Adamson v. Maddox, 111 Ga. App. 533 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965). · Go Syfert
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Adamson v. Maddox, 111 Ga. App. 533 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“it is contrary to common sense to rely upon a promise that is not legally binding upon the person making it.”
34 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Reindel v. Mobile Content Network Co., LLC (gand, 2009-08-17)
Treatment trajectory · 1967 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1967 1996 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Reindel v. Mobile Content Network Co., LLC
N.D. Ga. · 2009 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
it is contrary to common sense to rely upon a promise that is not legally binding upon the person making it.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cramp v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
See also Edwards, supra, 253 Ga.App. at 305 (1), 558 S.E.2d 815 (promises upon which plaintiff relied to establish fraud claim were unenforceable because the underlying employment contract, being terminable at will, was unenforceable); Alston v. Brown Transport Corp., 182 Ga.App. 632, 633 (2), 356 S.E.2d 517 (1987) (oral promises upon which fraud action relied could not be enforced); Adamson v. Maddox, 111 Ga.App. 533, 536 (3), 142 S.E.2d 313 (1965) (unenforceable promise may not be used to show justifiable reliance).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kamat v. ALLATOONA FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK
Ga. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Warthen Bank, 207 Ga. App. 80, 81 (2), supra. See also Adamson v. Maddox, 111 Ga. App. 533, 535-536 (3) ( 142 SE2d 313 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) R. T. Patterson Funeral Home, Inc. v. Head (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Furthermore, that evidence of part performance is sufficient to distinguish the case sub judice from Adamson v. Maddox, 111 Ga. App. 533, 535 (3), 536, supra, and from the general rule that there is no justifiable reliance upon future promises which must be in writing to be enforceable.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hodge Residential, Inc. v. BANKERS FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION
Ga. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
Adamson v. Maddox, 111 Ga. App. 533, 536 (3) ( 142 SE2d 313 ) (1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Godwin v. City of Bainbridge
Ga. Ct. App. · 1984 · confidence medium
However, “ ‘[misrepresentations are not actionable unless the hearer was justified in relying on them in the exercise of common prudence and diligence.’ [Cit.] It is contrary to common sense to rely upon a promise that is not legally binding upon the person making it.” Adamson v. Maddox, 111 Ga. App. 533, 536 ( 142 SE2d 313 ) (1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gowen v. Georgia International Life Insurance
Ga. Ct. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
However, the above stated rule does not apply to “those cases in which the promise upon which the promisor is charged with fraud is for any reason unenforceable at the time of its utterance. ‘Misrepresentations are not actionable unless the hearer was justified in relying on them in the exercise of common prudence and diligence.’ [Cits.] It is contrary to common sense to rely upon a promise that is not legally binding upon the person making it.” Adamson v. Maddox, 111 Ga. App. 533, 536 ( 142 SE2d 313 ) (1965); Ely v. Stratoflex, Inc., 132 Ga. App. 569, 572 ( 208 SE2d 583 ) (1974).
cited Cited as authority (rule) McGarr v. Bank of Pinehurst
Ga. Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
Adamson v. Maddox, 111 Ga. App. 533, 535 (3) ( 142 SE2d 313 ) (1965)...
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. Jones
Ga. Ct. App. · 1980 · confidence medium
It is true that Smith contends that the promise to repay is also a part of the fraud count for Smith asserts that Jones never intended to repay (see Adamson v. Maddox, 111 Ga. App. 533, 535-536 ( 142 SE2d 313 )).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hornsby v. First National Bank
Ga. Ct. App. · 1980 · confidence medium
Adamson v. Maddox, 111 Ga. App. 533, 535 (3) ( 142 SE2d 313 ) (1965)...
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bonner v. Wachovia Mortgage Co.
Ga. Ct. App. · 1977 · confidence medium
Adamson v. Maddox, 111 Ga. App. 533, 535 (3) ( 142 SE2d 313 ) (1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Southeastern Plumbing Supply Co. v. Lee (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1974 · confidence medium
See Coral Gables Corp. v. Hamilton, 168 Ga. 182, 196 ( 147 SE 494 ); Floyd v. Morgan, 62 Ga. App. 711, 715 (5) ( 9 SE2d 717 ); Adamson v. Maddox, 111 Ga. App. 533, 535 ( 142 SE2d 313 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Turpin v. North American Acceptance Corp.
Ga. Ct. App. · 1969 · confidence medium
A fortiori failure to observe an agreement by which one is not bound and which is unenforceable cannot amount to fraud. *216 “It is contrary to common sense to rely upon a promise that is not legally binding upon the person making it.” Adamson v. Maddox, 111 Ga. App. 533, 536 ( 142 SE2d 313 ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bennett v. Stroupe
Ga. Ct. App. · 1967 · confidence medium
Co., 111 Ga. App. 417, 420 ( 138 SE2d 687 ) and eit.; Adamson v. Maddox, 111 Ga. App. 533, 535 (3) ( 142 SE2d 313 ), and cases cited on p. 536.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kennesaw Life & Accident Insurance v. Flanigan
Ga. Ct. App. · 1967 · confidence medium
Co., 110 Ga. App. 417, 420 ( 138 SE2d 687 ); Adamson v. Maddox, 111 Ga. App. 533, 535 ( 142 SE2d 313 ); Holbrook v. Capital Auto.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Palmer v. Stevens
Ga. Ct. App. · 1967 · confidence medium
An Act approved March 10, 1966 (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 451-452) amended Code § 81-1001, adding to it the following provision: “Either party who amends or attempts to amend his petition or other pleadings in response to an order or other ruling of the court shall not be held to have waived his objection to such order or ruling, but may thereafter take' exception thereto as in other cases.” Compare, Adamson v. Maddox, 111 Ga. App. 533, 534 (1) ( 142 SE2d 313 ).
discussed Cited "see" Luttgen v. Fischer
Colo. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Adamson *1157 v. Maddox, 111 Ga.App. 533, 536 , 142 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1965) (reliance on a contract one knows to be unenforceable “is contrary to common sense”).
cited Cited "see" Sands v. Citizens & Southern National Bank
Ga. Ct. App. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Adamson v. Maddox, 111 Ga. App. 533, 536 ( 142 SE2d 313 ); Ballentine Motors of Ga., Inc. v. Nimmons, 93 Ga. App. 708, 709 (2) ( 92 SE2d 714 ); Turpin v. North Am.
cited Cited "see" Randall v. Cruce
Ga. Ct. App. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Adamson v. *863 Maddox, 111 Ga. App. 533 (3) ( 142 SE2d 313 ) (1965); Turpin v. North Am.
cited Cited "see" Motors Insurance Corp. v. Morgan
Ga. Ct. App. · 1968 · signal: see · confidence high
See Adamson v. Maddox, 111 Ga. App. 533 , supra. Submitted January 3, 1968 Decided April 19, 1968. 2.
cited Cited "see, e.g." John Henry Gay, Sr. v. Ben Grace
5th Cir. · 1970 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Adamson v. Maddox, 1965, 111 Ga.App. 533 , 142 S.E.2d 313 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." John Henry Gay, Sr. v. Ben Grace
5th Cir. · 1970 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Adamson v. Maddox, 1965, 111 Ga.App. 533 , 142 S.E.2d 313 .
ADAMSON
v.
MADDOX
41159.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Apr 6, 1965.
111 Ga. App. 533
Victor Higgins, Barrett & Hayes, Mose S. Hayes, for plaintiff in error., Grant, Spears & Duckworth, Wm. G. Grant, Hodges & Oliver, G. Robert Oliver, contra.
Bell.
Cited by 32 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 63%
Citer courts: N.D. Georgia (1)
Bell, Presiding Judge.

As the plaintiff amended his petition to meet the order sustaining the general demurrer to the original petition and allowing him time within which to amend the petition, he thereby acquiesced in the order, and cannot now be heard to object to it. Sherling v. Continental Trust Co., 175 Ga. 672 (1) (165 SE 560); Stainback v. Dunn, 53 Ga. App. 464, 465 (3) (186 SE 220). The holdings of these cases have been reinstated by the amendment to Code Ann. § 81-1001 found in[*535] Ga. L. 1962, p. 682. If plaintiff desired to stand upon the petition as filed, he should have refused to amend. This court will not consider plaintiff’s assignment of error upon the trial court’s order sustaining the demurrer to the original petition.

Plaintiff admits that the contract prepared by defendant was invalid because of the insufficient description of the land that was the subject matter of the contract. He even bases his action upon the premise, claiming that the property was “tied up” by an invalid contract for its sale and that he was thus deprived of the commission that he expected to receive for selling the property.

The contract is also invalid for another reason. The petition avers that plaintiff was agent for the owner of the land “prior to March 26, 1963,” while the contract attached as an exhibit to the petition shows that it was executed by plaintiff on April 3, 1963. In the absence of any positive indication that plaintiff was authorized to execute the instrument for the owner on April 3, 1963, we cannot assume that plaintiff’s authority as agent extended beyond the time alleged.

It requires no degree of perspicacity to comprehend that if the contract was unenforceable the property was not “tied up.” All rights in the property were unaffected by the invalid agreement. Plaintiff cannot plead, in effect, that the property was unaffected and at the same time claim damages for an artifice affecting the property, for legally and logically his claim is a non sequitur.

There is no merit in plaintiff’s contention that defendant committed fraud by promising several times “to go ahead and close the transaction,” when defendant “did not have any intention of going through with the deal at any time.” The general rule is that “Fraud cannot be predicated upon statements which are promissory in their nature as to future acts.” Jackson v. Brown, 209 Ga. 78, 80 (2) (70 SE2d 756); Beach v. Fleming, 214 Ga. 303, 306 (104 SE2d 427); S. & S. Builders v. Equitable Investment Corp., 219 Ga. 557, 564 (4) (134 SE2d 777); Rogers v. Sinclair Refining Co., 49 Ga. App. 72, 74 (174 SE 207); Monroe v. Goldberg, 80 Ga. App. 770, 775 (57 SE2d 448). On the other hand, “When a promise is made with no intention of per[*536] formance, and for the very purpose of accomplishing a fraud, it is a most apt and effectual means to that end, and the victim has a remedy by action or defense.” Floyd v. Morgan, 62 Ga. App. 711, 715 (5) (9 SE2d 717); Johnston v. Dollar, 83 Ga. App. 219, 223 (3) (63 SE2d 408); Hill v. Stewart, 93 Ga. App. 792, 796 (92 SE2d 829). See Coral Gables Corp. v. Hamilton, 168 Ga. 182, 194-199 (147 SE 494). Cf. Thomson v. McLaughlin, 13 Ga. App. 334, 337 (79 SE 182).

We do not believe that the latter rule can be extended to include those cases in which the promise upon which the promisor is charged with fraud is for any reason unenforceable at the time of its utterance. “Misrepresentations are not actionable unless the hearer was justified in relying on them in the exercise of common prudence and diligence.” Daugert v. Holland Furnace Co., 107 Ga. App. 566, 569 (130 SE2d 763) and citations. It is contrary to common sense to rely upon a promise that is not legally binding upon the person making it. “To make the following obligations binding on the promisor, the promise must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some person by him lawfully authorized, viz. . . . Any contract for sale of lands, or any interest in, or concerning them.” Code § 20-401 (4). This is merely the most obvious one of several reasons why the defendant’s statements that he would complete the transaction were not binding upon defendant. It is elementary that plaintiff must be charged with knowledge of the law. Thus knowing defendant’s promises to be unenforceable, plaintiff was not justified in relying upon them.

Judgment affirmed.

Frankum and Hall, JJ., concur.