O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 11-3-409 (2019)

Acceptance of draft; certified check

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) “Acceptance” means the drawee’s signed agreement to pay a draft as presented. It must be written on the draft and may consist of the drawee’s signature alone. Acceptance may be made at any time and becomes effective when notification pursuant to instructions is given or the accepted draft is delivered for the purpose of giving rights on the acceptance to any person. (b) A draft may be accepted although it has not been signed by the drawer, is otherwise incomplete, is overdue, or has been dishonored. (c) If a draft is payable at a fixed period after sight and the acceptor fails to date the acceptance, the holder may complete the acceptance by supplying a date in good faith. (d) “Certified check” means a check accepted by the bank on which it is drawn. Acceptance may be made as stated in subsection (a) of this Code section or by a writing on the check which indicates that the check is certified. The drawee of a check has no obligation to certify the check, and refusal to certify is not dishonor of the check.

History

Code 1981, § 11-3-409, enacted by Ga. L. 1996, p. 1306, § 3.

Annotations

Cross references. Certain misdemeanors of directors, offi-

cers, agents, and employees of financial institutions,, § 7-1-843.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS ANALYSIS GENERAL CONSIDERATION. CERTIFIED CLERKS CERTIFICATION WITHOUT ENDORSEMENT General Consideration. Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, deci-

sions under former Code 1933, §§ 141101, 14-1705, 14-1706, 109A-3-410, 109A-3-411, and 109A-4-303 and former

General Consideration (Cont’d) Code Sections 11-3-410 and 11-3-411 are included in the annotations for this Code section. Consideration given official comments. - This section was adopted verbatim from § 3-410 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and the legislature had benefit of drafter’s interpretation when it enacted this statute; therefore, due consideration should be given official comments as the court cannot say that legislature intended something else. Roswell Bank v. Atlanta Util. Works, Inc., 149 Ga. App. 660, 255 S.E.2d 124, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 1972 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 109A-3-410). Acceptance of check by means of telephone conversation cannot be effective because law requires that acceptance be in writing. Georgia Bank & Trust Co. v. Hadarits, 111 Ga. App. 195, 141 S.E.2d 172, 1965 Ga. App. LEXIS 919, rev’d, 221 Ga. 125, 143 S.E.2d 627, 1965 Ga. LEXIS 397 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 14-1101). Place and form of drawee’s signature of acceptance. - Official comments to § 3-410 of the Uniform Commercial Code (this section) include statement that “[c]ustomarily the signature is written vertically across the face of the instrument; but since the drawee has no reason to sign for any other purpose his signature in any other place, even on the back of the instrument, is sufficient.” Roswell Bank v. Atlanta Util. Works, Inc., 149 Ga. App. 660, 255 S.E.2d 124, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 1972 (1979) (decided under former Code Section 11-3-410). A petition must allege written acceptance of draft to set forth a cause of action based upon acceptance. Bank of Augusta v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 110 Ga. App. 231, 138 S.E.2d 191, 1964 Ga. App. LEXIS 579 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 14-1101). Certified Clerks Act of having check certified constitutes acceptance of payment under terms specified on check. Kersh v. Manis Whsle. Co., 135 Ga. App. 943, 219 S.E.2d

604, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1881 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 109A3-411). Payee bound by check’s notations. - In obtaining certification of check, payee accepts and is bound by notations already on it, such as that payee releases claims against drawer and another person. Kersh v. Manis Whsle. Co., 135 Ga. App. 943, 219 S.E.2d 604, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1881 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 109A-3-411). Bank draft does not operate as assignment of funds, as does certified check, or cashier’s check, or bank money order, which are considered to be notes carrying unconditional promises to pay. Fulton Nat’l Bank v. Delco Corp., 128 Ga. App. 16, 195 S.E.2d 455, 1973 Ga. App. LEXIS 1366 (1973) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 109A-3-403 and 109A-3411). Release of drawer upon certification. - Where a check, at instance of payee, is certified by bank upon which it is drawn, the bank becomes solely responsible, and the drawer is discharged from liability. McIntire v. Raskin, 42 Ga. App. 303, 155 S.E. 799, 1930 Ga. App. LEXIS 375 (1930), rev’d, 173 Ga. 746, 161 S.E. 363, 1931 Ga. LEXIS 393 (1931) (decided under former Code 1933, § 14-1706). If check is certified at instance of payee, bank then becomes absolute debtor of holder, drawers are released, and check is regarded as paid as between the drawers and holder. Since such certification operates as immediate payment from funds of drawer, it deprives payee of right to order payment stopped. Kersh v. Manis Whsle. Co., 135 Ga. App. 943, 219 S.E.2d 604, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1881 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 109A-3-411). Drawer procuring certification prior to delivery. - Where the drawer, before delivery of the check, personally procures the certification of the check by the bank upon which it is drawn; prior to its delivery, the relations, duties, and obligations between the drawer and the payee remain the same, but after its delivery, the bank becomes primarily liable, while the liability of the drawer becomes secondary. McIntire v. Raskin, 42 Ga. App.

303, 155 S.E. 799, 1930 Ga. App. LEXIS 375 (1930), rev’d, 173 Ga. 746, 161 S.E. 363, 1931 Ga. LEXIS 393 (1931) (decided under former Code 1933, § 14-1706). Certification of check for lump-sum alimony payment. - Certification of check for lump-sum alimony payment by bank at instance of wife amounted to payment of check as to all parties except her and the bank and resulted in settlement of judgment for alimony, and having accepted amount awarded, she was estopped, while retaining it, from further prosecuting her petition to set aside decree of divorce as contained in same judgment. Thompson v. Thompson, 203 Ga. 128, 45 S.E.2d 632, 1947 Ga. LEXIS 581 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 14-1705 and 14-1706). Where there was judgment pursuant to alimony agreement which sum husband paid to wife’s attorney, and attorney then

delivered to her his own check in settlement and that check at her instance was certified by a bank, certification amounted to payment of check as to all parties except her and the bank, and resulted in settlement of judgment for alimony. Kersh v. Manis Whsle. Co., 135 Ga. App. 943, 219 S.E.2d 604, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1881 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 109A-3-411). Certification Without Endorsement Drawer released by certification without endorsement. - Where payee certifies check and receives payment, drawer is released even though release on check provided for both “acceptance and endorsement” and payee failed to sign or endorse check. Kersh v. Manis Whsle. Co., 135 Ga. App. 943, 219 S.E.2d 604, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1881 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 109A-3-411).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 10 Am. Jur. 2d, Banks and Financial Institutions, §§ 577, 588, 590, 591, 600, 602, 643. 11 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, §§ 212, 381 et seq. 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, §§ 456, 457, 671. 50 Am. Jur. 2d, Letters of Credit, and Credit Cards, § 3. 60 Am. Jur. 2d, Payment, § 64. 72 Am. Jur. 2d, Statute of Frauds, § 154. C.J.S. 3A C.J.S., Alteration of Instruments, § 62 et seq. 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes, §§ 37, 160, 231, 242. U.L.A. Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 3409. ALR. Effect of certification of check upon presentment by one other than the owner or drawer, 12 A.L.R. 992. Acceptance of renewal note made or endorsed by personal representative of obligor in original paper as payment or novation of that paper, 12 A.L.R. 1546. Rights and liabilities of bank with respect to certified check or draft fraudulently altered, 22 A.L.R. 1157. What amounts to acceptance extrinsic to check, 26 A.L.R. 312. Effect of notice to drawee bank of claim

of lien on check payable to another, 42 A.L.R. 625. Delay in presenting certified or accepted check for payment as affecting liability of drawee bank, 42 A.L.R. 1138. Drawee’s mere writing of his name on bill as an acceptance thereof, 48 A.L.R. 760. Check on bank as payment of debts held by bank for collection, 65 A.L.R. 1151. Bank deposit for purpose of meeting certain checks or classes of checks, 86 A.L.R. 375. Meaning of term “accepted” as used in that provision of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act (§ 115, subd. 3) which dispenses with notice of dishonor to indorser where instrument was made or accepted for his accommodation, 90 A.L.R. 218; 129 A.L.R. 426. Lost or stolen travelers’ checks, 110 A.L.R. 976. Drawee bank’s certification of check as an admission of genuineness of drawer’s signature, 110 A.L.R. 1109. Avoidance of bank’s check certification secured by fraud, 100 A.L.R.2d 1197. Provision in draft or note directing payment “on acceptance” as affecting negotiability, 19 A.L.R.4th 1268.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 7 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1983–2022 · leading case: Tidwell v. Atlanta Gas Light Co. (In Re Georgia Steel, Inc.), 38 B.R. 829 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984).
Tidwell v. Atlanta Gas Light Co. (In Re Georgia Steel, Inc.), 38 B.R. 829 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984). · cites it 2× “” O.C.G.A. § 11-3-409(1) (Michie 1982) provides: “A check or other draft does not of itself operate as an assignment of any funds in the hands of the drawee available for its payment, and the drawee is not liable on the instrument until he accepts it.”
Green Prop. Corp. v. O'callaghan, Saunders & Stumm, Pc, 340 S.E.2d 652 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 4× “does not of itself operate as an assignment of any funds in the hands of the drawee available for its payment, and the drawee is not liable on the instrument until he accepts it.” Appellant argues that apart from the UCC, NBG is liable because appellant sued to recover not the…”
Weldon v. Trust Co. Bank of Columbus, N.A., 499 S.E.2d 393 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 4× “3 OCGA § 11-3-409 (1). 4 Id. 5 OCGA § 11-4-213 (1) (a).”
Harris v. Harbin Lumber Co. of Royston (In Re Ellison), 31 B.R. 545 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983). “§ 11-3-409(1) (Michie 1982); Lambeth v. Lewis, 114 Ga.”
Georgia Casulaty & Sur. Co. v. Tennille Banking Co. (In Re Smith), 51 B.R. 904 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1985). · cites it 2× “” O.C.G.A. § 11-3-409(1) (Michie 1982). Defendant owed no affirmative duty to the auction companies to pay the checks unless it accepted the checks 5 or special circumstances warranted payment, such as a special deposit.”
Moxie Capital, LLC v. Delmont 21, LLC (Ga. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 11-3-409 (d). As such, a certified check clearly falls within the more general definition of “check” set forth in OCGA § 11-3-104 (f) (defining “check” to include “a draft, other than a documentary draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank”).”
Whooping Creek Constr., LLC v. Bartow Cnty. Bank, 713 S.E.2d 871 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 2× “As we stated in Green, “[t]he decision in Stewart is based upon a provision of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), OCGA § 11-3-409 (1) [now OCGA § 11-3-408] which reads in pertinent part: ‘A check .”
— 11-3-409(1) — 3 cases
Tidwell v. Atlanta Gas Light Co. (In Re Georgia Steel, Inc.), 38 B.R. 829 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984). “” O.C.G.A. § 11-3-409(1) (Michie 1982) provides: “A check or other draft does not of itself operate as an assignment of any funds in the hands of the drawee available for its payment, and the drawee is not liable on the instrument until he accepts it.”
Harris v. Harbin Lumber Co. of Royston (In Re Ellison), 31 B.R. 545 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983). “§ 11-3-409(1) (Michie 1982); Lambeth v. Lewis, 114 Ga.”
Georgia Casulaty & Sur. Co. v. Tennille Banking Co. (In Re Smith), 51 B.R. 904 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1985). “” O.C.G.A. § 11-3-409(1) (Michie 1982). Defendant owed no affirmative duty to the auction companies to pay the checks unless it accepted the checks 5 or special circumstances warranted payment, such as a special deposit.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.