Constitutionality.

- Former Code 1933, § 26-1503 was constitutional. Daniel v. State, 231 Ga. 270, 201 S.E.2d 393 (1973); Alonso v. State, 231 Ga. 444, 202 S.E.2d 37 (1973), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 938, 94 S. Ct. 3062, 41 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1974).

Statutory vagueness and ambiguity.

- Former Code 1933, § 26-1503 was not so indefinite, vague, or uncertain as to fail to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that the person's contemplated conduct was forbidden. Mixon v. State, 226 Ga. 869, 178 S.E.2d 189 (1970).

Former Code 1933, § 26-1503 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(b)(2)) was neither vague nor ambiguous; nor was it drawn in words that are not capable of understanding by persons of ordinary intelligence. Starkly similar wording was employed by the General Assembly in former Code 1933, § 26-1503 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21 (b)(3)), which previously had been upheld against such attacks. State v. Raybon, 242 Ga. 858, 252 S.E.2d 417 (1979).

O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-21 and16-7-23 define identical crimes except for the amount of damage required for conviction and the former is a lesser included offense of the latter. Merrell v. State, 162 Ga. App. 886, 293 S.E.2d 474 (1982); Williams v. State, 180 Ga. App. 854, 350 S.E.2d 837 (1986).

Strict construction.

- As a criminal statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21 is subject to strict construction. McGonagil v. Treadwell, 216 Ga. App. 850, 456 S.E.2d 260 (1995).

Criminal trespass is location crime and its purpose is to keep defendant off property of others. Williamson v. State, 134 Ga. App. 583, 215 S.E.2d 518 (1975).

Moral turpitude not involved.

- Misdemeanor offense of criminal trespass does not involve moral turpitude and therefore the trial court properly refused to admit the conviction thereof to impeach a witness's testimony at trial. Barker v. State, 211 Ga. App. 279, 438 S.E.2d 649 (1993).

O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21 not preempted by § 16-11-35. - Appellants who were charged under the general criminal trespass statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21, for knowingly and without authority remaining on the premises of a junior college could not get their convictions overturned by arguing that the charge should have been brought under a specific trespass statute dealing with disruptive activity on college campuses, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-35, since the latter statute was not intended to preempt the general criminal trespass statute. Brooks v. State, 170 Ga. App. 440, 317 S.E.2d 552 (1984).

Accusation not required to specify instrumentality used.

- Accusation for battery, family violence, and criminal trespass that alleged that the defendant injured the victim by striking the victim, causing a visibly bloody lip, and that the defendant knocked a hole in the victim's closet door, was sufficient under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-71(c). There was no requirement that the accusation state the instrumentality used by the defendant because the instrumentality was not an element of any of the charged crimes. State v. Leatherwood, 326 Ga. App. 730, 757 S.E.2d 434 (2014).

Charging instrument defective.

- Trial court's denial of a defendant's special demurrer to a charge of criminal trespass, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(a), was error as the accusation failed to identify with particularity the property of the victim that the defendant allegedly interfered with and damaged. Newsome v. State, 296 Ga. App. 490, 675 S.E.2d 229 (2009).

Pretrial intervention program on related charges did not bar prosecution.

- Prosecution of the defendants for theft by taking and criminal trespass in Calhoun County, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-21(b) and16-8-2, was not prohibited by double jeopardy based on their prior entry into a pretrial intervention program under O.C.G.A. § 15-18-80(b) following charges of theft by receiving stolen property, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a), in Irwin County because there was no prosecution in Irwin County within the meaning of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-1-3(14) and16-1-8(a)(1)-(2). Palmer v. State, 341 Ga. App. 433, 801 S.E.2d 300 (2017).

Multiple prosecutions for same conduct.

- When the defendant is convicted of criminal damage to property in the second degree (a felony) and criminal trespass (a misdemeanor) and when the offenses were committed at different apartments under different tenancies, such convictions do not fall within the purview of the burglary statute. Hiatt v. State, 133 Ga. App. 111, 210 S.E.2d 22 (1974).

Denial of motion to sever.

- In a prosecution on two counts of attempting to hijack a motor vehicle, four counts of aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and criminal trespass, because the offenses committed by a defendant and a codefendant amounted to a series of continuous acts connected together both in time and the area in which committed, and there was no likelihood of confusion, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the defendant's motion to sever the trial from that of the codefendant; furthermore, the mere fact that the codefendants' defenses were antagonistic was insufficient in itself to warrant separate trials. Diaz v. State, 280 Ga. App. 413, 634 S.E.2d 160 (2006).

Defendant claiming that defendant did not damage property.

- Criminal defendant cannot legitimately raise the issue of criminal trespass by means of intentionally damaging another person's property without consent when the defendant claimed to not have damaged the property. Elder v. State, 180 Ga. App. 295, 349 S.E.2d 30 (1986).

Malicious prosecution action based on arrest for criminal trespass.

- In an action for malicious prosecution, where an employee of an apartment complex had given notice to the plaintiff that the plaintiff was forbidden to enter the property, even though the plaintiff entered as the guest of a tenant, the employee had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for malicious trespass when the plaintiff deviated from the purpose for which the plaintiff was invited and entered upon a portion of the premises unrelated to the invitation. Arbee v. Collins, 219 Ga. App. 63, 463 S.E.2d 922 (1995).

Church officials had probable cause to have former pastor arrested for criminal trespass when the pastor had been warned not to come on church premises. United Baptist Church, Inc. v. Holmes, 232 Ga. App. 253, 500 S.E.2d 653 (1998).

Applicability to civil cases.

- Transportation company's action against quarry for negligent hiring and retention failed because, although the quarry employee had a criminal history, that history did not involve the employee's experience working with heavy equipment; even considering the employee's criminal history, it was not natural and probable that the employee would violate O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21 and trespass on the company's railroad tracks using quarry equipment, and damage to the tracks was accidental, resulting from, at worst, a lapse in judgment. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Pyramid Stone Indus., Inc., F.3d (11th Cir. Sept. 17, 2008)(Unpublished).

In a case in which a car buyer appealed a district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of a lender, the Georgia criminal statutes for trespassing and theft, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-21,16-8-2, and16-8-3, did not expressly provide for a civil remedy and, thus, a civil remedy could not arise from a violation of those statutes. Goia v. Citifinancial Auto, 499 Fed. Appx. 930 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 2012)(Unpublished).

Cited in Rose v. State, 128 Ga. App. 370, 196 S.E.2d 683 (1973); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S. Ct. 1209, 39 L. Ed. 2d 505 (1974); Hudgens v. Retail, Whsle. & Dep't Store Local 315, 231 Ga. 669, 203 S.E.2d 478 (1974); Hudgens v. Retail, Whsle. & Dep't Store Local 315, 133 Ga. App. 329, 210 S.E.2d 821 (1974); M.J.W. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 350, 210 S.E.2d 842 (1974); Burton v. State, 137 Ga. App. 686, 224 S.E.2d 876 (1976); Rowles v. State, 143 Ga. App. 553, 239 S.E.2d 164 (1977); Williams v. State, 144 Ga. App. 72, 240 S.E.2d 591 (1977); Loury v. State, 147 Ga. App. 152, 248 S.E.2d 291 (1978); Favors v. State, 149 Ga. App. 563, 254 S.E.2d 886 (1979); State v. Moore, 243 Ga. 594, 255 S.E.2d 709 (1979); Bradford v. State, 149 Ga. App. 839, 256 S.E.2d 84 (1979); Huffman v. State, 153 Ga. App. 203, 265 S.E.2d 603 (1980); Giddens v. State, 156 Ga. App. 258, 274 S.E.2d 595 (1980); Septum, Inc. v. Keller, 614 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1980); Motes v. State, 159 Ga. App. 255, 283 S.E.2d 43 (1981); Sizemore Sec. Int'l, Inc. v. Lee, 161 Ga. App. 332, 287 S.E.2d 782 (1982); Walls v. State, 161 Ga. App. 625, 288 S.E.2d 769 (1982); Lemon v. State, 161 Ga. App. 692, 289 S.E.2d 789 (1982); Joiner v. State, 163 Ga. App. 521, 295 S.E.2d 219 (1982); Sellers v. State, 164 Ga. App. 637, 298 S.E.2d 623 (1982); Henderson v. State, 169 Ga. App. 615, 314 S.E.2d 677 (1984); Jones v. State, 169 Ga. App. 872, 315 S.E.2d 305 (1984); Raymond v. State, 170 Ga. App. 676, 318 S.E.2d 71 (1984); Cave v. State, 171 Ga. App. 22, 318 S.E.2d 689 (1984); Taylor v. State, 177 Ga. App. 624, 340 S.E.2d 263 (1986); Stover v. Watson, 180 Ga. App. 16, 348 S.E.2d 463 (1986); McLeroy v. State, 184 Ga. App. 62, 360 S.E.2d 631 (1987); Allison v. State, 184 Ga. App. 294, 361 S.E.2d 271 (1987); In re A.W.G., 184 Ga. App. 343, 361 S.E.2d 510 (1987); Butler v. State, 196 Ga. App. 706, 396 S.E.2d 916 (1990); State v. Seignious, 197 Ga. App. 766, 399 S.E.2d 559 (1990); Groom v. State, 212 Ga. App. 133, 441 S.E.2d 259 (1994); Brownlee v. City of Atlanta, 212 Ga. App. 174, 441 S.E.2d 492 (1994); Williams v. State, 214 Ga. App. 834, 449 S.E.2d 532 (1994); Harris v. State, 222 Ga. App. 56, 473 S.E.2d 229 (1996); Holmes v. Achor Ctr. Inc., 242 Ga. App. 887, 531 S.E.2d 773 (2000); Holmes v. Achor Ctr., Inc., 260 Ga. App. 882, 581 S.E.2d 390 (2003); State v. Perry, 261 Ga. App. 886, 583 S.E.2d 909 (2003); English v. State, 282 Ga. App. 552, 639 S.E.2d 551 (2006); Griffin v. State, 291 Ga. App. 618, 662 S.E.2d 171 (2008); Johnson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 32, 666 S.E.2d 452 (2008); Georgiacarry.Org, Inc. v. Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc., 299 Ga. 26, 785 S.E.2d 874 (2016).

Criminal intent and entry without authority.

- Former Code 1933, §§ 26-401(r) (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-1-3(18)) and 26-1503(b)(2) (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(b)(2)) require that a person accused of its violation shall have entered "knowingly and without authority" after having been told that such entry is forbidden. Thus, criminal intent and entry "without legal right or privilege or without permission of a person legally entitled to withhold the right" are elements of the crime. State v. Raybon, 242 Ga. 858, 252 S.E.2d 417 (1979).

Former Code 1933, § 26-1503(a) and (b)(1) delineate two completely separate criteria for misdemeanor of criminal trespass. Pittman v. State, 139 Ga. App. 661, 229 S.E.2d 135 (1976).

Notice is essential element of criminal trespass and must be proven by state beyond reasonable doubt at trial. Rayburn v. State, 250 Ga. 657, 300 S.E.2d 499 (1983).

An apartment complex security guard's testimony that a defendant had told the guard that the defendant was at the complex to buy drugs from a friend and that the guard then warned the defendant to stay off the premises was relevant, although the testimony incidentally put the defendant's character in issue, because the testimony showed that the defendant had notice to stay away from the property, an essential element of the offense of criminal trespass under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(b)(3). Love v. State, 302 Ga. App. 106, 690 S.E.2d 246 (2010).

Reasonable and sufficiently explicit notice required.

- Inherent in O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21 notice provision is a requirement that notice be reasonable under the circumstances, as well as sufficiently explicit to apprise the trespasser what property the trespasser is forbidden to enter. Rayburn v. State, 250 Ga. 657, 300 S.E.2d 499 (1983).

Because the trial court could have concluded that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had been given the requisite notice to not return to a train station without facing the risk of an arrest, some evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that the arrest, which was based solely on the violation of an invalid criminal trespass warning, lacked probable cause; hence, the suppression order was not disturbed on appeal. State v. Morehead, 285 Ga. App. 320, 646 S.E.2d 308 (2007).

Notice not to enter to be given by owner or rightful occupant.

- Evidence failed to establish an essential element of criminal trespass when a police officer notified the defendant not to enter the apartment based on a conversation the officer had with the manager of the apartment complex, however, the manager did not testify, the substance of the conversation was not in evidence, and there was no evidence that, when the officer gave the notice to the defendant, the officer was acting as the authorized representative of the owner or rightful occupant of the apartment. Jackson v. State, 242 Ga. App. 113, 528 S.E.2d 864 (2000).

Defendant's conviction for criminal trespass was reversed even though the evidence was that, pursuant to a divorce decree, defendant was prohibited from being on the property of the ex-spouse's work place until further order of the court because there was no evidence that the ex-spouse was the rightful occupant of the premises or that the rightful owner gave defendant prior notice. Sheehan v. State, 314 Ga. App. 325, 723 S.E.2d 724 (2012).

Locked door as notice not to enter.

- Locked door to the residence provided reasonable and sufficiently explicit notice to the defendant that entry into the complainant's residence was forbidden and, thus, to support a finding of guilt for criminal trespass. State v. Harper, 303 Ga. 144, 810 S.E.2d 484 (2018).

Difference between offenses described in former Code 1933, § 26-1503(b)(2) and (b)(3); the latter deals with a lawful entry and remaining on the premises after having been directed to leave while the former applies when notice forbidding entry is given before the accused goes upon the premises. Scott v. State, 130 Ga. App. 75, 202 S.E.2d 201 (1973).

Premises.

- Term "premises" has varying meanings, but it is inclusive enough generally to mean land and the buildings thereon. Williamson v. State, 134 Ga. App. 583, 215 S.E.2d 518 (1975).

Premises of another person.

- Phrase "premises of another" in subdivision (b)(3) was broad enough to include and embrace property owned by and used for public school purposes by a city or a county. Kitchens v. State, 221 Ga. 839, 147 S.E.2d 509 (1966).

Phrase "premises of another person" found in subdivision (b)(3) included property owned or used for public purposes. E.P. v. State, 130 Ga. App. 512, 203 S.E.2d 757 (1973).

Unlawful purpose.

- Words "unlawful purpose" mean a purpose to violate a criminal law. Mixon v. State, 226 Ga. 869, 178 S.E.2d 189 (1970).

An intent to commit a felony or theft is always an unlawful purpose. Williamson v. State, 134 Ga. App. 583, 215 S.E.2d 518 (1975).

Driver's argument that a city employee was acting outside the scope of employment at the time of an accident was without merit because the employee's act of crossing a private shopping center before pulling onto the road was not unlawful under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-20(e) (disregard of a traffic signal) or O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(b)(1) (criminal trespass) because no unlawful purpose was shown; the employee was, therefore, immune from suit and liability based on O.C.G.A. § 36-92-3. Guice v. Brown, 334 Ga. App. 199, 778 S.E.2d 823 (2015).

Authority to forbid entry.

- Officer who acts under the direction of the director of public safety at the University of Georgia has the authority to forbid entry on University of Georgia property. Singer v. State, 156 Ga. App. 416, 274 S.E.2d 612 (1980).

Possession of weapon on premises.

- Private property owners could forbid the possession of a weapon on their premises, as property law, tort law, and criminal law, such as that later codified in O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-21(b)(3),51-3-1 to51-3-2, and51-9-1, provided the canvas on which the Second Amendment was drafted, illustrated that the basis of the Second Amendment did not include protection for a right to carry a firearm in a place of worship against the church owner's wishes. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012).

Defense of "entering with permission".

- Defendant established a defense to the charge of criminal trespass by showing that defendant entered the apartment with the permission of the tenant and rightful occupant of the apartment. Jackson v. State, 242 Ga. App. 113, 528 S.E.2d 864 (2000).

The 15-year-old daughter was a "rightful occupant" of her parent's home and her invitation conveyed authority to the defendant to disregard an earlier notice that the defendant was barred from the home. Hutson v. State, 220 Ga. App. 609, 469 S.E.2d 825 (1996).

Minor's authority to allow entrance on property.

- Juvenile was properly convicted of criminal trespass under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(b)(2) as the juvenile's minor friend did not have the authority to override the mother's warnings that the juvenile was not permitted to enter their property. In re J. B. M., 294 Ga. App. 545, 669 S.E.2d 523 (2008).

Tenant's authority to be on property.

- When the defendant has a legal and binding contract to remain at a site, and nothing in the contract allows either party to rescind the contract unilaterally, and there is no judicial determination that the contract is void or breached, an offer by a landlord to refund part of the rent does not negate the contract when the refund is not accepted, and the defendant does not agree to any cancellation. In such a case, there is no authority for a landlord to revoke the defendant's authority to be or remain on the land, and the defendant is not shown beyond a reasonable doubt to be in violation of former Code 1933, § 26-1503. Davis v. State, 147 Ga. App. 107, 248 S.E.2d 181 (1978).

Protection of life tenant's interests.

- Witness's testimony that subject property passed to the witness after the end of a life estate, and that the life tenant's guardian had given the witness authority to protect the life tenant's interests, including getting defendant off the property, was proof of ownership and authority under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21. Wigley v. State, 194 Ga. App. 7, 389 S.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 194 Ga. App. 913, 389 S.E.2d 769 (1989).

Ownership of property.

- State did not have to prove the actual ownership of a door damaged by the defendant; it was only necessary to prove that the door belonged to someone other than the defendant. Jones v. State, 236 Ga. App. 716, 513 S.E.2d 254 (1999).

Former resident.

- Once the victim withdrew the defendant's authority to enter the victim's house, the fact that the defendant once lived there did not give the defendant subsequent authority to enter; further, the jury was authorized to find that the defendant entered the home at least once with the intent to assault the victim. Bilow v. State, 279 Ga. App. 509, 631 S.E.2d 743 (2006).

Home builder's right to exclude others from property.

- Home builder had the right to exclude a home inspector from trespassing on the builder's properties and properly exercised that right by instructing the inspector not to enter the builder's properties. Pope v. Pulte Home Corp., 246 Ga. App. 120, 539 S.E.2d 842 (2000).

Bank's authority over patron refusing to leave premises.

- Despite the plaintiff patron's claim that summary judgment was improperly granted to defendant bank on the patron's false arrest claim in light of conflicting evidence as to whether the patron was loud and hostile in the bank's premises, the bank was properly granted summary judgment regardless of whether the patron was loud and hostile because: (1) it was undisputed that the patron refused to leave the bank after being repeatedly asked by bank representatives to do so; (2) such refusal clearly provided probable cause for the patron's arrest for criminal trespass under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(b); and (3) such probable cause defeated an element of the false arrest claim. Mohamud v. Wachovia Corp., 260 Ga. App. 612, 580 S.E.2d 259 (2003).

Evidence as to amount of property damage.

- When there is no evidence as to whether the amount of damage done is more or less than $100.00, no conviction can stand under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(a). Johnson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 411, 274 S.E.2d 778 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 989, 101 S. Ct. 2327, 68 L. Ed. 2d 848 (1981); Matthews v. State, 224 Ga. App. 407, 481 S.E.2d 235 (1997).

No corroboration of accomplice's testimony required.

- Corroboration rule requiring independent corroborative evidence supporting the testimony of an accomplice does not apply to a misdemeanor. J.B.L. v. State, 144 Ga. App. 223, 241 S.E.2d 40 (1977).

Res gestae.

- Evidence of a female defendant's actions in knocking on hotel room doors and allegedly soliciting for prostitution would have been admissible at a trial as part of a course of criminal conduct because it was part of the res gestae of the charged crime; thus, the evidence could be admitted in a sentencing hearing. The hotel owner's testimony regarding the hotel guests' complaints, while not admissible to prove solicitation, would have been admissible to explain the owner's conduct in giving defendant notice to depart the hotel premises. Ansley v. State, 197 Ga. App. 765, 399 S.E.2d 558 (1990).

Evidence sufficient for conviction.

- Evidence was sufficient to prove that a juvenile appellant committed criminal trespass since, even though there was no direct evidence that the appellant was at the crime scene, the appellant was with three other juveniles when the others were seen driving and riding in vehicles that were later discovered to have been stolen from a repair shop storage facility, since a witness testified that the vehicles exited a driveway near the shop shortly before one of the of the vehicles broke down, that the vehicle broke down a few hundred feet from the shop, and that the second vehicle circled back, since the juveniles gave conflicting stories about the owner of the broken down vehicle, and since the key to the second vehicle was found in the appellant's pocket; the juvenile court could have inferred from the location of the broken down vehicle that both vehicles had just been taken from the shop by the four juveniles. In the Interest of R.F., 279 Ga. App. 708, 632 S.E.2d 452 (2006).

An adjudication on a charge of criminal trespass was not reversed on appeal, despite a claim that the evidence adduced at trial varied from the facts alleged in the delinquency petition, because the undisputed evidence showed that the juvenile came onto school property after having been advised against doing so, and the juvenile failed to show that the variance between the petition and the proof was misleading, led to surprise, impaired a defense, or would have resulted in a double jeopardy violation. In the Interest of R.C., 289 Ga. App. 293, 656 S.E.2d 914 (2008).

There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's convictions for false imprisonment, simple assault, and criminal trespass with regard to actions the defendant took toward the victim, who was a prior romantic friend, as the evidence established that the defendant went to the victim's home uninvited and entered the home; as the victim exited the bathroom, the defendant was standing in the hallway in front of the victim; alarmed, the victim attempted to flee into an adjacent room at which time the victim and the defendant struggled as the defendant attempted to prevent the victim from passing the defendant; once in the adjacent room, the defendant took the telephone from the victim as the victim tried to call9-1-1; and the victim ultimately pushed out the screen and successfully exited the residence through an open window despite the defendant's attempt to pull the victim back inside. Port v. State, 295 Ga. App. 109, 671 S.E.2d 200 (2008).

Evidence that the defendant, despite the victim's insistence that the defendant not do so, drove to the victim's house, knocked over the victim's mailbox, kicked in the glass panes of the victim's door, and refused to leave the premises was sufficient to convict the defendant of criminal trespass in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(a). Bradley v. State, 298 Ga. App. 384, 680 S.E.2d 489 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of criminal trespass and theft by taking because the defendant was found at a recycling facility trying to sell pieces of the victim's aluminum awning, which the defendant had previously been told was not trash, but belonged to a laundry establishment. Jackson v. State, 301 Ga. App. 863, 690 S.E.2d 195 (2010).

Because there was evidence to support each fact necessary to make out the state's case, the jury was authorized to find that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of family violence battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1, criminal trespass, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21, and abuse of an elder person, O.C.G.A. § 30-5-8; the victim's recollection of what occurred on the night at issue was contradicted by the victim's contemporaneous statements to neighbors and the police, as well as the victim's statements to the daughter the next morning that the defendant had grabbed the victim by the arm and twisted the arm, thereby causing the wound and other bruises. Laster v. State, 311 Ga. App. 360, 715 S.E.2d 768 (2011).

Evidence that a defendant possessed a cell phone, a debit card, and women's jewelry, all of which had been stolen a day earlier, while the defendant attempted to climb into a stranger's home, along with evidence that the defendant attempted to flee when caught climbing in the window, was sufficient to support convictions for criminal trespass and felony theft by receiving stolen property in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-21(b)(1) and16-8-7(a). Reese v. State, 313 Ga. App. 746, 722 S.E.2d 441 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's criminal trespass conviction when the victim testified that the defendant snapped the victim's cell phone in half, rendering the cell phone inoperable, and that the cell phone was worth less than $500. Although there was no evidence of the specific monetary amount of damage done to the cell phone, the jurors were authorized to draw from the jurors' own experience in forming an estimate of the damage to the cell phone, which was an everyday object. Feagin v. State, 317 Ga. App. 543, 731 S.E.2d 778 (2012).

Evidence that the victim's daughter saw the defendant back a truck onto the victim's property, the defendant fled in the truck and abandoned it, and the defendant's explanation that the truck had broken down was inconsistent with the tire tracks on the victim's property, as well as witness testimony was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for criminal trespass. Dowda v. State, 341 Ga. App. 295, 799 S.E.2d 807 (2017).

Although the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of second-degree damage to property, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of criminal trespass to property as there was clear evidence that the defendant intentionally damaged the property of another without consent of that other person and the damage to the property was $500 or less because the property owner testified to the extent of the damage to the air-conditioning units, and the jury viewed a surveillance video of the defendant inflicting such damage. Wynn v. State, 344 Ga. App. 554, 811 S.E.2d 53 (2018).

Evidence insufficient.

- Victim's statement to defendant, made when they were living in the marital residence, that he did not want to see her again was not sufficient notice to support a conviction of criminal trespass based on defendant's knocking on the victim's door at a different residence nearly three years later. Wood v. State, 227 Ga. App. 677, 490 S.E.2d 179 (1997).

Defendant's convictions for terroristic acts, aggressive driving, and criminal trespass were reversed on appeal since the only evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of a roadway situation wherein the victim was tailgated and an object was thrown at the victim's car, causing a dent, was a police officer's hearsay testimony that the officer spoke to the defendant's mother, who indicated that the defendant had not been home, and the hearsay statement of the defendant admitting to the tailgating and honking; this evidence was inadmissible hearsay and therefore, relying on the remaining evidence, insufficient evidence existed to support the defendant's convictions. Patterson v. State, 287 Ga. App. 100, 650 S.E.2d 770 (2007).

Merger with or inclusion within burglary.

- When the intent to steal was proved, the crime of criminal trespass then merged with or was included within former Code 1933, § 26-1601. Williamson v. State, 134 Ga. App. 583, 215 S.E.2d 518 (1975); Deese v. State, 137 Ga. App. 476, 224 S.E.2d 124 (1976); Varnes v. State, 159 Ga. App. 452, 283 S.E.2d 673 (1981); Poole v. State, 205 Ga. App. 652, 423 S.E.2d 52 (1992); Vaughan v. State, 210 Ga. App. 381, 436 S.E.2d 19 (1993).

Defendant could properly be sentenced to serve consecutive terms on defendant's convictions of criminal damage to property in the second degree and criminal trespass, where the latter crime had been charged as the lesser offense of burglary. Williams v. State, 180 Ga. App. 854, 350 S.E.2d 837 (1986), cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 899, 400 S.E.2d 709 (1991).

When the defendant was convicted of burglary, but the evidence also could have supported a conviction of criminal trespass, the trial court erred in denying the defendant's request to charge on the lesser offense. Echols v. State, 222 Ga. App. 598, 474 S.E.2d 766 (1996).

Trial court must give a requested charge on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of burglary where the testimony of the accused, if believed, would negate an element of the crime of burglary, i.e., entry with intent to commit a felony or theft. Hiley v. State, 245 Ga. App. 900, 539 S.E.2d 530 (2000).

Defendant did not meet the defendant's burden to show through the record that the trial court did not consider criminal trespass under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(b) as a lesser included offense of burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1 in light of the fact that both the defendant and defense counsel put forth the theory of criminal trespass, and the trial court explicitly stated that the court believed the victim's testimony over that of defendant. Joyner v. State, 267 Ga. App. 309, 599 S.E.2d 286 (2004).

Under the facts, the trial court should have merged the defendant's criminal trespass conviction into the burglary conviction prior to sentencing because the offenses were based upon the same act; the evidence showed that the defendant only entered an apartment one time. Hawkins v. State, 302 Ga. App. 84, 690 S.E.2d 440 (2010).

Rule of lenity did not apply.

- Trial court did not err in not applying the rule of lenity with regard to the defendant's conviction for criminal attempt to commit burglary because the crimes of criminal trespass and criminal attempt to commit a burglary did not address the same criminal conduct and there was no ambiguity created by different punishments being set forth for the same crime, thus, the rule of lenity did not apply. Snow v. State, 318 Ga. App. 131, 733 S.E.2d 428 (2012).

Not included offense of aggravated assault.

- Criminal trespass is not a lesser included offense of aggravated assault as a matter of law, and, since the indictment for aggravated assault alleged that the defendant committed an assault by shooting a deadly weapon "at, toward, and in the direction of" the victim, the state was not required to prove that the defendant interfered with the victim's property, and criminal trespass was not an included offense as a matter of fact. Robinson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 832, 459 S.E.2d 588 (1995).

Included offense of second degree criminal damage to property.

- Trial court did not err in instructing the jury on criminal trespass after granting a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of second degree criminal damage to property because criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of the latter crime. Jennings v. State, 226 Ga. App. 461, 486 S.E.2d 693 (1997).

Defendant, who shot and damaged three out-of-service power transformers and was convicted of second degree criminal damage to property, was entitled to jury charge on criminal trespass, a lesser included offense, because the state failed to prove that the value of the transformers was over $500. Waldrop v. State, 231 Ga. App. 164, 498 S.E.2d 337 (1998).

Because it was undisputed that the victim failed to testify regarding the value of the damage to the subject property, an adjudication for the offense of second-degree criminal damage to property entered against a juvenile was vacated; however, given evidence that the juvenile intentionally damaged the property of another without consent, and the damage was $500 or less, an adjudication could be entered on a charge of criminal trespass, which did not violate the juvenile's due process right to be notified of the charges. In the Interest of J.T., 285 Ga. App. 465, 646 S.E.2d 523 (2007).

Although the state failed to provide any evidence regarding the value of a broken window and, thus, a juvenile court erred in finding that a juvenile committed criminal damage to property in the second degree, the juvenile court did not err in finding that the juvenile participated in the act of breaking the victim's window in an attempt to burglarize the house; thus, the evidence was sufficient to support an adjudication of delinquency for committing an act which would support a conviction for the offense of criminal trespass to property as a lesser included offense of criminal damage to property in the second degree. The result of reducing the offense did not violate the juvenile's due process right to be notified of the charges against the juvenile since the juvenile, as a defendant, is on notice of all lesser crimes which are included in the crime charged as a matter of law. In the Interest of J. S., 296 Ga. App. 144, 673 S.E.2d 645 (2009).

Criminal damage to property.

- When an adjudication of delinquency based on criminal damage to property in the second degree was vacated, remand for an adjudication of delinquency for committing an act which would support a conviction for the offense of criminal trespass to property where the defendant was charged as an adult was appropriate, since this is a lesser offense included within criminal damage to property in the second degree. In re A.F., 236 Ga. App. 60, 510 S.E.2d 910 (1999).

Failure to charge criminal trespass.

- It is not error to fail to charge the lesser included offense of criminal trespass within the offense of attempt to commit burglary where it is not requested and where there is no evidence as to the amount of damage done, and whether it was more or less than $100.00 for which reason no conviction could stand under former Code 1933, § 26-1503 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(a)), and there is no evidence of entry, for which reason the defendant must no less have been acquitted under former Code 1933, § 26-1503 (see O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(b)(1)). Fullewellen v. State, 127 Ga. App. 568, 194 S.E.2d 275 (1972).

When an accused is charged with theft by taking, the judge is not required to charge a jury on criminal trespass, a lesser offense, in the absence of a specific request by defense counsel. Martin v. State, 143 Ga. App. 875, 240 S.E.2d 231 (1977).

Trial court did not err in refusing to give the defendant's criminal trespass jury instruction as no competent evidence showed that the defendant's daughters told the police officers to leave the daughter's residence and the officers had a right to remain long enough to arrest the defendant and the defendant's daughter after a scuffle broke out and the defendant pushed the officers. Poe v. State, 254 Ga. App. 767, 563 S.E.2d 904 (2002).

Trial court did not err when the court declined to give the defendant's written instruction on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of criminal attempt to commit burglary as the evidence did not support giving the requested instruction and the instruction was not an accurate statement of the law. Snipes v. State, 257 Ga. App. 713, 572 S.E.2d 62 (2002).

Based on testimony that the defendant entered a business for a lawful purpose, and the state showed that the defendant entered the building with the intent to commit theft, no evidence was presented that the defendant entered the premises for any other unlawful purpose; hence, the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction of criminal trespass under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(b)(1) as a lesser included offense of burglary. Moore v. State, 280 Ga. App. 894, 635 S.E.2d 253 (2006).

When the defendant was charged with burglary but denied entering the premises, it was not error to refuse to instruct on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass; trespass instructions were not appropriate when the defendant denied entering the burglarized premises. Adams v. State, 284 Ga. App. 534, 644 S.E.2d 426 (2007).

Trial court erred in convicting the defendants of burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) for entering property with intent to take electrical wiring and copper piping because the trial court should have charged the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(b)(1), when the jury could have concluded that the defendants were guilty of criminal trespass since the jury could have found that the defendants entered a house with the intent to loiter there; the defendants were on the property without permission, one of the defendants stated that the defendants were not there to steal anything but rather to "look around," and the defendants thought the house was about to be bulldozed, police officers did not find any tools in the building or in the immediate possession of either of the defendants, and the defendants were not found in immediate possession of any purported stolen items. Waldrop v. State, 300 Ga. App. 281, 684 S.E.2d 417 (2009).

Trial court's error in failing to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(b)(1), in the defendants' trial for burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) was not harmless because there was evidence that a home had been burglarized previously, and there was very little evidence linking the damage in the house to the defendants. Waldrop v. State, 300 Ga. App. 281, 684 S.E.2d 417 (2009).

Because the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of entering a motor vehicle with intent to commit theft since: (1) the victim found the defendant going through a box of personal items in the victim's truck, and (2) when the victim questioned the defendant, the defendant fled and barricaded up in a nearby gas station bathroom, the defendant was not entitled to a lesser included offense charge of criminal trespass; the defendant did not tailor the instruction to the applicable portion of the statute, and, in any event, a criminal trespass charge was not warranted since the evidence showed that the defendant entered the truck with the intent to commit theft. Woods v. State, 302 Ga. App. 891, 691 S.E.2d 913 (2010).

Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of burglary because, if the jury believed the state's evidence, the defendant was guilty of burglary and if the jury accepted the defendant's defense to the crime, the defendant was guilty of no offense. Stillwell v. State, 329 Ga. App. 108, 764 S.E.2d 419 (2014).

Trial court did not commit plain error by failing to charge the jury on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of burglary because the defendant did not testify at trial or present any other evidence negating any element of the crime of burglary; the state presented evidence from which the jury could infer an intent to steal; and there was no evidence that the defendant was merely seeking shelter from the cold when the defendant tried to break into the area of the victims' house containing valuables. Daniel v. State, 338 Ga. App. 389, 787 S.E.2d 281 (2016).

Failure to request instruction on specific type of burglary.

- Because the defendant did not submit a written request to charge the jury on the specific method of criminal trespass intended under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(a), (b)(1), (b)(3), and because the evidence defendant sought to introduce without the state's motion in limine was admitted at trial through testimony of other witnesses, the defendant's burglary conviction was upheld. Herbert v. State, 298 Ga. App. 826, 681 S.E.2d 245 (2009).

Charge inconsistent with evidence.

- When in prosecution for burglary the defendant steadfastly maintained that the defendant had neither entered nor had even been near the building where the burglary took place, having denied being there, the defendant was not entitled to a charge to the effect that if the jury disbelieved the defendant the jury could still come back with a verdict of guilty on the lesser offense of criminal trespass. Johnson v. State, 164 Ga. App. 429, 296 S.E.2d 775 (1982).

Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a jury charge on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of burglary since such a charge would not have been warranted by the evidence, which showed that the defendant harbored either the unlawful purpose of committing theft or the lawful purpose of going back to sleep in a friend's house. Dillard v. State, 323 Ga. App. 333, 744 S.E.2d 863 (2013).

Charge on circumstantial evidence unwarranted.

- While the prosecution against the defendant on charges of burglary, theft by taking, and criminal trespass included both direct and circumstantial evidence, convictions on those charges were not reversed merely because the trial court failed to charge former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) as the defendant failed to request that charge. Rodriguez v. State, 283 Ga. App. 752, 642 S.E.2d 705 (2007).

Charge supported by evidence.

- In an action for criminal trespass, the trial court did not err by charging the jury on the custody of children who have not been legitimated because whether the defendant was authorized to enter the premises based on a legal right the defendant had to the proprietor's child was raised by the evidence, the charge given was a correct principle of law, and the charge was not likely to confuse the jury regarding the defendant's guilt or innocence of criminal trespass. Hudson v. State, 321 Ga. App. 702, 742 S.E.2d 516 (2013).

Justification defense charge not warranted.

- With regard to the defendant's convictions for criminal trespass, simple assault, and battery, the trial court did not err in failing to give jury charges on the affirmative defense of justification because the evidence was insufficient to support such a defense as the defendant admitted that in the time it took the defendant to rip an air conditioning unit from the window and break in, the allegedly pursuing assailants had stopped chasing the defendant and had gone home. Miller v. State, 335 Ga. App. 58, 778 S.E.2d 424 (2015).

Entering parking facility without payment or permission.

- Person who knowingly and without authority enters a parking facility without payment of the required parking fee or the owner's permission may commit criminal trespass. Reinertsen v. Porter, 242 Ga. 624, 250 S.E.2d 475 (1978).

Delinquency based on criminal trespass.

- Testimony of owner of house at which the defendant was accused of throwing eggs that some damage had been done was sufficient evidence of damage to support adjudication of delinquency based on a charge of criminal trespass. B.L. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 14, 274 S.E.2d 67 (1980).

In a juvenile delinquency case, even though the state conceded that the state failed to establish venue, a defendant juvenile could be retried on a trespass allegation because the defendant did not challenge the juvenile court's trespass finding, and the evidence showed that the defendant entered school property without permission after receiving notice to stay away in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(b)(2). In the Interest of M.S., 292 Ga. App. 127, 664 S.E.2d 240 (2008).

Lawful entry by licensed bondsmen.

- Licensed bondsmen could not be found guilty of criminal trespass where they entered the complainant's home so as to execute a pickup order and arrest warrant for the complainant's daughter and thus had a lawful purpose for entering complainant's home. Mease v. State, 165 Ga. App. 746, 302 S.E.2d 429 (1983).

Possibility that a damaged fence infringed upon city's sidewalk right-of-way did not entitle defendant to take the law into defendant's own hands and step on the fence, rather than reporting the problem fence to the appropriate regulatory division of the city. Williams v. State, 181 Ga. App. 902, 354 S.E.2d 184, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 803, 108 S. Ct. 47, 98 L. Ed. 2d 12 (1987).

When a protester maintained an around-the-clock vigil on the portico of a federal office building, and maintained a bedroll and slept on the premises, the protestor's continued use of the property as a residence, after receiving notice to leave, was unlawful and constituted a trespass under Georgia law. United States v. Gilbert, 720 F. Supp. 1554 (N.D. Ga. 1989), modified on other grounds, 920 F.2d 878 (11th Cir. 1991).

Warrantless arrest legal.

- After the defendant was arrested by an off-duty police officer working as a security guard in whose presence the defendant appeared to have committed the offense of criminal trespass, the warrantless arrest was legal. Amason v. Kroger Co., 204 Ga. App. 695, 420 S.E.2d 314 (1992).

Two dents in door of operable motor vehicle sufficient.

- Under the doctrine of transferred intent, the jury could have found that the defendant had the requisite criminal intent to commit the crime of criminal trespass to property when the defendant unintentionally struck the vehicle with the knife the defendant intentionally threw at a former lover. Furthermore, jurors may draw from the jurors' own experience in forming estimates of damage to everyday objects and two dents in the door of an operable vehicle had monetary value. Burrell v. State, 293 Ga. App. 540, 667 S.E.2d 394 (2008).

Evidence of damage to victim's door.

- There was evidence that a defendant "busted down" the door to the victim's apartment and that the chain lock on the door was broken. Because the chain lock was an everyday object, and the victim's testimony authorized the jury to estimate the amount of damage done to the lock, sufficient evidence existed for the jurors to determine the door was damaged and to draw on the jurors' own experiences to decide the amount of damage to the front door in rendering the jury's verdict that the defendant was guilty of criminal trespass. Pierce v. State, 301 Ga. App. 167, 687 S.E.2d 185 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0549, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 244 (Ga. 2010).

Reasonable suspicion to conduct investigatory stop.

- Because law enforcement officers were given permission to enter a landowner's land in order to investigate the presence of possible trespassers for engaging in other illegal activity on that property, and found the defendant and a cohort, the officers gained a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the two individuals were involved in some form of criminal activity, the very least of which was criminal trespass, and therefore had the authority to detain the individuals in a brief investigative stop. Burgess v. State, 290 Ga. App. 24, 658 S.E.2d 809 (2008).

Officer arresting restaurant invitee.

- Summary judgment was properly granted to a police officer on a restaurant invitee's false imprisonment claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-20. The officer, who was told by the restaurant manager that the invitee refused an order to leave the premises, had probable cause to arrest the invitee without a warrant for criminal trespass under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21. Kline v. KDB, Inc., 295 Ga. App. 789, 673 S.E.2d 516 (2009).

Warrantless arrest of hotel guest proper.

- Exigent circumstances authorized an officer's warrantless arrest of a hotel guest for criminal trespass because the offense was committed in the officer's presence when the guest refused the officer's request to leave the hotel. Thus, the guest's false imprisonment claim against the hotel was properly dismissed on summary judgment. Lewis v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, 310 Ga. App. 58, 712 S.E.2d 91 (2011).

Probable cause to arrest hotel guest.

- As a police officer, acting with the authority and direction of a hotel, notified a guest to depart the hotel due to the guest's unruly behavior, but the guest did not depart, the officer had probable cause to arrest the guest for criminal trespass. Therefore, the guest's false imprisonment claim against the hotel was properly dismissed on summary judgment. Lewis v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, 310 Ga. App. 58, 712 S.E.2d 91 (2011).

Probable cause for arrest following accident.

- Even assuming that the plaintiff was arrested rather than detained when the plaintiff was placed in the backseat of a patrol car at the scene of an accident, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity as the plaintiff failed to set forth a claim that the plaintiff's clearly established Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Even if the officer was mistaken, the officer was entitled to rely on a victim's allegations at the scene of the accident and, thus, the officer had reason to believe that the plaintiff damaged the property of another person without consent in violation of Georgia law; further, because the warrantless arrest was supported by at least arguable probable cause, the officer was entitled to search the plaintiff incident to that arrest. Moreno v. Turner, 572 Fed. Appx. 852 (11th Cir. July 22, 2014)(Unpublished).

Value of property.

- Conviction for damage to property in the second degree was vacated and one for criminal trespass to property entered as the opinion of the victim's network manager that the victim incurred $1,929 in labor expenses for repairs to cut telephone wire was not competent evidence as it was not based on personal knowledge and the only competent evidence showed $384 was spent to replace materials. Clement v. State, 324 Ga. App. 39, 749 S.E.2d 41 (2013).

Evidence sufficient to support delinquency.

- There was sufficient evidence to support an adjudication of delinquency based on criminal trespass. Although the defendant, a juvenile, argued that the defendant did not intentionally damage a kitchen wall, but accidentally kicked a hole in the wall while trying to kill a roach, the trial court was not required to accept this explanation. In the Interest of B.B., 298 Ga. App. 432, 680 S.E.2d 497 (2009).

While the evidence was insufficient under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-23(a)(1) to conclude that a juvenile damaged property at a mobile home park in excess of $500, the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for criminal trespass to property under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(a) as a lesser-included offense of second-degree criminal damage to property. In re A. C. R-M, 311 Ga. App. 848, 717 S.E.2d 344 (2011).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of trespassing on school grounds.

- As it was undisputed that the defendant was on school property despite previously having been banned, and there was no testimony that the defendant received written authorization to be present on the property, the evidence was sufficient to support a criminal trespass conviction. Isenhower v. State, 324 Ga. App. 380, 750 S.E.2d 703 (2013).

Evidence sufficient for conviction.

- See Johnson v. State, 172 Ga. App. 333, 323 S.E.2d 255 (1984); Kerr v. State, 193 Ga. App. 165, 387 S.E.2d 355 (1989); Hope v. State, 193 Ga. App. 202, 387 S.E.2d 414 (1989); Daniel v. State, 260 Ga. 555, 397 S.E.2d 286 (1990); Moore v. State, 197 Ga. App. 9, 397 S.E.2d 477 (1990); Kesler v. State, 215 Ga. App. 553, 451 S.E.2d 496 (1994). But see Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797, 505 S.E.2d 731 (1998); McCrosky v. State, 223 Ga. App. 537, 478 S.E.2d 586 (1996); Reid v. State, 224 Ga. App. 524, 481 S.E.2d 259 (1997); Smith v. State, 226 Ga. App. 150, 485 S.E.2d 538 (1997); Thomas v. State, 227 Ga. App. 469, 489 S.E.2d 561 (1997); Carter v. State, 231 Ga. App. 42, 497 S.E.2d 812 (1998), but see Ga. 350 (2013); Bain v. State, 239 Ga. App. 696, 521 S.E.2d 832 (1999); Cox v. State, 243 Ga. App. 582, 532 S.E.2d 697 (2000); Barnett v. State, 244 Ga. App. 585, 536 S.E.2d 263 (2000); Kier v. State, 247 Ga. App. 431, 543 S.E.2d 801 (2000).

Defendant contended that, since the complaining witness lived in an apartment with common entrance ways, halls, etc., the evidence did not show that the defendant was on the premises of another from which the defendant was required to leave. However, the witness stated that the defendant was on the witness's property when the witness made repeated requests for the defendant to leave. The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of criminal trespass beyond a reasonable doubt. Strozier v. State, 187 Ga. App. 16, 369 S.E.2d 504 (1988).

Defendant's conviction for trespassing at a dentist's office was affirmed, even though defendant had been given an appointment by the receptionist, where there had been repeated and unequivocal notices to defendant that defendant should stay away from any premises occupied by the dentist. Stockwell v. State, 198 Ga. App. 206, 400 S.E.2d 709 (1990).

Once a disgruntled customer refused to leave the shoe store's premises after being told to go by the owner, and after being informed by a police officer in the officer's official capacity of possible criminal charges if the customer did not comply with the owner's request to leave, the customer became a criminal trespasser. Rembert v. Arthur Schneider Sales, Inc., 208 Ga. App. 903, 432 S.E.2d 809 (1993).

Evidence of a marked survey and history of a property line dispute between defendant and defendant's neighbor authorized finding that defendant knowingly ignored the property line when defendant sheared neighbor's hedge. Haygood v. State, 225 Ga. App. 81, 483 S.E.2d 302 (1997).

When the defendant had been warned that the defendant could not enter university property for the purpose of sleeping after a prior incident in which the defendant activated an alarm in the university library after falling asleep and finding that the defendant was locked in late one night, the defendant was properly convicted of criminal trespass after the defendant was found asleep on a couch in the student center around midnight. Hammond v. State, 237 Ga. App. 238, 515 S.E.2d 183 (1999).

Trial court's admission of recall evidence that defendant threatened a witness, a neighbor of the victims, when the defendant was leaving the stand was not error; even if the admission of the recall testimony was in error, it was harmless as the evidence was overwhelming to support a conviction for child molestation, burglary, and criminal trespass since: (1) two victims and one mother of a victim, all with a sufficient opportunity to observe the defendant, identified the defendant in a pre-trial photographic lineup and at trial; (2) the neighbor also identified the defendant; (3) a victim and the neighbor knew the defendant by first name preceding the incident; (4) a victim and the neighbor noticed the defendant wearing the clothes discovered in a victim's home the night of the incident; and (5) the state presented evidence that the defendant had committed similar acts previously. Rubi v. State, 258 Ga. App. 815, 575 S.E.2d 719 (2002).

State's evidence was sufficient to find the juvenile defendant committed criminal trespass, obstructed a police officer, and interfered with government property, and the juvenile court properly adjudicated the juvenile delinquent; the juvenile threw an egg at an officer's car damaging a plastic strip on the car window, broke at least two windows in the police substation, and obstructed an officer by fleeing after the officer was identified and ordered the defendant to stop. In the Interest of M.M., 265 Ga. App. 381, 593 S.E.2d 919 (2004).

Evidence supported a criminal trespass conviction as there was videotaped evidence of defendant driving over the top of a mail box and destroying it during a high speed flight from law enforcement officers. McCullough v. State, 268 Ga. App. 445, 602 S.E.2d 181 (2004).

When the defendant, according to the defendant's love interest, drove a stolen vehicle onto the victim's property through a locked gate, parked near a building where objects were stolen, and got into the vehicle and drove away, and the owner testified that the owner had not given the defendant permission to take the objects that were stolen, there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of criminal trespass in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(a), burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a), and theft by taking in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2. Sexton v. State, 268 Ga. App. 736, 603 S.E.2d 66 (2004).

Evidence supported defendant's rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated assault, criminal trespass, misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer, felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer, and possession of marijuana conviction because: (1) a victim testified that defendant choked the victim, slammed the victim around a room, and raped and sodomized the victim, then drank a beer, took the victim's BC powder packets, and a cell phone, and left; (2) defendant fled from the police, kicked two officers, and had marijuana, BC packets, and a cell phone on the defendant's person; (3) defendant's DNA matched the DNA on the beer can; (4) a nurse testified that the victim's bruise was consistent with strangulation; and (5) a doctor testified that the victim's injuries were consistent with rape and sodomy. Lewis v. State, 271 Ga. App. 744, 611 S.E.2d 80 (2005).

Sufficient evidence supported convictions of aggravated assault, criminal trespass, and obstruction of a9-1-1 call as the defendant became irate after a demand for a refund was denied by a store, a store manager told the defendant to leave, but the defendant refused, when the manager picked up the phone to call9-1-1, the defendant grabbed the phone and slammed it on the counter, the defendant pushed the bag of brass plates the defendant was trying to return in the manager's face, cutting the manager, and punched the manager in the face. Hooker v. State, 278 Ga. App. 382, 629 S.E.2d 74 (2006).

Because the defendant, accused of committing acts which disabled two cars, testified that the defendant's spouse's parent gave both cars to the spouse and that both were registered in the spouse's name, and there was no evidence that either car belonged exclusively to the defendant, the victim had interests in each car, so the defendant's two convictions for criminal trespass were supported by the evidence. Jones v. State, 278 Ga. App. 616, 629 S.E.2d 546 (2006).

There was sufficient evidence supporting the defendant's convictions of armed robbery, burglary, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and criminal trespass; the evidence included a custodial statement in which the defendant admitted participating in the crimes and testimony by a witness as to the preparations for the robbery, the clothing worn by the defendant and by the accomplice, and the defendant's disposal of a gun. Medlin v. State, 285 Ga. App. 709, 647 S.E.2d 392 (2007).

Sufficient evidence supported convictions of aggravated assault, aggravated assault on a peace officer, obstruction of a law enforcement officer, interference with government property, and criminal trespass after the defendant admitted obstructing officers and damaging a patrol car and the victim's vehicle; although the defendant denied assaulting the victim and responding officer, the jury was authorized to reject the defendant's testimony in favor of the victim's and officer's testimony. Gartrell v. State, 291 Ga. App. 21, 660 S.E.2d 886 (2008).

Evidence that the victim told the defendant that the defendant had no business coming to the victim's property and that an officer told the defendant not to go onto the victim's property was sufficient to support the conviction for criminal trespass. Austin v. State, 335 Ga. App. 521, 782 S.E.2d 308 (2016).

Evidence insufficient for conviction.

- Defendant's criminal trespass conviction was reversed since the evidence did not support allegations that the defendant entered another person's premises for the unlawful purpose of driving metal spikes into a private roadway. Feagin v. State, 198 Ga. App. 460, 402 S.E.2d 80 (1991).

Since there was no evidence of a continuing trespass, and since a housing authority had an adequate remedy at law, summary judgment granting an injunction barring entry on the housing authority's property by a husband and wife was reversed. Strange v. Hous. Auth. of Summerville, 268 Ga. App. 403, 602 S.E.2d 185 (2004).

Despite the fact that the evidence presented at trial sufficiently proved a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(b)(2), the defendant's criminal trespass conviction, based on a charge alleged in the accusation of violating § 16-7-21(b)(3), could not be upheld on appeal because the evidence presented at trial failed to support that conviction. Roach v. State, 289 Ga. App. 23, 656 S.E.2d 165 (2007).

Because the state's evidence presented in support of a criminal trespass charge failed to show that the defendant entered the subject premises after entry was expressly forbidden by the owner, the rightful occupant, or authorized representative of either the owner or occupant, insufficient evidence supported a criminal trespass conviction. Osborne v. State, 290 Ga. App. 188, 665 S.E.2d 1 (2008).

Because all the evidence was circumstantial as a defendant was not seen removing anything from the alleged victim's barn, the defendant's conviction for criminal trespass under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21 was inappropriate pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6) because, although the defendant was on the victim's property without permission, it was not proven that the defendant was there for a criminal purpose as the evidence indicated that the defendant was at the barn to drop off a saw that the defendant wanted to sell to the victim. Parker v. State, 297 Ga. App. 384, 677 S.E.2d 345 (2009).

Excessive penalty imposed.

- Imposition of the maximum misdemeanor punishment upon conviction for criminal trespass exceeded constitutional bounds against cruel and unusual punishment where the trespass involved defendant's trimming of a neighbor's hedge. Haygood v. State, 225 Ga. App. 81, 483 S.E.2d 302 (1997).

Excessive sentence not imposed.

- Sentence of six months imprisonment and six months probation for trespass at a university was not cruel and unusual punishment since the defendant had a prior conviction for trespassing at the university and an ordinance violation for picketing at the university. McCrosky v. State, 234 Ga. App. 321, 506 S.E.2d 400 (1998).

Rule of lenity inapplicable.

- With regard to defendant's conviction for criminal attempt to commit burglary in the first degree, the trial court did not err in not applying the rule of lenity because the crimes of criminal trespass and criminal attempt to commit a burglary do not address the same criminal conduct and there was no ambiguity created by different punishments being set forth for the same crime, thus, the rule of lenity did not apply. Snow v. State, 318 Ga. App. 131, 733 S.E.2d 428 (2012).

Mistrial properly denied despite allegation that the defendant's character was put in evidence, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, and the fact that the defendant's counsel declined to offer a curative instruction regarding the witness's statement; moreover, given the nature of the character statement, such was non-responsive to the state's questioning and unintentional. Ivey v. State, 284 Ga. App. 232, 644 S.E.2d 169 (2007).

Theater patron pursuing civil remedies against officer.

- Because after speaking with defendant first theater security officer, defendant second security officer reasonably believed the first officer had banned the plaintiff arrestee from the theater, the second officer had probable cause to believe that the arrestee, by returning to the theater, had committed criminal trespass under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21, and the arrestee's false arrest and First Amendment claims properly failed on summary judgment; the fact that the conviction was later reversed because the first officer lacked authority from the theater's owner, rightful occupant, or an authorized representative of the owner or rightful occupant as required by § 16-7-21(b)(2) to ban the arrestee from the theater did not affect the analysis since probable cause did not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as needed for a conviction. Osborne v. Am. Multi Cinema, Inc., F.3d (11th Cir. Oct. 8, 2009)(Unpublished).

Failure to obey request to leave jail premises insufficient for arrest.

- No reasonable officer in the same circumstances and possessing the deputy's knowledge could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff for criminal trespass, when and where the plaintiff was arrested. The scope of the deputy's warning to "leave" or "get the hell out of here" issued on the sidewalk immediately outside the jail building did not extend definitely and reasonably to the entirety of the jail property over 1000 feet away or to property beyond the sidewalk and beyond the bounds of the jail parking lot; the lack of the needed explicitness of the notice to depart was not debatable. Kopperud v. Mabry, 573 Fed. Appx. 828 (11th Cir. July 28, 2014)(Unpublished).

Proof of damages for broken window.

- Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for criminal trespass because the evidence showed that a window was broken in the victim's apartment and that the defendant had glass in the defendant's hair when loading the victim's furniture onto a truck; although there was no evidence of the specific monetary amount of damage done to the window, the jurors were authorized to draw from the jurors' own experience in forming an estimate of the damage to the window, which was an everyday object. Pullins v. State, 323 Ga. App. 664, 747 S.E.2d 856 (2013).

Crime information center records.

- Georgia Crime Information Center is authorized to maintain records of reported crime and, in some instances, to record information identifying persons charged with the commission of crime; however, the center is not authorized to maintain records identifying persons charged with disorderly conduct except when the charge is directly connected with or directly related to certain statutory offenses, including criminal trespass. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-33.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 52 Am. Jur. 2d, Malicious Mischief, § 1 et seq. 75 Am. Jur. 2d, Trespass, §§ 70, 72 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 87 C.J.S., Trespass, § 154 et seq.

ALR.

- Criminal offense of forcible detainer or trespass, where entry was peaceable, 49 A.L.R. 597.

Refusing admission to, or ejecting from place of amusement, 60 A.L.R. 1089.

Validity, construction, and application of statutes or ordinances penalizing one who enters or remains in dwelling after having been forbidden to do so, 146 A.L.R. 655.

Participation of student in demonstration on or near campus as warranting imposition of criminal liability for breach of peace, disorderly conduct, trespass, unlawful assembly, or similar offense, 32 A.L.R.3d 551.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance forbidding unauthorized persons to enter upon or remain in school building or premises, 50 A.L.R.3d 340.

Propriety of exclusion of persons from horseracing tracks for reasons other than color or race, 90 A.L.R.3d 1361, 64 A.L.R.5th 769.

Public rights of recreational boating, fishing, wading, or the like in inland stream the bed of which is privately owned, 6 A.L.R.4th 1030.

Trespass: state prosecution for unauthorized entry or occupation, for public demonstration purposes, of business, industrial, or utility premises, 41 A.L.R.4th 773.

Entry on private lands in pursuit of wounded game as criminal trespass, 41 A.L.R.4th 805.

Validity, construction, and operation of statute or regulation forbidding, regulating, or limiting peaceful residential picketing, 113 A.L.R.5th 1.