Patel v. Patel, 677 S.E.2d 114 (Ga. 2009). · Go Syfert
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Patel v. Patel, 677 S.E.2d 114 (Ga. 2009). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“ince the clearly erroneous test is the same as the any evidence rule, we will not disturb factfindings of the trial court if there is any evidence to sustain them.”
52 citation events (52 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Girls Galore, Inc. v. City of Atlanta (gactapp, 2026-03-03)
Treatment trajectory · 2009 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2009 2017 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 21 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Girls Galore, Inc. v. City of Atlanta (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2026 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
ince the clearly erroneous test is the same as the any evidence rule, we will not disturb factfindings of the trial court if there is any evidence to sustain them.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Antonio Robles Castillo v. Jessica Cardenas Lopez
Ga. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
In the final divorce decree, the trial court recited that it had reviewed and considered, not only the financial documents tendered by the couple, but also “the testimony and argument pertaining to [Castillo’s] income and the financials related to properties owned in Mexico.” “[T]his Court properly gives due deference to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 391 (1) (a) ( 677 SE2d 114 ) (2009).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Emile Blau v. Stacia Horn Blau
Ga. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Specifically, beginning in 1 Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 391 (1) (a) ( 677 SE2d 114 ) (2009) (punctuation omitted); see Gibson v. Gibson, 301 Ga. 622, 624 ( 801 SE2d 40 ) (2017) (“In reviewing a bench trial, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s rulings, defer to the trial court’s credibility judgments, and will not set aside the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.”). 2 Spruell v. Spruell, 356 Ga. App. 722 , 724 ( 848 SE2d 896 ) (2020); see Blalock v. Cartwright, 300 Ga. 884, 885 (I) ( 799 SE2d 225 ) (2017) (explaining th…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Joshua Spruell v. Tamara Spruell
Ga. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
Joshua first contends that the trial court erred in treating his military disability pension as divisible property when it awarded Tamara $30,000 in lump-sum 5 Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 391 (1) (a) ( 677 SE2d 114 ) (2009) (punctuation omitted); see supra note 1. 6 See, e.g., Colbert v. Colbert, 321 Ga. App. 841, 841 (1) ( 743 SE2d 505 ) (2013); see also Brooks-Powers v. Metro.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Herbert L. Cousin, Jr. v. Adrian C. Tubbs
Ga. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
On appellate review of a bench trial, we will not set aside the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and we properly give “due deference to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”2 But the trial court’s application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo.3 With these guiding principles in mind, we turn to Cousin’s specific claims of error. 2 Autrey v. Autrey, 288 Ga. 283, 284-85 (2) ( 702 SE2d 878 ) (2010) (punctuation omitted); accord Marlowe v. Marlowe, 297 Ga. 116, 119 (2) ( 772 SE2d 647 ) (2015); Patel v. Pat…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Arya John Sedehi v. Amanda Chamberlin
Ga. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
In the appellate review of a bench trial, we will “not set aside the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and this Court properly gives due deference to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”6 But when a question of law is at issue, we review the trial court’s 5 Although it is unclear on what basis the trial court determined the amount of the alimony award, it is worth noting that, at trial, Chamberlin testified that she spent approximately $100,000 on the Cape Cod wedding, and that she had to sell her house in Washin…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Provenzano v. Jones
Ga. · 2017 · confidence medium
We give “due deference to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 391 (1) (a) ( 677 SE2d 114 ) (2009).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Provenzano v. Jones
Ga. · 2017 · confidence medium
We give “due deference to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 391 (1) (a) ( 677 SE2d 114 ) (2009).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Henry County Board of Education v. S. G.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
See Reed v. State, 291 Ga. 10, 13 (3) ( 727 SE2d 112 ) (2012); Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 392 (1) (a) ( 677 SE2d 114 ) (2009).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hoard v. Beveridge
Ga. · 2016 · confidence medium
Based on this record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in making its award which ensured effective representation of both spouses. 4 See Simmons, 288 Ga. at 673-674 (finding no abuse of discretion where record showed trial court considered the parties’ relative financial positions and granted fees to wife because she would be primary physical custodian); Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 393 (4) ( 677 SE2d 114 ) (2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in trial court’s decision to deny wife’s claim for attorney fees under OCGA § 19-6-2 where the trial court found both p…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Jackson v. Sanders (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
In sum, given the lack of evidentiary support for Jackson’s testimony regarding his business’s finances and income from his rental properties; the inaccuracies and omissions in his DRFA; and his seemingly disingenuous testimony that, although he wanted his accountant to testify regarding his finances, he nevertheless told his accountant that such testimony was unnecessary, we simply cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Jackson failed to produce reliable evidence of his gross income and thus, calculating his gross income under OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (4) (B).28 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Douglas Dodson v. Sarah Walraven
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Furthermore, since the clearly erroneous test is the same as the any evidence rule, we will not disturb factfindings of the trial court if there is any evidence to sustain them.3 2 The trial court’s order denying his motion for new trial partially modified the original order, but it did not materially alter Dodson’s obligations other than to add the attorney fee award. 3 (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 391-392 (1) (a) ( 677 SE2d 114 ) (2009). 3 Here, the trial court’s award was premised on its finding as to Dodson’s income under the child support guide…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dodson v. Walraven
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 391-392 (1) (a) ( 677 SE2d 114 ) (2009).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eldridge v. Eldridge
Ga. · 2012 · confidence medium
“In the appellate review of a bench trial, this Court will not set aside the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous,” and “[s]ince the clearly erroneous test is the same as the any evidence rule, we will not disturb factfindings of the trial court if there is any evidence to sustain them.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 391-392 (1) ( 677 SE2d 114 ) (2009).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hardigree v. Smith
Ga. · 2012 · confidence medium
(Citation and footnote omitted.) Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 392 (1) (b) ( 677 SE2d 114 ) (2009).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reed v. State
Ga. · 2012 · confidence medium
Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 392 (1) (a) ( 677 SE2d 114 ) (2009); Delbello v. Bilyeu, 274 Ga. 776, 777 (1) ( 560 SE2d 3 ) (2002); Turpin v. Todd, 271 Ga. 386, 390 ( 519 SE2d 678 ) (1999); Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585 ( 242 SE2d 101 ) (1978); Brenntag Mid South v. Smart, 308 Ga. App. 899, 902 (2) ( 710 SE2d 569 ) (2011); Shook v. State of Ga., 221 Ga. App. 151,152 ( 470 SE2d 535 ) (1996); Jones v. State, 146 Ga. App. 88, 90 ( 245 SE2d 449 ) (1978) (the phrase “clearly erroneous” “should not be given varying meanings depending on the type case in which” it appears).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Parker v. Kelley
Ga. · 2012 · confidence medium
Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 392 (1) (a) ( 677 SE2d 114 ) (2009).
examined Cited "see" Capote v. State (4×)
Ga. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 392 ( 677 SE2d 114 ) (2009) (civil); Delbello v. Bilyeu, 274 Ga. 776, 777 ( 560 SE2d 3 ) (2002) (civil); Turpin v. Todd, 271 Ga. 386, 390 ( 519 SE2d 678 ) (1999) (habeas corpus); Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585 ( 242 SE2d 101 ) (1978) (civil); Brenntag Mid South v. Smart, 308 Ga. App. 899, 902 ( 710 SE2d 569 ) (2011) (civil); Shook v. State of Ga., 221 Ga. App. 151, 152 ( 470 SE2d 535 ) (1996) (civil forfeiture); and Jones v. State, 146 Ga. App. 88, 90 ( 245 SE2d 449 ) (1978) (criminal). 10 Notably, however, the standard we articulated in Reed did not address the sta…
examined Cited "see" RIGBY Et Al. v. BOATRIGHT Et Al. (4×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 392 (1) (a) ( 677 SE2d 114 ) (2009).
discussed Cited "see" French v. Dilleshaw (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a). 2 Under the clearly erroneous standard, we must give “due deference to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses,” and we must accept the factual findings of the court below “if there is any evidence to sustain them.” Pȧtel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 391-392 (1) (a) ( 677 SE2d 114 ) (2009) (citations and punctuation omitted). 3 French admitted fault for the collision. 4 Dilleshaw was reimbursed the costs of these repairs, both temporary and permanent, and those costs are not at issue in this case. 5 According to Dilleshaw, he was …
examined Cited "see" Mongerson v. Mongerson (4×)
Ga. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 393 (4), 677 S.E.2d 114 (2009); Wood v. Wood, 283 Ga. 8 (6), 655 S.E.2d 611 (2008); Rieffel v. Rieffel, 281 Ga. 891, 893 , 644 S.E.2d 140 (2007).
Patel
v.
Patel
S09F0505.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
May 4, 2009.
677 S.E.2d 114
Davis, Matthews & Quigley, Kurt A. Kegel, Kelly R. Webb, for appellant., William R. Pike, Tyler J. Browning, for appellee.
Hunstein.
Cited by 23 opinions  |  Published
HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice.

Dhiraj Patel (“Husband”) filed for divorce from Kapila Patel (“Wife”) after 22 years of marriage. Following a bench trial at which the parties testified, along with several experts regarding the value of Husband’s medical practice and the parties’ residential and business properties, the trial court issued a final judgment and decree of divorce. Wife’s application for discretionary review of the trial court’s award * of alimony," its equitable division of certain property, and its denial of her request for attorney fees was granted pursuant to this Court’s Family Law Pilot Project. See Wright v. Wright, 277 Ga. 133 (587 SE2d 600) (2003). Finding no error, we affirm.

1. (a) Wife contends that the trial court failed to properly consider the factors set forth in OCGA § 19-6-5 (a) [1] in awarding her monthly alimony of $5,000 for the first year; $4,000 for the following two years; and $3,000 for the final year. Specifically, she challenges the trial court’s finding that she is capable of updating her skills and reentering the work force, and its consideration of the parties’ respective financial resources.

“ ‘In the appellate review of a bench trial, this Court will not set aside the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and this Court properly gives due deference to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.’ (Cit.)” [Cit.] “Furthermore,[*392] since the clearly erroneous test is the same as the any evidence rule, we will not disturb factfindings of the trial court if there is any evidence to sustain them.” [Cit.]

LaFont v. Rouviere, 283 Ga. 60, 61 (1) (656 SE2d 522) (2008). Here, there was evidence to support the trial court’s finding regarding Wife’s ability to work. As for the trial court’s consideration of Wife’s need for alimony and Husband’s ability to pay,

“|i]n the absence of any mathematical formula, fact-finders are given a wide latitude in fixing the amount of alimony . . . and to this end they are to use their experience as enlightened persons in judging the amount necessary for support under the evidence as disclosed by the record and all the facts and circumstances of the case.” . . . [Cit.]

Arkwright v. Arkwright, 284 Ga. 545, 546 (2) (a) (668 SE2d 709) (2008). Based on our review of the record, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount of alimony awarded to Wife.

(b) Wife also argues that the reductions in alimony after the first and third years constitute improper future modifications that are not based on a change of circumstances, as required by OCGA § 19-6-19. However, because the alimony provision set forth in the trial court’s order “state[s] the exact amount of each payment and the exact number of payments to be made without other limitations, conditions or statements of intent, the obligation is one for lump sum alimony payable in installments,” Winokur v. Winokur, 258 Ga. 88, 90 (1) (365 SE2d 94) (1988), rather than periodic alimony. [2] Thus, OCGA § 19-6-19 does not apply. Rivera v. Rivera, 283 Ga. 547, 549 (661 SE2d 541) (2008) (lump sum alimony not subject to modification). It is within the trial court’s discretion to establish an installment payment schedule for a lump sum alimony award that varies over time, see, e.g., Shepherd v. Collins, 283 Ga. 124, n. 2 (657 SE2d 197) (2008) (reversing finding of lump sum alimony on other grounds), and there was no abuse of such discretion here.

2. Wife argues that the trial court erred in its valuation of certain family loans, the marital residence, and the furnishings and jewelry[*393] in Wife’s possession. Because there was evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings on each of these issues, they will not be disturbed on appeal. LaFont, supra, 283 Ga. at 61 (1).

Decided May 4, 2009. Davis, Matthews & Quigley, Kurt A. Kegel, Kelly R. Webb, for appellant. William R. Pike, Tyler J. Browning, for appellee.

3. Wife maintains that the trial court erred in its equitable division of property by awarding to Husband the office condominium housing his medical practice. However, “[i]n equitable actions for divorce, the factfinder possesses broad discretion to distribute marital property to assure that property accumulated during the marriage is fairly divided between the parties. . . . [Cit.]” Wood v. Wood, 283 Ga. 8, 10 (3) (655 SE2d 611) (2008). Given the overall distribution of assets between the parties and the trial court’s findings of fact specific to the office condominium, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the office condominium to Husband. See id. at 10-11.

4. Finally, Wife contends that the trial court erred by failing to award attorney fees to her.

OCGA § 19-6-2 (a) (1) authorizes a trial court, after considering the financial circumstances of the parties, to exercise its discretion to award attorney fees to one party in order to “ensure effective representation of both spouses so that all issues can be fully and fairly resolved.” . . . [Cit.]

Wood, supra, 283 Ga. at 11 (6). Here, the trial court found that both parties had utilized marital property to pay attorney fees. As noted in Division 1 (a), supra, the trial court did consider the respective financial conditions of the parties. There was no abuse of discretion in this regard.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.
1

This statute sets forth the following considerations in determining the amount of alimony: (1) the standard of living established during the marriage; (2) the duration of the marriage; (3) the age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties; (4) the financial resources of each party; (5) where applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire sufficient education or training to find appropriate employment; (6) the contribution of each party to the marriage, including homemaking, child care, education and career building of the other party; (7) the financial condition of the parties; and (8) any other relevant factors.

2

At oral argument, counsel for Wife maintained that the trial court’s consideration of the factors set forth in OCGA § 19-6-5 (a) necessarily established that the resulting award was one for periodic alimony. However, these factors are relevant for the determination of permanent alimony, whether periodic or lump sum. See, e.g., Wood v. Wood, 283 Ga. 8 (1) (a) (655 SE2d 611) (2008) (discussing consideration of OCGA§ 19-6-5 (a) factors in context of lump sum alimony award).