against the Thorntons remained pending in the trial court. dogs’ vicious propensities.” Matta-Troncoso v. Tyner, 343 Ga. App. 63, 66- 68 (806 SE2d 10) (2017). The Court of Appeals further concluded that Tyner could be liable under OCGA § 44-7-14 because that statute did not limit a landlord’s liability to injuries occurring on a leased premises, and that there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Matta-Troncoso’s injuries “arose from” Tyner’s failure to repair the gate latch. Id. at 68-70 (referencing portion of OCGA § 44-7-14 that provides that a “landlord is responsible for damages arising from defective construction or for damages arising from the failure to keep the premises in repair”) (emphasis supplied). We granted Tyner’s petition for cert...
...evidence that national chapter owned or kept the dog); see also Martin v. Johnson-Lemon, 271 Ga. 120, 123 (516 SE2d 66) (1999) (Court of Appeals 4 The Mattas, in fact, concede in their brief here that their “claims against Tyner are pled under OCGA § 44-7-14 and no claim was made against Tyner pursuant to OCGA § 51-2-7.” erred by implicitly analyzing an action against an out-of-possession landlord under an inapplicable Code section and not OCGA § 44-7-14)....
...Identifying this misguided application of OCGA § 51-2-7 does not, however, resolve the question before us today. That is because the Court of Appeals went on to hold that the grant of summary judgment in Tyner’s favor was erroneous even under OCGA § 44-7-14 because “there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [Matta-Troncoso’s] injuries arose from the Thorntons’ dogs escaping their enclosure and then attacking [Matta-Troncoso] as a result of Tyner’s failure to repair the latch on the fence’s front gate.” Matta-Troncoso, 343 Ga....
...o repair the broken gate latch. The Mattas brought a negligence claim against Tyner under OCGA § 44- 7-14, a statute that pertains to out-of-possession landlords and governs claims of negligence for failure to repair. Assuming that OCGA § 44-7-14 can be used to hold out-of-possession landlords liable for injuries resulting from dog bites,6 it remains “well established that to recover for injuries caused by another’s negligence, a plaintiff must show four elements: a duty, a breach of that duty, causation and damages.” Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC v. J. B., 300 Ga. 840, 841 (797 SE2d 87) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, Tyner had a statutory duty to “keep the premises in repair.” OCGA § 44-7-14....
...674, 678 (556 SE2d 867) (2001) (noting lack of precedent “which provides for liability for dog bites other than OCGA § 51-2-7 and the premises liability statute, OCGA § 51-3-1”). cause the dogs to escape from the yard. The Mattas, on the other hand, contend that OCGA § 44-7-14 contains no express knowledge requirement, and it is therefore “doubtful that Plaintiffs even need to show evidence of propensity to recover [damages].” According to the Mattas, the statute requires only that “Plaintiffs show evid...
...a duty, there must be evidence that the injuries were proximately caused by the breach of the duty.” Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC, 300 Ga. at 841. See also Jones v. Campbell, 198 Ga. App. 83, 86 (400 SE2d 364) (1990) (to recover under OCGA § 44-7-14, “a tenant is required to show not only that the landlord breached his statutory duty to keep the premises in repair, but that such breach was the proximate cause of (the) injury”) (citation and punctuation omitted). “Inextricably...
...defendant could reasonably foresee that an injury would result from his act or omission. Smith v. Finch, 285 Ga. 709, 712 (681 SE2d 147) (2009). Georgia courts have applied that general rule in other cases evaluating negligence claims under OCGA § 44-7-14. See, e.g., Gale v. North Meadow Assoc. Joint Venture, 219 Ga. App. 801, 803 (466 SE2d 648) (1995) (affirming summary judgment for landlord under “the landlord’s limited liability under OCGA § 44-7-14,” because there was no evidence of prior acts from which the landlord could have “reasonably foreseen the attack” by a co-worker) (citation and punctuation omitted) (physical precedent only); Jones, 198 Ga. App. at 85 (in case brought under OCGA § 44-7-14, affirming summary judgment for landlord for injuries caused when tenant fell in sinkhole on leased property because “[t]here was no evidence to show that the [landlords], any more than the [tenants], should reasonably have foreseen t...
...36, 40 (470 SE2d 738) (1996), 267 Ga. 785 (482 SE2d 339) (1997); Demarest v. Moore, 201 Ga. App. 90, 92 (410 SE2d 191) (1991). Our Court of Appeals, moreover, has acknowledged the role of foreseeability where negligence is alleged in the dog-bite context, including under OCGA § 44-7-14....
...and hence required proof of the dangerous nature of a particular dog and proof of his owner’s knowledge of that individual’s deviation from presumptive harmlessness.”) (citations omitted). In light of this presumption, plaintiffs under OCGA § 44-7-14 to third parties for injuries caused by a dangerous condition erected by the tenant — in that case, a swimming pool....
...That the alleged defect was the broken gate latch, however, does not mean that the dogs are irrelevant to the issue of proximate causation under the facts of this case. 9 Our conclusion also aligns with our previous explanation that the General Assembly enacted OCGA § 44-7-14 to “limit the potential liability of out-of-possession landlords,” and that “any alteration or expansion of an out-of-possession landlord’s statutory liability must emanate from the legislature and not from the courts of this State.” Martin, 271 Ga....
...Breach of duty alone is not enough to sustain recovery, Hudson v. Swain, 282 Ga. App. 718, 721 (639 SE2d 319) (2006), and we decline to deviate from that maxim — and to judicially expand out-of-possession landlords’ liability — here. seeking to hold out-of-possession landlords liable under OCGA § 44-7-14 for injuries caused by their tenants’ dogs must therefore present some evidence showing that the landlord had knowledge of the dogs’ tendencies or propensities to do harm in order to demonstrate reasonable foreseeability....