O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
This article shall be known and may be cited as “Uniform Commercial Code - Sales.”
History
Code 1933, § 109A-2-101, enacted by Ga. L. 1962, p. 156, § 1.
Annotations
Law reviews. For article, “The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code,” see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 605 (1981).
For comment, “Medical Expert Systems and Publisher Liability: A Cross-Contextual Analysis,” see 43 Emory L.J. 731 (1994).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Coverage of article. - Article 2 of the Georgia Commercial Code, O.C.G.A. § 112-101 et seq., applied to a contract because the sale of goods, the dirt which the seller offered to furnish to the buyer, was the predominant purpose of the contemplated transaction. Furthermore, the trial court did not err in putting the question of predominant purpose to the jury because the evidence permitted a rational jury to
resolve this issue in a way that would lead to a conclusion that the sale of goods under O.C.G.A. § 11-2-107(1) was the predominant purpose of the contemplated transaction. Paramount Contr. Co. v. DPS Indus., 309 Ga. App. 113, 709 S.E.2d 288, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 209 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1216, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 607 (Ga. Sept. 6, 2011).
RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 15A Am. Jur. 2d, Commercial Code, § 69. 64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Works and Contracts, § 17. Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms. 6 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Commercial Code, § 2:2. C.J.S. 82 C.J.S., Statutes, §§ 217 et seq., 238.
U.L.A. Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 2101. ALR. Preemption of strict liability in tort by provisions of UCC Article 2, 15 A.L.R.4th 791. Impracticability of performance of sales contract under UCC § 2-615, 55 A.L.R.5th 1.
Notes of Decisions
Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Rountree, 364 S.E.2d 65 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 4× “The contention is that the lease of the computer equipment was the equivalent of a sale and that the transaction is thus within the ambit of OCGA § 11-2-101 et seq. However, it is clear that the lease is not equivalent to a sale by appellant and a purchase by appellees of the…”
Jones v. Baran Co., LLC, 660 S.E.2d 420 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 2× “Jones filed this breach of contract action under Georgia’s Uniform Commercial Code — Sales (OCGA § 11-2-101 et seq.) and sought compensatory damages and attorney fees against appellee, The Baran Company, LLC d/b/a Mercedes-Benz of Buckhead (“the Dealer”).”
Almand v. Reynolds & Robin, P.C., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (M.D. Ga. 2007).
· cites it 2× ““governs the sale of motor vehicles,” cites O.C.G.A. § 11-2-101 and concludes that an “action for breach of contract for sale has a statute of limitations of four years,” citing O.”
Embryo Progeny Assocs. v. Lovana Farms, Inc., 416 S.E.2d 833 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 2× “The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Lovana Farms holding that the claim was based on a contract for the sale of goods under the sales article of the Uniform Commercial Code (OCGA § 11-2-101 et seq.), and that the suit was barred by the four-year statute of…”
Culberson v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 616 S.E.2d 865 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 2× “Culberson brought claims for breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, and revocation of acceptance under the Uniform Commercial Code — Sales (OCGA§ 11-2-101 et seq.) and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ( 15 USC § 2301 et seq.”
Alco Stand. Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 426 S.E.2d 648 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 2× “There is some confusion in the arguments submitted in this case as to whether the transaction between the parties is governed by the “Uniform Commercial Code — Sales,” OCGA § 11-2-101 et seq. and particularly OCGA § 11-2-207.”
Rodgers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 627 S.E.2d 151 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 2× “*549 General Motors moved for summary judgment, contending: (1) that the waiver signed by Rodgers precluded him from bringing any breach of warranty claims under Georgia’s Uniform Commercial Code, OCGA§ 11-2-101 et seq.; and (2) that Rodgers’ Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim was…”
Accessory Overhaul Grp., Inc. v. Mesa Airlines, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (N.D. Ga. 2014).
· cites it 2× “Defendants respond that AOG performed repair services, and while those services may have involved goods, the primary purpose of AOG’s work was to service the wheels, tires and brakes of their aircraft.”
Putnam-Greene Fin. Corp. v. AT&T Corp. (N.D. Ga. 2020).
· cites it 2× “See O.C.G.A. § 11-2-101 et seq. The parties have pointed the Court to no authority, and the Court has located none, expanding the definition of “goods” or what constitutes an “urgent and immediate necessity” for the purposes of Georgia’s voluntary payment doctrine.”
Platinum Marietta, Inc. v. Fred Vah (Ga. Ct. App. 2025).
· cites it 2× “(Count 3); deceit (Count 4); and revocation of acceptance under Georgia’s UCC, OCGA § 11-2-101 et seq. (Count 5). Platinum moved for summary judgment on all claims.”
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