...840, 108 S.E.2d 272 (1959) (citing State v. Jones, 7 Ga. 422 (1849)). However, in 1973, the General Assembly enacted a law providing the State limited avenues of appeal in criminal cases. See 1973 Ga. Laws 297 (now codified, as amended, at OCGA §§ 5-7-1 to 5-7-5)....

...Because we agree with the state that the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest Tyson, we reverse. 1. Tyson has filed a motion to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, citing OCGA §§ 5-7-1 to 5-7-3, and sought to be released on bail under OCGA § 5-7-5....

...right to review by certiorari any and all judgments rendered by the Court of Appeals" without exception and did not restrict the application for review to defendants in criminal cases. [10] In 1973, the Georgia legislature enacted OCGA §§ 5-7-1 to 5-7-5 giving the state the right to file a direct appeal or take a proceeding by certiorari in certain criminal cases....

...d in a consistent manner with, a defendant who has procured a favorable trial court ruling which the State has appealed pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1. In the latter situation, the defendant is entitled to seek release on reasonable bail pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-5....

...Although I disagree with the majority's rationale for denying Tyson's motion to dismiss the appeal which resulted from our grant of a writ of certiorari, I concur in the denial of the motion. However, as I would dismiss as moot Tyson's appeal from the trial court's denial of bail requested pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-5, I disagree with the majority's affirmance of the trial court's bail decision in Division 2 of the majority opinion....

...The majority's holding that this Court's review of decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals adversely to the State in criminal cases is done only "under our constitutional authority," has the unfortunate effect of wreaking havoc upon the General Assembly's statutory provisions. Under the majority's rationale, OCGA § 5-7-5, [27] which is triggered only by the State seeking review pursuant to Chapter 5-7, can never come into effect when the State files a petition for a writ of certiorari in a criminal case. Thus, when the State appeals directly or by interlocutory application a trial court's ruling in favor of the criminal defendant, the defendant is authorized to seek bail under § 5-7-5; but when the State seeks to have this Court review by certiorari a Court of Appeals' judgment in favor of a criminal defendant, the defendant is deprived of the opportunity to seek bail under § 5-7-5....

...in keeping with those standards. 2. After going to such lengths to unnecessarily invoke this Court's constitutional power, the majority, without comment or explanation, summarily affirms the trial court's denial of Tyson's request, pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-5, to be released on bail pending the disposition of the State's appeal....

...As Justice Carley's concurrence points out, Tyson's appeal from the denial of bail presents several issues to be decided by this Court: What does the statute mean by "shall be entitled to be released on reasonable bail?" What party has the burden of proof when the trial court is considering a motion for bail based on § 5-7-5? To these questions I would add another: if, as the majority opinion holds, all petitions for certiorari filed in this Court by the State in criminal matters are here by dint of this Court's constitutional authority to grant a writ of certio...

...right to appeal in criminal cases into an unconstitutional assault on this Court's constitutional authority to grant a writ of certiorari in any Court of Appeals' case effectively keeps the majority from having to construe the ramifications of OCGA § 5-7-5. As I noted above in Division 1, while OCGA § 5-7-5 authorizes the criminal defendant to have the bail matter reviewed by the appellate court in which the State's appeal is pending, that authority is dependent upon the State having filed an appeal as authorized in Chapter 5-7....

...The majority opinion offers no resolution to the issues, and appellate jurisprudence suffers from the majority's failure to set forth the rationale for its judgment. The majority's reticence, however, cannot be construed as an implicit determination that OCGA § 5-7-5 is not applicable to the *452 case at bar. As the defendant in a criminal case in which the State sought to appeal an adverse decision, Tyson had a statutory right under OCGA § 5-7-5 to seek release on bail pending the disposition of the State's appeal....

...f gravity or great public importance, the statutory limitations placed on the State cannot be ignored by this Court when the issue is not whether to grant certiorari, but whether the necessary prerequisites to a criminal defendant seeking bail under § 5-7-5 have been met. In the latter instance, if the State's appeal does not fall within the limitations of Title 5, Chapter 7, then the criminal defendant is not statutorily entitled to seek bail pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-5; if, however, the State's appeal does fall within those appeals permitted by Title 5, Chapter 7, the criminal defendant is authorized to invoke § 5-7-5 as a basis for seeking release on bail pending the disposition of the appeal initiated by the State. Because OCGA § 5-7-5, in and of itself, does not limit this Court's ability to grant a writ of certiorari to any decision of the Court of Appeals and § 5-7-1 serves only as a statutory prerequisite and not as a jurisdictional limitation when the criminal defendant invokes entitlement to bail under § 5-7-5, the majority's lack of rationale concerning its affirmance of the denial of bail should not be seen as a determination that § 5-7-5 is not applicable to the situation. I dissent from the majority's summary affirmance of the trial court's denial of Tyson's request for release on bail pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-5. [29] That statute makes it clear that Tyson's appeal of the trial court's denial of his request for release on bail is made moot by this Court's issuance of an opinion addressing the merits of the State's appeal. OCGA § 5-7-5 contains a temporal limitation—any release on bail granted pursuant to it is good only "pending disposition of the appeal." With today's issuance of an opinion on the State's appeal, Tyson's window for release on bail is closed, and any allegations of error concerning the trial court's denial of bail are moot....

...422, 424 (1849); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 21-1.4 commentary at 21-19 (2d ed.1986) (double jeopardy clause of United States Constitution and similar clauses in state constitutions are a primary constraint on the power of the prosecution to appeal). [4] See 1973 Ga. Laws 297 (codified at OCGA §§ 5-7-1 to 5-7-5)....

...he language "any case" does not give any express right to the State to appeal. Because there was no statutory authority for the State to seek a writ of certiorari, the B'Gos court dismissed the certiorari petition for lack of jurisdiction. [27] OCGA § 5-7-5 states: In the event the state files an appeal as authorized in this chapter, the accused shall be entitled to be released on reasonable bail pending the disposition of the appeal, except in those case punishable by death....

...his Court or the Court of Appeals, as is required by § 5-7-1. [29] Since I believe that the State's appeal falls within the parameters of OCGA §§ 5-7-1 and 5-7-3, the appeal from the denial of bail is rightfully before this Court pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-5....

...THE STATE. HINES, Chief Justice. John Johnson was convicted of murder but was granted a new trial. The State appealed, and the trial court entered an order denying Johnson’s motion for appeal bond. Johnson now appeals from that order, contending that it is directly appealable pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-51 and that the denial of bond violates the same statute....

...pretrial bond, was tried before a jury in 2014, was convicted of felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder and a consecutive five-year term 1 OCGA § 5-7-5 provides: “In the event the state files an appeal as authorized in this chapter, the accused shall be entitled to be released on reasonable bail pending the disposition of the appeal, except in those cases punishable by death....

...for the firearms charge. The trial court, however, granted his motion for new trial and vacated the previously imposed sentences, and the State filed a notice of appeal.2 Johnson subsequently filed a motion for appeal bond in the trial court under OCGA § 5-7-5. After a hearing, the trial court denied that motion, deciding that “the bond [Johnson] seeks is not, in fact, a supersedeas or appeal bond to which OCGA § 5-7-5 applies, but is rather a pretrial bond, which would put [him] back in his previous posture before trial in 2014,” and that the pertinent question “is not whether [Johnson] should [be] granted bond pending the outcome of the State’s...

...We granted Johnson’s motion to expedite. See Ingle v. State, 216 Ga. App. 836, 837 (456 SE2d 2  1. We first consider whether the denial of Johnson’s appeal bond is directly appealable. Johnson relies on the second sentence of OCGA § 5-7-5, which provides that “[t]he amount of the bail, to be set by the court, shall be reviewable on direct application by the court to which the appeal is taken.” This sentence must be read, Johnson argues, to include review of a denial of bail pending an appeal by the State. For purposes of this appeal only, we assume that this provision of OCGA § 5-7-5 does not provide for direct review of the denial of bail....

...for appeal bond is directly appealable by Johnson, and, therefore, this appeal is not subject to dismissal for failure to obtain a certificate of immediate review as required by OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). 2. Turning to the merits, Johnson relies on the first sentence of OCGA § 5-7-5, which provides that, “[i]n the event the state files an appeal as authorized in this chapter, the accused shall be entitled to be released on reasonable bail pending the disposition of the appeal, except in those cases punishable by...

...d file its appeal as authorized in Chapter 7 of Title 5 of the Georgia Code, the same chapter that includes this bail provision. See OCGA §§ 5-7-1 (a) (8), 5-7-2 (c). Johnson insists that he is therefore “entitled to be released” under OCGA § 5-7-5 because the State has not in any manner sought the death penalty in his case, and that, as a result, the case does not come within the exception for “those cases punishable by death.” The State, however, argues that Johnson’s case i...

...ment for life.”); 17-10-30 (b) (requiring consideration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances in cases of offenses, other than aircraft hijacking and treason, “for which the death penalty may be authorized”). In construing OCGA § 5-7-5, we “presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant and so we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would....

...(recognizing that an offense may be “punishable by death” and yet a sentence of death be prohibited in the absence of a finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance). Johnson argues in his appellate reply brief that 7 OCGA § 5-7-5 excepts only cases punishable by death, but Weatherbed was dealing with a statute, OCGA § 17-7-70 (b), that likewise excepted from its application “cases” that were “punishable by death.” See also Neal v....

...J., concurring, joined by all Justices, similarly holding that our appellate jurisdiction over “cases” in which a sentence of death “could be imposed” includes all murder cases). We can discern no reason from the immediate context of OCGA § 5-7-5 or from its legal background to interpret the phrase “cases punishable by death” in that statute in any manner different from our interpretation of OCGA § 17-7- 70 (b) in Weatherbed. It follows that Johnson’s murder case comes within the exception clause of OCGA § 5-7-5. The question then becomes what effect that statute has on a case that comes within its exception clause. The primary clause of OCGA § 5-7-5 providing that “the accused shall be entitled to be released” does not govern Johnson’s case....

...Ga. at 828 (4), and “applied only so far as their language fairly warrants.” Sawnee Elec. Membership Corp. v. Ga. Pub. Svc. Comm., 273 Ga. 702, 704 (544 SE2d 158) (2001) (citation and punctuation omitted). The general rule of OCGA § 5-7-5 is that an accused is automatically entitled to reasonable bail pending an appeal by the State. The exception removes cases punishable by death from that general rule. Accordingly, an accused in such a case is clearly not automatically entitled to bail pending the State’s appeal. But OCGA § 5-7-5 does not purport to make any special provision for such cases....

...OCGA § 5-7-6 (“This chapter shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes stated in this chapter.”); Ga. L. 2013, p. 222, §§ 3, 21 (enacting OCGA § 5-7-6 and applying it only to offenses which occur on or after July 1, 2013). And interpreting OCGA § 5-7-5 as leaving the grant or denial of bail in the trial court’s discretion would have the advantage of limiting the reach of the exception clause to a less drastic departure from the general statutory rule. Nevertheless, because the exception clause has no language that could be construed as a provision for bail in cases punishable by death, we cannot say that it is possible to determine from OCGA § 5-7-5 alone whether bail pending appeal by the State can be granted within the trial court’s discretion and what is the extent of any such discretion. The APA has no general appellate provisions for appeal bonds that apply to appeals by...

...[certain misdemeanor offenses] shall be in the discretion of the convicting court.” As a result, if OCGA § 17-6-1 (g) was read as extending to the context of appeal bonds in appeals by the State, it would conflict with the general rule of automatic entitlement to bail in OCGA § 5-7-5 with respect to almost every offense it covers, including virtually every type of felony other than murder....

...ls, and when the conflicting statute expressly governs bail pending an appeal by the State. Although OCGA § 17-6-1 (g) cannot be applied to Johnson’s murder case and there is no other appeal bond statute in felony cases5 besides OCGA § 5-7-5, we still must answer the questions of whether bail pending appeal can be granted to Johnson in the trial court’s discretion and, if so, what is the extent of that discretion....

...to grant bail pending appeal must be left in the sound discretion of the trial court. See Hardin, 251 Ga. at 534; Birge, 238 Ga. at 89-90; Vanderford, 126 Ga. at 70-72 (2). Cf. OCGA § 17-6-1 (g) (prohibiting bail pending an appeal by the defendant in certain cases). Although OCGA § 5-7-5 grants most criminal defendants automatic entitlement to bail pending an appeal by the State, there is no statutory provision for such bail pending the State’s appeal in the capital case of murder....

...After Birge and Hardin, the General Assembly took an even more strict approach to criminal appeal bonds in appeals by the defendant when it prohibited them for murder and certain other felonies by its enactment of OCGA § 17-6-1 (g). But the General Assembly never changed its pre-existing approach in OCGA § 5-7-5 for bail pending appeal by the State....

...State’s appeal in a murder case, where the trial court has determined that the defendant’s conviction was improperly obtained. Nevertheless, we recognize 16 that the General Assembly has chosen to treat murder cases differently in OCGA § 5-7-5, and trial courts must be allowed some level of discretion to deny requests for bail pending appeals by the State in such cases....