green
Positive treatment
27.8 score
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995
2010
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 27 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
WILLIAMS, CONGRESSWOMAN v. POWELL
Fielden, 280 Ga. at 445 (citing Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 (1) ( 449 SE2d 94 ) (1994); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 , 611- 612 ( 93 SCt 2908 , 37 LE2d 830) (1973)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bruno v. Light.
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
In construing OCGA § 16-5-90 and 16-5-91 so as to find them constitutional, the Johnson Court rejected the argument that the stalking statutes proscribed "many examples of conduct which society considers to be normal everyday living in constitutionally protected areas." Johnson , 264 Ga. at 591 (1), 449 S.E.2d 94 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. COHEN
The trial court also erred in concluding that OCGA §§ 16-11-62 (2) and 16-11-66 (a) are unconstitutionally vague.“A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence notice of the conduct which is prohibited and encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [Cit.]” Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 (1) ( 449 SE2d 94 ) (1994).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Cohen
“A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence notice of the conduct which is prohibited and encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [Cit.]” Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 (1) ( 449 SE2d 94 ) (1994).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Freeman v. State
(5×)
also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
“A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence notice of the conduct which is prohibited and encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [Cit.]” Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 (1) ( 449 SE2d 94 ) (1994).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Freeman v. State
(4×)
also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
“A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence notice of the conduct which is prohibited and encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [Cit.]” Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 (1) ( 449 SE2d 94 ) (1994).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Seibert v. State
“To ‘contact’ is readily understood by people of ordinary intelligence as meaning to get in touch with; communicate with.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 (1) ( 449 SE2d 94 ) (1994).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Fielden
Johnson v. State, supra, 264 Ga. at 591 (1) (statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if it reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Mann v. State
Co., 214 Ga. 178, 182 ( 104 SE2d 77 ) (1958); McCoy v. Sanders, 113 Ga. App. 565, 567 ( 148 SE2d 902 ) (1966). 9 Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 ( 449 SE2d 94 ) (1994). 10 See Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608 ( 203 SE2d 153 ) (1974). 11 See Jekyll Island-State Park Auth. v. Jekyll Island Citizens Assn., 266 Ga. 152, 153 ( 464 SE2d 808 ) (1996). 12 See State v. Shepherd Constr.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jones v. State
Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 592 (1) ( 449 SE2d 94 ) (1994); see Robinson v. State, 216 Ga. App. 816 (1) ( 456 SE2d 68 ) (1995) (victim feared for her life after enduring threatening telephone calls and other misdeeds).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Bohannon v. State
Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 ( 449 SE2d 94 ) (1994).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Fly v. State
Fly’s contentions that the aggravated stalking statute is unconstitutionally vague and over broad are foreclosed by Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 592 (1) ( 449 SE2d 94 ) (1994).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Jerusheba v. State
Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 (1) ( 449 SE2d 94 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hood v. Carsten
(2×)
"To `contact' is readily understood by people of ordinary intelligence as meaning `(t)o get in touch with; communicate with.' [Cit.]" Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 (1), 449 S.E.2d 94 (1994).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Kinney v. State
Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 ( 449 SE2d 94 ) (1994).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Durant v. State
Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 (1) ( 449 SE2d 94 ) (1994). “ ‘[H]arassing and intimidating’ means a knowing and willful course of conduct directed *874 at a specific person which causes emotional distress by placing such person in reasonable fear of death or bodily harm to himself or herself or to a member of his or her immediate family, and which serves no legitimate purpose.” OCGA § 16-5-90 (a).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Robinson v. State
“To ‘contact’ is readily understood by people of ordinary intelligence as meaning ‘(t)o get in touch with; communicate with.’ ” Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 (1) ( 449 SE2d 94 ) (1994).
discussed
Cited "see"
Chan v. Ellis
See OCGA § 16-5-90 (a) (1).* ** 4 See also Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 (1) ( 449 SE2d 94 ) (1994) (as used in OCGA § 16-5-90, “[t]o ‘contact’ is readily understood by people of ordinary intelligence as meaning ‘to get in touch with; communicate with’ ” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
discussed
Cited "see"
105 Floyd Road, Inc. v. Crisp County
See generally Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590 (1) ( 449 SE2d 94 ) (1994) (statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if it reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct). 5 We cannot agree with the County that the vagueness of the phrase “substantial business purpose” is subject to narrowing by this Court.
discussed
Cited "see"
Jagat v. State
The terms harassing or intimidating mean “ ‘a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes emotional distress by placing such person in reasonable fear of death or bodily harm to . . . herself . . . and which serves no legitimate purpose.’ ” Id. at 873-874 (1); see Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 (1) ( 449 SE2d 94 ) (1994).
discussed
Cited "see"
Wright v. State
See Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 (1) ( 449 SE2d 94 ) (1994) (“‘contact’ is readily understood by people of ordinary intelligence as meaning ‘(t)o get in touch with; communicate with’ ”); Fly v. State, 229 Ga. App. 374, 376 (1) ( 494 SE2d 95 ) (1997).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Marion D. Calhoun v. Carlotta Harrell
See also Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 (1) ( 449 SE2d 94 ) (1994) (as used in OCGA § 16-5-90, “[t]o ‘contact’ is readily understood by people of ordinary intelligence as meaning ‘to get in touch with; communicate with’ “ (citation and punctuation omitted)).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Hood v. Perdue
The point is that the defendant telephones intending to harass and the defendant certainly knows if he is doing that.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 , 449 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1994) (holding that Georgia’s stalking statute was expressly limited to a "knowing and willful” course of harassment and intimidation).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Old South Amusements, Inc.
Compare Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590 (1) ( 449 SE2d 94 ) (1994) (“[a] statute is unconstitutionally over-broad if it reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct”).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton
(2×)
See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590 , 449 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1994) (stating that the stalking statute does not prohibit conduct that is protected expression under the First Amendment); State v. Fonseca, 670 A.2d 1237, 1240 (R.I.1996) (stating that the defendant’s First Amendment interests were not threatened by the statute).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Vines
(2×)
See also Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 591 (1) ( 449 SE2d 94 ) (1994); State v. Burch, 264 Ga. 231 ( 443 SE2d 483 ) (1994).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
DENNIS
v.
State
v.
State
S94A1280.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Oct 31, 1994.
L. Elizabeth Lane, for appellant., Charles H. Weston, District Attorney, Thomas J. Matthews, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Rachelle L. Strausner, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Hunt.
Cited by 1 opinion | Published
Hunt, Chief Justice.
Horace Dennis III was convicted of the armed robbery and felony murder of Paula Doggett and sentenced to life imprisonment.[1] He appeals and we affirm.
1. Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s determination, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. We find no error requiring reversal in the defendant’s remaining enumerations of error.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.1
The crimes occurred on June 26, 1992. Dennis was indicted for malice murder, felony murder and armed robbery on January 23, 1993. He was tried April 12-15, 1993. The jury found him guilty of felony murder and armed robbery on April 15, 1993; the trial court merged the armed robbery conviction with the felony murder conviction and sentenced him to life in prison. Dennis filed a motion for new trial on May 13,1993, amending it on May 14, 1993 and October 13, 1993; the motion was denied on January 18, 1994. Dennis filed his notice of appeal on February 17, 1994. The case was docketed in this Court on May 19, 1994, and submitted for decision on briefs on July 11, 1994.