Syfert Injury Law Firm

Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation

Call Now: 904-383-7448

2018 Georgia Code 11-3-118 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 11-3-118 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 11-3-118

TITLE 11 COMMERCIAL CODE

Section 3. Negotiable Instruments, 11-3-101 through 11-3-605.

ARTICLE 3 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

11-3-118. Statute of limitations.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (e) of this Code section, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six years after the accelerated due date.
  2. Except as provided in subsection (d) or (e) of this Code section, if demand for payment is made to the maker of a note payable on demand, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the note must be commenced within six years after the demand. If no demand for payment is made to the maker, an action to enforce the note is barred if neither principal nor interest on the note has been paid for a continuous period of ten years.
  3. Except as provided in subsection (d) of this Code section, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to an unaccepted draft to pay the draft must be commenced within three years after dishonor of the draft or ten years after the date of the draft, whichever period expires first.
  4. An action to enforce the obligation of the acceptor of a certified check or the issuer of a teller's check, cashier's check, or traveler's check must be commenced within three years after demand for payment is made to the acceptor or issuer, as the case may be.
  5. An action to enforce the obligation of a party to a certificate of deposit to pay the instrument must be commenced within six years after demand for payment is made to the maker, but if the instrument states a due date and the maker is not required to pay before that date, the six-year period begins when a demand for payment is in effect and the due date has passed.
  6. An action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay an accepted draft, other than a certified check, must be commenced within (i) six years after the due date or dates stated in the draft or acceptance if the obligation of the acceptor is payable at a definite time; or (ii) six years after the date of the acceptance if the obligation of the acceptor is payable on demand.
  7. Unless governed by other law regarding claims for indemnity or contribution, an action (i) for conversion of an instrument, for money had and received, or like action based on conversion; (ii) for breach of warranty; or (iii) to enforce an obligation, duty, or right arising under this article and not governed by this Code section, must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.
  8. This Code section does not apply to sealed instruments, which are governed by the provisions of Code Section 9-3-23.

(Code 1981, §11-3-118, enacted by Ga. L. 1996, p. 1306, § 3.)

Law reviews.

- For article on the 1963 amendment to the Georgia Uniform Commercial Code, see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 378 (1963). For note, "Negotiable Promissory Notes Containing Time and Demand Provisions: The Need for Consistent Interpretation," see 19 Ga. L. Rev. 717 (1984).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Code Section 11-3-122 are included in the annotations for this section.

Retroactive application barred.

- O.C.G.A. § 11-3-118 did not apply retroactively to extend the limitation period in an action on a demand note brought before the current provision went into effect. Johnson v. Hodge, 223 Ga. App. 227, 477 S.E.2d 385 (1996).

Where an action on demand notes was barred under former § 11-3-122(1)(b), O.C.G.A. § 11-3-118 did not apply retroactively to revive the previously time-barred claim. McNeal Constr. Co. v. Wilson, 271 Ga. 540, 522 S.E.2d 222 (1999), reversing McNeal Constr. Co. v. Wilson, 235 Ga. App. 759, 509 S.E.2d 742 (1998).

Direct suit on instrument.

- One may bring action upon debt evidenced by commercial paper by suing directly on instrument which imports its own consideration without setting forth facts creating obligation evidenced by the paper. Minner v. Childs, 116 Ga. App. 272, 157 S.E.2d 50 (1967) (decided under former Code Section11-3-122).

Conversion and negligence action barred.

- Bank account holder's conversion and negligence action against a bank for paying two checks on the holder's account without authorization was barred by the Georgia Uniform Commercial Code's three-year statute of limitations set forth in O.C.G.A. § 11-3-118(g), which applied to negotiable instruments, because the holder did not file a complaint until more than three years after the bank paid the checks at issue. Ogundele v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Dec. 6, 2004).

Date of commencement of time for bringing actions.

- Six-year period for bringing actions on unsealed demand instrument commences upon date of instrument or, if no date is stated, on date instrument was issued. Woodall v. Hixon, 154 Ga. App. 844, 270 S.E.2d 65, rev'd on other grounds, 246 Ga. 758, 272 S.E.2d 727 (1980) (decided under former Code Section11-3-122).

Cited in Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Hale Haven Props., 346 Ga. App. 39, 815 S.E.2d 574 (2018).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Effect of expiration of former limitation period.

- 11 Am. Jur. 2d, Banks and Financial Institutions, § 927. 11 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, § 190. 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, § 632 et seq. 45 Am. Jur. 2d, Interest and Usury, § 51.

C.J.S.

- 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes, §§ 86 et seq., 257. 47 C.J.S., Interest and Usury, §§ 42-53.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 3-118.

ALR.

- Who must bear loss of funds from failure of bank, at which bill or note is payable, during delay in presenting it, 2 A.L.R. 1381.

Time at which interest is payable under will or contract providing for payment of interest, 10 A.L.R. 997.

Right of holder to sue bank in respect of deposit made, for payment of existing obligation other than check, 50 A.L.R. 1012.

Time when statute of limitation commences to run in favor of endorser of paper upon which prior endorsement was forged, 117 A.L.R. 1164.

Statute of limitations: action by one secondarily liable on negotiable instrument against others secondarily liable, or against principal, as an action on such instrument, or an action on an implied promise, or a similar action, 143 A.L.R. 1062.

Application of "bad check" statute with respect to postdated checks, 52 A.L.R.3d 464.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 11-3-118

Total Results: 1  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

Copy

McNeal Constr. Co. v. Wilson, 522 S.E.2d 222 (Ga. 1999).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 18, 1999 | 271 Ga. 540, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 3776, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 755

...tion on a demand note accrued on the date on its face or, if no date specified, on the date issued. OCGA § 9-3-24 (1996) provided that suits upon promissory notes must be brought within six years after the same became due and payable. However, OCGA § 11-3-118 was amended, effective July 1, 1996, to provide that actions brought to enforce the obligations of makers of demand notes had to be commenced within six years after the demand for payment....
...The trial court granted Wilson's motion for summary judgment and denied appellants' motion for summary judgment, holding that the statute of limitation did not begin to run until Wilson made the demand for payment. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the amended version of OCGA § 11-3-118 was applicable because the action was filed after the statute had been amended, even though under the previous statute Wilson's action was time-barred. McNeal Constr. Co. v. Wilson, 235 Ga.App. 759, 509 S.E.2d 742 (1998). This Court granted appellants' petition for a writ of certiorari on the following question: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that OCGA § 11-3-118(b) applies even to claims which had expired before its effective date? See Brown v. Brown, 269 Ga. 724(2), 506 S.E.2d 108 (1998). Compare Hunter v. Johnson, 259 Ga. 21, 376 S.E.2d 371 (1989); Hollingsworth v. Hubbard, 184 Ga.App. 121, 361 S.E.2d 12 (1987). Appellants argue that OCGA § 11-3-118 should not be applied retroactively to revive Wilson's previously time-barred claim....
...demonstrates an intent by the legislature for retroactive application. Canton Textile Mills v. Lathem, 253 Ga. 102, 103, 317 S.E.2d 189 (1984). In Johnson v. Hodge, 223 Ga.App. 227, 229, 477 S.E.2d 385 (1996), the Court of Appeals observed that OCGA § 11-3-118 contains no legislative language requiring retroactive application. Wilson does not dispute the principle that legislative intent must be clear before a statute is applied retroactively. Instead, Wilson contends that OCGA § 11-3-118 was not retroactively applied because her action was filed after the statute's effective date, even though her action was time-barred at the time the statute was enacted....
...Our holding is only that the legislature did not intend the application of the new statute of limitation at issue here to be retroactive, not that the legislature could not provide for retroactive application if it chose to do so. Since this action was barred under OCGA § 11-3-122(1)(b) at the time OCGA § 11-3-118 was amended and there is no evidence that the legislature intended OCGA § 11-3-118 to operate retroactively, the ruling of the Court of Appeals must be reversed....