CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 20, 2022
...llees
presented no evidence that the Attorney General or the Department
of Law had “agreed to send, accept, or rely upon electronic
signatures or authorized his subordinates to do so in this instance
or in any e-mail communication.” See OCGA §
10-12-18 (a)
10 OCGA §
10-12-7 (a) provides that “[a] record or signature shall not be
denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.” In
addition, that statute goes on to state that “[a] contract s...
...extent to which, it will send and accept electronic records and
electronic signatures to and from other persons and otherwise
create, generate, communicate, store, process, use, and rely upon
electronic records and electronic signatures”); OCGA §
10-12-18 (c)
(providing that, apart from an exception not relevant here, the
GUETA shall not require a state agency “to use or permit the use of
electronic records or electronic signatures”).
To determine whether the GUETA applies, we begin by
examining the text, structure, and history of the GUETA....
...he trial court’s
implicit conclusion that the State consented to conducting the
transaction by electronic means. See OCGA §
10-12-5 (b).
Furthermore, despite the State’s contentions, nothing in OCGA
32
§
10-12-18 (a) or (c) excepts the State from the GUETA under these
circumstances....
...to enter into the Agreement by e-mail. Likewise, subsection (c) only
makes clear that a governmental agency is not required to use
electronic records or electronic signatures but does not prohibit the
State from choosing to do so.
Moreover, construing OCGA §
10-12-18 (a) and (c) as the State
urges us to do would allow governmental agencies to invoke OCGA
§
10-12-18 to invalidate an electronic transaction despite the fact
that “the context and surrounding circumstances, including the
parties’ conduct,” demonstrated that the parties had agreed to
conduct the transaction electronically, thereb...
