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Call Now: 904-383-7448This chapter shall be known as and may be cited as the "Georgia Uniform Securities Act of 2008."
(Code 1981, §10-5-1, enacted by Ga. L. 2008, p. 381, § 1/SB 358.)
- For survey article on business associations, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 35 (2008).
Cited in Griffin v. State Bank, 312 Ga. App. 87, 718 S.E.2d 35 (2011); Cox v. Mayan Lagoon Estates Ltd., 319 Ga. App. 101, 734 S.E.2d 883 (2012); Cushing v. Cohen, 323 Ga. App. 497, 746 S.E.2d 898 (2013).
22 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Securities Regulation, § 2 et seq. 22A Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Securities Regulation, § 35 et seq.
- What gives rise to right of recession under state blue-sky laws, 52 A.L.R. 5th 491.
Investigative authority of administrative agencies in state regulation of securities, 58 A.L.R.5th 293.
State regulation of viatical life insurance programs, viatical settlements, and viatical investments, 28 A.L.R.6th 281.
Effect of asset freeze obtained by Securities and Exchange Commission on attorney's fees paid or owed by company subject to freeze, 161 A.L.R. Fed. 233.
Total Results: 20
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2020-10-21T00:00:00-07:00
Snippet: negligence, fraud, and violations of Georgia’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (OCGA § 16-14-1 et seq.). As to solely Barbara Bart, the plaintiffs asserted claims for civil conspiracy to commit fraud and securities fraud (OCGA § 10-5-1 et seq.). The complaint also alleged that Merrill 4 Lynch and Bank of America had aided and abetted a breach of fiduciary duty and fraud, and that control person liability (OCGA § 10-5-58 (g)) applied to
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2019-01-24T00:00:00-08:00
Citation: 823 S.E.2d 558, 348 Ga. App. 474
Snippet: to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6), arguing that Jones: (1) had no contractual relationship with DTCC; (2) could not satisfy any element of conversion against DTCC; and (3) had no right of action against DTCC under the Georgia Uniform Securities Act, OCGA § 10-5-1 et seq. ("the Act"). Computershare, Ameris Bancorp, and Ameris Bank filed a similar motion to dismiss, asserting that Jones failed to state a claim for: (1) violation of the Act; (2) breach of contract; (3) conversion; and (4) negligence. In addition
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2013-07-16T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 323 Ga. App. 497, 746 S.E.2d 898
Snippet: investments were simply real estate development loans for which the plaintiffs must bear the loss. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the financial instruments at issue here are securities under the Georgia Securities Act of 1973, former OCGA § 10-5-1 et seq. The plaintiffs in both of these cases sued attorney Charles M. Cushing, Palmetto Capital Corporation, and Mary Alice Ruben, as the executor of James Ruben’s estate, as trustee and beneficiary of the James Ruben Jr. Trust, and individually
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2012-11-30T00:00:00-08:00
Citation: 319 Ga. App. 101, 734 S.E.2d 883, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 3996
Snippet: indictment. Accordingly, Cox was entitled to summary judgment in part as to Constantino’s liability on Count 3 of her complaint. Cox also relies on facts necessary to establish Constantino’s multiple violations of the Georgia Securities Act, OCGA § 10-5-1 et seq., reflected by his convictions on Count 2, Counts 7 and 8, and Counts 15 through 17 of the indictment. We are unable to discern that the facts proven “by virtue of the conviction[s],” as Cox contends, necessarily show that Cox was injured by
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2012-05-03T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 315 Ga. App. 779, 728 S.E.2d 294, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 1629
Snippet: Angela B. Dillon, for appellant. Robert D. James, Jr., District Attorney, Deborah D. Wellborn, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. Judgment affirmed. Phipps, P. J., and Dillard, J., concur. OCGA§§ 16-14-1 et seq.; 16-14-4 (a). OCGA§ 10-5-1 et seq. (2000). Note: Effective July 1, 2009, the Georgia Securities Act of 1973 was repealed in its entirety and replaced with the Georgia Uniform Securities Act of2008. See Ga. L. 2008, p. 381, §§ 1, 10. OCGA §§ 10-5-5 (a) (2000) (“It shall be
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2012-02-09T00:00:00-08:00
Citation: 723 S.E.2d 305, 314 Ga. App. 46, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 476
Snippet: and vacated in part, and case remanded with direction. ADAMS and BLACKWELL, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Effective July 1, 2009, the Georgia Securities Act of 1974 was amended and became known as the "Georgia Uniform Securities Act of 2008." See OCGA § 10-5-1; Ga. L. 2008, p. 381, § 1. Because the Purchase Transaction occurred before July 1, 2009, Greenwald relied upon the provisions of the former Georgia Securities Act of 1973 to support his securities fraud claims. [2] In the trial court, Greenwald
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2011-10-17T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 718 S.E.2d 35, 312 Ga. App. 87
Snippet: ") (citation and punctuation omitted). A determination of this issue, however, is unnecessary to resolve this appeal. [3] Effective July 1, 2009, this chapter was amended and became known as the "Georgia Uniform Securities Act of 2008." See OCGA § 10-5-1; Ga. L. 2008, p. 381, § 1. Since the transactions forming the basis of the counterclaim occurred prior to July 1, 2009, Griffin relies upon the provisions of the former Georgia Securities Act of 1973. [4] Griffin's counterclaim appears to assert
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2009-09-22T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 684 S.E.2d 306, 300 Ga. App. 146, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 3103
Snippet: D. Baggett, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee. MILLER, Chief Judge. A jury convicted Keith Bernard Beard of one count of a state officer or employee improperly attempting to influence official action by another state officer or employee (OCGA § 16-10-5[1]) and one count of violation of his oath as a public officer (OCGA § 16-10-1[2]). Beard appeals challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as to each conviction. Finding that the State presented evidence of bribery by Beard, but failed to present
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2009-07-13T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 681 S.E.2d 717, 299 Ga. App. 11, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 2503
Snippet: have not demonstrated that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Fernandez's claims for punitive damages and litigation expenses. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. SMITH, P.J., and BERNES, J., concur. NOTES [1] OCGA § 10-5-1 et seq. Notably, effective July 1, 2009, this Chapter was revised and became known as the "Georgia Uniform Securities Act of 2008." Ga. L. 2008, p. 381. This opinion, however, refers only to the Georgia Securities Act of 1973. [2] OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(7)
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2005-03-21T00:00:00-08:00
Citation: 272 Ga. App. 860, 614 S.E.2d 93, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 949
Snippet: Andrews, Presiding Judge. In Garvin v. Secretary of State, 266 Ga. App. 66 (596 SE2d 166) (2004), we affirmed the portion of the superior court’s judgment finding that Garvin violated the Georgia Securities Act of 1973 (the Act) (OCGA § 10-5-1 et seq.) by selling securities without registering *861the securities and without registering as a dealer or a salesperson authorized to sell the securities. But we reversed the portion of the superior court’s judgment finding that Garvin was subject to an
Court: Ga. | Date Filed: 2005-01-10T00:00:00-08:00
Citation: 278 Ga. 903, 607 S.E.2d 549, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 119
Snippet: SE2d 166) (2004), to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the term “willfully” as used in OCGA § 10-5-13 (a) (1) (A) (iv) requires a knowing and intentional violation of the Georgia Securities Act of 1973 (“Act”), OCGA§ 10-5-1 et seq. For the reasons which follow, we find that the Court of Appeals set an incorrect standard for establishing a willful violation in order to impose an administrative penalty under OCGA § 10-5-13(a) (1) (A) (iv); the term “willfully” requires
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2004-09-15T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 604 S.E.2d 644, 269 Ga. App. 607, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1238
Snippet: right to receive from ABC a sum of money equal to a designated percentage of the death benefits payable from one or more life insurance policies on the life of one or more persons (known as viators) who are said to be terminally ill." [2] OCGA § 10-5-1 et seq. [3] OCGA § 16-14-4(a), (b). [4] See Jordan v. Tri County Ag, 248 Ga.App. 661, 666(5), 546 S.E.2d 528 (2001); see also OCGA § 16-14-3(9). [5] (Emphasis supplied.) Former OCGA § 10-5-2(a)(26). [6] See Notes to OCGA § 10-5-2(a)(26). [7]
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2004-06-07T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 596 S.E.2d 166, 266 Ga. App. 66
Snippet: Commissioner, and affirmed by the superior court that, by collectively selling and promoting these contracts as an investment venture, Garvin sold investment contracts which were classified as securities under the Georgia Securities Act of 1973 (OCGA § 10-5-1 et seq.), and that he did so without registering the investment contracts as securities or registering as a dealer or a salesperson authorized to sell such securities. Garvin does not dispute that he was not registered to sell securities in Georgia
Court: Ga. | Date Filed: 2001-11-19T00:00:00-08:00
Citation: 555 S.E.2d 459, 274 Ga. 624, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 3476
Snippet: this case and would instead reach and resolve the issues on the merits, I must respectfully dissent to the majority opinion. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice FLETCHER joins in this dissent. NOTES [1] OCGA § 16-14-1 et seq. [2] OCGA § 10-5-1 et seq. [3] See OCGA § 16-14-7(e). [4] See Caldwell v. State, 253 Ga. 400, 400-401, 321 S.E.2d 704 (1984). [5] Contrary to appellants' argument, the record reflects legitimate bases for the State's dismissal of its RICO action. The State's decision
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2000-02-29T00:00:00-08:00
Citation: 530 S.E.2d 250, 243 Ga. App. 5, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 1231
Snippet: Cox's appeal, and we therefore affirm the judgment in the cross-appeal. 1. In the main appeal, Cox contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Edelsons on his claim that they violated the Georgia Securities Act of 1973, OCGA §§ 10-5-1 through 10-5-24. Cox argues that his investment in the Edelsons' corporation was a purchase of stock and that it triggered the protections and relief authorized under the Act. The trial court agreed with the Edelsons that Cox's investment in their
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 1999-10-15T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 517 S.E.2d 89, 238 Ga. App. 18
Snippet: Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied, and this appeal followed. Held: 1. Defendant first contends the trial court erred in charging[1] the jury that plaintiffs could recover under the Georgia Securities Act of 1973, OCGA § 10-5-1 et seq., because plaintiffs' right to recover the consideration paid for a security sold in violation of that Act, accorded by OCGA § 10-5-14(a), is barred by the two-year statute of limitation established by OCGA § 10-5-14(d). We agree and reverse
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 1998-06-26T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 503 S.E.2d 356, 233 Ga. App. 109, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 2522
Snippet: award of attorney fees in favor of J. Thomas Chapin against Ronald Huggins and I.H. International, Inc. Chapin filed an action against Huggins and I.H. International, Inc. alleging fraud and violation of the Georgia Securities Act of 1973, OCGA § 10-5-1 et seq. The trial court granted summary judgment to Chapin with respect to the securities violation and awarded him attorney fees under OCGA § 10-5-14(a), in addition to the amount of his investment plus interest. We affirmed this judgment in Huggins
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 1991-11-19T00:00:00-08:00
Citation: 413 S.E.2d 759, 202 Ga. App. 172, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1715
Snippet: in the trial court's grant of appellees' motion for summary judgment on the securities claims. To determine whether the WGC stock contemplated under the sale contract constituted a "security" under either the Georgia Securities Act of 1973, OCGA § 10-5-1 et seq., or the federal securities acts, we apply the test in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U. S. 681, 685-686 (105 SC 2297, 85 LE2d 692) (1985), which is whether the stock "bears such characteristics usually associated with common stock that
Court: N.D. Ga. | Date Filed: 1988-06-03T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 698 F. Supp. 883, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11837, 1988 WL 111578
Snippet: defendants in violation of § 10b-5.[4] C. COUNT THREE: GEORGIA SECURITIES LAW CLAIMS Plaintiff contends that by failing to register the cattle purchase transaction as a security, defendants have violated the Georgia Securities Act. Ga.Off'l Code Ann. § 10-5-1, et seq. Plaintiff's claim relates to the alleged offer and sale of unregistered securities. Plaintiff in his response brief contends that this claim also relates to alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions in violation of the Georgia securities
Court: N.D. Ga. | Date Filed: 1985-03-27T00:00:00-08:00
Citation: 605 F. Supp. 1105, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21328
Snippet: section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder; Count II, section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933; Count III, section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933; Count IV, the Georgia Securities Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-5-1 et seq.; Count V, common law fraud; Count VI, common law breach of fiduciary duty; and Count VII, common law negligence. On July 13, 1984, the defendants moved to dismiss the first four counts of the complaint on the ground that the application of