CopyCited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 22, 1997 | 268 Ga. 408, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 3496
...ounty pursuant to Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. VI (Ga. Const.1983), the constitutional venue provision providing for venue in the county of residence of the defendant. DOC moved to transfer the action to Baldwin County claiming venue is controlled by OCGA §
50-21-28, the venue provision of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, OCGA §
50-21-20 et seq., (GTCA), which provides that venue for tort actions against the State is in the county where the loss occurred....
...The trial court granted both motions, transferring the action to Baldwin County and ordering Campbell to pay DOC's attorney fees. The trial court certified its order for immediate review and we granted Campbell's application for interlocutory appeal to consider *100 her constitutional challenge to OCGA §
50-21-28 and the trial court's award of attorney fees. Because we find that OCGA §
50-21-28 is constitutional and provides the exclusive venue for this GTCA action against DOC, we affirm the trial court's order transferring this case to Baldwin County. However, we reverse the award of attorney fees pursuant to OCGA §
9-15-14. 1. OCGA §
50-21-28 provides "[a]ll tort actions against the state under [the GTCA] shall be brought in the state or superior court of the county wherein the loss occurred." Campbell contends that this statute is unconstitutional because it contravenes the c...
...Relying on Hoffman v. Dept. of Corrections,
218 Ga.App. 363,
460 S.E.2d 882 (1995), Campbell argues that DOC is a resident of Fulton County and venue over DOC is proper in Fulton County pursuant to Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. VI. DOC contends that OCGA §
50-21-28 is a permissible limitation of venue because the State has constitutional authority to make a limited waiver of sovereign immunity subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the GTCA. See Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (a). Although this Court has not before been called upon to consider the constitutionality of OCGA §
50-21-28, a comparable statutory venue provision was subjected to an identical constitutional challenge in Glover v....
...ing that waiver was "not in any way conditioned on the [venue] limitation." [2] Id. at 481,
254 S.E.2d 857. Although involving a challenge to a different statutory venue provision, the analysis of Glover is applicable to Campbell's challenge to OCGA §
50-21-28 and, under that analysis, the constitutionality of OCGA §
50-21-28 depends upon whether the State's waiver of immunity in the GTCA is conditioned on the limitation of venue provided in the statute....
...utes the exclusive remedy for any tort committed by a state officer or employee"). Unlike the venue statute in Glover, it is apparent that the waiver of immunity contained in the GTCA is expressly conditioned on the venue limitation provided in OCGA §
50-21-28 and is a term and condition upon which the State has consented to be sued....
...the part of the State, it may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued). While it is axiomatic that a statute standing alone may not contravene a constitutional provision, Glover, supra,
243 Ga. at 482,
254 S.E.2d 857, OCGA §
50-21-28 is the implementation of a constitutional amendment authorizing not only the adoption of the GTCA but also the limitation on the waiver of sovereign immunity contained therein. Accordingly, we find the enactment of OCGA §
50-21-28 to be a valid exercise of the General Assembly's constitutional authority pursuant to Article I, Section II, Paragraph IX (a). 2. Because we find OCGA §
50-21-28 to be an express condition of the State's waiver of sovereign immunity, we hold that §
50-21-28 establishes the proper venue in actions brought under the GTCA and against the State as the sole defendant....
...exclusive is misplaced as the court in Jahncke failed to recognize this body of case law. 3. Campbell contends the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to DOC pursuant to OCGA §
9-15-14. We agree. Campbell's constitutional challenge of OCGA §
50-21-28 was based on the apparent conflict between the statute and the venue provision of Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. VI. Because the constitutionality of OCGA §
50-21-28 had not previously been determined and Campbell's challenge was arguably supported by the language of Art....
...The sovereign immunity of the state and its departments and agencies can only be waived by an Act of the General Assembly which specifically provides that sovereign immunity is thereby waived and the extent of such waiver. [4] We do not here consider whether OCGA §
50-21-28 provides the exclusive venue where the "joint tortfeasor" provision of the state constitution is implicated....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 13, 2006 | 280 Ga. 333
...vision, the constitutional joint tortfeasor venue provision could not be varied by the statute. [5] In Campbell v. Dept. of Corrections, [6] we addressed a situation similar to that presented in Glover. In Campbell, the plaintiff contended that OCGA §
50-21-28, which provides that venue in tort actions against the State under the Georgia Tort Claims Act is in the county where the loss occurred, contravened the joint tortfeasor venue provision of our Constitution. We concluded, however, that it did not, as the General Assembly had the authority under Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (a) of the Constitution to enact OCGA §
50-21-28....
...[7] In this regard, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (a) authorized the General Assembly to set the terms and conditions of any State waiver of sovereign immunity. We held that, although a statute could not by itself contravene a constitutional provision, "OCGA §
50-21-28 is the implementation of a constitutional amendment authorizing not only the adoption of the [Georgia Tort Claims Act] but also *485 the limitation on the waiver of sovereign immunity." [8] The defendants in these actions contend that OCGA §
9-10-31(c) is authorized by Art....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 3, 1997 | 268 Ga. 582, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 4006
...plicable two-year statute of limitation of OCGA §
9-3-33, and that the DOC was not a "person" subject to suit within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the alternative, the DOC asked that venue be transferred to Baldwin County as required by OCGA §
50-21-28, the venue provision of the GTCA....
...For the reasons which follow, we affirm the adverse ruling on the federal claims, but reverse the dismissal of alleged violations of state law. 1. This action was properly transferred to Baldwin County. The enactment of the venue limitation in the GTCA found in OCGA §
50-21-28 [2] is a valid exercise of the General Assembly's authority under Article I, Section II, Paragraph IX (a) of the 1983 Georgia Constitution, and establishes the proper venue in actions brought under the GTCA and against the State as the sole defendant....
...All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] The plaintiff is identified as Jane Doe #102 in accordance with a protective order entered by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia in Cason v. Seckinger, Civil Action No. 84-313-1-MAC(CWH). [2] OCGA §
50-21-28 provides in relevant part, "[a]ll tort actions against the state under [the GTCA] shall be brought in the state or superior court of the county wherein the loss occurred." [3] OCGA §
50-21-27(b) provides, "For tort claims and causes of a...
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 4, 1998 | 269 Ga. 400
...Evans. HINES, Justice. We granted certiorari in Evans v. Department of Transportation,
226 Ga.App. 74,
485 S.E.2d 243 (1997) to consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly construed the phrase "the county wherein the loss occurred" found in OCGA §
50-21-28, the venue provision of the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA), OCGA §
50-21-20 et seq....
...On DOT's motion, the Superior Court of Richmond County transferred venue to Columbia County, where the collision occurred. After a jury found that DOT was not negligent, Evans appealed to the Court of Appeals, asserting, inter alia, that the trial court erred in transferring venue. Examining OCGA §
50-21-28, the Court of Appeals concluded that venue was proper in Richmond County, where the death of Evans' daughter occurred. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals found that it was error to transfer the action to Columbia County. In the situation in which an action is brought under the GTCA and against the State as the sole defendant, the venue provision of OCGA §
50-21-28 is exclusive....
...m shopping. [1] These arguments are not persuasive. What is more, by challenging the express legislative mandate, such arguments implicitly reject the exclusivity of the GTCA's special venue provision. This Court has determined the enactment of OCGA §
50-21-28 to be a valid exercise of the legislature's constitutional authority and the statute an express condition of the State's waiver of sovereign immunity....
...The only claim asserted by Evans resulting from her daughter's death is the cause for wrongful death. [3] However, there is no concern of an absurd result in the event of *323 multiple claims derived from personal injuries to the same individual, each constituting a loss as contemplated in OCGA §
50-21-28, because nothing in the statute precludes the plaintiff's election of venue among the locations of loss....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 2, 2000 | 536 S.E.2d 743, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 3775
Sears, Justice.
The issue raised in this granted interlocutory appeal is whether OCGA §
50-21-28, which provides that venue under the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA)1 is in the county where the loss occurred, is unconstitutional because it conflicts with the joint tortfeasor venue provision of the Georgia Constitution.2 We conclude that the rationale of our decisions in Campbell v. Dept. of Corrections3 and Glover v. Donaldson4 requires that we hold that the venue limitation set forth in OCGA §
50-21-28 is constitutional because it is a valid exercise of the General Assembly’s constitutional authority to set the conditions of the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity.
The appellant, Brenda Dean, is the surviving spouse of Charles Dean and administratrix of his estate....
...Dean learned that Tabsum and Huber had their registered offices in Cobb County, she moved the Fulton State Court to transfer the case to Cobb County. The DOT, however, filed its own motion to transfer, contending that the Tort Claims Act placed venue of the action in Pickens County, where the loss occurred. See OCGA §
50-21-28.5 The Fulton State Court granted the DOT’s motion to transfer....
...IV of the Georgia Constitution6 permitted her to file the action in the county of residence of any of the joint tortfeasors, and that the constitutional provision took priority over the statutory venue provision of the Tort Claims Act. The Pickens Superior Court denied Ms. Dean’s motion, ruling that §
50-21-28 controlled over the joint tortfeasor venue provision “because the waiver of immunity contained in the [Tort Claims Act] is expressly conditioned on the venue limitation of OCGA §
50-21-28 and is a term and condition upon which the State has consented to be sued....
...Campbell filed a tort action against the Georgia Department of Corrections in the Department’s county of residence. In doing so, Campbell relied upon the constitutional venue provision providing for venue in the county of residence of the defendant.7 The Department, on the other hand, contended that OCGA §
50-21-28 required that it be sued in the county where the loss occurred, and the Department filed a motion to transfer the case to the county of loss. In response, Campbell contended that the statutory venue provision of §
50-21-28 was unconstitutional because it conflicted with the constitutional venue provision providing that certain actions had to be filed in the defendant’s county of residence....
...rt ruled against MARTA, concluding that the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity was not conditioned upon the venue provision in the MARTA Act.10
Applying the Glover analysis in Campbell, we concluded that Campbell’s constitutional challenge to §
50-21-28 turned on whether “the State’s waiver of immunity in the GTCA is conditioned on the limitation of venue provided in the statute.”11 Based on our review of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions concerning the GTCA, we concluded that “[u]nlike the venue statute in Glover, it is apparent that the waiver of immunity contained in the GTCA is expressly conditioned on the venue limitation provided in OCGA §
50-21-28 and is a term and condition upon which the State has consented to be sued.”12 We also held that “[w]hile it is axiomatic that a statute standing alone may not contravene a constitutional provision, OCGA §
50-21-28 is the implementation of a constitutional amendment authorizing not only the adoption of the GTCA but also the limitation on the waiver of sovereign immunity contained therein.”13 We therefore held that the venue provision of the Tort Claims Act was not unconstitutional for the reason asserted by Campbell, that §
50-21-28 established the proper venue for “actions brought under the [Tort Claims Act] and against the State as the sole defendant,”14 and that this holding was supported by a long line of cases that hold that special venue provisions control “where, as here, they use the term ‘shall’ instead of the permissive use of ‘may.’ ”15
Although we stated in Campbell that we were not addressing the issue presented by the instant case - “whether §
50-21-28 provides the exclusive venue where the ‘joint tortfeasor’ provision of the state constitution is implicated,”16 - we conclude that the rationale of Campbell is equally applicable to the joint tortfeasor venue provision of the constitution. Simply stated, in Campbell we held that §
50-21-28 was constitutional because the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity was expressly conditioned on the venue limitation codified in it. *834That holding is applicable here, and requires that we hold that §
50-21-28 is constitutional even though it is inconsistent with the joint tortfeasor venue provision of the constitution. Moreover, because we held in Campbell that §
50-21-28 is a special venue provision that is controlling and exclusive because of its use of the word “shall,” we now hold that it establishes the proper venue in tort actions against the State even when the State is not the sole tortfeasor....
...Accordingly, Dean must sue the DOT in Pickens County, where the loss occurred, and Pickens County will then become the DOT’s county of residence for purposes of this lawsuit.17
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that OCGA §
50-21-28 is constitutional.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Benham, C. J., and Corley, J., who dissent.
OCGA §
50-21-20 et seq.
Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV of the 1983 Ga. Constitution.
268 Ga. 408 (490 SE2d 99) (1997).
243 Ga. 479 (254 SE2d 857) (1979).
OCGA §
50-21-28 provides as follows:
All tort actions against the state under this article shall be brought in the state or superior court of the county wherein the loss occurred; provided, however, that, in any case in which an officer or employee of t...
