Bainbridge Limited Lp v. Dekalb County Tax Assessors

Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2022-02-15T00:00:00-08:00

Snippet: “base their decisions regarding the taxability, uniform assessment, and valuation of real property on the circumstances of such property on January 1 of the tax year for which the assessment is being prepared.” Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. § 560-11-10-.09 (1) (b) (2); see also OCGA § 48-5- 10 (“Each return by a taxpayer shall be for property held and subject to taxation on January 1 next preceding each return.”). “The essence of this duty is to see that all taxable property within the county is assessed

Earnest Ray White v. State

Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2018-05-30T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 814 S.E.2d 447

Snippet: requirements set forth in OCGA § 5-5-41 (c) (7) (A) and (B). For instance, some states appear to have placed a more minimal threshold burden on petitioners in establishing their right to test evidence for DNA. See, e.g. , R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-12 (no requirement to show a chain of custody for DNA testing petitions in Rhode Island). However, Massachusetts has imposed the requirement that the petitioner make a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the biological material on the

Morton v. Glynn County Board of Tax Assessors

Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2008-11-26T00:00:00-08:00

Citation: 670 S.E.2d 528, 294 Ga. App. 901, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 3962

Snippet: County did not base its assessment on the value of distinctive club memberships, but instead conducted its appraisals based upon the sales prices of comparable properties, a method specifically approved by the APM. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 560-11-10-.09(1)(a). The taxpayers assert, however, that the County could not simply rely upon comparable sales figures. They note that the APM is designed to provide fair market value under "normal circumstances," and "[w]hen unusual circumstances are affecting

Richardson v. JM Smith Corp.

Court: M.D. Ga. | Date Filed: 2007-02-06T00:00:00-08:00

Citation: 473 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8352, 2007 WL 433563

Snippet: EEOC's interpretation of these statutes is entitled to great deference. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 761, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979). [10] Rogers Dep. at 58. [11] Id. at 47, 109, 124-125. See also disciplinary reports from 10/9/01, 10/11/01, 2/18/03, 4/7/03, 4/11/03 and 6/18/03 and Termination Report from 1/20/04. [12] Plaintiff Richardson admitted that he "could not answer" whether the warning about the cage was because of his religion. Richardson Dep. at 156. [13] Ragan

Suter v. State

Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2002-12-04T00:00:00-08:00

Citation: 259 Ga. App. 28, 576 S.E.2d 10, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 3697

Snippet: law in charging, pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-9.1, that when a defendant pleads guilty to an offense and is sentenced to a term of confinement, the sentencing judge may release the defendant pending the defendant’s surrendering to the county jail at a later date and time certain. He maintains that the trial judge, in so charging, instructed the jury that the court was legally authorized to do that which it was not in fact authorized to do since OCGA § 17-10-9.1 (a) (5) makes a defendant convicted of

Miller v. State

Court: Ga. | Date Filed: 2002-10-28T00:00:00-08:00

Citation: 571 S.E.2d 788, 275 Ga. 730

Snippet: (2001). See OCGA § 17-3-1 (a) (a “murder” prosecution has no statute of limitation); OCGA § 16-5-1 (Code section defining malice and felony murder provides that one convicted of “murder” may be punished by life imprisonment or death); OCGA § 17-10-9.1 (a judge may not release one convicted of “minder” prior to his surrender to jail officials); OCGA § 17-6-1 (a) (“murder” is bailable only before a superior court judge). See United States v. Nix, 465 F2d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1972), citing Sheppard

Pine Pointe Housing, L.P. v. Lowndes County Board of Tax Assessors

Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2002-03-12T00:00:00-08:00

Citation: 561 S.E.2d 860, 254 Ga. App. 197, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 831

Snippet: seller must post a bond with the Internal Revenue Service and be reasonably assured that the property continues to be operated as a qualifying low-income project by the new owner. [11] Ga. Admin. Code Rule 560-11-10. [12] Ga. Admin. Code Rule 560-11-10-.09(1). [13] Ga. Admin. Code Rule 560-11-10-.02(1)(w). [14] (Punctuation omitted.) NAACP v. Overstreet, 221 Ga. 16, 29(4)(a), 142 S.E.2d 816 (1965). [15] Ga. Admin. Code Rule 560-11-10-.09(4)(c)(1)(i). [16] Id. [17] Id. [18] 224 Ga. 328, 330, 161

George L. Smith II Georgia World Congress Center Authority v. Soft Comdex, Inc.

Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2001-06-19T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 550 S.E.2d 704, 250 Ga. App. 461, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 2025

Snippet: Georgia Dome, not the Center. On appeal, the Authority relies on OCGA § 10-9-3(3) to blur the distinction between the Authority, the Center, and the Georgia Dome. That statute is part of the Geo. L. Smith II Georgia World Congress Center Act, OCGA § 10-9-1 et seq., which established the Authority and its oversight of a State-owned international trade and convention center project. OCGA § 10-9-3(3) defines the "project" to include the Center, but provides that other facilities within the project may

Exposition Enterprises, Inc. v. George L. Smith II Georgia World Congress Center Authority

Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 1985-11-27T00:00:00-08:00

Citation: 177 Ga. App. 211, 338 S.E.2d 726, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2560

Snippet: trade. Appellant sought damages and specific per*212formance of its alleged contract with the Authority. The Authority moved for summary judgment and its motion was granted.” The statutory provisions regarding the Authority are embodied in OCGA § 10-9-1 et seq. The provisions pertinent to this case read as follows: “The management of the business and affairs of the authority shall be vested in the board of governors, subject to the provisions of this chapter and to the provisions of bylaws adopted

McCleskey v. Zant

Court: N.D. Ga. | Date Filed: 1984-02-01T00:00:00-08:00

Citation: 580 F. Supp. 338, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19860

Snippet: DB83 DB80 DB85 DB102 Incremental Increase in Death Sentencing Rate -0.3 .10 .05 .10 .05 .04 .04 .05 .06 .06 .07 .06 .06 .06 .04 "P" Value .0001 .031 .01 .03 .10 .09 .01 .001 .0004 .01 .01 .01 .02 .05 NOTES [1] A separate one-day hearing was had several months after the original hearing. The transcript of those proceedings appears in Volume X of the transcript, and that testimony will hereafter

Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. City of Columbus

Court: Ga. | Date Filed: 1939-11-16T00:00:00-08:00

Citation: 6 S.E.2d 320, 189 Ga. 458, 1939 Ga. LEXIS 730

Snippet: 1937 1938 1937 1938 1937 1938 1937 1938 1 $ 8,790 $10,863 13.6 11 $ 664 $ 870 Def. Def. 2 8,830 8,475 13.5 14.2 1,251 909 95.9 Def. 3 10,158 11,068 11.8 10.9 1,564 2,002 76.7 59.9 4 20,442 17,192 5.9 7 2,961 791 40.5 Def. 5 Not open 47,320 .... 2.5 .... 10,232 .... 3.9 It was undisputed that the plaintiff's operating policies were efficient