CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 12, 1987 | 256 Ga. 790
...he contracts do not contain the consumer protections required by DIDMCA. Therefore, DIDMCA does not exempt those contracts from §
10-1-33. 2. For purposes of the certified question, the lenders' pertinent defense was that the 1983 amendment of OCGA §
7-4-3, effective March 31, 1983, [4] eliminated the causes of action of Doyle and Wood, even though they entered into their contracts before the amendment's effective date. With regard to this defense, the Eleventh Circuit has certified the following question to us: "Whether [the 1983 amendment to OCGA §
7-4-3 (a)], which provides that OCGA §
10-1-33 shall not apply to retail installment contracts pertaining to any manufactured home with a cash sales price of more than $3,000.00, [which the contracts in question exceeded] operates retroactively s...
...The lenders, relying on Ward v. Hudco Loan Co.,
254 Ga. 294 (328 SE2d 729) (1985); Fountain v. Dixie Finance Corp.,
252 Ga. 543 (314 SE2d 906) (1984); and Southern Discount Co. v. Ector,
246 Ga. 30 (268 SE2d 621) (1980), contend that the 1983 amendment to OCGA §
7-4-3 should be applied retroactively to defeat Doyle's and Wood's causes of action....
...The lenders, however, do acknowledge that the issue of retroactivity of laws is "at last and always a question of legislative intent." Canton Textile Mills v. Lathem,
253 Ga. 102, 103 (1) (317 SE2d 189) (1984). [5] In the instant case, we find that there is a clear legislative intent that the 1983 amendment of OCGA §
7-4-3 (a) should not be applied retroactively. From the time the DIDMCA preemption became effective in 1980 until March 31, 1983, the effective date of the amendment of OCGA §
7-4-3 (a), two categories of lawful interest rates existed in Georgia....
...ided the consumer protection benefits required by DIDMCA. If the consumer protections were not provided, then the lender would lose the DIDMCA preemption and *793 would be subject to the interest limits of OCGA §
10-1-33. With the amendment of OCGA §
7-4-3 (a) in 1983 the General Assembly abolished the interest limits applying to mobile home loans in excess of $3,000. OCGA §
7-4-3 (a) (1). This removal of interest limits, however, was coupled with the requirement that lenders provide consumers the protections required by DIDMCA. OCGA §
7-4-3 (b) (1)....
...None of the previous cases relied on by the lenders dealt with legislation with such a trade-off. Moreover, we find this trade-off indicative of the legislative intent regarding the retroactivity vel non of the relevant provisions of the 1983 amendment to §
7-4-3. If we were to adopt the lenders' position and apply OCGA §
7-4-3 (a) (1), as amended in 1983, retroactively, a third category of permissible loan contracts would be created for the period preceding March 31, 1983. Under it a lender could charge in excess of 10% add-on for loans in excess of $3,000 and the consumer would not be entitled to the protections of DIDMCA. Obviously, the General Assembly, in amending §
7-4-3 in 1983, considered the DIDMCA protections important enough to require lenders to include them in mobile home contracts in excess of $3,000....
...MCA protections. Because we should not, in determining legislative intent, ascribe to the legislature an unreasonable intention, e.g., City of Jesup v. Bennett,
226 Ga. 606 (2) (176 SE2d 81) (1970), we conclude that the General Assembly intended for §
7-4-3 (a) (1) and (b) (1), as amended in 1983, to have prospective application only....
...The GMVSFA has been applied to mobile homes because of the judicial construction given to the definition of "motor vehicle" appearing at OCGA §
10-1-31 (a) (4). E.g., Holder v. Brock,
129 Ga. App. 732 (200 SE2d 912) (1973). The General Assembly, however, by amending OCGA §
7-4-3 in 1983 created laws which specifically apply to mobile home retail installment contracts. As previously noted, OCGA §
7-4-3 (a) (1) removes the interest limit for mobile home installment sales contracts in excess of $3,000, while §
7-4-3 (b) (1) requires lenders for such contracts to grant consumers the protections of DIDMCA. Moreover, the 1983 amendment to §
7-4-3 distinguishes between mobile home contracts and motor vehicle contracts. The amendment abolishes the interest limit on motor vehicle loans in excess of $5,000, §
7-4-3 (a) (2), [6] and only extends the consumer protection of DIDMCA to mobile home installment sales contracts and not to motor vehicle installment sales contracts, §
7-4-3 (b) (1). Since the General Assembly, beginning in 1983, has distinguished between mobile home loans and motor vehicle loans, and since §§
7-4-3 (a) (1) and (b) (1), as amended in 1983, deal specifically with mobile home installment sales contracts, whereas §
10-1-33 (d), as amended in 1985, does not, we conclude that OCGA §§
7-4-3 (a) (1) and (b) (1) express the controlling legislation and legislative intent on mobile home installment sales contracts in excess of $3,000. Moreover, we note that the retroactive application of new subsection (d) of OCGA §
10-1-33 to mobile home installment contracts would defeat the legislative intent, discussed in Division 3, supra, of the 1983 amendment of OCGA §
7-4-3, which couples the abolishing of interest limits on mobile homes with the granting of consumer protections....
...For the foregoing reasons, the lenders' reliance on §
10-1-33 (d), as amended, fails. 5. In addition to the foregoing, we conclude that OCGA §
10-1-36.1, added to GMVSFA in 1985, see Ga. Laws 1985 at 699, also expresses an intent by the General Assembly that neither the 1983 amendment of OCGA §
7-4-3, nor the addition of new subsection (d) to §
10-1-33 in 1985 (assuming it did apply to mobile home loans, see Division 4, supra) was intended to apply retroactively....
...OCGA §
10-1-36.1 (a) bars all class actions for violation of GMVSFA, but subsection (b) exempts from this bar all class actions involving mobile homes pending as of February 22, 1985. If the General Assembly had intended for either the 1983 amendment to §
7-4-3 or the 1985 addition of new subsection (d) to §
10-1-33 to apply retroactively, the inclusion *795 of the exemption in OCGA §
10-1-36.1 for class actions pending on February 22, 1985, would have been unnecessary, for such class actions would have been abolished by the retroactive application of those laws....
...ury limits have turned on absence of a savings clause. See Ward, supra, 254 Ga.; Fountain v. Dixie Finance, supra; Southern Discount Co. v. Ector, 246 Ga., supra. [6] We note that new subsection (d) of §
10-1-33, as enacted in 1985, is identical to §
7-4-3 (a) (2), as amended in 1983.
