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Call Now: 904-383-7448This article may be cited as "Uniform Commercial Code - Secured Transactions."
(Code 1981, §11-9-101, enacted by Ga. L. 2001, p. 362, § 1.)
- For comment, "Electronic Self-Help Repossession and You: A Computer Software Vendor's Guide to Staying Out of Jail," see 48 Emory L.J. 1477 (1999).
- 68A Am. Jur. 2d, Secured Transactions, § 123 et seq.
Violation of the Truth-In-Lending Act and Regulation Z, 73 POF3d 275.
- 6A C.J.S., Assignments, §§ 82, 87. 8 C.J.S., Bailments, § 42. 14 C.J.S., Chattel Mortgages, §§ 2, 311 et seq. 35 C.J.S., Factors, § 46 et seq. 53 C.J.S., Liens, § 2 et seq. 72 C.J.S., Pledges, §§ 5, 43 et seq.
- Uniform Commercial Code (U.L.A.) § 9-101.
- What constitutes Truth in Lending Act violation which "was not intentional and resulted from bona fide error not withstanding maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error" within meaning of § 130(c) of Act (15 USCA § 1640(c)), 153 A.L.R. Fed. 193.
Consignment transactions under Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 on secured transactions, 58 A.L.R.6th 289.
Total Results: 17
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2022-03-02T00:00:00-08:00
Snippet: and containing a description of the collateral; (2) the secured party has given value to the 12 OCGA § 44-14-470 (b). 13 (Emphasis added.) Id. 14 See OCGA § 44-14-471. 15 OCGA § 11-9-101 et seq. 7 debtor; and (3) the debtor has ‘rights’ in the collateral.”16 Article 9 does not, however, “apply to the extent that . . . [a]nother statute of this state expressly governs the creation, perfection
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2018-04-16T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 813 S.E.2d 610
Snippet: state and county where the original sale took place, or the state and county where the motor vehicle was repossessed, or the state and county of the buyer's residence, at the seller's election. (c) This Code section is cumulative of [OCGA § 11-9-101 et seq. ] and provides cumulative additional rights and remedies which must be fulfilled before any deficiency claim will lie against a buyer, and nothing herein shall be deemed to repeal said part.
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2015-11-23T00:00:00-08:00
Citation: 335 Ga. App. 344, 780 S.E.2d 793
Snippet: that creates a ‘security interest’ in the lender” and refer to Article 9. See OCGA § 40-3-5; Almand, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 1365. Accordingly, Venable’s contract is controlled by Article 9 (“Uniform Commercial Code - Secured Transactions”; see OCGA § 11-9-101). See OCGA § 11-9-109 (1). It follows that the proper limitation period applicable to Venable’s contract is the six-year statute of limitation codified at OCGA § 9-3-24. The majority’s reliance upon dicta from All Tech Co. v. Laimer Unicon
Court: Ga. | Date Filed: 2015-06-15T00:00:00-07:00
Snippet: . . was correct and affirm.’” Barnwell v. TPCII, LLC, 295 Ga. 153, 154 (758 SE2d 281) (2014) (citations omitted). 3. Tafel next contends that the “Race Car Loan Agreement” is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), see OCGA § 11-9-101 et seq., and that the trial court erred by not ruling that, under the UCC, when Lion Antique retained the race cars instead of immediately selling them, it accepted the race cars in satisfaction of the judgment. Tafel, however, did not raise this
Court: Ga. | Date Filed: 2015-06-15T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 297 Ga. 334, 773 S.E.2d 743, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 443
Snippet: was correct and affirm.’ ” Barnwell v. TPCII, LLC, 295 Ga. 153, 154 (758 SE2d 281) (2014) (citations omitted). 3. Tafel next contends that the “Race Car Loan Agreement” is governedbythe Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), see OCGA § 11-9-101 et seq., and that the trial court erred by not ruling that, under the UCC, when Lion Antique retained the race cars instead of immediately selling them, it accepted the race cars in satisfaction of the judgment. Tafel, however, did not raise this
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2010-07-21T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 699 S.E.2d 767, 305 Ga. App. 332, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 2646
Snippet: for debt, the State must prove fraudulent intent. The statute cannot properly be employed in the enforcement of civil contract rights.") (citation omitted). [4] Quinn v. State, 171 Ga.App. 590, 594(9)(a), 320 S.E.2d 827 (1984). [5] See OCGA §§ 11-9-101 et seq. (Uniform Commercial Code, Secured Transactions); 44-14-30 et seq. (Mortgages, Conveyances to Secure Debt, and Liens). [6] Ellis v. Brookwood Park Venture, 161 Ga.App. 242, 243, 288 S.E.2d 308 (1982) ("An implicit contractual provision exists
Court: Ga. | Date Filed: 2004-06-07T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 597 S.E.2d 367, 278 Ga. 52, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 1875
Snippet: and the Georgia bankruptcy courts,[6] we hold that ownership of such collateral does not pass to a creditor upon repossession for nonpayment under an installment loan sales contract. Revised Article 9 of the Georgia Uniform Commercial Code (OCGA § 11-9-101 et seq.) governs our analysis.[7] The UCC's statutory framework makes clear that repossession alone is not enough to extinguish the debtor's ownership in the collateral, but that a creditor must go through additional steps after repossession to obtain
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 1996-03-08T00:00:00-08:00
Citation: 470 S.E.2d 256, 220 Ga. App. 803, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 1129
Snippet: not subject to personal property foreclosure. Except for mobile homes permanently attached to realty, mobile homes are personal property, not real property, and are governed by OCGA § 40-3-1, the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act and OCGA § 11-9-101, the Uniform Commercial Code. See Wooden v. Michigan Natl. Bank, 117 Ga.App. 852, 162 S.E.2d 222 (1968). Although Zelinski claims that the mobile home served as his principal residence and that he was required by the terms of the loan agreement to
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 1993-07-16T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 434 S.E.2d 571, 209 Ga. App. 595, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 997
Snippet: verdict in favor of CCC as to the commercial reasonableness of the disposition of the collateral, with the issue of damages remaining for jury determination. This ruling is enumerated as error. The Uniform Commercial Code Secured Transactions, OCGA § 11-9-101 et seq., provides the framework for any recovery of the balance of the purchase price after a secured party has repossessed and disposed of collateral securing the debt. Pursuant to OCGA § 11-9-504, a secured party after default may sell, lease,
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 1988-06-28T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 371 S.E.2d 146, 187 Ga. App. 676, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1187
Snippet: plaintiff failed to renew by paying the weekly rental and defendant repossessed the washing machine. Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that the contract between the parties is covered by the Uniform Commercial Code — Secured Transactions, OCGA § 11-9-101 et seq., and that defendant converted her washing machine by failing to comply with certain provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code — Secured Transactions, particularly OCGA § 11-9-504 et seq. Defendant contends that the contract is a “true lease”
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 1987-09-08T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 360 S.E.2d 633, 184 Ga. App. 64, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2751
Snippet: and intentionally concealing the tools. He contends that no valid security interest in the tools was created, because the State failed to produce any security agreement that complied with the Uniform Commercial Code Secured Transactions. OCGA § 11-9-101 et seq. Pretermitting the question of whether a valid security interest *66 was created, the State presented no evidence that appellant endangered the security interest by unlawfully, knowingly, wilfully and intentionally concealing the tools in
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 1987-04-01T00:00:00-08:00
Citation: 355 S.E.2d 733, 182 Ga. App. 418
Snippet: 134 Ga. App. 73 (213 SE2d 175) (1975). *419 Appellant argues that the signature card contract creates a security interest and lien rather than the right of set-off, thereby requiring adherence to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, OCGA § 11-9-101 et seq. Appellant is correct in its assertion that a security interest differs from a right of set-off: "`[a] right of set-off is not a security interest ... A bank's right to set-off against a depositor's account is often loosely referred to as
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 1986-09-02T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 348 S.E.2d 713, 180 Ga. App. 171, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2097
Snippet: the amount for which the realty was sold. Reliance on Reeves, supra, is misplaced as to the foreclosure sale of Mr. Fraser's realty under power of sale. The statute at issue in Reeves was OCGA § 11-9-504 (3). That statute is a provision of OCGA § 11-9-101 et seq., which comprises the Secured Transactions Article of our Uniform Commercial Code. Nothing in that Secured Transaction Article applies "to the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real estate, including a lease or rents thereunder
Court: Ga. | Date Filed: 1986-05-07T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 342 S.E.2d 671, 255 Ga. 718
Snippet: Appeals. This case comes to us upon certified questions submitted by the Court of Appeals in regard to the efficacy of the appellant's waiver of notice. The "Uniform Commercial Code Secured Transactions" is found at Chapter 9 of OCGA Title 11. OCGA § 11-9-101 et seq. The provisions concerning default are found in Part 5. OCGA § 11-9-501 et seq. OCGA § 11-9-504 (1) provides that after default a secured party may sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of the collateral. OCGA § 11-9-504 (3) generally requires
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 1984-09-05T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 322 S.E.2d 67, 172 Ga. App. 19, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 1840
Snippet: lessor] to be made at the expiration of the lease. Nowhere therein can it be construed that the parties contemplated a sale, an option to purchase, or creation of a security interest. [Cits.] Thus, Article 9 of Title 109A of the Code [now OCGA § 11-9-101 et seq.] does not apply and the parties' conduct is governed by the terms of the lease, which do not require the sale of the equipment upon default, nor for the credit of proceeds of such a sale against appellant's indebtedness. That the appellee
Court: Ga. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 1983-09-06T00:00:00-07:00
Citation: 308 S.E.2d 199, 168 Ga. App. 83, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 3374
Snippet: F2d 574 (5th Cir. 1970); Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 371 F2d 462 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Kane v. First Nat. Bank, 56 F2d 534 (5th Cir. 1932). Whether or not the surety has made a filing pursuant to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (OCGA § 11-9-101 et seq. (Code Ann. § 109A-9-101 et seq.)) is of no consequence, as the relevant Code sections are intended to preserve *86 and protect the surety's right of subrogation. Pembroke State Bank v. Balboa Ins. Co., 144 Ga. App. 609 (241 SE2d 483) (1978);
Court: N.D. Ga. | Date Filed: 1983-02-24T00:00:00-08:00
Citation: 28 B.R. 383, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 1625
Snippet: payable to the SBA. The execution of the Guaranty was effective to create a security interest in cash proceeds from the sale of Mr. Peavy's residence under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Georgia. Official Code of Ga.Ann. §§ 11-9-101, et seq. (Michie 1982), Ga.Code Ann. §§ 109A-9-101 et seq. (Harrison 1979). (Language in the Guaranty was insufficient to create a security interest in the residence itself since transfers of interests in real property are expressly excluded from