State v. Martin, 466 S.E.2d 216 (Ga. 1996). · Go Syfert
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State v. Martin, 466 S.E.2d 216 (Ga. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
93 citation events (37 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: LUCID GROUP USA, INC. v. STATE OF GEORGIA (ga, 2026-02-17)
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 25 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) LUCID GROUP USA, INC. v. STATE OF GEORGIA
Ga. · 2026 · confidence medium
See Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 10 (concluding that a statute did not violate Paragraph IV(c) because it was a general law for purposes of Paragraph IV(a)); State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 246 (1996) (same).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Zarate-Martinez v. Echemendia
Ga. · 2016 · confidence medium
(Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.) State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 246 (4) ( 466 SE2d 216 ) (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hammond v. the State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
See generally Moran v. State, 257 Ga. App. 236, 237-238 (3) ( 570 SE2d 673 ) (2002) (“[0]n appeal we apply the law as it exists at the time of appeal rather than the law prevailing at the rendition of the judgment under review, where the law has been changed in the meantime and where no vested right will be impaired.”); State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 246 (3) ( 466 SE2d 216 ) (1996) (law changing scope of evidence that may be offered in trial but that does not affect manner or degree of punishment and does not alter substantive rights is applicable to case pending on appeal on effective date…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) COTTRELL Et Al. v. ATLANTA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Et Al.
Ga. · 2015 · confidence medium
This constitutional provision is complied with when the law operates uniformly upon all persons who are brought within the relations and circumstances provided by it.” [Cits.] A law which operates uniformly upon all persons of a designated class is a general law within the meaning of the Constitution, provided that the classification thus made is not arbitrary or unreasonable. [Cit.] (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 246 (4) ( 466 SE2d 216 ) (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cottrell v. Atlanta Development Authority, D/B/A Invest Atlanta
Ga. · 2015 · confidence medium
This constitutional provision is complied with when the law operates uniformly upon all persons who are brought within the relations and circumstances provided by it.”' [Cits.] A law which operates uniformly upon all persons of a designated class is a general law within the meaning of the Constitution, provided that the classification thus made is not arbitrary or unreasonable. [Cit.] (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 246 (4) ( 466 SE2d 216 ) (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. Baptiste (2×)
Ga. · 2010 · confidence medium
This constitutional provision is complied with when the law operates uniformly upon all persons who are brought within the relations and circumstances provided by it.’ (Cits.) A law which operates uniformly upon all persons of a designated class is a general law within the meaning of the Constitution, provided that the classification thus made is not arbitrary or unreasonable.” [Cit.] State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 246 (4) ( 466 SE2d 216 ) (1996).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Gliemmo v. Cousineau (7×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. · 2010 · confidence medium
Rather, as with the Hospital Care for Pregnant Women Act, it is a general law because it operates uniformly upon all health care liability claims arising from emergency medical care as provided in the statute, and as fully discussed in Division 3 of this opinion, that "classification of the designated class is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. [Cit.]" State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 246 (4), 466 S.E.2d 216 (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jackson v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Mikell and Adams, JJ., concur. 1 Wesson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 428, 431 (2) ( 631 SE2d 451 ) (2006). 2 OCGA § 16-13-31. 3 Barclay v. State, 142 Ga. App. 657, 658 ( 236 SE2d 901 ) (1977). 4 State v. Williams, 275 Ga. App. 612, 614 ( 621 SE2d 581 ) (2005). 5 Poole v. State, 266 Ga. App. 113, 116 (1) ( 596 SE2d 420 ) (2004). 6 Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385, 394 (II) (117 SC 1416, 137 LE2d 615) (1997). 7 State v. Merit, 262 Ga. App. 687, 688-689 ( 586 SE2d 393 ) (2003). 8 Hunter v. State, 198 Ga. App. 41, 44 (2) ( 400 SE2d 641 ) (1990). 9 Adams v. State, 201 Ga. App. 12, 14 (3) ( 410 SE2d …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Register v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 245-246 ( 466 SE2d 216 ) (1996); Todd v. State, 228 Ga. 746, 751-753 ( 187 SE2d 831 ) (1972).
examined Cited as authority (rule) State v. Lindsay (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
State v. Martin, supra at 245-246 (3).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bishop v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Accordingly, the superior court properly gave retroactive effect to OCGA § 16-11-66 (d); Price v. State, 269 Ga. 222, 225 (4) ( 498 SE2d 262 ) (1998); State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 245-246 (3) ( 466 SE2d 216 ) (1996), and no error resulted upon admitting the mother’s testimony as to her daughter’s telephone conversation with the defendant. 2.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. McCabe
Ga. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 245 (1) ( 466 SE2d 216 ) (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Moncrief
Ga. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
It is a well-established rule that “an appellate court applies the law as it exists at the time its opinion is rendered[.]” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 245 ( 466 SE2d 216 ) (1996); Helmeci v. State, 230 Ga. App. 866, 868 ( 498 SE2d 326 ) (1998), cert. denied.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Levins (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 245 (1) ( 466 SE2d 216 ) (1996); Helmeci v. State, 230 Ga. App. 866, 868 (1) ( 498 SE2d 326 ) (1998).
examined Cited as authority (rule) State v. Nolen (3×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 245 (1), 466 S.E.2d 216 (1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Elmore v. State
Ga. · 1998 · confidence medium
State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 245 (1) ( 466 SE2d 216 ) (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Helmeci v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Our Supreme Court has clearly stated that generally, in criminal cases, “an appellate court applies the law as it exists at the time its opinion is rendered.” State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 245 (1) ( 466 SE2d 216 ) (1996); see also Hill v. Willis, 224 Ga. 263, 265 ( 161 SE2d 281 ) (1968); Houston v. State, 192 Ga. App. 73, 74 ( 383 SE2d 571 ) (1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Meyer v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Pursuant to State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 245 (1) ( 466 SE2d 216 ) (1996), the officer was required to select and read to Meyer the appropriate warning found in OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Boone
Ga. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Notwithstanding, defendant asserts in the case sub judice that the August amendment has no impact upon the trial court’s order granting his motion in limine because the August amendment vio lates ex post facto constitutional provisions and “is invalid as an unreasonable special law which seeks to amend general law.” These assertions were rejected by the Georgia Supreme Court in State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 245-246 (3), (4) and (5), supra. Consequently, since the record in the case sub judice establishes that the implied consent warnings the arresting officer read to defendant when defen…
discussed Cited "see" Chandler v. State (2×)
Ga. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 245-246 (3) ( 466 SE2d 216 ) (1996) (statute altering evidence presented in a DUI prosecution); Livingston v. State, 264 Ga. 402 (1) (e) ( 444 SE2d 748 ) (1994) (statute altering that which could be presented in capital sentencing trial); Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735, 737-738 (3) ( 208 SE2d 791 ) (1974) (statute eliminating defendant’s ability to give an unsworn statement at trial). *719 Decided March 19, 2007.
discussed Cited "see" State v. Kampplain (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
“The pláin and unequivocal language of Section 5 of the April 1995 act makes the act retroactively applicable to all pending cases.” State v. Hunter, 221 Ga. App. 837, 838 (1) ( 473 SE2d 192 ) (whole court); see State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244 ( 466 SE2d 216 ).
examined Cited "see" State v. Hunter (4×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244 , 466 S.E.2d 216 (1996) (recognizing that, pursuant to Section 5, the April 1995 act "was expressly made applicable to pending cases by the Legislature").
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Matthews v. MacOn Water Authority (2×)
Ga. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244 (4) ( 466 SE2d 216 ) (1996); C & S Nat.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Love v. State (2×)
Ga. · 1999 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244 (3) ( 466 SE2d 216 ) (1996).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Mayo (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244 ( 466 SE2d 216 ) (1996); Helmeci v. State, 230 Ga. App. 866 ( 498 SE2d 326 ) (1998).
The State
v.
Martin
S95G1753.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Feb 12, 1996.
466 S.E.2d 216
Keith C. Martin, Solicitor, for appellant., J. Michael Mullís, for appellee., Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Daryl A. Robinson, Neal B. Childers, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, amicus curiae.
Hunstein.
Cited by 38 opinions  |  Published
Hunstein, Justice.

Michael Martin was stopped on September 10, 1994 and charged with driving under the influence. The trial court denied his motion in limine to suppress his breath test results and the Court of Appeals reversed, applying the April 1995 amendment to OCGA § 40-5-67.1 to Martin’s appeal. Martin v. State, 217 Ga. App. 860 (460 SE2d 92) (1995). We granted certiorari in this case to address the validity of the implied consent warning in this case, including the effect of the April 1995 and the August 1995 amendments to OCGA § 40-5-67.1. We conclude that the Court of Appeals’ opinion must be reversed pursuant to the August 1995 amendment.

1. OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) was amended in April 1995 (“the April amendment”). Ga. L. 1995, p. 1160. In regard to drivers suspected of DUI, it provided that “the arresting officer shall select and read to[*245] the person the appropriate implied consent warning,” (emphasis supplied), id. at § 1, p. 1161, and set forth the precise language of the warnings. Section 5, which was not codified, provided that the April amendment “shall apply to all cases pending at the time of its approval by the Governor,” Ga. L. 1995, p. 1164, § 5, to-wit, April 21, 1995.

As correctly recognized by the Court of Appeals, the language in the April amendment was mandatory and was expressly made applicable to pending cases by the Legislature. The language employed by the arresting officer in Martin’s case did not comply with the language in the April amendment. Given the well-established rule that an appellate court applies the law as it exists at the time its opinion is rendered, Hill v. Willis, 224 Ga. 263, 265 (161 SE2d 281) (1968); Houston v. State, 192 Ga. App. 73, 74 (383 SE2d 571) (1989), the Court of Appeals acted properly when it reversed the trial court’s denial of Martin’s motion.

2. While Martin’s petition for certiorari was pending in this Court, the Legislature, during the 1995 Extraordinary Session, amended OCGA § 40-5-67.1. The amendment, which retained the language of subsection (b), as set forth in the April amendment, added a new subsection (b) (1) to provide as follows:

Subsection (b) of this Code section shall apply to any case wherein the request for chemical testing is made regarding an offense committed on or after April 21, 1995. Subsection (b) of this Code section shall not apply to any case wherein the request for chemical testing was made regarding an offense committed prior to April 21, 1995, in which case those provisions of former Code Sections 40-5-67.1 and 40-6-392 governing the content of the notice required to be given by the officer to the person regarding administration of chemical testing and governing the admissibility of evidence of results of chemical testing or refusal to submit to chemical testing which were in effect at the time of the offense was committed shall apply.

This language (“the August amendment”) was made effective August 18, 1995. Ga. L. 1995, Ex. Sess., p. 5, § 1.

The August amendment renders the April amendment applicable only to those stops made after April 21, 1995. By its plain language the August amendment applies to Martin’s case. Accordingly, if the August amendment is valid, it would constitute the law in current effect and thus would control our consideration of Martin’s appeal. Hill, Houston, supra.

3. The August amendment does not violate federal or State ex[*246] post facto constitutional provisions. U. S. Const., Art. I, Sec. IX, Par. III; Art. I, Sec. I, Par. X, Ga. Const. of 1983. The August amendment modifies the scope of evidence which may be offered in a DUI trial. It does not affect the manner or degree of punishment and does not alter any substantive rights conferred on Martin by law. Livingston v. State, 264 Ga. 402 (1) (e) (444 SE2d 748) (1994); Todd v. State, 228 Ga. 746, 751 (187 SE2d 831) (1972).

4. The August amendment does not violate the uniformity provision of the Georgia Constitution. Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV (a), Ga. Const. of 1983.

“Our State Constitution only requires a law to have uniform operation; and that means that it shall apply to all persons, matters, or things which it is intended to affect. If it operates alike on all who come within the scope of its provisions, constitutional uniformity is secured. Uniformity does not mean universality. This constitutional provision is complied with when the law operates uniformly upon all persons who are brought within the relations and circumstances provided by it.” [Cits.] A law which operates uniformly upon all persons of a designated class is a general law within the meaning of the Constitution, provided that the classification thus made is not arbitrary or unreasonable.

C & S Nat. Bank v. Mann, 234 Ga. 884, 889 (3) (218 SE2d 593) (1975). The August amendment applies to all persons who were arrested for DUI prior to April 21, 1995. This classification was created to protect the welfare and safety of the general public, see OCGA § 40-5-55 (a), which would have been adversely affected by application of the April amendment to those persons who had been arrested but whose cases had not been disposed of, prior to the enactment of the April amendment.

We hold that the August amendment “operates uniformly throughout the state upon the subject or class of subjects with which it proposes to deal, [cits.]” Lasseter v. Ga. Public Svc. Comm., 253 Ga. 227, 229 (2) (319 SE2d 824) (1984), and that the Legislature’s classification of the designated class is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. See generally McAllister v. American Nat. Red Cross, 240 Ga. 246 (2) (240 SE2d 247) (1977).

5. It follows from our holding in Division 4 that the August amendment does not violate Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV (c), Ga. Const. of 1983, which prohibits special laws relating to the rights or status of private persons.

6. The August amendment does not violate federal or State equal protection rights. U. S. Const., Amend. XIV; Art. I, Sec. I, Par. II, Ga.[*247] Const, of 1983.

Decided February 12, 1996. Keith C. Martin, Solicitor, for appellant. J. Michael Mullís, for appellee. Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Daryl A. Robinson, Neal B. Childers, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, amicus curiae.
Where a criminal statute does not discriminate on racial grounds or against a suspect class, equal protection . . . concerns are satisfied if the statute bears a “reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose” and is “neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.” [Cit.]

Fleming v. Zant, 259 Ga. 687, 688 (1) (386 SE2d 339) (1989). See also Reed v. State, 264 Ga. 466 (448 SE2d 189) (1994) (setting forth two-prong test to an evaluation of legislation under an equal protection claim).

The August amendment distinguishes between persons arrested for DUI before April 21, 1995 and those arrested after that date. This classification is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable for the reasons set forth in Division 4, supra.

7. Accordingly, we conclude that the August amendment is valid and its provisions apply to this case. Accord Howard v. State, 219 Ga. App. 228 (465 SE2d 281) (1995). The record establishes that the implied consent warning given Martin satisfied the applicable statutory requirement under former OCGA §§ 40-5-67.1 and 40-6-392. Howard, supra. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Martin’s motion.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur.