Court must consider financial circumstances.

- When the trial court did not consider the financial circumstances of both parties as part of the court's determination of the amount of attorney fees, if any, to be allowed in a contempt proceeding, there was no evidence that the ex-wife was able to pay the attorney fees ordered. Thus, if she failed to pay the awarded fees, the failure would not necessarily be a refusal to abide by the court's order, but might simply arise from an inability to pay, tantamount to imprisonment for debt. Thedieck v. Thedieck, 220 Ga. App. 764, 470 S.E.2d 265 (1996).

Attorneys' fees award to the creditor (the debtor's former spouse) that was related to the debtor's unsuccessful efforts to obtain modifications to the divorce decree was not a domestic support obligation (DSO) as defined in the Bankruptcy Code and, thus, was not a priority claim because there was no express determination by the Georgia state court that the fees were awarded as support based upon the relative financial circumstances of the parties rather than as a sanction for frivolous litigation. Mosely v. Mosely (In re Mosely), 577 Bankr. 419 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2017).

Court's express reservation of jurisdiction.

- Fact that court may expressly reserve jurisdiction to make additional award does not mean such reservation is mandatory. Richardson v. Richardson, 237 Ga. 830, 229 S.E.2d 641 (1976).

Court jurisdiction over matter of attorney fees.

- Trial court does not lose jurisdiction of matter of attorney fees simply because term of court ended. Richardson v. Richardson, 237 Ga. 830, 229 S.E.2d 641 (1976).

O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2(a) is inapplicable to child custody modification actions. Wilson v. Perkins, 344 Ga. App. 869, 811 S.E.2d 518 (2018).

Fee award modifiable while suit pending.

- Although the grant of attorney fees is a final judgment which may be enforced by attachment or by writ notwithstanding reconciliation of the parties, this does not necessarily mean that the fee award, like other elements of temporary alimony, may not be modified by the court at any time while the suit is pending and is within the jurisdiction of the court. Haim v. Haim, 251 Ga. 618, 308 S.E.2d 179 (1983).

Words "on account" need not appear in temporary order to prevent the award of attorney fees from being final and complete. Richardson v. Richardson, 237 Ga. 830, 229 S.E.2d 641 (1976).

Oral pronouncement of fees must be reduced to writing.

- Husband's concern about the interest rate of 11.25 percent imposed on an award of attorneys fees was justified under circumstances in which the husband asserted that the date of the judgment was October 1, 2007, and the applicable prime rate was 7.75 percent, while the wife argued that the applicable prime rate was 8.25 percent, the rate on July 20, 2007, the day the trial court orally pronounced the court's judgment; however, an oral pronouncement was not a judgment. It had to have been reduced to writing and entered as a judgment to have been effective. Mongerson v. Mongerson, 285 Ga. 554, 678 S.E.2d 891 (2009), overruled on other grounds, 288 Ga. 670, 706 S.E.2d 456 (2011).

Reversal required when inaccurate income statement relied upon.

- Final judgment and decree of divorce had to be partially reversed as to alimony and attorney's fees because the judgment relied on an inaccurate statement of the husband's income. Lutz v. Lutz, 302 Ga. 500, 807 S.E.2d 336 (2017).

Cited in Roberts v. Roberts, 226 Ga. 203, 173 S.E.2d 675 (1970); Margeson v. Givens, 231 Ga. 552, 203 S.E.2d 186 (1974); Mullinax v. Mullinax, 234 Ga. 553, 216 S.E.2d 802 (1975); Evans v. Evans, 242 Ga. 57, 247 S.E.2d 857 (1978); Swinson v. Swinson, 242 Ga. 305, 248 S.E.2d 675 (1978); Kight v. Kight, 242 Ga. 563, 250 S.E.2d 451 (1978); Griffin v. Griffin, 243 Ga. 149, 253 S.E.2d 80 (1979); Atkins v. Zachary, 243 Ga. 453, 254 S.E.2d 837 (1979); Ford v. Ford, 243 Ga. 763, 256 S.E.2d 446 (1979); Stitt v. Stitt, 243 Ga. 730, 256 S.E.2d 461 (1979); Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 246 Ga. 266, 271 S.E.2d 175 (1980); Griffin v. Griffin, 248 Ga. 743, 285 S.E.2d 710 (1982); Keith v. Keith, 248 Ga. 819, 286 S.E.2d 434 (1982); Reno v. Reno, 249 Ga. 855, 295 S.E.2d 94 (1982); Easler v. Fuller, 169 Ga. App. 110, 311 S.E.2d 534 (1983); Norman v. Norman, 255 Ga. 32, 334 S.E.2d 687 (1985); Cotting v. Cotting, 261 Ga. App. 370, 582 S.E.2d 527 (2003); Cotting v. Cotting, 261 Ga. App. 370, 582 S.E.2d 527 (2003); Page v. Baylard, 281 Ga. 586, 642 S.E.2d 14 (2007); Stanley v. Stanley, 281 Ga. 672, 642 S.E.2d 94 (2007); Wood v. Wood, 283 Ga. 8, 655 S.E.2d 611 (2008); Mongerson v. Mongerson, 285 Ga. 554, 678 S.E.2d 891 (2009), overruled on other grounds, 288 Ga. 670, 706 S.E.2d 456 (2011); Harris v. Williams, 304 Ga. App. 390, 696 S.E.2d 131 (2010); Baars v. Freeman, 288 Ga. 835, 708 S.E.2d 273 (2011); Avren v. Garten, 289 Ga. 186, 710 S.E.2d 130 (2011); Blumenshine v. Hall, 329 Ga. App. 449, 765 S.E.2d 647 (2014); Bankston v. Warbington, 332 Ga. App. 29, 771 S.E.2d 726 (2015); Islamkhan v. Khan, 299 Ga. 548, 787 S.E.2d 731 (2016).

Purpose of allowing attorney fees.

- Allowance of attorney's fees in applications for divorce or alimony is a necessary provision to enable the wife to properly protect her interests. Brady v. Brady, 228 Ga. 617, 187 S.E.2d 258 (1972).

In the allowance of attorney's fees, while the financial condition of the husband must have due weight with the court, still, except in cases where the husband is unable to pay a fee, or more than merely nominal compensation, the allowance for attorney's fees should be sufficient to insure to the wife proper legal representation by a competent attorney. Brady v. Brady, 228 Ga. 617, 187 S.E.2d 258 (1972).

Purpose of allowing attorney fees to the wife is to enable her to contest issues between herself and her husband, and the amount of such fees is to be set in accord with this purpose. Richardson v. Richardson, 237 Ga. 830, 229 S.E.2d 641 (1976).

Purpose of allowing attorney fees is to ensure effective representation of both spouses so that all issues can be fully and fairly resolved. Johnson v. Johnson, 260 Ga. 443, 396 S.E.2d 234 (1990).

Pursuant to Georgia law, when awarded, attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 are awarded as an intrinsic part of temporary alimony. Vakharwala v. Vakharwala, 301 Ga. 251, 799 S.E.2d 797 (2017).

Attorney fees are part of alimony. McClain v. McClain, 237 Ga. 80, 227 S.E.2d 5 (1976).

Award of attorney fees in divorce proceedings constitutes alimony and therefore is nondischargeable in bankruptcy. Westmoreland, Patterson & Moseley v. Painter, 21 Bankr. 846 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982).

Attorney fees are considered temporary alimony. Ford v. Ford, 245 Ga. 569, 266 S.E.2d 183 (1980).

Attorney fees improperly awarded in modification action when original proceedings arose out of divorce action.

- Attorney fees improperly awarded in action to set aside paternity and modification of child support, as the proceedings did not arise out of the original divorce case, as required by O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2, but arose instead out of a paternity and modification action. Cothran v. Mehosky, 286 Ga. App. 640, 649 S.E.2d 838 (2007).

Award not authorized in legitimation proceeding.

- In a proceeding to legitimate a child, the trial court erred in awarding the custodial parent attorney's fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2(a) as the statute only permitted such an award in alimony and divorce cases. Appling v. Tatum, 295 Ga. App. 78, 670 S.E.2d 795 (2008).

Trial court has authority to exercise sound discretion in awarding or denying attorney's fees. Wilson v. Wilson, 243 Ga. 637, 256 S.E.2d 334 (1979).

Attorney fees in an action for nonpayment of alimony and child support are within the discretion of the trial court. Aycock v. Aycock, 251 Ga. 104, 303 S.E.2d 456 (1983).

Discretion of judge as to amount of allowance will not be controlled, unless there is an abuse of discretion. Brady v. Brady, 228 Ga. 617, 187 S.E.2d 258 (1972).

Appellate court may not control the discretion of a trial judge in awarding temporary alimony and attorney fees, unless it can be clearly shown by an appellant that the trial court committed grievous error or a gross abuse of discretion. Bowman v. Bowman, 242 Ga. 259, 248 S.E.2d 654 (1978).

In a divorce action wherein both parties presented evidence regarding each parties' respective financial conditions, the trial court did not err by denying the wife's claim for attorney fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2; additionally, contrary to the wife's argument, the husband's alleged unwillingness to settle the divorce proceedings was irrelevant to the inquiry whether attorney fees should be awarded. Jackson v. Jackson, 282 Ga. 459, 651 S.E.2d 92 (2007).

Consideration of parties' financial circumstances.

- In a divorce action, in the absence of a transcript, an appellate court had to presume that, in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2(a)(1), the trial court had considered the parties' financial circumstances and did not abuse the court's discretion in not ordering one spouse to pay the other spouse's attorney's fees. Dasher v. Dasher, 283 Ga. 436, 658 S.E.2d 571 (2008).

In a divorce action, a trial court properly considered the parties' financial circumstances under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2(a)(1) in awarding a former wife $16,000 in attorney's fees. Arkwright v. Arkwright, 284 Ga. 545, 668 S.E.2d 709 (2008).

In a divorce proceeding, there was no merit to a husband's contention that the trial court actually based the court's award of attorney's fees to a wife on O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 merely because the court noted the impact of the husband's litigious conduct on the reasonableness of the attorney fees the wife incurred because the trial court expressly awarded the wife attorney fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 and explicitly stated that the court was looking solely at the parties' financial circumstances and disregarding the husband's conduct in making the court's award. Kautter v. Kautter, 286 Ga. 16, 685 S.E.2d 266 (2009).

There was no abuse of discretion in a trial court's denial of attorney fees to either party pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2(a)(1) in their divorce action as the trial court properly based the court's determination upon consideration of the parties' relative financial positions; the husband could not seek attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11. Sponsler v. Sponsler, 287 Ga. 725, 699 S.E.2d 22 (2010).

In a divorce proceeding, a trial court's failure to award attorney's fees to a former spouse under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 was not an abuse of discretion as the trial court properly considered the relative financial positions of the parties. Hunter v. Hunter, 289 Ga. 9, 709 S.E.2d 263 (2011).

In an appeal pursuant to Ga. S. Ct. R. 34(4), a trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by considering evidence that the husband and wife received financial assistance from a close relative (their respective mothers) since there was no statutory limitation on the type of evidence of financial circumstances a trial court may consider when a trial court makes an attorney's fee award under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 and because the award of fees under § 19-6-2 was within the trial court's discretion. Jarvis v. Jarvis, 291 Ga. 818, 733 S.E.2d 747 (2012).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by awarding the husband attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2, despite the award not being sustainable under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b), because the record showed that the court carefully considered the parties' relative financial positions, their obligations under the final decree, and the substantial costs incurred by both parties, and the husband was awarded substantially less than the total amount of fees claimed to have been incurred in the litigation. Hoard v. Beveridge, 298 Ga. 728, 783 S.E.2d 629 (2016).

Fact that a party in a divorce proceeding was able to pay for a portion of their fee obligation during the course of a lengthy and contentious divorce proceeding did not deprive the trial court of the court's statutory authority to award fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2. Hoard v. Beveridge, 298 Ga. 728, 783 S.E.2d 629 (2016).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by denying the wife's request for attorney's fees because the record reflected that the trial court considered the relative financial positions of the parties and some evidence supported the decision. Frost v. Frost, 299 Ga. 278, 787 S.E.2d 693 (2016).

Direct testimony as to value of services is not required in determining attorney fees in cases involving alimony. Hilsman v. Hilsman, 245 Ga. 555, 266 S.E.2d 173 (1980).

Expert evidence as to value of attorney fees not required.

- While trial court is vested with sound discretion to award or refuse to award attorney fees based on the financial condition of the parties and other circumstances of the case, it may not decline to grant attorney fees solely because no expert evidence as to their value was presented. Webster v. Webster, 250 Ga. 57, 295 S.E.2d 828 (1982).

Grant of attorney's fees may be enforced either by writ of fi. fa. or by attachment for contempt against the husband. Kay v. Vaughan, 224 Ga. 875, 165 S.E.2d 131 (1968).

Deadline for requesting attorney fees.

- Attorney fees must be requested at some time prior to the entry of the final judgment in a divorce trial (i.e., prior to the conclusion of the hearing on the remaining issues); but once such a request is made, the issue of attorney fees is preserved, without further reservation by the trial judge or additional application by the parties, for a decision by the trial court. Blanchet v. Blanchet, 251 Ga. 379, 306 S.E.2d 907 (1983).

Judge may award fees after verdict.

- When there has been an application for attorney's fees, a hearing thereon prior to the verdict for a divorce, and the judge has reserved decision on the question until after the verdict, an award of attorney's fees after the verdict is not invalid simply because the award was made after the verdict granting a divorce. McCurry v. McCurry, 223 Ga. 334, 155 S.E.2d 378 (1967).

Improperly awarded attorney's fees for refusal to settle.

- Whether a party is at "fault" for a refusal to settle is wholly irrelevant to the inquiry whether attorney fees should be awarded in the first instance, such that the trial court's decision to grant the husband's request for attorney fees was an abuse of the court's discretion. Weaver v. Weaver, 263 Ga. 56, 428 S.E.2d 79 (1993).

Attorney fees for separate litigation.

- Neither the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2(a) nor its purpose of ensuring the adequate representation of the respective needs of both spouses in a divorce supports the inclusion of fees from separate litigation in a fee award under § 19-6-2(a); accordingly, in a divorce case the trial court erred in awarding fees for attorneys who represented the wife in a prior divorce action that was dismissed and in a proceeding before the IRS. Padilla v. Padilla, 282 Ga. 273, 646 S.E.2d 672 (2007).

Bankruptcy court denied a Chapter 13 debtor's ex-wife's request for reimbursement of attorneys' fees she incurred to obtain a judgment against the debtor which found that a state court's award of attorneys' fees in her divorce action was a debt in the nature of support that was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) and was entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1). Nothing in the state court's order awarding the ex-wife attorneys' fees allowed her to recover additional fees for enforcing the order, and there was no merit to the ex-wife's claims that she was entitled to the additional fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2, and under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 because the debtor had acted in bad faith. Owoade-Taylor v. Babatunde (In re Babatunde), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 10, 2012).

Award of attorney's fees for improper conduct.

- Trial court's award of $ 98,385 in attorney fees and expenses pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) was affirmed based on the husband's egregious and improper behavior, and abuse of the discovery process, but the additional award of $ 60,000 for misconduct pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 was reversed because such an award had to be a part of alimony and the parties' prenuptial agreement barred the wife from receiving alimony. Vakharwala v. Vakharwala, 301 Ga. 251, 799 S.E.2d 797 (2017).

Alleged misconduct of husband irrelevant to attorney's fees award.

- Contrary to a wife's argument, any alleged misconduct by the husband, including allegedly being disingenuous regarding sources of income during discovery and at trial, was irrelevant to the award of attorneys' fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2; the trial court did not err when the court failed to award the wife attorneys' fees for finding the husband in wilful contempt of the original temporary support order. Johnson v. Johnson, 284 Ga. 366, 667 S.E.2d 350 (2008).

Attorney's fees in proceeding under the Family Violence Act.

- Trial court erred by applying the divorce and alimony "disparity of income" standard under paragraph (a)(1) of O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 to a motion for attorney's fees filed under the Family Violence Act, O.C.G.A. § 19-13-1 et seq. Suarez v. Halbert, 246 Ga. App. 822, 543 S.E.2d 733 (2000).

Failure to take into account financial circumstances.

- Award of attorney's fees to a mother in connection with contempt proceedings was vacated because under the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2, the award of attorney's fees was improper because the trial court did not take into account the financial circumstances of the parties. Amoakuh v. Issaka, 299 Ga. 132, 786 S.E.2d 678 (2016).

Attorney fees award not excessive.

- In a divorce proceeding, given the financial statements of both parties, because the record and the transcript of the final hearing established that the trial court properly considered their relative financial positions, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion when the court awarded attorney fees to the wife. Rieffel v. Rieffel, 281 Ga. 891, 644 S.E.2d 140 (2007).

Denial of request for attorney fees in divorce case proper.

- There was no error in denying a wife's request for attorney fees because the trial court found that both parties had utilized marital property to pay attorney fees, and the trial court did consider the respective financial conditions of the parties. Patel v. Patel, 285 Ga. 391, 677 S.E.2d 114 (2009).

Failure to make required findings.

- Trial court erred in awarding the wife attorney fees in relation to the general divorce action because the trial court failed to make the required findings of fact. McCarthy v. Ashment-McCarthy, 295 Ga. 231, 758 S.E.2d 306 (2014).

In a contempt action arising out of a custody dispute, the trial court erred in failing to make findings sufficient to support the award of attorney fees to the ex-wife under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) or O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 and, thus, remand for an explanation of the statutory basis for the award and any findings necessary to support the award was required. Cole v. Cole, 333 Ga. App. 753, 777 S.E.2d 39 (2015).

Issue of attorney fees had to be remanded for an explanation of the statutory basis for the award and any findings necessary to support the award because the trial court failed to include any findings as to the financial circumstances of the parties or how its award was necessary to ensure that the husband, whose income at the time of the divorce was higher than the wife's, received effective representation in the underlying action. Rogers v. Baliles, 333 Ga. App. 725, 776 S.E.2d 659 (2015).

Insufficient grounds for court's award.

- Award of attorney's fees in a divorce and child custody proceeding was improper because it was not possible to determine the statutory ground for the award or whether the evidence was sufficient to support the award under the appropriate statutory ground. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the trial court for a statement of the statutory basis for the award of attorney fees and any finding that must be made to support the award. Moon v. Moon, 277 Ga. 375, 589 S.E.2d 76 (2003).

Award of attorney fees to the ex-husband was reversed as attorney fees were not authorized in an action seeking a change of custody by the noncustodial parent, even if child support was also sought; there was nothing in the record to suggest that the attorney fees were awarded under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, as the trial court did not rule on the ex-husband's motion seeking an amendment to the order to include reference to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 and seeking findings of fact to support the order. Thornton v. Intveldt, 272 Ga. App. 906, 614 S.E.2d 175 (2005).

Award of attorney fees to the estate, if predicated on O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b), was erroneous as the findings necessary to support such an award were not made; further, if the attorney's fee award was based on O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2, it was also erroneous as there was no evidence of the parties' financial circumstances that authorized such an award. Findley v. Findley, 280 Ga. 454, 629 S.E.2d 222 (2006).

Trial court's award of attorney's fees to a wife was not predicated on the parties' economic standing, but on the husband's "stubborn stance" in the proceeding, which was not consistent with an award of attorney's fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2. McGahee v. Rogers, 280 Ga. 750, 632 S.E.2d 657 (2006).

Because the trial court failed to make findings sufficient to support an attorney's fee award under either O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 or O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b), this issue had to be remanded for an explanation of the statutory basis for the award and any findings necessary to support the award. Cason v. Cason, 281 Ga. 296, 637 S.E.2d 716 (2006).

Because a review of the record showed that, after a thorough consideration of the parties' financial circumstances, the trial court denied a spouse's request for attorney's fees, the trial court did not abuse the discretion granted to the court by O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2(a)(1). Taylor v. Taylor, 283 Ga. 63, 656 S.E.2d 828 (2008).

In a divorce case, an award of attorney fees to the wife was reversed because the trial court did not specify whether the court was awarding fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 or O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 and had not made any findings in support of the court's award. Leggette v. Leggette, 284 Ga. 432, 668 S.E.2d 251 (2008).

Award of attorney's fees and expenses in a petition to modify child custody was improper because there was no evidence presented to the trial court regarding the reasonableness of the fees. Lurry v. McCants, 302 Ga. App. 184, 690 S.E.2d 496 (2010).

Trial court erred in awarding a husband attorney fees because the court merely ordered the wife to pay attorney fees to the husband without findings of fact and without any cogent evidence of the work performed by the husband's counsel and the nature thereof. Holloway v. Holloway, 288 Ga. 147, 702 S.E.2d 132 (2010).

Trial court could not have awarded the ex-wife attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2(a) because the action for modification of child custody was not one for alimony, divorce and alimony, or contempt of an order arising out of alimony or divorce and alimony. Moore v. Hullander, 345 Ga. App. 568, 814 S.E.2d 423 (2018).

Insufficient evidence regarding reasonableness of fees.

- In a contempt proceeding and modification of visitation following a finding that a mother had repeatedly refused to allow a father visitation, an award of attorney's fees to the father was not supported by any testimony regarding the reasonableness of the fees, and no statutory basis was specified, requiring reversal. Weeks v. Weeks, 324 Ga. App. 785, 751 S.E.2d 575 (2013).

Attorney's fees award proper.

- There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's award of $50,000 in attorney's fees to the wife in a divorce case; the trial court considered evidence of the financial circumstances of the parties and evidence that the wife incurred over $75,000 in litigation expenses in her efforts to obtain necessary financial documents and to effectively present the complicated financial issues raised in the case. Walton v. Walton, 285 Ga. 706, 681 S.E.2d 165 (2009).

There was sufficient evidence regarding the husband's assets to warrant awarding the wife attorney fees for a contempt proceeding to enforce the divorce decree, but the amount had to be reexamined on remand to the extent that it was based on an erroneous award concerning the wife's share of the husband's 401(k) account. Killingsworth v. Killingsworth, 286 Ga. 234, 686 S.E.2d 640 (2009).

Record did not support a husband's claim that the trial court made an attorney fees award because the court thought it was improper for a man to seek alimony and that the case should have settled because the trial court specifically set forth in the divorce decree that in denying alimony, the court considered the conditions of the parties and that rehabilitative alimony to the husband was not warranted since the request was premised on his less-than-credible claim that the wife had agreed with his lack of employment and his being a stay-at-home parent; as to the award of fees in favor of the wife, the trial court expressly considered the parties' fiscal circumstances as the court was obligated to do under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2(a)(1). Klardie v. Klardie, 287 Ga. 499, 697 S.E.2d 207 (2010).

Trial court's award of $60,000 attorney's fees to a wife under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 was upheld based on the trial court's order, which recounted several instances of the husband's misconduct during the litigation and found that they caused numerous delays, extra motions, and extra conversations, and forced the wife's counsel to make multiple requests for documents and answers and to go to otherwise unnecessary efforts to obtain needed documents. The award was also proper under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2(a)(1) to ensure effective representation of both spouses. Miller v. Miller, 288 Ga. 274, 705 S.E.2d 839 (2010).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in awarding a wife attorney fees because the court considered the relative financial positions of the wife and the husband, and although the final judgment and decree did not cite a statutory basis for the attorney fee award, that omission did not mean that the basis of the award was in question; the award was made pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 because no motion for attorney fees was made pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14, and there was no indication that the trial court considered an award of attorney fees on that basis. Simmons v. Simmons, 288 Ga. 670, 706 S.E.2d 456 (2011).

Trial court did not err in awarding the wife attorney fees without citing to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 as there was no requirement that the statute be cited in the trial court's order and there was evidence that the wife's counsel charged a reasonably hourly rate for a family law attorney with the attorney's training and experience. Horn v. Shepherd, 292 Ga. 14, 732 S.E.2d 427 (2012).

Because the fee award to the mother under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 was not based solely on child support modification, but also on contempt allegations that arose out of the original divorce decree, the award was not an abuse of discretion. Odum v. Russell, 342 Ga. App. 390, 802 S.E.2d 829 (2017).

Hearing proper as was subsequent award.

- Husband's complaint that he was not afforded a hearing on the issue of attorney fees was without merit; the trial court began the final hearing by stating that the issues remaining for resolution at the hearing were alimony and attorney fees, and reminded the parties that testimony was regarding alimony and attorney fees only, and during the hearing, the husband's counsel argued that no award of attorney fees should be made due to the husband's financial condition. After the evidence was presented, the trial court orally announced a ruling on the issue of attorney fees and the husband voiced no objection. Mongerson v. Mongerson, 285 Ga. 554, 678 S.E.2d 891 (2009), overruled on other grounds, 288 Ga. 670, 706 S.E.2d 456 (2011).

Action for contempt and modification of support and visitation.

- When the ex-wife's action was not purely an action for modification of visitation, but included an action for contempt and an action to modify child support, an award of attorney fees was within the discretion of the court. McDonogh v. O'Connor, 260 Ga. 849, 400 S.E.2d 310 (1991).

Award of attorneys' fees to the mother was proper because evidence was presented regarding the reasonableness of the fees and expenses requested and the fee was predicated on the finding of contempt. Vines v. Vines, 292 Ga. 550, 739 S.E.2d 374 (2013).

Use of remedial proceeding of attachment for contempt.

- Administrator of wife's estate has standing to use remedial proceeding of attachment for contempt against the husband for failure to obey the order of the court requiring the payment of attorney's fees. Kay v. Vaughan, 224 Ga. 875, 165 S.E.2d 131 (1968).

When the liability of the husband for the attorney's fees awarded to the wife had accrued prior to her death, the right to enforce such award survived her death and vested in her personal representative. Kay v. Vaughan, 224 Ga. 875, 165 S.E.2d 131 (1968).

Incarceration for contempt.

- When a trial court in a civil contempt proceeding sought to obtain an ex-wife's compliance with the visitation provisions of the final divorce decree by conditioning her avoidance of, or release from, incarceration upon payment of the attorney fees award, it exceeded its authority. Thedieck v. Thedieck, 220 Ga. App. 764, 470 S.E.2d 265 (1996).

Attorney fees in contempt proceeding.

- Attorney fees are not recoverable in contempt proceeding concerning only child custody or visitation rights. Smith v. Smith, 244 Ga. 230, 259 S.E.2d 480 (1979).

O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2(a)(1) allows the recovery of attorney fees even in a contempt proceeding involving only child custody or visitation rights. Thedieck v. Thedieck, 220 Ga. App. 764, 470 S.E.2d 265 (1996).

Trial court's award of attorney's fees based on the court's finding of contempt for violating a provision of the parties' divorce agreement prohibiting cohabitation in the presence of the parties' children was reversed and remanded for the trial court to determine the parties' intended meaning of "cohabitation" when the parties included that term in the agreement, and a determination of whether the mother violated that provision. Todd v. Casciano, 256 Ga. App. 631, 569 S.E.2d 566 (2002).

Since, in the context of a contempt matter brought against the client, a husband's attorney was never given proper notice of the possibility that the attorney fees hearing could have resulted in an award against the attorney pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b), the award was improper; a claim for attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 was not considered a realistic opportunity to contest the need for legal services forming the basis of an O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) award because the basis for an award of fees under the two statutes was different. Williams v. Cooper, 280 Ga. 145, 625 S.E.2d 754 (2006).

Although an award of attorney fees to a wife in a declaratory judgment action brought by a husband seeking a determination of the husband's obligations under a divorce decree was not authorized by either O.C.G.A. § 9-4-9 or O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, the award was allowed by O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2(a)(1) because the wife's separate contempt action based on the husband's failure to comply with the divorce decree was consolidated for disposition with the husband's declaratory judgment action, and the trial court found in favor of the wife in that declaratory judgment action. Waits v. Waits, 280 Ga. App. 734, 634 S.E.2d 799 (2006).

Trial court properly held a parent in contempt in a post-divorce matter as the parent acknowledged that the parent refused to return the parties' children to the custodial parent after summer visitation and helped the children obtain legal counsel to file a modification of custody proceeding, which was prohibited by prior trial court orders. Further, the custodial parent properly filed the contempt petition in the county wherein that parent resided and, since the custodial parent was successful in having the other parent found in contempt, the custodial parent was properly awarded attorney fees. Brochin v. Brochin, 294 Ga. App. 406, 669 S.E.2d 203 (2008).

As a final divorce decree was not yet entered when a wife refused to sell the parties' house to the husband, and moreover, the decree did not require her to sell him the house, a trial court erred in holding her in contempt and in ordering her to pay the husband's attorney fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2. Farris v. Farris, 285 Ga. 331, 676 S.E.2d 212 (2009).

Because the father was prohibited in filing the counterclaim for contempt and the trial court was not authorized to consider it, the trial court was also not authorized to order the mother to pay the father's attorney fees resulting therefrom. Mullins-Leholm v. Evans, 322 Ga. App. 869, 746 S.E.2d 628 (2013).

In a contempt case brought by a former wife to enforce a divorce decree's requirement that the husband refinance two properties in his name alone, the trial court's award of attorney fees and expenses was vacated and the case remanded for the trial court to identify the statutory basis for the award and to include the requisite findings of fact supporting the award. Borotkanics v. Humphrey, 344 Ga. App. 875, 811 S.E.2d 523 (2018).

Payment condition for purging contempt.

- Trial court was authorized to award attorney fees in a contempt action arising out of a divorce and alimony case, but the court should not have made payment a condition for purging the contempt without first allowing a reasonable time to pay the fees. Gay v. Gay, 268 Ga. 106, 485 S.E.2d 187 (1997).

State court award of attorney fees is nondischargeable.

- Award of attorney's fees made by the state court in connection with divorce proceedings in that forum is nondischargeable; such fees are intended as support and should be held to be nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5). Myers v. Myers, 61 Bankr. 891 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986).

Award reversed when award altered jury's allocation of resources.

- Trial court's award of a substantial sum in litigation expenses to the wife worked a change "in matter of substance" of the jury's allocation of resources between the parties necessitating reversal under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-7, when such allocation was based upon the jury's expectation that no party would be required to pay litigation costs incurred by the other party. Stone v. Stone, 258 Ga. 716, 373 S.E.2d 627 (1988).

Error to award fees in default proceeding.

- Court erred in awarding attorney fees in a default proceeding since the issue of attorney fees had never been alleged, averred, or prayed for, and since there had been no notice whatsoever to the defendant that the issue of attorney fees would arise. Jayson v. Gardocki, 221 Ga. App. 455, 471 S.E.2d 545 (1996).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 24A Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, §§ 618 et seq., 634, 640, 643, 649 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 27B C.J.S., Divorce, § 542 et seq.

ALR.

- Right to alimony, counsel fees, or suit money in case of invalid marriage, 4 A.L.R. 926; 110 A.L.R. 1283.

Liability of husband in independent action for services rendered by attorney to wife in divorce suit, 25 A.L.R. 354; 42 A.L.R. 315.

Validity and effect of agreement by which attorney's right to compensation or the amount thereof is contingent upon divorce or amount of alimony, 30 A.L.R. 188.

Financial condition of parties as affecting allowance of suit money in divorce suit, 35 A.L.R. 1099.

Right to attorney's fees in suit or proceeding to enforce payment of past due alimony awarded by decree of divorce a vinculo or a mensa et thoro, 82 A.L.R. 726.

Validity of statutory provision for attorney's fees, 90 A.L.R. 530.

Allowance against husband in suit for divorce, of amount for expense of taking deposition of wife or paying cost of her transportation to place of trial, 111 A.L.R. 1098.

Order in divorce suit for payment of counsel fees to attorney for wife, rather than to wife, 118 A.L.R. 1138.

Right to allowance of counsel fees to wife in action for divorce or separation, as affected by misconduct or lack of good faith of her attorney, 150 A.L.R. 1181.

Order granting or refusing motion for temporary alimony or suit money in divorce action as appealable, 167 A.L.R. 360.

Wife's misconduct or fault as affecting her right to temporary alimony or suit money, 2 A.L.R.2d 307.

Right of former wife to counsel fees upon application after absolute divorce to increase or decree alimony, 15 A.L.R.2d 1252.

Enforcement of claim for alimony or support, or for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection therewith, against exemptions, 54 A.L.R.2d 1422.

What constitutes "trial," "final trial," or "final hearing" under statute authorizing allowance of attorneys' fees as costs on such proceeding, 100 A.L.R.2d 397.

Necessity and sufficiency of notice and hearing as to allowance of suit money or counsel fees in divorce or other marital action, 10 A.L.R.3d 280.

Divorce: wife's right to award of counsel fees in final judgment of trial or appellate court as affected by the fact that judgment was rendered against her, 32 A.L.R.3d 1227.

Validity of statute allowing attorney's fee to successful claimant but not to defendant, or vice-versa, 73 A.L.R.3d 515.

Right of party who is an attorney and appears for himself to award of attorney's fees against opposing party as element of costs, 78 A.L.R.3d 1119.

Authority of divorce court to award prospective or anticipated attorneys' fees to enable parties to maintain or defend divorce suit, 22 A.L.R.4th 407.

Court's authority to award temporary alimony or suit money in action for divorce, separate maintenance, or alimony where the existence of a valid marriage is contested, 34 A.L.R.4th 814.

Excessiveness or adequacy of attorney's fees in domestic relations cases, 17 A.L.R.5th 366.

Alimony or child-support awards as subject to attorneys' liens, 49 A.L.R.5th 595.