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2018 Georgia Code 9-11-69 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 9 CIVIL PRACTICE

Section 11. Civil Practice Act, 9-11-1 through 9-11-133.

ARTICLE 8 PROVISIONAL AND FINAL REMEDIES AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

9-11-69. Execution; discovery in aid thereof.

Process to enforce a judgment for the payment of money shall be a writ of execution unless the court directs otherwise. In aid of the judgment or execution, the judgment creditor, or his successor in interest when that interest appears of record, may do any or all of the following:

  1. Examine any person, including the judgment debtor by taking depositions or propounding interrogatories;
  2. Compel the production of documents or things; and
  3. Upon a showing of reasonable necessity, obtain permission from a court of competent jurisdiction to enter upon that part of real property belonging to or lawfully occupied by the debtor which is not used as a residence and which property is not bona fide in the lawful possession of another;

    in the manner provided in this chapter for such discovery measures prior to judgment.

(Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 69; Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, § 32; Ga. L. 1987, p. 816, § 1.)

U.S. Code.

- For provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 69, and annotations pertaining thereto, see 28 U.S.C.

Law reviews.

- For survey article on trial practice and procedure for the period from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 439 (2003). For note discussing discovery proceedings available to creditors, see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 814 (1978).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Purpose of this section is to aid enforcement of a judgment or execution after it has become a final determination of the issue between the parties. McLarty v. Emhart Corp., 122 Ga. App. 677, 178 S.E.2d 344 (1970).

Purpose of post judgment discovery under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-69 is to aid a litigant to recover on a liability which has been established by a judgment. Miller v. United States Shelter Corp., 179 Ga. App. 469, 347 S.E.2d 251 (1986).

Post-judgment discovery procedures have for their purpose identifying assets to satisfy the judgment. Fleming v. Busey, 153 Ga. App. 489, 265 S.E.2d 839 (1980).

Allowable questions.

- Any question which would lead to any property or sources of income of judgment debtor is pertinent and allowable. Fleming v. Busey, 153 Ga. App. 489, 265 S.E.2d 839 (1980); Miller v. United States Shelter Corp., 179 Ga. App. 469, 347 S.E.2d 251 (1986).

Attorney's fees statute did not apply to post-judgment proceedings.

- In post-judgment discovery proceedings, the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to third parties (the judgment debtor's wife and her limited liability companies) from whom the judgment creditor sought information because O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 did not apply to post-judgment discovery according to the statute's plain language. RL BB ACQ I-GA CVL, LLC v. Workman, 341 Ga. App. 127, 798 S.E.2d 677 (2017).

There is no territorial limitation in discovery statutes as to location of witnesses, documents, assets, etc. Thrift v. Vi-Vin Prods., Inc., 134 Ga. App. 717, 215 S.E.2d 709 (1975).

Non-resident judgment debtor.

- Trial court had jurisdiction to compel a non-resident judgment debtor to attend a postjudgment deposition in Georgia; under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-69, the judgment creditor was entitled to notice the deposition under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-30, and the geographical limitations of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-45 did not apply. Heard v. Ruef, Ga. App. , 815 S.E.2d 607 (2018).

Service by mail.

- "In the manner provided in this chapter" includes service by mail upon counsel pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-5(b), such that the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's pleadings. Clinton Leasing Corp. v. Patterson, 209 Ga. App. 336, 433 S.E.2d 422 (1993).

Inapplicability of privilege as to matters working forfeiture.

- Defendant is not privileged to refuse to answer on grounds that an answer would cause a forfeiture of the defendant's estate and interfere with the defendant's right to earn a living. Aldridge v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 132 Ga. App. 788, 209 S.E.2d 234 (1974).

Privilege as to matters tending to work a forfeiture of an estate was inapplicable to post-judgment discovery proceedings geared toward uncovering or identifying assets to satisfy the judgment as the forfeiture did not result from answering questions or producing documents, but rather, results from a judgment already entered. Kushner v. Mascho, 143 Ga. App. 801, 240 S.E.2d 290 (1977).

Post-judgment discovery held only proper procedure.

- In action brought by bank against corporation seeking recovery on several notes and trade acceptances, as well as to recover an overdraft on a checking account, the trial court was without authority to direct the appellants, sole stockholders in the corporation, to either return all collateral to the premises of the corporation or to provide a list of the equipment; the proper procedure for obtaining such information is by post-judgment discovery in aid of execution, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-69, and the appellee's contention that the order to provide a list was authorized pursuant to the trial court's inherent power to issue orders necessary to the exercise of the court's jurisdiction was without merit. Ponderosa Granite Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 173 Ga. App. 105, 325 S.E.2d 591 (1984).

Court may impose sanctions for failure to comply with post-judgment discovery orders, including contempt for not appearing at a deposition, notwithstanding the fact that the person to be deposed is a nonresident, although there is apparently no provision for the aggrieved party to move for a dismissal of an appeal. Ostroff v. Coyner, 187 Ga. App. 109, 369 S.E.2d 298 (1988).

Use of privilege against self-incrimination.

- When interrogatories in fieri facias do not constitute or evidence extensive questioning as to the judgment debtor's financial affairs which would tend, as a matter of law, to incriminate the debtor, work a forfeiture of the debtor's estate, or bring disgrace or infamy upon the debtor or the debtor's family, but are clearly within the ambit of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-69, the burden is on the debtor to state the general reason for the debtor's refusal to answer and to specifically establish that a real danger of incrimination exists with respect to each question. Petty v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 169 Ga. App. 418, 312 S.E.2d 874 (1984).

Scope includes nonparties.

- Plain language of paragraph (1) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-69 works an express expansion of the permissible use of post-judgment written interrogatories to any person, regardless of whether the person is a party to the underlying action in which the money judgment was rendered. Esasky v. Forrest, 231 Ga. App. 488, 499 S.E.2d 413 (1998).

Impleader of persons not parties to the underlying judgment not permitted.

- O.C.G.A. § 9-11-69 does not authorize a judgment creditor to implead and hold liable persons who were not parties to the underlying judgment. C-Staff, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 275 Ga. 624, 571 S.E.2d 383 (2002).

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-69 did not authorize a judgment creditor to implead and hold liable persons who were not parties to the underlying judgment; a judgment creditor must initiate a separate civil action against persons the creditor claims are liable for a judgment to which they were not parties by filing a complaint and serving the defendants under the procedures set forth in the Civil Practice Act, see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9. Pazur v. Belcher, 272 Ga. App. 456, 612 S.E.2d 481 (2004).

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-69 did not authorize a judgment creditor to implead and hold liable persons who were not parties to the underlying judgment; instead, the judgment-creditor had to initiate a separate civil action against persons the judgment-creditor claims were liable for a judgment to which they were not parties. However, in the instant case, the plaintiff judgment creditors were not seeking to hold the defendant transferee liable for the consent judgment, only to avoid an allegedly fraudulent transfer. Reyes-Fuentes v. Shannon Produce Farm, Inc., F. Supp. 2d (S.D. Ga. May 2, 2012).

Action against shareholder for piercing corporate veil.

- Employer's complaint alleged against one of the employer's shareholders for piercing the corporate veil was not subject to a seven-year statute of limitations under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60 as the employee failed to first obtain a judgment against the employer and then file a separate action to pierce the corporate veil, but instead filed an amended complaint against that shareholder over six years after the original complaint was filed. Pazur v. Belcher, 272 Ga. App. 456, 612 S.E.2d 481 (2004).

Scope includes spouse of debtor.

- Spouse of a judgment debtor is within the scope of the post-judgment discovery process, subject to the limitations created by the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9, provisions governing discovery generally. In re Callaway, 212 Ga. App. 500, 442 S.E.2d 309 (1994).

Judgment creditor was authorized to seek bank records of the debtor's wife in post-judgment discovery because the creditor was entitled to seek information that would lead to any property or other sources of income of the debtor; further, the wife had begun paying the husband's country club dues from her bank accounts after the judgment was entered. Hickey v. RREF BB SBL Acquisitions, LLC, 336 Ga. App. 411, 785 S.E.2d 72 (2016).

Non-party spouse.

- Non-party spouse of a judgment debtor is within the scope of post-judgment discovery, including post-judgment interrogatories. Esasky v. Forrest, 231 Ga. App. 488, 499 S.E.2d 413 (1998).

No supplementary proceedings against non-parties.

- District court erred when the court granted judgment-creditor's motion to commence supplementary proceedings against various third parties because in Georgia a judgment-creditor had to initiate a separate civil action against persons it claimed were liable for a judgment if they were not parties to the underlying action which granted the judgment. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. C-Staff, Inc., 318 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir. 2003).

Cited in Tennesco, Inc. v. Berger, 144 Ga. App. 45, 240 S.E.2d 586 (1977); Johnson v. Heifler, 149 Ga. App. 860, 256 S.E.2d 143 (1979); Custom Form Mfg. Co. v. Miller, 157 Ga. App. 410, 278 S.E.2d 69 (1981); Chambers v. McDonald, 161 Ga. App. 380, 288 S.E.2d 641 (1982); Georgia Farm Bldgs., Inc. v. Willard, 170 Ga. App. 327, 317 S.E.2d 229 (1984); Grant v. Newsome, 201 Ga. App. 710, 411 S.E.2d 796 (1991); Threatt v. Forsyth County, 262 Ga. App. 186, 585 S.E.2d 159 (2003); Roberts v. First Ga. Cmty. Bank, 335 Ga. App. 228, 779 S.E.2d 113 (2015).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Creditor's Bills, §§ 3, 31. 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions and Enforcement of Judgments, § 530 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 26B C.J.S., Depositions, § 28 et seq. 27 C.J.S., Discovery, § 74 et seq. 33 C.J.S., Executions, §§ 4 et seq., 529, 530. 35B C.J.S, Federal Civil Procedure, §§ 1303, 1319 et seq.

ALR.

- Judgment in replevin as implying a direction for return of property, 144 A.L.R. 1149.

Sufficiency and timeliness of notice by indemnitee to indemnitor of action by third person, 73 A.L.R.2d 504.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-69

Total Results: 4  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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C-Staff, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 571 S.E.2d 383 (Ga. 2002).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 15, 2002 | 275 Ga. 624, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 2963

...Evans, Atlanta, for appellant. The Szymoniak Firm, Scott J. Topolski, Beth L. Blechman, for appellee. FLETCHER, Chief Justice. While pursuing efforts to execute on a judgment that Liberty Mutual Insurance Company had obtained against C-Staff, Inc., Liberty Mutual invoked OCGA § 9-11-69 to implead various persons and entities that had not been parties to the underlying action in which Liberty Mutual obtained its judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified to this Court the question of whether OCGA § 9-11-69 authorizes a judgment creditor to implead and hold liable persons who were not parties to the underlying judgment....
...Liberty Mutual later moved to compel responses to its discovery requests, and the *384 Georgia federal court granted those motions, in part. After receiving responses to its discovery, Liberty Mutual moved to add Keesee, KBAS I, and Continental Benefit, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69 and OCGA § 9-11-69, and hold them liable for the Florida judgment....
...Liberty Mutual never filed a complaint in the Georgia federal court against Keesee or anybody else. The federal court permitted the impleader, overruling Keesee's objection that he could not be liable for a judgment to which he had not been a party without Liberty Mutual's first filing a direct action against him. 1. OCGA § 9-11-69 permits a judgment-creditor to use judicially-enforceable discovery tools to seek information that would "lead to any property or sources of income of the judgment debtor" [1] or to those who may be liable for the debt, as follows: Process...
...apter for such discovery measures prior to judgment. As both parties recognize, nothing in this code section expressly permits a judgment-creditor to hold liable any party other than the judgment-debtor. Liberty Mutual nonetheless contends that OCGA § 9-11-69 vests trial courts with the discretion to add and hold liable persons who were not parties to the judgment....
...a civil action against those it seeks to hold responsible for satisfying the debt by following the procedures set forth in the Civil Practice Act, which requires a complaint to be filed and the defendants to be served with process. [4] Although OCGA § 9-11-69 is a part of the Civil Practice Act, it does not authorize a judgment-creditor to implead and hold liable persons against whom the judgment was not entered....
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Alexander v. Gibson, 300 Ga. 394 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 30, 2016 | 794 S.E.2d 597

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Workman v. Rl Bb Acq I-ga Cvl, LLC, 303 Ga. 693 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 21, 2018

... reached by the Court of Appeals, OCGA § 9-15-14 (a) and (b) are not limited to pre-judgment proceedings.2 This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that subsection (b) encompasses “abuses of discovery procedures available under Chapter 11,” which would include OCGA § 9-11-69, the statute governing post- judgment discovery.3 See generally C-Staff, Inc....
...OCGA § 9-15-14 has no application to post-judgment discovery. See CEI Svcs. v. Sosebee, 344 Ga. App. 508 (2) (811 SE2d 20) (2018). To the extent that CEI Svcs. conflicts with this decision, it is hereby disapproved. 3 The Court of Appeals concluded that OCGA § 9-11-69 precludes Appellants from seeking fees and expenses under OCGA § 9-15-14; this was erroneous. Irrespective of how OCGA § 9-11-69 may limit or shape post-judgment procedures, it is applicable only to “the judgment creditor, or his successor in interest[.]” Id. Thus, it has no application to Appellants. 7 “party,” whi...
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Workman v. Rl Bb Acq I-ga Cvl, LLC, 814 S.E.2d 696 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 21, 2018

...Contrary to the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals, OCGA § 9-15-14 (a) and (b) are not limited to pre-judgment proceedings.2 This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that subsection (b) encompasses "abuses of discovery procedures available under Chapter 11," which would include OCGA § 9-11-69, the statute governing post-judgment discovery.3 See generally C-Staff, Inc....
...15-14 has no application to post-judgment discovery. See CEI Svcs. v. Sosebee, 344 Ga. App. 508 (2), 811 S.E.2d 20 (2018). To the extent that CEI Svcs. conflicts with this decision, it is hereby disapproved. The Court of Appeals concluded that OCGA § 9-11-69 precludes Appellants from seeking fees and expenses under OCGA § 9-15-14 ; this was erroneous. Irrespective of how OCGA § 9-11-69 may limit or shape post-judgment procedures, it is applicable only to "the judgment creditor, or his successor in interest." Id....