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2018 Georgia Code 44-9-70 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 44-9-70 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 44-9-70

TITLE 44 PROPERTY

Section 9. Easements, 44-9-1 through 44-9-92.

ARTICLE 4 RIGHTS OF WAY FOR MINING, QUARRYING, AND OTHER BUSINESSES

44-9-70. Rights of way for mining, quarrying, and other business - Method of obtaining.

Any person, firm, corporation, company of persons, or corporation chartered under the laws of any state of the United States who is actually engaged in the business of mining iron, copper, gold, coal, or any other metal or mineral; quarrying marble, granite, or any other stone; or making copperas, sulphur, saltpeter, alum, or other similar articles and who needs a right of way for a railroad, turnpike, or roadway; an easement for pipelines or power lines; or a common road across the lands of others in order to operate his business successfully may obtain a right of way in the manner provided in this article for acquiring the right to convey water across the lands of others by the owners of mines. All proceedings in relation thereto shall be had and the damages shall be assessed and paid according to the method of condemning land provided in Title 22.

(Ga. L. 1862-63, p. 171, § 1; Code 1868, § 772; Code 1873, § 742; Code 1882, § 742; Ga. L. 1887, p. 35, § 2; Civil Code 1895, § 650; Ga. L. 1904, p. 51, § 1; Civil Code 1910, § 795; Code 1933, § 83-201; Ga. L. 1952, p. 38, § 1.)

Cross references.

- Mining and drilling generally, § 12-4-20 et seq.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

O.C.G.A. Art. 4, Ch. 9, T. 44 is a constitutional exercise of legislative authority. Jones & Co. v. Venable, 120 Ga. 1, 47 S.E. 549, 1 Ann. Cas. 185 (1904).

O.C.G.A. § 44-9-70's "necessity" standard, which is based upon the successful operation of the applicant's business, is a valid exercise of the General Assembly's state constitutional authority with respect to the declaration of private ways of necessity. Benton v. Georgia Marble Co., 258 Ga. 58, 365 S.E.2d 413 (1988).

O.C.G.A. § 44-9-70 does not constitute a delegation of the state's power of eminent domain with respect to property to be condemned for a public purpose. Benton v. Georgia Marble Co., 258 Ga. 58, 365 S.E.2d 413 (1988).

O.C.G.A. Art. 4, Ch. 9, T. 44 applies only to corporations chartered within this state. Chestatee Pyrites Co. v. Cavenders Creek Gold Mining Co., 119 Ga. 354, 46 S.E. 422, 100 Am. St. R. 174 (1904).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

17B Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Mines and Minerals, § 2.

ALR.

- Validity of statute restricting the right of mining so as not to interfere with surface, 28 A.L.R. 1330.

Condemnation of premises or part thereof as affecting rights of landlord and tenant inter se, 163 A.L.R. 679.

Condemner's waiver, surrender, or limitation, after award, of rights or part of property acquired by condemnation, 5 A.L.R.2d 724.

Compensation for, or extent of rights acquired by, taking of land, as affected by condemner's promissory statements as to character of use or undertakings to be performed by it, 7 A.L.R.2d 364.

Correlative rights of dominant and servient owners in right of way for pipeline, 28 A.L.R.2d 626.

Right to intervene in court review of zoning proceeding, 46 A.L.R.2d 1059.

Admissibility, in eminent domain proceeding, of evidence as to price paid for condemned real property during pendency of the proceeding, 55 A.L.R.2d 781.

Admissibility, in eminent domain proceeding, of evidence as to price paid for condemned real property on sale prior to the proceeding, 55 A.L.R.2d 791.

Right of adjoining landowners to intervene in condemnation proceedings on ground that they might suffer consequential damage, 61 A.L.R.2d 1292.

Eminent domain: recovery of value of improvements made with knowledge of impending condemnation, 98 A.L.R.3d 504.

State statute of limitations applicable to inverse condemnation or similar proceedings by landowner to obtain compensation for direct appropriation of land without the institution or conclusion of formal proceedings against specific owner, 26 A.L.R.4th 68.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 44-9-70

Total Results: 2  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Benton v. Georgia Marble Co., 365 S.E.2d 413 (Ga. 1988).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 9, 1988 | 258 Ga. 58

...Webb, Martha Tate Springer, Fine & Block, Paul R. Jordan, for appellants. Hansell & Post, Gary W. Hatch, John G. Parker, John L. Watkins, Landrum & Landrum, Phillip M. Landrum, Jr., for appellee. MARSHALL, Chief Justice. This appeal involves a statutory proceeding under OCGA § 44-9-70, which provides, in pertinent part, that a person or corporation engaged in the business of metal or mineral mining, or quarrying marble, granite, or any other stone, may obtain a right-of-way for a railroad across the lands of others "in order to operate his business successfully." [1] OCGA § 44-9-70 further provides that, "[a]ll proceedings in relation thereto shall be had and the damages shall be assessed and paid *59 according to the method of condemning land provided in Title 22." Three alternative methods are provided in Title 22...
...d be thereby incurred by Georgia Marble would result in the previously described reduction in its ability to compete. Consequently, the special master found that exclusive use of the railroad by Georgia Marble is necessary, and, therefore, this OCGA § 44-9-70 proceeding is likewise necessary....
...ex issues" which the court found to be raised in exceptions to the special master's award filed by certain of the defendants. The superior court sustained the special master's overruling of the defendants' challenges to the constitutionality of OCGA § 44-9-70; this ruling was based upon this court's decision in Jones & Co....
...601 (261 SE2d 597) (1979), the court further concluded that, since Art. I, Sec. III, Par. II, of the *61 Georgia Constitution, concerning "private ways" in cases of "necessity," does not establish any requisite criterion of "necessity" for the taking, OCGA § 44-9-70's definition of "necessity," based upon the need of the plaintiff for the right-of-way in order to operate its business successfully, is the appropriate standard to be applied here. Based upon what the court below referred to as "uncontroverted evidence" that Georgia Marble had met the requisite standard of necessity for a private taking under OCGA § 44-9-70, the court approved the special master's finding in this regard....
...perty if condemnation of the easement is allowed. The fourth issue concerns the extent of the appellants' constitutional right to jury trial in this proceeding. 1. We hold that, under the decision of this court in Jones & Co. v. Venable, supra, OCGA § 44-9-70's "necessity" standard, which is based upon the successful operation of the applicant's business, is a valid exercise of the General Assembly's state constitutional authority with respect to the declaration of private ways of necessity....
...Under the authority of § 650 of the Political Code, the plaintiff instituted a proceeding against adjacent property owners for condemnation of a railroad right-of-way across their land. Section 650 of the Political Code, a predecessor statute to OCGA § 44-9-70, provided "that a person or corporation actually engaged in [the business of quarrying granite or other stone], who may need, for the successful prosecution of the same, such a right-of-way, may obtain it `in the same manner that the right...
...ns of the 1884 lease did not grant Georgia Marble an irrevocable easement in perpetuity for the railroad right-of-way, notwithstanding the leasehold termination. Second, Georgia Marble maintains that the trial court erred in concluding *67 that OCGA § 44-9-70 does not constitute a delegation of the state's power of eminent domain....
...vent of termination of the lease, an argument that the lease documents grant the lessees "and their heirs and assigns" an easement in perpetuity is legally unsustainable. 6. Under the Venable decision, the trial court did not err in ruling that OCGA § 44-9-70 does not constitute a delegation of the *68 state's power of eminent domain with respect to property to be condemned for a public purpose....
...inion, a misinterpretation of the trial court's order. As we read the order, the trial court did grant summary judgment in favor of Georgia Marble on that issue. Judgment affirmed in Case Nos. 45172 and 45173. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] OCGA § 44-9-70 provides in full, "Any person, firm, corporation, company of persons, or corporation chartered under the laws of any state of the United States who is actually engaged in the business of mining iron, copper, gold, coal, or any other metal...
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Johnson v. Allgood Farm, LLC., 602 S.E.2d 837 (Ga. 2004).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 13, 2004 | 278 Ga. 283, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 2948

...But, the Johnsons moved for reconsideration on the bases that the writ failed to contain a legally sufficient description of the property in question, that the court needed to define "reasonable access" and "unimproved lands" in regard to their mineral rights, and that the writ incorrectly referenced OCGA § 44-9-70....
...to and use of the Land is limited to what is reasonable and necessary to mine minerals and not otherwise, and it is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' access to and use of Lands above-described is contingent upon Plaintiffs' full compliance with OCGA § 44-9-70, et seq., in reference to Rights of Way for Mining, Quarrying, and Other Business; [2] 1....
...pon by the trial court. Thus, the question of the term's meaning with regard to the Johnsons' mineral rights is not ripe for review. [3] 2. The Johnsons further contend that the trial court erred by conditioning *839 their use of the lands upon OCGA § 44-9-70, [4] et. seq., because the original deeds conveyed to them both ingress and egress. But here again, this issue regarding construction of the deeds was not explored below. Thus, there is no basis to find that the trial court erred in referencing OCGA § 44-9-70 et seq....
...rtion of the Allgood Farm land in question based upon a disagreement about whether the property is "unimproved." Should such a dispute arise pursuant to the amended order and writ of possession, the Johnsons may seek the appropriate relief. [4] OCGA § 44-9-70 reads: Any person, firm, corporation, company of persons, or corporation chartered under the laws of any state of the United States who is actually engaged in the business of mining iron, copper, gold, coal, or any other metal or mineral;...
...d provided in Title 22. [5] There is no basis either to find that by referring to the statutory provisions, the trial court implicitly found that the deeds did not confer rights of ingress and egress to the Johnsons because the applicability of OCGA § 44-9-70 et seq....