Nash v. State, 476 S.E.2d 69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · Go Syfert
Nash v. State, 476 S.E.2d 69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“evidence that remained at the residence after being notified by to depart was sufficient to support his conviction for criminal trespass”
30 citation events (26 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Bullock v. Jeon (gactapp, 1997-06-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Bullock v. Jeon (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
evidence that remained at the residence after being notified by to depart was sufficient to support his conviction for criminal trespass
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nydia Tisdale v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Nash v. State, 222 Ga. App. 766, 767 (2) ( 476 SE2d 69 ) (1996) (holding that “[t]he testimony of the victim’s 19–year–old sister that she was living at the residence leased by her aunt” was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to conclude that she had the authority to order appellant off the premises). (c) Tisdale argues that the captain’s requests were too ambiguous to constitute commands.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) MARTIN-ARGAW v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Porter, District Attorney, Stephen A. Fern, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 See, e.g., Goolsby v. State, 299 Ga. App. 330, 330-31 ( 682 SE2d 671 ) (2009); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 2 See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). 3 See OCGA § 16-11-106 (b) (1). 4 See OCGA § 16-11-122. 5 See OCGA § 16-7-1 (a). 6 See OCGA § 16-5-91 (a). 7 No transcript of this hearing was included in the record. 8 The jury found Martin-Argaw not guilty of the aggravated assault alleged in Count 2, and the State moved for an entry of nolle prosequi…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Jhm
Ga. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] Nash v. State, 222 Ga.App. 766, 766-767 (1), 476 S.E.2d 69 (1996) (an indictment alleging that defendant threw a knife at the victim when the proof showed the knife fell out of the defendant's hand as he was attempting to stab the victim was not fatal to a conviction of aggravated assault because the variance did not create surprise or mislead defendant; therefore no prejudice). [2] OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(1) provides that "[a] person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults ... [w]ith [the] intent to murder, to rape, or to rob."
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Interest of J. H. M.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Nash v. State, 222 Ga. App. 766, 766-767 (1) ( 476 SE2d 69 ) (1996) (an indictment alleging that defendant threw a knife at the victim when the proof showed the knife fell out of the defendant’s hand as he was attempting to stab the victim was not fatal to a conviction of aggravated assault because the variance did not create surprise or mislead defendant; therefore there was no prejudice).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Jac
Ga. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
See id. at ___(1), 662 S.E.2d 235 (variance between indictment alleging that defendant held knife to victim's neck and proof that defendant only pointed it at him was immaterial); Nash v. State, 222 Ga.App. 766, 766-767 (1), 476 S.E.2d 69 (1996) (variance between indictment alleging that defendant threw a knife at the victim and proof that the knife fell out of the defendant's hand as he was stabbing the victim was not fatal to conviction for aggravated assault).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Interest of J. A. C.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
See id. (variance between indictment alleging that defendant held knife to victim’s neck and proof that defendant only pointed it at him was immaterial); Nash v. State, 222 Ga. App. 766, 766-767 (1) ( 476 SE2d 69 ) (1996) (variance between indictment alleging that defendant threw a knife at the victim and proof that the knife fell out of the defendant’s hand as he was stabbing the victim was not fatal to conviction for aggravated assault).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Woods v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Ruffin and Ellington, JJ, concur. 1 Jones v. State, 243 Ga. App. 374, 376 (2) ( 533 SE2d 437 ) (2000). 2 Id. at 377 (2). 3 Smith v. State, 232 Ga. App. 290, 295 (1) ( 501 SE2d 523 ) (1998). 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 See Jimenez v. State, 228 Ga. App. 668, 669 ( 492 SE2d 530 ) (1997). 8 See generally Bean v. State, 239 Ga. App. 106, 108 (2) ( 521 SE2d 19 ) (1999). 9 See Randall v. State, 207 Ga. App. 637, 639 (1) ( 428 SE2d 616 ) (1993). 10 See Hardeman v. State, 247 Ga. App. 503, 507 (4) (b) ( 544 SE2d 481 ) (2001). 11 Kellibrew v. State, 239 Ga. App. 783, 786 (4) ( 521 SE2d 921 ) (1999). 12 See Daw…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nichols v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Reeves v. State, 233 Ga. App. 802, 803-804 (1) ( 505 SE2d 540 ) (1998) (defendant stabbed and cut victim with knife); McSears v. State, 226 Ga. App. 90, 92 (3) ( 485 SE2d 589 ) (1997) (defendant swung knife at victim); Littleton v. State, 225 Ga. App. 900, 902 (2) ( 485 SE2d 230 ) (1997) (defendant held knife to victim’s neck); Nash v. State, 222 Ga. App. 766, 767 (2) ( 476 SE2d 69 ) (1996) (defendant chased and tried to stab victim with knife).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Quiroz v. State (3×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence medium
J., and Johnson, E J., concur. 1 Reese v. State, 270 Ga. App. 522, 523 ( 607 SE2d 165 ) (2004). 2 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 320 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 3 (Emphasis supplied.) 4 Taiton v. State, 254 Ga. App. 111, 112 (1) ( 561 SE2d 139 ) (2002) (citations and punctuation omitted). 5 De Palma v. State, 225 Ga. 465, 469-470 (3) ( 169 SE2d 801 ) (1969) (citation and punctuation omitted). 6 Ross v. State, 195 Ga. App. 624, 625 (1) (b) ( 394 SE2d 418 ) (1990); see also Nash v. State, 222 Ga. App. 766, 766-767 (1) ( 476 SE2d 69 ) (1996) (variance between indictment alleging that d…
Nash
v.
the State
A96A1511.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Sep 16, 1996.
476 S.E.2d 69
Kimberly C. Harris, for appellant., Harry N. Gordon, District Attorney, Richard L. Dickson, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Andrews, Pope, Smith.
Cited by 14 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 67%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Georgia (1)
Andrews, Judge.

Pappeio Nash was found guilty by a jury of aggravated assault and criminal trespass. On appeal, he claims: (1) that the aggravated assault conviction must be reversed because the evidence at trial varied from the facts alleged in the indictment; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for either offense; and (3) that his trial counsel was ineffective.

The victim testified for the State that she was at her aunt’s residence when Nash, her ex-boyfriend and the father of her unborn child, came uninvited into the residence and demanded that she speak to him. When the victim refused to speak with Nash, the victim’s 19-year-old sister, who testified she was living at the aunt’s residence at the time, told Nash to leave. The State presented evidence that, instead of leaving, Nash got a knife from the kitchen, ran after the victim with the knife and grabbed her, and then dropped the knife when he lost his balance while attempting to stab the victim.

Nash testified that the victim invited him to come to the residence. He testified that, after he arrived at the residence, he got into an argument with the victim’s sister, who had a knife. He testified that he got a knife from the kitchen, at which point the victim said, “you ain’t fixing to mess with my sister,” spat in his face, and ran. Nash then testified that he chased the victim but dropped the knife before he caught the victim and slapped her.

1. There was no fatal variance between the evidence produced at trial and the facts alleged in the indictment in support of the aggravated assault charge.

The indictment alleged that Nash assaulted the victim with a deadly weapon, a knife, by throwing the knife at the victim. At trial, the evidence showed that the knife fell out of Nash’s hand as he was stabbing at the victim. This variance was not sufficient to mislead or surprise Nash and thus impair his ability to prepare a defense, nor did it subject him to the risk of being prosecuted again for the same[*767] offense. Since Nash was not prejudiced, the variance between the allegations and the proof was not fatal to his conviction under the indictment. DePalma v. State, 225 Ga. 465, 469 (169 SE2d 801) (1969).

2. The evidence was sufficient to support Nash’s convictions for aggravated assault and criminal trespass.

. Evidence that Nash chased the victim with a knife and dropped it while stabbing at her was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

As to the criminal trespass conviction, the jury found Nash guilty of this offense as a lesser included offense of the charge of burglary. See Huffman v. State, 153 Ga. App. 203, 204 (265 SE2d 603) (1980). The jury verdict was based on the trial court’s instruction that a person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he “knowingly and without authority: . . . [rjemains upon the land or premises of another person . . . after receiving notice from the owner, rightful occupant, or, upon proper identification, an authorized representative of the owner or rightful occupant to depart.” OCGA § 16-7-21 (b) (3). The testimony of the victim’s 19-year-old sister that she was living at the residence leased by her aunt was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that she was a rightful occupant of the residence with authority to notify Nash to depart the premises within the meaning of OCGA § 16-7-21 (b) (3). See Hutson v. State, 220 Ga. App. 609, 610-611 (469 SE2d 825) (1996); Murphy v. State, 238 Ga. 725, 728-729 (234 SE2d 911) (1977). Evidence that Nash remained at the residence after being notified by the victim’s sister to depart was sufficient to support his conviction for criminal trespass. Jackson v. Virginia, supra.

3. Lastly, Nash claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because of alleged errors made by a third-year law student who, with the approval of the court, assisted in the trial of his case under the supervision of a staff attorney at the University of Georgia Legal Aid Clinic, who represented Nash and was physically present during the trial. See Rules of the Supreme Court of Georgia, Rules 92-97; OCGA § 15-20-1 et seq. We find no error amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel.

The record shows that defense counsel elicited testimony from Nash that, during his relationship with the victim, they had some minor scuffles prior to the present incident. Nash also testified on direct examination that, after he was arrested and jailed on the present charges, the victim accepted numerous collect telephone calls he made to her from jail. Assuming this testimony had the effect of commenting adversely on Nash’s character, defense counsel testified at[*768] the hearing on the motion for new trial that eliciting this testimony was part of a deliberate trial strategy. The testimony by Nash about the minor prior difficulties he had with the victim was obviously intended to bolster his testimony that the present incident was also such a minor altercation. His testimony about collect telephone calls by him from jail accepted by the victim after the incident was intended to lend additional credibility to Nash’s claim that the incident was just another minor scuffle with the victim in their continuing relationship. “Trial strategy and tactics do not equate with ineffective assistance of counsel. Effectiveness is not judged by hindsight or by the result. Although another lawyer may have conducted the defense in a different manner and taken another course of action, the fact that defendant and his present counsel disagree with the decisions made by trial counsel does not require a finding that defendant’s original representation was inadequate.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Powell v. State, 210 Ga. App. 409, 413-414 (437 SE2d 598) (1993). The trial court did not err in finding that Nash’s trial counsel was not ineffective. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

Decided September 16, 1996. Kimberly C. Harris, for appellant. Harry N. Gordon, District Attorney, Richard L. Dickson, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

Judgment affirmed.

Pope, P. J., and Smith, J., concur.