O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 11-3-118 (2019)

Statute of limitations

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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(a) Except as provided in subsection (e) of this Code section, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six years after the accelerated due date. (b) Except as provided in subsection (d) or (e) of this Code section, if demand for payment is made to the maker of a note payable on demand,

an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the note must be commenced within six years after the demand. If no demand for payment is made to the maker, an action to enforce the note is barred if neither principal nor interest on the note has been paid for a continuous period of ten years. (c) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this Code section, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to an unaccepted draft to pay the draft must be commenced within three years after dishonor of the draft or ten years after the date of the draft, whichever period expires first. (d) An action to enforce the obligation of the acceptor of a certified check or the issuer of a teller’s check, cashier’s check, or traveler’s check must be commenced within three years after demand for payment is made to the acceptor or issuer, as the case may be. (e) An action to enforce the obligation of a party to a certificate of deposit to pay the instrument must be commenced within six years after demand for payment is made to the maker, but if the instrument states a due date and the maker is not required to pay before that date, the six-year period begins when a demand for payment is in effect and the due date has passed. (f) An action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay an accepted draft, other than a certified check, must be commenced within (i) six years after the due date or dates stated in the draft or acceptance if the obligation of the acceptor is payable at a definite time; or (ii) six years after the date of the acceptance if the obligation of the acceptor is payable on demand. (g) Unless governed by other law regarding claims for indemnity or contribution, an action (i) for conversion of an instrument, for money had and received, or like action based on conversion; (ii) for breach of warranty; or (iii) to enforce an obligation, duty, or right arising under this article and not governed by this Code section, must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues. (h) This Code section does not apply to sealed instruments, which are governed by the provisions of Code Section 9-3-23.

History

Code 1981, § 11-3-118, enacted by Ga. L. 1996, p. 1306, § 3.

Annotations

Law reviews. For article on the 1963 amendment to the Georgia Uniform Commercial Code,

see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 378 (1963). For note, “Negotiable Promissory Notes Containing Time and Demand Provisions: The Need for Consistent Interpretation,” see 19 Ga. L. Rev. 717 (1984).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, deci-

sions under former Code 1933, §§ 3-705 and 109A-3-122 and former Code Section

11-3-122 are included in the annotations for this Code section. Retroactive application barred. - O.C.G.A. § 11-3-118 did not apply retroactively to extend the limitation period in an action on a demand note brought before the current provision went into effect. Johnson v. Hodge, 223 Ga. App. 227, 477 S.E.2d 385, 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 1109 (1996). Where an action on demand notes was barred under former § 11-3-122(1)(b), O.C.G.A. § 11-3-118 did not apply retroactively to revive the previously timebarred claim. McNeal Constr. Co. v. Wilson, 271 Ga. 540, 522 S.E.2d 222, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 783 (1999) (reversing McNeal Constr. Co. v. Wilson, 235 Ga. App. 759, 509 S.E.2d 742, 1998 Ga. App. LEXIS 1531 (1998) (decided under former Code Section 11-3-122). Direct suit on instrument. - One may bring action upon debt evidenced by commercial paper by suing directly on instrument which imports its own consideration without setting forth facts creating obligation evidenced by the paper. Minner v. Childs, 116 Ga. App. 272, 157

S.E.2d 50, 1967 Ga. App. LEXIS 773 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, § 109A-3-122). Conversion and negligence action barred. - Bank account holder’s conversion and negligence action against a bank for paying two checks on the holder’s account without authorization was barred by the Georgia Uniform Commercial Code’s three-year statute of limitations set forth in O.C.G.A. § 11-3-118(g), which applied to negotiable instruments, because the holder did not file a complaint until more than three years after the bank paid the checks at issue. Ogundele v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 1:04-CV-1852-CC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25396 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 6, 2004). Date of commencement of time for bringing actions. - Six-year period for bringing actions on unsealed demand instrument commences upon date of instrument or, if no date is stated, on date instrument was issued. Woodall v. Hixon, 154 Ga. App. 844, 270 S.E.2d 65, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2412, rev’d, 246 Ga. 758, 272 S.E.2d 727, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1263 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 3-705).

RESEARCH REFERENCES C.J.S. 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes, §§ 86 et seq., 257. 47 C.J.S., Interest and Usury, §§ 4253. U.L.A. Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 3118. ALR. Who must bear loss of funds from failure of bank, at which bill or note is payable, during delay in presenting it, 2 A.L.R. 1381. Time at which interest is payable under will or contract providing for payment of interest, 10 A.L.R. 997. Right of holder to sue bank in respect of

deposit made, for payment of existing obligation other than check, 50 A.L.R. 1012. Time when statute of limitation commences to run in favor of endorser of paper upon which prior endorsement was forged, 117 A.L.R. 1164. Statute of limitations: action by one secondarily liable on negotiable instrument against others secondarily liable, or against principal, as an action on such instrument, or an action on an implied promise, or a similar action, 143 A.L.R. 1062. Application of “bad check” statute with respect to postdated checks, 52 A.L.R.3d 464.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 9 cases, 1988–2020 · leading case: McNeal Constr. Co. v. Wilson, 522 S.E.2d 222 (Ga. 1999).

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McNeal Constr. Co. v. Wilson, 522 S.E.2d 222 (Ga. 1999). · cites it 16× “However, OCGA § 11-3-118 was amended, effective July 1, 1996, to provide that actions brought to enforce the obligations of makers of demand notes had to be commenced within six years after the demand for payment.”

Hale Haven Props., LLC v. Bank of Am., N.A., 815 S.E.2d 574 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). · cites it 2× “itled to enforce the instrument if (i) the person was in possession of the instrument and entitled to enforce it when loss of possession occurred; (ii) the loss of possession was not the result of a transfer by the person or a lawful seizure; and (iii) the person cannot…”

Talmadge v. Respess, 482 S.E.2d 709 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 6× “” Although these latter notes do not specifically provide that interest will begin to accrue on the date of the note, such is the construction of those notes under former OCGA § 11-3-118 (d), which applies to the notes in this case.”

McNeal Constr. Co. v. Wilson, 509 S.E.2d 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 6× “OCGA § 11-3-118 (b) now provides in pertinent part that ‘if demand for payment is made to the maker of a note payable on demand, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the note must be commenced within six years after the demand.”

Johnson v. Hodge, 477 S.E.2d 385 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 11-3-118 (b) now provides in pertinent part that “if demand for payment is made to the maker of a note payable on demand, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the note must be commenced within six years after the demand.”

Commonwealth Land Title Ins. v. Miller, 395 S.E.2d 243 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 2× “” See OCGA § 11-3-118 (e); Ghitter v. Edge, 118 Ga.”

Brice v. Nw. Georgia Bank, 368 S.E.2d 816 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · cites it 2× “Held: OCGA § 11-3-118 (e), cited in the trial court’s order granting summary judgment, prescribes as follows: “Unless the instrument otherwise specifies, two or more persons who sign as maker, acceptor or drawer or indorser and as a part of the same transaction are jointly and…”

Phillip H. Taylor, Jr. v. Ameris Bank (Ga. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 2× “”); see also OCGA § 11-3-118 (a) (providing that an action to enforce a note must be commenced within six years after the due date); OCGA § 9-3-23 (actions on instruments filed under seal may be brought within 20 years).”

Sparagon v. State, 548 S.E.2d 118 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 2× “Early, 4 Sparagon urges that, unlike with *441 ordinary promissory notes governed by OCGA § 11-3-118 (b), an actual demand for payment and subsequent refusal to pay are necessary to start the limitation period against the State bond payable “on demand.”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.