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2018 Georgia Code 51-3-21 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 51 TORTS

Section 3. Liability of Owners and Occupiers of Land, 51-3-1 through 51-3-44.

ARTICLE 2 OWNERS OF PROPERTY USED FOR RECREATIONAL PURPOSES

51-3-21. Definitions.

As used in this article, the term:

  1. "Charge" means the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land.
  2. "Land" means land, roads, water, watercourses, private ways and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment when attached to the realty.
  3. "Owner" means the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, a lessee, an occupant, or a person in control of the premises.
  4. "Recreational purpose" includes, but is not limited to, any of the following or any combination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, aviation activities, nature study, water skiing, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical, archeological, scenic, or scientific sites.

(Ga. L. 1965, p. 476, § 2; Ga. L. 2014, p. 825, § 2/HB 494.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

"Charge" construed.

- Alleged benefits of advertising and promotion of sales of the defendant's products from the opening to the public of picnic grounds and a lake on the defendant's property are not a "charge" as defined by paragraph (1) of this section. Bourn v. Herring, 225 Ga. 67, 166 S.E.2d 89 (1969), appeal dismissed sub nom. Herring v. R.L. Mathis Certified Dairy Co., 400 U.S. 922, 91 S. Ct. 192, 27 L. Ed. 2d 183 (1970).

State park's collection of a $1.00 parking fee upon all motor vehicles did not constitute a charge imposing liability for personal injuries sustained by a park visitor under the Georgia Recreational Property Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq. Majeske v. Jekyll Island State Park Auth., 209 Ga. App. 118, 433 S.E.2d 304 (1993).

The fee charged to youths and teams participating in a softball program at a park owned by a city and county recreation board was not the "charge" referred to in O.C.G.A. § 51-3-21 so as to render the protection of the Recreational Property Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq., inapplicable to the defendant; the charge referred to in the Act is what is imposed to obtain permission to enter the premises. Spivey v. City of Baxley, 210 Ga. App. 772, 437 S.E.2d 623 (1993).

After the plaintiff sued the United States over injuries the plaintiff allegedly sustained when the plaintiff fell down stairs within a federally owned campground, the United States was insulated from liability under Georgia's Recreational Property Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20, because O.C.G.A. § 51-3-25(2)'s exception to non-liability for landowners who charged admission fees did not apply since the fees the United States charged campers were not admission fees, which were prohibited by federal law, but were assessed to defray the costs of providing utilities. Swafford v. United States, 839 F.3d 1365 (11th Cir. 2016).

"Land" construed.

- Nothing on the face of this section indicates in any way an intention on the part of the General Assembly to limit its effect to privately owned land such as land held by farmers. Stone Mt. Mem. Ass'n v. Herrington, 225 Ga. 746, 171 S.E.2d 521 (1969).

"Recreational purpose" construed.

- When a building owner asserted it had opened its property to the public for "recreational purposes," showed that people come to the Underground Atlanta area for entertainment, and also showed that the plaintiffs were sightseers and had taken pictures of the area, such facts did not indicate "recreational purposes" as defined in paragraph (4) of O.C.G.A. § 51-3-21. Cedeno v. Lockwood, Inc., 250 Ga. 799, 301 S.E.2d 265 (1983).

A park created to celebrate the spirit of an historic athletic and cultural event and to provide a gathering place for visitors to relax and enjoy themselves constitutes property available to the public for recreational purposes so as to come within the immunity provisions of the Recreational Property Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq. Anderson v. Atlanta Comm. for the Olympic Games, Inc., 273 Ga. 113, 537 S.E.2d 345 (2000).

Recreational Property Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq., applies to spectators at athletic events when no admission charge is imposed. Spivey v. City of Baxley, 210 Ga. App. 772, 437 S.E.2d 623 (1993).

Summary judgment was inappropriate when a fact issue remained as to whether a lot owner's clearing of property subject to an easement interfered with the easement holders' rights to use the land for recreational purposes, such as enjoying the land in its natural uncut state. E. Beach Props. v. Taylor, 250 Ga. App. 798, 552 S.E.2d 103 (2001).

Summary judgment was improperly entered in favor of an Olympic Committee since a genuine issue of material fact existed about whether the operation of the Olympic Park was a commercial or a recreational venture; on remand, the jury was ordered to resolve the question of whether the nature of the Park at the time of the underlying explosion which caused the death or injury of those involved in the litigation was commercial or recreational, and the court was to decide whether the Recreational Property Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq., applied to the Park and insulated the Committee from liability. Anderson v. Atlanta Comm. for the Olympic Games, Inc., 261 Ga. App. 895, 584 S.E.2d 16 (2003), aff'd, sub nom. Atlanta Comm. for the Olympic Games, Inc. v. Hawthorne, 278 Ga. 116, 598 S.E.2d 471 (2004).

Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to a city on allegations of negligence asserted against by an injured motorcycle driver as the Recreational Property Act (Act), O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq., prevented the driver from recovering from the city based on allegations of simple negligence; moreover, the Act clearly applied because it was undisputed that the injuries occurred when the driver collided with the cable fence on the city's recreational property, and the city permitted the general public to use the park and open field where the accident occurred for recreational purposes without charge. Carroll v. City of Carrollton, 280 Ga. App. 172, 633 S.E.2d 591 (2006).

Hunting is among the many recreational purposes recognized by the Georgia Recreational Property Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq. Lee v. Dep't of Natural Res. of Ga., 263 Ga. App. 491, 588 S.E.2d 260 (2003).

Park in which substantial profit made.

- Stone Mountain Park premises are a public recreation area, notwithstanding the fact that substantial revenues may be derived from the sale of special permits, concessions, and tickets to rides and other attractions located on the premises. Hogue v. Stone Mt. Mem. Ass'n, 183 Ga. App. 378, 358 S.E.2d 852, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 906, 358 S.E.2d 852 (1987).

Cemetery maintenance company.

- Whether the Recreational Property Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq., applied to a cemetery maintenance company was a question for the jury; liability could be imposed based upon theories that the maintenance company acted as the cemetery owner's agent. Martin v. Dempsey Funeral Servs. of Ga., Inc., 319 Ga. App. 343, 735 S.E.2d 59 (2012).

Cited in Georgia Power Co. v. McGruder, 229 Ga. 811, 194 S.E.2d 440 (1972); Erickson v. Century Mgt. Co., 154 Ga. App. 508, 268 S.E.2d 779 (1980); Georgia Marble Co. v. Warren, 183 Ga. App. 866, 360 S.E.2d 286 (1987); Cooley v. City of Carrollton, 249 Ga. App. 387, 547 S.E.2d 689 (2001).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 51-3-21

Total Results: 8  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Anderson v. Atlanta Comm. for the Olympic Games, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 345 (Ga. 2000).

Cited 66 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 23, 2000 | 273 Ga. 113

...must be examined in light of facts of case at hand). The RPA limits, with certain exceptions, the liability of an owner of land who has made property available without charge to the public for recreational purposes. OCGA §§ 51-3-22, 51-3-23. OCGA § 51-3-21(4) provides that "recreational purposes" includes, but is not limited to, any of the following or any combination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, water skiing, wint...
...d water areas available to the public for recreational purposes." OCGA § 51-3-20. See also City of Tybee Island v. Godinho, 270 Ga. 567, 511 S.E.2d 517 (1999). By its express language, the RPA is not limited to the activities delineated within OCGA § 51-3-21(4) but encompasses any recreational activity, i.e., any amusement, play or other form of relaxation which refreshes the mind or body....
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Cedeno v. Lockwood, Inc., 301 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. 1983).

Cited 38 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 5, 1983 | 250 Ga. 799

...It shows that people come to the Underground area for entertainment. It also shows that plaintiffs were sightseers *802 and had taken pictures of the area. We disagree with Lockwood's assessment that such facts indicate "recreational purposes" as defined in the RPA. OCGA § 51-3-21 (4) (Code Ann....
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Atlanta Comm. for Olympic Games, Inc. v. Hawthorne, 598 S.E.2d 471 (Ga. 2004).

Cited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 28, 2004 | 278 Ga. 116

...See generally Martin v. Williams, 215 Ga.App. 649(3), 451 S.E.2d 822 (1994); see also Sechler Family Partnership v. Prime Group, 255 Ga.App. 854(2), 567 S.E.2d 24 (2002) (discovery of admissible evidence). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] See OCGA § 51-3-21(3), which defines "owner" as used in the RPA....
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City of Tybee Island v. Godinho, 511 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 1999).

Cited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 8, 1999 | 270 Ga. 567, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 544

...rred in reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the City. Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] OCGA § 51-3-20 to § 51-3-26. [2] Godinho v. City of Tybee Island, 231 Ga.App. 377, 499 S.E.2d 389 (1998). [3] See OCGA § 51-3-21 to 51-3-26. [4] OCGA § 51-3-20. [5] OCGA § 51-3-21(4)....
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Mayor of Garden City v. Harris, 302 Ga. 853 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 29, 2018 | 809 S.E.2d 806

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Mercer Univ. v. Stofer, 830 S.E.2d 169 (Ga. 2019).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 24, 2019 | 306 Ga. 191

...ination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, aviation activities, nature study, water skiing, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical, archeological, scenic, or scientific sites. OCGA § 51-3-21 (4)....
...In some other contexts, "purpose" may be understood to refer to subjective motivation. But that is not how the Act uses the word. With only one exception not relevant here,9 "purpose" appears in the Act only as part of the defined term "recreational purposes." See OCGA § 51-3-21 (4) (non-exclusive list of a variety of activities)....
...Similarly, OCGA § 51-3-22 refers to "persons entering for recreational purposes" (emphasis added). There can be no question about whether the property owner - who may be far away from the property itself, doing no swimming, hiking, skiing, or any of the other activities listed in OCGA § 51-3-21 (4) - is using the property for "recreational purposes"; it would be strange indeed to characterize the purpose of an absent owner as "recreational." Consideration of a landowner's financial interests is nowhere found in the language of th...
...853, 855, 809 S.E.2d 806 (2018). See Ga. L. 2018, p.1083, § 1. None of these changes are relevant to this case, to which the prior version of the statute applies. The plaintiffs do not dispute that Mercer qualifies as an "owner" for purposes of the statute, defined in OCGA § 51-3-21 (3) as "the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, a lessee, an occupant, or a person in control of the premises." Although not pertinent to Cedeno , it is worth noting that the property that is relevant is not necessarily an entire tract...
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The Mayor & Alderman of Garden City v. Harris, 302 Ga. 853 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 29, 2018

...705, 709 (723 SE2d 901) (2012) (explaining that “this Court may construe statutes to avoid absurd results”) (citing Allen v. Wright, 282 Ga. 9, 12 (1) (644 SE2d 814) (2007)). In this case, the record clearly supports the trial court’s finding that the public was charged a fee to enter the premises. See OCGA § 51-3-21 (1) (defines a “charge” as “the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land”)....
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Mercer Univ. v. Stofer, 306 Ga. 191 (Ga. 2019).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 24, 2019

...L. 2018, p. 1083, § 1. None of these changes are relevant to this case, to which the prior version of the statute applies. 5 The plaintiffs do not dispute that Mercer qualifies as an “owner” for purposes of the statute, defined in OCGA § 51-3-21 (3) as “the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, a lessee, an occupant, or a person in control of the premises.” 9 to use the property for recreational purposes does not thereby: (1)...
...combination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, aviation activities, nature study, water skiing, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical, archeological, scenic, or scientific sites. OCGA § 51-3-21 (4)....
...In some other contexts, “purpose” may be understood to refer to subjective motivation. But that is not how the Act uses the word. With only one exception not relevant here,9 “purpose” appears in the Act only as part of the defined term “recreational purposes.” See OCGA § 51-3-21 (4) (non-exclusive list of a variety of activities)....
...entering for recreational purposes” (emphasis added). There can be no question about whether the property owner — who may be far away from the property itself, doing no swimming, hiking, skiing, or any of the other activities listed in OCGA § 51-3-21 (4) — is using the property for “recreational purposes”; it would be strange indeed to characterize the purpose of an absent owner as “recreational.” Consideration of a landowner’s financial interests is nowhere found in th...