10-6A-1 (2019)

Annotations

Law reviews. For annual survey of real property law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 331 (2005). For annual survey of real property law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 367 (2006).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Propriety of summary judgment. - Trial court erred in granting summary judgment on a homebuyer’s breach of contract claim against the buyer’s realtor as material fact issues remained as to whether the realtor violated the realtor’s duties under the Brokerage Relationships in Real Estate Transaction Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-6A-1 et seq.; however, summary judgment was proper, based on the testimony presented on the motion, as to the homebuyer’s fraudulent concealment claim. Ikola v. Schoene, 264 Ga. App. 338, 590 S.E.2d 750, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 1477 (2003). Client’s summary judgment motion was properly denied; the absence of a written agreement between a real estate broker and a client did not preclude the broker from seeking to recover compensation under the remedies found outside the scope of the Georgia Brokerage Relationships in Real Estate Transactions Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-6A-1 et seq., including those at common law. Killearn Partners, Inc. v. Southeast Props., 279 Ga. 144, 611 S.E.2d 26, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 222 (2005). Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a home seller and against a realtor in construing the unambiguous language in the brokerage agreement at issue, which was for a definite term and was not terminable at will; moreover, although a sale was not consummated, the realtor remained entitled to the realtor’s six percent commission, and the seller remained obligated to pay that amount, which was the proper measure of damages. Ben Farmer Realty, Inc. v. Owens, 286 Ga. App. 678, 649 S.E.2d 771, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 768 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1820, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 81 (Ga. Jan. 7, 2008). Scope. - Silence in the Georgia Brokerage Relationships in Real Estate

Transactions Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-6A-1 et seq., as to when or under what circumstances a real estate agent may assert a claim for payment owed in exchange for services rendered or whether a written agreement must exist before an agent may claim such payment demonstrates that the Georgia legislature did not intend for the Act to regulate real estate commissions or remuneration payments; rather, the Act is concerned primarily with the question of whether and under what circumstances a client or a customer relationship arises and what duties are owed within the context of each. Killearn Partners, Inc. v. Southeast Props., 279 Ga. 144, 611 S.E.2d 26, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 222 (2005). Act is not exclusive remedy, common law claims remain. - Nothing in the text of the Georgia Brokerage Relationships in Real Estate Transactions Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-6A-1 et seq., provides for the act to be the exclusive remedy; therefore, even in the absence of a written brokerage engagement as defined under the act, a broker may nevertheless recover for the value of the broker’s services under common law theories of quantum meruit or as the procuring cause. Killearn Partners, Inc. v. Southeast Props., Inc., 266 Ga. App. 508, 597 S.E.2d 578, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 425 (2004), aff’d, 279 Ga. 144, 611 S.E.2d 26, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 222 (2005), overruled in part, Amend v. 485 Props., 280 Ga. 327, 627 S.E.2d 565, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 167 (2006). Remedies outside of act’s scope not foreclosed. - Nothing in the Georgia Brokerage Relationships in Real Estate Transactions Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-6A-1 et seq., indicates that the Georgia General Assembly intended to foreclose the

availability of remedies outside the Act’s scope, including those available under statute and at common law. Killearn

Partners, Inc. v. Southeast Props., 279 Ga. 144, 611 S.E.2d 26, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 222 (2005).