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2018 Georgia Code 9-3-50 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 9-3-50 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 9-3-50

TITLE 9 CIVIL PRACTICE

Section 3. Limitations of Actions, 9-3-1 through 9-3-115.

ARTICLE 3 LIMITATIONS ON RECOVERY FOR DEFICIENCIES CONNECTED WITH IMPROVEMENTS TO REALTY AND RESULTING INJURIES

9-3-50. Definitions.

As used in this article, the term:

  1. "Person" means an individual, corporation, partnership, business trust, unincorporated organization, association, or joint-stock company.
  2. "Substantial completion" means the date when construction was sufficiently completed, in accordance with the contract as modified by any change order agreed to by the parties, so that the owner could occupy the project for the use for which it was intended.

(Ga. L. 1968, p. 127, §§ 5, 6.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Substantial completion meant action time barred.

- Trial court erred in denying a developer's motion for summary judgment on the homeowners' claim for negligent construction because the developer presented testimony that the sale of the last townhouse closed on December 8, 2004, and that on the date of closing, construction of the townhouses was substantially complete; thus, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51, the statute of repose, barred any action filed after December 8, 2012, and the homeowners filed the homeowners' suit two months after that date. Ashton Atlanta Residential, LLC v. Ajibola, 331 Ga. App. 231, 770 S.E.2d 311 (2015).

Cited in Turner v. Marable-Pirkle, Inc., 238 Ga. 517, 233 S.E.2d 773 (1977); Benning Constr. Co. v. Lakeshore Plaza Enters., Inc., 240 Ga. 426, 241 S.E.2d 184 (1977); Landon v. Williams Bros. Concrete Co., 149 Ga. App. 699, 256 S.E.2d 99 (1979); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Kent & Assocs., 232 Ga. App. 419, 501 S.E.2d 858 (1998); Colormatch Exteriors, Inc. v. Hickey, 275 Ga. 249, 569 S.E.2d 495 (2002); Wilks v. Overall Constr., Inc., 296 Ga. App. 410, 674 S.E.2d 320 (2009).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Building and Construction Contracts, § 115 et seq. 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, § 75.

C.J.S.

- 17B C.J.S., Contracts, § 589.

ALR.

- What constitutes "improvement to real property" for purposes of statute of repose or statute of limitations, 122 A.L.R.5th 1.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 9-3-50

Total Results: 2  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Colormatch Exteriors, Inc. v. Hickey, 569 S.E.2d 495 (Ga. 2002).

Cited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 10, 2002 | 275 Ga. 249, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 1795

...Under that definition, "substantial completion" is "the date when construction was sufficiently completed, in accordance with the contract as modified by any change order agreed to by the parties, so that the owner could occupy the project for the use for which it was intended." OCGA § 9-3-50(2)....
...812, 818(5), 521 S.E.2d 638 (1999), the Court of Appeals held that, for purposes of the statute of limitations, the building was substantially complete, even though the opinion clearly reveals that no certificate of occupancy was ever issued. Furthermore, the definition of "substantial completion" in OCGA § 9-3-50(2) does not require that the improvement can be occupied "legally," but simply applies in instances where "the owner could occupy the project for the use for which it was intended." (Emphasis supplied.) We conclude that the issuance of a ce...
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Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. v. J. G. Wilson Corp., 300 S.E.2d 507 (Ga. 1983).

Cited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 9, 1983 | 250 Ga. 691

...Moore, Julia B. Jagger, Long, Weinberg, Ansley & Wheeler, Palmer H. Ansley, Jr., John H. Stanford, Jr., for appellees. CLARKE, Justice. This case involves a constitutional challenge to the 8-year architects' and contractors' immunity statute. OCGA § 9-3-50 et *692 seq....
..., 1978, over a year before the fire occurred. 1. This court in Mullis v. Southern Co. Services, 250 Ga. 90 (296 SE2d 579) (1982), recently considered various constitutional challenges to the 8-year architects' and contractors' immunity statute, OCGA § 9-3-50 et seq....
...ed the rolling steel fire doors placed in the hotel. Northbrook now insists that Wilson was not the designer but was, instead, a mere manufacturer of the doors. Northbrook cites cases from other jurisdictions to convince us that the immunity of OCGA § 9-3-50 et seq....
...by the owner. Thus the doors were not only designed by Wilson but were custom designed and made for the space in the hotel. Wilson is not a mere manufacturer but is a designer within the contemplation of the statute. The action being barred by OCGA § 9-3-50 et seq....