O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A. § 40-5-55 (2019)
Implied consent to chemical tests
✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) The State of Georgia considers that any person who drives or is in actual physical control of any moving vehicle in violation of any provision of Code Section 40-6-391 constitutes a direct and immediate threat to the welfare and safety of the general public. Therefore, any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the highways or elsewhere throughout this state shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to Code Section 40-6-392, to a chemical test or tests of his or her blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol or any other drug, if arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed in violation of Code Section 40-6-391 or if such person is involved in any traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities. The test or tests shall be administered at the request of a law enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been driving or was in actual physical control of a moving motor vehicle upon the highways or elsewhere throughout this state in violation of Code Section
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 261
cases (9 in the last 5 years), 1982–2025 · leading case: Handschuh v. State, 607 S.E.2d 899 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
Handschuh v. State, 607 S.E.2d 899 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). “Handschuh contends the trial court should have granted his motions to suppress because his refusal was admitted under OCGA § 40-5-55, which per Cooper , is unconstitutional to the extent that it requires the chemical testing of the operator of a motor vehicle involved in a…”
Hough v. State, 620 S.E.2d 380 (Ga. 2005). “Because both of these appeals regard the constitutionality and construction of Georgia’s Implied Consent Statute, OCGA § 40-5-55, they have been consolidated for our review.”
State v. Frost, 773 S.E.2d 700 (Ga. 2015). “Gary Frost was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that he was less safe to drive, see OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1), and at the time of his arrest, he refused to submit to a state-administered breath test required by OCGA § 40-5-55 (a). The State gave…”
Cooper v. State, 587 S.E.2d 605 (Ga. 2003). “* 1 2He makes a constitutional challenge to the provision in OCGA § 40-5-55 (a), the implied consent statute, requiring chemical testing of the operator of a motor vehicle involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities.”
Bailey v. the State, 790 S.E.2d 98 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). “The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that Bailey’s bodily fluids were collected as a result of a traffic accident resulting in serious injuries, as defined by OCGA § 40-5-55 (c). The trial court concluded that “in conjunction with a finding of probable cause of…”
Snyder v. State, 657 S.E.2d 834 (Ga. 2008). “At issue in this case is the construction of a portion of OCGA § 40-5-55, Georgia’s implied consent law.”
Furcal-Peguero v. State, 566 S.E.2d 320 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). “) OCGA § 40-5-55 (a). “Under the implied consent laws, every driver is deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test for alcohol content, subject only to the duty placed upon an officer to advise the testee that he is entitled to an independent test of his own choosing.”
State v. Simmons, 605 S.E.2d 846 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). “’ OCGA § 40-5-55 (a).” (Punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.”
Hughes v. State, 770 S.E.2d 636 (Ga. 2015). “Under OCGA § 40-5-55 (a), a law enforcement officer may insist that a driver involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities submit to a test of his blood for the presence of alcohol and drugs, so long as the officer has probable cause to believe that…”
Perano v. State, 300 S.E.2d 668 (Ga. 1983). “§ 68B-306 [OCGA § 40-5-55] `may have a physician, or a qualified technician, chemist, registered nurse, or other qualified person of his own choosing administer a chemical test or tests in addition to any administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer.”
State v. Norris, 635 S.E.2d 810 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). “3 OCGA § 40-5-55, commonly referred to as Georgia’s implied consent statute, provides in subsection (a) that *195 Subsection (b) of OCGA § 40-5-55 recognizes, however, that a driver’s implied consent to chemical testing of his bodily substances may be withdrawn.”
Lee v. State, 749 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). “The implied consent statute, OCGA § 40-5-55 (a), provides that any person who operates a motor vehicle in this state and is arrested for DUI is deemed to have given consent to chemical tests of his bodily substances to determine the presence of alcohol or drugs.”
— 40-5-55(a) — 8 cases
Handschuh v. State, 607 S.E.2d 899 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). “Handschuh contends the trial court should have granted his motions to suppress because his refusal was admitted under OCGA § 40-5-55, which per Cooper , is unconstitutional to the extent that it requires the chemical testing of the operator of a motor vehicle involved in a…”
State v. Simmons, 605 S.E.2d 846 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). “’ OCGA § 40-5-55 (a).” (Punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.”
Rodriguez v. State, 565 S.E.2d 458 (Ga. 2002).
State v. Simmons, 2000 MT 329 (Mont. 2000).
R.T.M. v. State, 677 So. 2d 801 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).
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