CopyCited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 1, 2021 | 311 Ga. 682
...discretion by failing to find that StadCo had a leasehold interest in
the stadium that is subject to ad valorem taxation. The appellants
also asserted that the Board’s decision was based on an
“unconstitutionally adopted” exemption codified in OCGA §
10-9-10.
The appellees and intervenors StadCo and the Georgia World
Dwight Robinson; and the Fulton County Tax Commissioner, Arthur E.
Ferdinand....
...determined that StadCo’s interest was a non-taxable usufruct after
conducting an investigation and holding a hearing at which they
considered evidence concerning the nature of StadCo’s interest.
They also argued that the Board’s decision was not based on OCGA
§
10-9-10 but on an evaluation of agreements entered into between
the intervenors prior to the construction of the stadium....
...On appeal, the appellants contend that the trial court
erred in dismissing the petition, allegedly sua sponte, arguing
primarily that the trial court had applied an incorrect standard of
review. They also contend that the trial court erred in declining to
find OCGA §
10-9-10 unconstitutional....
...expectations and understanding between the parties with respect to
additional rights and obligations concerning the use of the stadium.
The Board’s Exemption Decision provides, in relevant part:
Based on the [MOU and the Tri-Party MOU], and
pursuant to OCGA §
10-9-10,[3] it is the intent of the
3 The GWCCA owns and operates the stadium and the land it sits upon,
and, as an agency of the State of Georgia, it is exempt from ad valorem taxes
pursuant to OCGA §
10-9-10....
...t. The appellants
subsequently amended the petition to add a fourth count seeking to
enjoin the Board and its members from treating StadCo’s leasehold
interest in the stadium as tax exempt, and a fifth count seeking a
declaration that OCGA §
10-9-10, as it was amended in 1989, was
unconstitutional....
...leasehold interest in the stadium, and for an injunction to prevent
the Board members from implementing the Exemption Decision.
And, finally, the Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the
appellants’ challenge to the constitutionality of OCGA §
10-9-10 on
mootness grounds....
...capacities declaring that the SLM Agreement granted StadCo a
taxable leasehold interest; (d) a judgment against the Board, as well
as against the Board members and the Chief Appraiser in their
official and individual capacities, declaring that OCGA §
10-9-10, as
amended in 1989, is unconstitutional....
...(Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) McConnell v. Dept. of Labor,
302
Ga. 18, 18-19 (805 SE2d 79) (2017). We note that the trial court should have
addressed whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the claim for
declaratory relief challenging OCGA §
10-9-10 because it was brought against
the Board as well as against the Chief Appraiser and the Board members in
their official capacities....
...al court will
be issuing an advisory opinion, and the Declaratory Judgment Act
makes no provision for a judgment that would be advisory.”
(citations and punctuation omitted)).
(d) The appellants also sought a judgment declaring that
OCGA §
10-9-10, as amended, was unconstitutional. The appellants
argued that, prior to its amendment in 1989, OCGA §
10-9-10
contained a clause that prohibited the GWCCA from extending its
tax exempt status “to any lessee or other private person or entity.”
See Ga....
...The
appellants fail to acknowledge, however, that the trial court
dismissed this count of the petition on an alternate ground.
The trial court held as follows:
The most basic reason why [the Petitioners’]
challenge fails is that [OCGA §
10-9-10’s]
constitutionality has no bearing on the Exemption
Decision....
...[and] GWCCA’s
statutory exemption would automatically transfer to the
lessee. Here, however, the [Board] considered the details
of the MOUs, repeatedly referenced the MOUs in its
Exemption Decision, and even noted that its decision was
dependent not on [OCGA §
10-9-10] but on the terms of
the MOUs, such that if those terms were materially
changed, [the Board’s] exemption ruling might also
change....
...er that conclusion. In
other words, [the Board] unanimously found that the
interest GWCCA conveyed to StadCo constituted a
32
usufruct, something that is exempt from taxation not
because of OCGA §
10-9-10 ....
...10] irrelevant and is reason enough to find, as a matter of
law, that Count III should be dismissed.
We agree with this reasoning. In light of the trial court’s correct
conclusion that the Board did not rely on an exemption allegedly
expressed in OCGA §
10-9-10, but rather determined that StadCo’s
interest was a nontaxable usufruct,16 we need not reach the trial
court’s alternative ruling on the merits of the appellants’ challenge
to the constitutionality of the statute.
(e) Finall...
...m for a refund.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Peterson
and Bethel, JJ., not participating, and McMillian, J., disqualified.
34
Decided June 1, 2021.
OCGA §
10-9-10; constitutional question....
